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Psychology ana the Trinity have always enjoyed closs relations. Their ir.tio.ate
connection goes back to St. Augustine's Tie i.rinitat;e. a book which not only give the
first classical expression of the boctrine of the Trinity, but also laia the founuations
of introspective psychology. In recent times, many writers on the Trinity have employed- a
psychological theory of personality as their basis i or understanding the ue Lty. «.ost ox'1
these, however, have relied on the oluer type of functional psychology ana have employed1
it in an analogical manner; selaom have they venture^, to take account of the psychouyr jaic
theories of personality structure as developed by V'reua ana his followers.
The present enquiry undertakes to relate the more recent theories oi psychoaynaoi.cs
to the i' uunaation of the aoctrine, rather than tv the uoctrine itself. Our reason . or
this proceaure is that we claim that psychodyiimnics were involved in both the a ounuations
and the developments if the doctrine; to consider both of thuse would involve covering
too much ground, so we have com inea our study to the fiPunaations with few references to
the actual aoctrine.
Although the inter-relation of the two disciplines is not new, our metnoa is new, in
that psychodynamics are regarded as participating within what has been poatulateu oy theol
-ogy as "revelation", as a component, part. Psychoaynaaacs is a more difficult discipline
to handle than the older psychology, largely because of its claim to reduce theology una
religious practices to psychological categories. Theology's position has oeen equally
defensive as psychoayanmics has been threatening ana ox •©nsive, by its claim that Revelat¬
ion is immune from such criticism as psycbooynaaics would make, touch work has nod to be
done , therefore, to prepare the two ciscipiine3 for encounter. «.e have also sought to
take into account the more recent developments in New Testament studies emanating largely
from Bultmann, ana Ramsey's concept of models has been found to be of great service
throughout the enquiry.
The contents of the enquiry are as follows. An Introduction indicates the problems
Af
relating to bringing~t© two disciplines into an encounter^ Part One is concerned with
detailing the vafcous psychodynamic theories which will be employed in the central study.
Use other side if necessary.
¥'reuG*» position is inaieateG largely «itbout cogent. »e then folio* with tk a*velopA«nt
» Freuti«s work by keltuiie Ueinj the position of esoaera Freudians ( .innicott, Anna J reud,
brlk.H, Lrikson ana sdith Jacobean), ana the restructuring of froaa's theories by i air*
bairn, as develop® by Juntrip, are eonsiaereG) the JkXistentiuli.it protest over against
the '-"reuGian position is stated} finally we present the standpoint of bang, 'these chapters
ineiuoe specific comments tnu criticises. A final chapter which usla with psycboaynamic
theories in relation to their logical otatus, particularly reuolan foitiulationa, erne
Part One.
The soconh iart of the hncuiry, »hieh is the central section, is aiviueo into
three sections, The first relates the iuoas of suj^rego atiu &socothei<tBi| it examinee i reuu*
inn claims} .it outxinee c Jhtetapoiury Ola Testament studies, -hica in turn leads to a
detailed consideration of revelation, followed by one on reduction. It onus with a otaay oi
key passvigee in the 'Ola Testament.
The decone .Action of Part Two considers the relation of the concept o> the o*,irii
in Acripturn to that of the iG or unconscious in psychouyn-Aiica. A sfcuuy oi the Spirit in
the i&fele is incluGeG} a Gets ilea examination oi the la or Unconscious una its implication*
follows} a fresh stuuy oi' relevant passages in the few Testament, with special reierenco t<
St. Paul, enoe this section.
The * hi £U Section eonsiGera the fact o: Jesus the son ana PayshoaytK-soies, -uoh
attest ion is given here to contemporary studies oi the Jospels, incluuing the "new < ueat"
of the bistorliml Jesus, SulUoann's ueuythologiaing pragruaase «*nu eubsetuent stuuies,
Poyoho&ynmde criticues of Jesus Christ are also oonaiuereG, l'he part playeu oy psyctaeuyisr
uaicc in Christologioal developments clears the «ay for a fresh consideration of the
historical Jesus, in which key gospel passages are examined,
fiie Tbiru .art of the enquiry ie very much in the nature of a Coua. After consio*
©ring four representative theories of the Trinity ( ourth, Augustine, ..ren mrsis ana Jung)
we give a sousery of our own encuiiy, which leads to suggestions being offere* as to the
psyefeoaymjoics operating in the doctrine itself, -ana we suggested how it ooulG be employed
in a functional manner as a psyebothapeatio concept, o ooncluueG that Arinifcur*ac oxpori-
enee is i unaamental ana that peychoGy^ssdoe afford the principal clue to this fact,
ihe logiane who may not express their auherence to the aoctrine my nevertheless exhicit
in their writing true Trinitarian faith, as the uoetrlne is bated on experience, (e.g.
Schleieraacher) anc that in the -empirical fit" of the experience, we lino the principle
clue to the doctrine.
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PREFACE
The following enquiry has been undertaken while I have
been employed as a Parish Minister in a down-town city church,
and part of the time I was undergoing training as a psycho¬
therapist at the Davidson Clinic, Edinburgh. Without the
stimulus provided by these two situations this study would
never have been written.
It had its origin in fact at a psychotherapeutic group of
which the writer was a member, in which I expressed the content¬
ion that the relationship bet\ireen the psychic structure and the
Doctrine of the Trinity was very close indeed. One of the group,
the late Rev* Ian Ireland, suggested that this might form the
basis of a Ph.D. thesis,
In the early stages I was much encouraged to undertake this
work by both Professor J.A. Whyte of St Andrews and Professor
Ian T. Ramsey of Oxford, who is now The Lord Bishop of Durham,
the latter having continued to help and encourage throughout.
Edinburgh University in accepting my application to undertake
the writing of a thesis on the subject of the Trinity provided
me with a trinity of supervisors, Professor John Mclntyre,
Professor Ronald Hepburn and Dr* Boris Semeonoff, Each one has
spent time and given me every attention throughout the writing
of the work, I would also like to thank others who have assisted
me. The late Dr. Jean Biggar, my analyst, and Dr, Winifred Rush-
forth, my supervisor at the Davidson Clinic, both gave me
X
tremendous help in understanding the schools of psychodynaraics
and myself as well! Dr. R.S. Lee of Oxford and Dr. Winnicott
both set me on to enquiries which have proved most fruitful,
and my psychiatrist friends, Dr. Eric Wood and Dr. Douglas
Haldane have both been willing to spend time and discuss
certain difficulties with me, which has helped to clear ray mind
on many matters,
I would also wish to thank Mr Indrasen Indulkar for the
diagrams included in the text} for Dr. G.W, Spink, the organist
of my church, for reading the copies and correcting not only
the proofs but removing many infelicities of style, and for
Mrs Bakker who has brought order and coherence out of the
palimpsest which I presented to her for typing. Finally, I must
thank my wife and family who have had to do without me so much.
St Bride's Manse, Edinburgh.
March 1968 J.R.W.
INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THE ENQUIRY
"It is.♦the duty of theologians in every age
to soak themselves as far as they can in the
thought of their own times and thus imbued to
approach again the record of those events,
seeking whatever fresh ligli God wills to break
forth upon them and has been training them to
see. "^
To "soak oneself" in all the thought of one's times is an
impossibility. There is so much thought that one has to be
selective. The writer of this enquiry, however, has endeavour¬
ed to "soak himself" in one specific aspect of contemporary
thought, namely psychodynamics with its corresponding practice
of psychotherapy.
"Psychotherapy" is a branch of psychology. This term is
preferred to the more usual one of psychoanalysis, which refers
more exclusively to the Freudian school. The word "psychoanalysis"
is used, however, by Freudians both for the practice of their
form of psychotherapy, and for the various dogmas which have been
produced from that practice, particularly those first set out
by Freud. We shall use the terra "psychotherapy" for the practice
or treatment} we shall, however, employ the terra "psychodynamics"
not only to refer to assumed or inferred dynamic processes in
1. Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, p.36
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tlie mind, but also as a term to cover the various dogmas and
structural hypotheses which have arisen from the various
schools of "depth psychology". We realise that to some the use
of the term involves an extension to its normal functioning;
we prefer it, however, to "depth psychology" or any other term.
To those trained in academic or experimental psychology,
this branch of study is not considered as "scientific". In fact,
modern psychology is a "house divided " in a way similar to
modern philosophy. The condition of the latter has been described
by John Macmurray"*" where he notes that the two main forms of
philosophizing which have emerged after the breakdown of the
traditional systems are Logical Empiricism and Existentialism;
the former discards the problems in order to retain the method,
while the latter relinquishes the method in wrestling with the
problems. A similar state exists in psychology today. Academic
psychology and experimental psychology are wedded to the scienti¬
fic system, concentrating on behaviour; psychodynamics has depart¬
ed from that system in order to cope with the human problem.
It uses various sets of concepts, sometimes scientifically
unproved, and sometimes even scientifically unprovable, as
sustaining- facts behind the practice of psychotherapy, in order
to bring some measure of understanding to the phenomena, impart¬
ing intuitions and insights which academic and experimental
psychology could not and would never claim to give.
1. John Macmurray, The Self as Agent, p. 27-8
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This enquiry, however, is concerned with theology, or
rather with the foundations of one doctrine of the Christian
Faith, namely the Doctrine of the Trinity. It is intended as a
radical enquiry. By 'Radical" I would adopt the definition given
to the word by Bishop J.A.T. Robinson ^ where the word is defined
in relation to one who is "concerned to go to the roots of the
creed or code than merely to restate them (like the reformer)
or to abolish them (like the revolutionary,)" Dr. Robinson goes
on to say that radical theology asks how far the projection of a
supernatural God is really necessary. However, he does state that
radical theology is not concerned with reducing or changing the
reality, but with re-locating it "so that it can come to men again
in and through the vital connections of life rather than over and
2
above them." It is our belief that there is no discipline
better qualified to undertake this task than that of psycho-
dynamics, for it is concerned with understanding and describing
man's psyche, "the vital connections of life."
Why then is re-location necessary? Simply because the
doctrines of the Church, and in particular, that of Christ's
person and the Trinity, were worked out in an age which was
dominated by ontology and metaphysics, and they no longer form
categories in which contemporary thought is cast.
1. J.A.T, Robinson, Correspondence Column, The Observer,
Sunday, December kf 1966
2. ibid.
A popular exposition of this new point is that of Cornelius
van Peursen who divides man's understanding of the nature of
reality into three basic stages. The first stage is the period
of myth in \>rhich man and reality, subject and object are fused.
In the "mythical" stage, man is merged into the world of things.
The second stage is the "ontological" one, where man places
himself in relation to the world: the two are distanced and
separated. Natural is set over against the supernatural} the
profane over against the sacred. God and ethical values are
given ontological status as isolated substances and "things
in themselves", existing outside of reality and over against it.
There is, however, a third stage, to which van Peursen gives the
name of "functional", where the metaphysical, ontological
understanding of the world is no longer necessary, for man
controls and understands the world functionally. This is the
stage in which, he claims, we are at present.
All such categorizations are wide open to criticism. Even
if their aim is to abolish metaphysics, they are themselves a
form of metaphysics! It is to be noted, however, that before
van Peursen, Freud himself, in Totem and Taboo.^p. 93) divided
man's \iray of thinking into three stages: animistic, religious
and scientific, which are not unlike those of van Peursen. It
is also possible to see in this categorization of van Peursen
a parallel with the various stages in human development, from
1. Cornelius van Peursen, Man and Reality - the History of
Human Thought in The Student World. No. i. p. 13
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that of symbiosis of mother and child, to the stage in which
subject and object are differentiated and set over one against
the other, to the final stage of mature interdependence.
If, however, we deal only with the second and third stages,
we could say that the second one was a period to which the word
"projectionist" could be applied; the third period is one in
which man has no need of his projections and has recalled them,
re-introjecting them and putting them back to where they belong,
in the Unconscious mind.
This is, however, anticipating our arguments in the enqtiiry
where the above and other similar statements will be spelled out.
At the moment, we would draw attention to the fact that not only
from popular writers like Robinson and van Peursen, but from many
quarters there have been calls to re-interpret the faith. Even
such a careful, middle-of-the-road theologian as John Baillie,
in his Gifford Lectures explains how the use of Greek metaphysics
helped to interpret the Christian faith and its implications for
the age in which the interpretation was undertaken; but that it
made the faith appear to be too much an affair of the intellect,
as if it were in its own essence a metaphysical system. Baillie
regards the Trinity as a doctrine much needing interpretation,
as the thought forms in which it was expressed were satisfactory
and indeed assimilable for that age, but useless today.^ He also
added that metaphysics form no part of man's thinking, except in
1. John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God, p. 15^-5
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Christian preaching!"'' Baillie therefore saw the continuing use
of metaphysics as the reason why a good many Christians in the
last century renounced the Christian faith for truth's sake.
It is quite clear that Baillie•s protest is a valid one, for
this procedure meant that one must first understand and embrace
metaphysics before one can understand theology.
Before Baillie, however, Schleiermacher prophesied con¬
cerning the doctrine of the Trinity} "There must still be in
store for it a transformation which will go back to its very
2
beginnings..." Perhaps this enquiry may contribute towards the
fulfilment of Schleiermacher's prophecy, for we shall be con¬
cerned not so much with the doctrine of the Trinity itself, but
with the foundations of that doctrine, "its very beginnings".
Our study will barely consider the contribution of Greek
metaphysics to the dogma, for our primary concern is with the
foundations of the dogma in the Bible itself; we would, however,
draw attention to the fact that the Bible also bears witness to
that ontological outlook to which van Peursen draws our attention.
I believe that before the Bible can be used in our times as a
basis for theologizing, as it must be, some prior adjustments
need to be undertaken. All the various forms of criticism have to
be undertaken including Bultmann's demythologizing programme.
In addition to these I would add other adjustments, such as a
1. John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God, p. 15^-5
2, F, Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 172
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change in orientation from the projectionist outlook of script¬
ure to a more introjected way of understanding the material,
which may help to bring about that change of location, of which.
J.A*T* Robinson wrote* The Bible, we find, seldom speaks of the
mind of man and its activities: this cannot be regarded as a
God-given precedent for all time, but rather as an indication of
the dominant ways of thinking of the ages and cultural thought-
forms in which it was produced* It does not follow that because
the Bible has little or no concern for psychological matters,
neither should we, in our age, exhibit these tendencies. Our
failure to find in the Bible the kind of psychological material
which we in our age take for granted is due to the particular
slanting or orientation of the culture of the ages, and is perhaps
also due to the existence of one single omnibus concept which
covered much of the phenomena which we would separate out and
give individual significance to - namely "God", It is possible
to produce from the Bible an objective theology of an utterly
transcendent God, but such an outlook may have arisen because
of the practices of those times to describe phenomena in either
a projectionist way or to include them under a universal concept.
In this case the so-called objectivity of God rests on the out¬
look of the times and on the way in which men then described
experienced relationships. The Biblical categories cannot be
applied "holus-bolus" without psychological re-adjustment being
included along with the other forms of criticism* This re¬
orientation or re-location is indispensable for there is no
8
direct line from the actual text of the Bible, the "revelation"
as it is sometimes called, to a dogmatic doctrine of God, To
continue with the metaphor of electricity, transformers of
many kinds must first perform their work before the current
is usable,
Bultmann, as we shall see, transformed the message of the
New Testament into existentialist categories, claiming that
these were pre-theological; prior to all the standpoints is
the nature of being itself, which theology assumes. We would
make a similar claim for psychodynamics, We do not read psycho-
dynamics into the text of the Bible, or by applying it superimpose
foreign ideas upon the scriptures. Therefore we accept and shall
use the first part of Bultmann's demythologizing programme,
but not the second part, of re-mythologizing the Biblical material
into existentialist categories, We shall be content to point to
the psychodynamics in the vital experiences of the Bible, before
proceeding to make theological claims.
The assertion that the Biblical material can be investi¬
gated and comprehended under psychodynamic categories is one
which may be resisted by theologians who regard the subject
matter of theology as outside the sphere of an enquiry such as
this. Even some psychologists work within very limited spheres
of enquiryj
"Psychology is concerned with the psychic effect
of a belief, not with its truth or falsehood, and
this is a limitation which must be accepted if
religion is to be compared to psychotherapy,"1
1, David Cox, Jung and St, Paul, p, 13
There is a truth in the above, if one limits one's study
to psychotherapy on the one hand, and a transcendent God on the
other. I believe, however, that psychodynaraics can be employed
to investigate the foundations of doctrine as in the Scriptures;
moreover, it can say something about origins, because it was
present at the origins! To put the matter another way, the
origins can be investigated in terms of the psychodynamic model
as well as in terms of the theological model.
Such brash confidence, however, must not blind us to the
danger and pitfalls inherent in such an inter-disciplinarian
study as this one. We may, in this connection, cite the following}
1. The first warning is from those who are concerned with
language. Writing of this problem, David Cox, in the study
mentioned above, stated:
"A mistake which is too often made is to think that
one may take a psychological statement and relate it
directly to a theological statement, and it is even
possible for people to string together theological
and psychological phrases and imagine that they have
produced a meaningful sentence. In fact, psychology
and theology use two quite different languages, and
no comparison can be made between statements in the
different languages until one has been 'translated'
into the other, or both have been translated into a
third language,
Cox speaks of the wholly different sets of terms which the
two disciplines use and declares that nothing but harm can be
done by those who unthinkingly compare psychological and religious
2
formulae as though they belonged to the same language.
1. ibid., p.X intro
2. ibid., p. 4
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Cox is careful not to mix the two at any point, even to the extent
of separating the subjects of each discipline into alternate
chapters, with the results that we have the two set side by
side, with points of contact few and far between and so that an
encounter is almost non-existent. This, however, is to be prefer¬
red to the study of H.L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil,
in which a disastrous mixing of terms takes place. For example,
",,,the whole of theMailable energy on the part of the Christian
should not be directed towards individuation.,.but to sanctifi-
cation," (p.106); and again, "The shadow is not simply to be
•assimilated' but sanctified," (ibid,, p.111). One is reminded
here of words of David Jenkins about syntheses of this kinds they
begin with a mixture, go on in a muddle and end in a mess!
Neither position, of Cox or Philp, quoted above is wholly
satisfactory. One writer who has brought the two fields together
with considerable success is Victor White, who xirrites as follows:
"The worker on the boundaries of religion and psychology
must be bi-lingual, and there is no dictionary which
will supply the exact equivalents of the two languages
he must employ. His work will bring him into contact
with two peoples who know remarkably little about one
another, who have seldom shared one another's experi¬
ences, whose respective upbringing and ways of thought
render mutual understanding extremely difficult."
White also writes later on:
"Each speaks a different language; each describes
an observed occurrence from a different viewpoint."
1. Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p. 8
2. ibid., p. 203
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That is to says the same observed occurrence, the same pheno¬
menon is seen in two different ways, according to whichever model is
being applied and in whose terms it is being described. The use
of Ramsey's concept of models enables us to undertake the work
as suggested by White,
2. Throughout the history of Christianity, there have
always been scholars and writers who have sought to relate the
faith in some way to the trends of thought current at their time,
usually as an apologetic for the faith in some form of re-inter¬
pretation, The influence of secular philosophy has seldom been
absent from theology and even in the New Testament there are
obvious borrowings,
"Xt has been the fate or fortune of theological
study to have been forced to absorb into its system ^
the assured results of the other branches of learning,"
John Macquarrie describes these efforts of re-interpretation
by theologians, as an attempt to find a point of entry into "the
contemporary mind in order that they may be able to present the
Christian faith in terms intelligible to their own age. They
therefore make use of current philosophical conceptions when these
2
were drawn from systems of thought quite alien to Christianity,"
Macquarrie goes on to speak of three difficulties or dangers
inherent in such an encounter, (i) Preoccupation with the
secular philosophy and over-emphasis of parts of it may distort
1, H.A, Williams,'Theology and Self-Awareness', Soundings, p.69
2, J, Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.3
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the faith, (ii) Ideas quite alien to the faith may slip into its
theology while masquerading under the guise of traditional
Christian terminology, (iii) A plain accommodation of the
Christian faith to the prevailing philosophical fashion of the
day, i.e., a capitulation of the faith to the "philosophy", as
in "reductionism", in which theology is transformed into anthro¬
pology or psychology, which was the aim of Feuerbach. This study
therefore is no new procedure as all the way through its history
the Christian Church has made use of secular concepts and thereby
risked the charge of being reductionist or of diluting the pure
faith.
3. Whilst these warnings are no doubt necessary, we never¬
theless wish to note that if one states in advance how far one
discipline is to be allowed to illuminate another, honest enquiry
can be inhibited.
"The philosopher's job is to inquire. The £>hilosophical
theologian has only pretended to inquire. His conclusions
are prescribed from the outset.
As we have already indicated, an even worse state can result
when each discipline claims autonomy for itself, sets up bound¬
aries, with the result that the "encounter" is limited to
drawing parallels between the two. If one states in advance how
far psychology, for example, can examine the sacred precincts
of theology, the "charmed circle" of revealed religion which
1. Howard Root, 'Beginning all over again', Soundings. p.k
possesses unchallengeable authority, as Hepburn has wittily
called i#, then no worthwhile conclusions may result. In this
enquiry xtfe will subscribe to no prior "gentleman's agreement"
which xirill inhibit true encounter.
There is a fundamental difficulty in that theology has
always been regarded as being concerned about the being of God,
whereas psychology is concerned with the being of man; they work
in different fields, the former in categories of revelation,
the latter in empirical data, concerning human behaviour, or
mental inferences. As Father Copleston has said, speaking of
Existentialismj "The problem of God cannot be raised on the plane
2
of the phenomenological analysis of man." This challenge will
be taken up at length during the enquiry, particularly when we
face the whole Barthian edifice which rests exclusively on
Revelation. We assert that even in this concept of the wholly-
other the mind of man has played its part. It is our contention
that the foundation of the Trinitarian formulation of the concept
of God has been built out of human experiences, which can be
understood and interrogated from a psychodynamic, as well as
from a theological, viewpoint or model. We cannot possibly
conceive of any "revealed" material which has by-passed the
human psyche.
We deprecate therefore the preservation of a "sacred area"
1. R.W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox, p.6
2. F.C, Copleston, Existentialism and Modern Man, p. 18
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which purports to form the basis of theology, and into which
nothing secular is permitted. Bultmann, in spite of his usual
radical approach to scripture, has surrounded the kerygma with
a protective "fence". Hodgson has done this, not with the
1
kerygroa, but with the revelation itself. We cannot subscribe
to those who would keep certain theological areas absolutely
immune from secular enquiry. Had the Church done this in the
last century - some Christians did and their followers are still
with us - Christianity would still be committed to a pre-
scientific view of Creation based on Genesis regarded as a
scientific text-book; the newer insights resulting from the
critical attitude to the scriptures would not have been avail¬
able for use in the Church.
All these attempts we would explain as the desire to keep
a "gap" for God, an area which is screened off as sacrosanct,
autonomous, free from the erosion of human criticisms and
scientific enquiry. But faith, we hope to show, dictates that
2
we must no longer preserve gaps as anchorage for belief in God,
3
Writing in 1939» John Macmurray claimed that the physical
sciences came first because the material world is less highly
1. L. Hodgson, For Faith and Freedom, p. 86
2. Dietrich Bonhoeffer gets the credit these days for the
"gap for God" notion. However, it appears in J.B. Pratt,
The Religious Consciousness, p.455 f•J and is also found
in Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion,
p,262 f.
3. J. Macmurray, The Boundaries of Science, p.56, 62
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charged with emotion than the field of organic and personal life.
He goes on to say: "A society which can develop a scientific
psychology is a society which has overcome its fear of examin¬
ing its own motives," Would it be fair to indicate that a fear
of examining the phenomena which form the basis of doctrine
under the terms of a psychological model, lies at the ground
of preserving a "gap" for God? This is imputing motives} and
logically it is not necessarily true, as there may be logical
reasons which can be deduced for this procedure. Nevertheless,
we hope to be able to examine without fears of any kind the
material upon which Revelation has been founded, and to see how
far the participation of man himself has been employed in it.
It is our belief that the Trinity as a dogma began as the
Trinity of experience} "God-as-He-is-in-Himself" was first of
all "God-as-He-is-for-us", We will therefore examine the experi¬
ences of the Christians and the Hebrews before them, applying
to these the models of psychodynamic structure} we do this
because we contend that such phenomena can be understood under
psychodynamic as well as under religious models.^ Ramsey's
models, as we have said, will be the means of providing us with
a new method of enquiry along these lines.
If it could be said of this enquiry that it is written in
any tradition, one would wish to point to that of Anglican
1, I.T, Ramsey, Religious Language, p. 27-8
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scholars of the last hundred or so years (with some reservations)
from F.W, Robertson of Brighton to J.A.T, Robinson of Woolwich.
There are certain features to be noted in this tradition. For
example: (i) A certain openness is apparent. F.W. Robertson
regarded the Doctrine of the Trinity as "the sum of all that
knowledge which has as yet been gained by man." He emphasises
the "as yet", because in the future this knowledge may be super¬
seded by higher knowledge. (ii) There is also an emphasis on
2
human participation. Illingworth asserts that personality is the
gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass. Bethune-
3
Baker alloxirs an important place to experience and argues from the
observed facts of human experience of Christian revelation that
led to the formulation of the Doctrine of the Trinity.
(iii) There is also an analogical argument frequently employed,
moving from the personality of man to the personality of God, as
in Stuart McDowell who, using the old functional psychology,
connects conation with the Father, intellect with Sonship and
4
affection with the Holy Spirit. "The Trinity within us is more
than suggestive of the truth that in God, personality is also
A i 5
truine."
1. F.W. Robertson, Sermons on Christian Doctrine, pp.149-163
2. J.R, Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, p. 225
3. J.F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History
of Christian Doctrine, p. 239
4. S, McDox-rell, Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity, p.96-7
5. ibid.,p.62. McDoxvell1 s is the earliest theological work I
have met which mentions the name of Freud, but he does not
use Freud's findings.
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The most recent full treatment of the Trinity in this
tradition is that of Leonard Hodgson,^ However, whilst I would
claim to be writing in this tradition, I find myself unable to
use the work of Hodgson to any great extent. This is largely
because this enquiry aims at understanding the foundations of
the Trinity in a post-Freudian, post-Bultmann and post-Ramsey
situation, and Hodgson is decidedly prior to the work of all
these thinkers. It is pre-Freudian in that whilst relying on a
psychological assessment of human personality for the background
thinking on his presentation of the doctrine, Hodgson employs
Laird's Problems of the Self (1917) where the three functions of
the older psychology - thinking, feeling and willing - are regard¬
ed by Laird as on the one hand distinct, yet are able to inter-
2
penetrate one another in a dynamic unity of continuous being.
Having read carefully Laird's analysis of the self, in his Shaw
3
Lectures , I found that none of his contributions could be
usefully incorporated into this enquiry, as the model employed
is so different from ours, Hodgson's work is also pre-Bultmann
in that he seldom allows radical criticism to enter into his
discussion of scripture upon which he bases the doctrine (the
revelatum, as he calls it) and towards which he takes a protect¬
ive attitude. He virtually regards scripture in the same fixed
way as did St Augustine, Hodgson is naturally pre-Ramsey, but
1. L, Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity
2. ibid., p. 85
3. J, Laird, Problems of the Self
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one notes that he speaks twice of "projecting into eternity"
essential relationships.^
The tradition, however, is from Robertson to Robinson, and
I would quote from the latter to complete the brief survey; this
is from a criticism he makes of the work of Paul van Burenj
"In the past Christians have tended to make many
statements which have appeared to characterize a
Person in himself rather than a personal relationship.
But vtfiat lies outside or beyond this relationship,
we can never say,,. God is known through his effects.
And what theology analyses and describes is the
existential relationship in which these effects
are known,..."
"The Doctrine of the Trinity is not, as it has
often been represented, a model of the divine life
as it is in itself. It is a formula or definition
describing the distinctively Christian encounter
with God. Hence all the features in the Trinitarian
formula are in the last analyses representations of
the existential relationship,"
Another contemporary Anglican from the other side of the Atlantic
writes:
"Actually, however, the 'threeness' with which we
are really concerned is not in the nature of God as
an object of thought, but in the Church's experience
of the divine; and here the ground for the trinitarian
confession is firmly laid..,,"
1. L. Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, pp.68, 121
There are other objections to Hodgson, e.g., his claim to
employ the psychological model is vitiated by his moving
into the social model (p,190) although he denies this; his
analogy of adoption is overworked, and his idea of internally
constitutive unity is contrived. In a similar class we would
place the book of Franks, The Doctrine of the Trinity. It is
a mine of information; throughout he uses as a criterion of
judgement the triad of authority, reason and experience. We
could not incorporate it in our study,
2. J.M. Robinson, The Honest to God Debate, p. 255-6
3. John Knox, The Church and the Reality of Christ, p.73
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We shall focus our attention therefore on "the distinctively
Christian encounter with God" (Robinson) or "the Church's
experience of the divine." (Knox).Unashamedly, we shall use the
word "experience", ambiguous though it is. We cannot regard
experiences as "merely subjective", for they are always experi¬
ences of something, even if the content is one's own mental
states. To think otherwise would be to fall prey to the "Cartesian
Faux-Pas",the name given by Archbishop Temple to Descartes'
major premiss, Cogito ergo sum.
The tradition which we have appealed to, has its origins
far back in the great treatise on the Trinity by St Augustine,
De Trinitate. In the 1930s this tradition was abruptly halted
when Karl Barth began his Dogmatics with an exposition of the
Trinity based solely on Revelation, this concept taking over
completely the work jjreviously done by metaphysics. Whereas
Augustine had worked from Genesis 1, 26, that man was made by God
in his image, and that therefore a theory of human personality
could be used to understand the being of God, Barth set God and
man on either side of the Kierkegaardian infinite abyss; all
analogies were dismissed as being too weak and tainted with human
sinfulness. Some theologians have capitulated to Berth's views,
e.g., Claude Welch, I hope to demonstrate in this enquiry why I
find myself unable to accept Barth's position, and that the Anglican
tradition, based on Augustine, is a sounder one, and a better
starting point for our undertaking.
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In one sense, there is nothing new in applying psychology
to this doctrine; but the method of application can be new.
Previously, it has been used as a supp>ort to the doctrine; we
believe, however, that the situation is altered, as psychodynamics <•
underlie the experiences upon which the dogma is based. We hope
therefore to penetrate into the very foundations of the dogma,
realizing that this may involve some radical modification to
received belief, some re-location, and possibly, some reduction
may result; but this is not our object. Our views will be modified
as we are persuaded by the insights made available through the
interrogation by the various models. The parallels to the Church's
need to accommodate its teachings to the new knowledge of Copernicus
1
and Darwin are often quoted in this connection.
On the one hand, therefore, we believe that psychodynamics
can be a valuable apologetic tool for the Christian faith in our
times; it does not provide the whole truth and cannot displace
all other models, nor can it take over the whole content of the
faith without remainder. We believe, however, that the human mind,
like truth itself, is multi-dimensional; theology is one of the
products of that mind; therefore a study which concerns the mind
cannot be irrelevant to theology, even although the subject matter
is claimed by some to be non-psychological. We cannot accept this;
anything claiming to be an encounter or an experience cannot
1. H.A. Williams, 'Theology and Self-Awareness', Soundings. p.69




There is, of course, a natural resistance on the part of
theologians to admit Freud and his work owing to the anti-religious
bias which he displayed. In spite of this fact, which we shall
discuss, we think that Christian theology would be immeasurably
poorer were it to exclude this valuable tool of insight.
One of the most significant studies, or rather, encounters,
in this dual field is that of R.S. Lee in Freud and Christianity.
In the introduction to the book, Canon A.E. Baker claimed that
Lee's work "throws real light on the Christian religion in many
of its types and varieties, for it views its great doctrines
in immediate relation to experience. (italics mine.) Dr. Lee
considers many doctrines and aspects of the Christian faith,
e.g,sin, atonement, the Church, the Life and Teaching of Christ,
the Fatherhood of God, However, he makes no reference to the
Trinity or to the Holy Spirit, which we believe to be the most
related to human experience and the most dependent upon it. Lee's
study is based exclusively on Freud's work, which he accepts fairly
comjjletely.
"The writer believes that Freud and his school have
made a more scientific, accurate and comprehensive
contribution to the understanding of human behaviour
than any other school of psychology, and in the following
pages the argument will take no account of what other
schools have to say."^
1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.7
2. ibid., p. 30
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He therefore accepts the Freudian model in spite of the many-
criticisms which have been made of it, or the various modifications
which have resulted from the work of Freud's followers, like
Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, Erikson etc. Dr. Lee's
work moves from one psychodynamic system to examine many aspects
of the Christian faith.
Our task is different. We will examine and employ many psycho-
dynamic systems in addition to that of Freud, but all in relation
to the foundations of one particular doctrine, namely that of the
Trinity. Although there is this difference, we write in the same
spirit as Dr. Lee does;
"Psychology is not a substitute for religion; but
on the other hand, religious behaviour obeys psycho¬
logical laws, and it is disastrous to ignore these."1
Jung also has written similarly; everything to do \irith religion,
he states, everything it says, impinges so closely on the human
2
soul, that psychology cannot afford to overlook it.
**********
It is always one's hope in embarking on such an enquiry as
this, that one will break some fresh ground, or impart insights
which others may pursue. One works, however, on the shoulders of
other men, ever indebted to their labours, and at the end, one is
1. R.S, Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion, p.7-8
2. C.G. Jung, 'A Psychoanalytical Approach to the Dogma of
the Trinity', Collected Works. Vol.11, p,109ff.
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amazed how very little indeed is original. One arrives at what
one thinks are original thoughts only to discover that Augustine
or Freud or someone else has said the same thing before! That
great men have felt the same experience is some consolation,
Freud himself tells us that after reading Watkins Lloyd on
The Moses of Michelangelot
"My first feeling was one of regret that the author
should have anticipated so much of my own thought,
which seemed precious to me, because it was the
result of my own efforts.,.,
In regard to the form which this enquiry takes, certain
major problems could well have been dealt with at the beginning;
we have preferred, however, to deal with them as they arise,
e.g., revelation and reduction. Our work does not attempt to
solve all the theological and philosophical problems it is bound
to raise. It is the work of a psychotherapist concerned with the
application of the models he has found therapeutically valuable,
to data which have traditionally been regarded as the province
of theology alone. Therefore, problems which arise as the result
of this enquiry must be left for others, like philosophical
theologians, to solve.
Two inconsistencies may be observed in the writing, the
first concerns words which I have used and which vary in spelling.
For example, the reader may find super-ego, Super-ego, superego,
or Superego, because I have decided to quote author's directly
1. W, Lloyd, The Moses of Michelangelo, 191^-, Collected Papers,
Vol.IV, p.28^
and not modify their spelling. Secondly, with regard to style.
There are inconsistencies, largely through the employment of
ipsissinia verba in the text, when explicating the various schools
of thought etc.
The plan of our enquiry will be as follows. We will begin
by considering the various psychodynamic models suggested by
present-day writers from Freud, Klein, some present-day Freudians,
Fairbairn and Guntrip, the Existentialists and Jung; after this,
a discussion of their work will be made, and we shall draw our
conclusions and state our preferences. This will form the first
part of the enquiry.
The second part will be the application of the models to:
(i) Monotheism in the Old Testament, considered in relation to
the superego, (ii) The Holy Spirit considered in relation to the
id, the Unconscious or psychic energy, (iii) The present position
of Jesus of Nazareth, and the Christology which resulted from him,
examined again by psychodynamics. In each separate study we
indicate the present trend in contemporary Biblical scholarship.
Finally, in Part Three, we will consider the above in
relation to our approach the contributions of others, and then
make a comprehensive statement of our findings; La-S we will
suggest ways in which these findings have influenced the formation
of the dogma of the Trinity itself. The doctrine of the Trinity,
however, is not the subject of this study; we are concerned




I have already indicated in the General Introduction to this
enquiry that the relating of psychology to the Trinity is no new
practice. From St Augustine onwards there have been many examples
of theologians who have taken a theory of the structure of man's
mind, either of their own construction or from a philosopher or
psychologist and employed it to illuminate some aspect of the
Trinity, as a Vestigium Trinitatis, or as an analogy.
We now possess, however, theories of the structure of man's
mind in greater depth and detail than ever before, and the main
purpose is to consider these in relation to the foundations of
the Doctrine, and to ascertain how far they can be employed to
illuminate it.
In this First Part of this enquiry, I am setting out in some
detail the various structures of the mind which I hope to use in
the Second Part, when I shall come to consider the Biblical
foundations of the Doctrine. The reader may feel at times that I
have lost sight of the main purpose of the enquiry by my not
relating anything said in this Part One to theology in general
or to the foundations of Trinitarian thought in particular.
However, I feel that it is best to set out these structural
theories in some detail, therefore my concern in this section will
be purely with psychodynaraics, Much of what is contained in these
chapters will be common knowledge to those with an acquaintance
with psychodynamic theories; I hope, however, to add comments and
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criticisms throughout which will help to indicate the position
which I am taking towards each of them. Following this setting out
of the various systems, I hope to engage in a discussion as to
their logical status. Although this First Part is preparatory
to the main discussion in Part Two, it can stand on its own as
an independant unit.
The work of "depth psychology" or psychodynamics was
initiated by Freud, and it is therefore natural th&fc I should
begin by considering his own contribution, before passing to




The year 1900 marked the beginning of a new epoch, not only
in the birth of the twentieth century, but in a now way of under¬
standing the mind of man, through the postulation of vast hither¬
to unknown "territory". In his The Interpretation of Dreams,
Freud not only named this great area of the mind "The Unconscious",
but put forward descriptions as to how it operated and he cate¬
gorized its functionings,
Freud, however, was one who did not rest content with
formulations once made. As his work continued and as new data
presented itself, he had the courage to surrender his old ideas
in favour of new ones, thereby illustrating the point made by
A.D, Ritchie that the permanent thing about science is its
method not its conclusions,"'"
Many criticisms have been made,and continue to be made,
of Freud's work, and the relevant ones to this discussion will
be dealt with in Chapter VII of this first Part. Some are
reasonable and skilfully argued; others less so. One popular
writer once claimed that psychoanalysts use rather pretentious
jargon for very ordinary facts about the human personality
already well known, using terms to disguise the commonplace of
1, A.D, Ritchie, quoted by Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics. p«l6
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their observations upon the obvious,^ Freud, however, might agree
in some way to this as he admitted that it is difficult in ego
psychology to avoid what is already familiar and that his work
was more a question of arriving at a new way of looking at things
2
than making new discoveries. On the other hand, Freud would
resist any charge that his structural entities like super-ego
and id were merely personifications of "conscience" or "temptat¬
ion",3
The permanent thing in psychoanalysis is, as A.D, Ritchie
pointed out, its method, Freud's work began as a method of
treating those who were mentally indisposed. He showed conclu¬
sively how the implications from psychoanalysis went far beyond
such treatment. But he also revealed that it could never give up
its original field of work, because it still relied upon continual
contact with clinical material for further advances and development,
"The accumulation of empirical date upon which we base our theories
can be obtained in no other way." However, this new method brought
forward so much new material that in order to handle the sheer
quantity of phenomena, Freud was forced to construct systems of
thought or patterns, Without these "models" of comprehension the
handling of the material would have been impossible. Freud
called these constructs his "Metapsychology",
Two of his biographers give reasons for this strange name.
Helen Walker Puner says that Freud refused to apply the legitimate
name of philosophy because he may have been classed with Nietzsche
1. C.E.M, Joad, Science and Ethics, ed, C .11. Waddington, p. 26
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.82
3. E, Jacobson makes this claim. The Self & the Ob.ject World, p. 123.
which Freud "answered" in New Introductory Lectures, p.82
4. Freud, ibid., p.194 -
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as "another philosopher" whose work was based on guesses and
intuition; also because psychoanalysis had already been dismissed
by its detractors as a heap of philosophical nonsense/ Ernest
Jones says that Freud hoped to found a new science, and quotes
Freud as saying that he used the term because his psychology
2
takes one beyond consciousness.
His metapsychology was by no means static. In fact it was
continually being altered and developed as new material came to
light. It is not my purpose to go into all the various ramifi¬
cations resulting from alterations in theory which Freud initiated;
nor is it my intention to give a "potted history" of "the rise and
development" of psychodynamics. The material has been worked
through by many who have presented it in a systematic fashion,
and one can only refer the reader to some of the authorities who
3
have accomplished this task already.
Because of the evolution of Freud's thought, he is exceed¬
ingly difficult to quote, for one must know from which period one
is quoting. In spite of the various systematizations of Freud's
thought, there is some truth in tfie remark of Ernst Kris that
there is no fully comprehensive statement of the system
which is satisfactory since the periods of his work require to be
1. Helen Walker Puner, Freud - His Life and Mind, p. 215
2. Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Si,;mund Freud, pp. 296,30k
3. H. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction
D. Wyss, Depth Psychology - A Critical History
0, Fenichel, The Psychoanalysis Theory of Neurosis
(contains a statement rather than a history)
J.C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society
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clearly distinguished, G-untrip has said that the history of
medical sciences like that of other sciences is strewn with
discarded hypotheses} "so also is the history of psychoanalysis,
2
and so also surely, the history of theology,"" The Bible itself
contains many discarded hypotheses, which, when set side by side
are contradictory and incompatible. Quoting Freud is, in this
respect, like quoting from the Bible! One must indicate precisely
the period of Freud*s work to which reference is being made.
Dieter Wyss, who has systematized the development of Freud's
work has divided it into three distinct phases. The first, up to
1900, "From Sympton to the Personality" has as its chief charact¬
eristic, the sexual drive. The second phase, 1900-23» "Personality"
has the self-preservation drive as its chief characteristic. The
final phase "From Personality to Mythology" dates from 1923 when
Freud's slim volume "The Ego and the Id" was published; Wyss
regards the death drive, aggression, Thanatos, as its main
3
characteristic. However, the third phase differs from the first
two, as outlined by Wyss, in a further way. Thus in the earlier ones
the emphasis is on the Unconscious, whereas in the third phase
the emphasis is more on the actual ego and the analysis of it
and this I would regard as the significant difference. One can
1. Ernst Kris, 'Psychoanalytical Proposition' in Melvin H.
Marx, Psychological Theory. 1951, P»337
2. H, Guntrip, Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls, 1956
3. D. Wyss, Depth Psychology, pp. 45-165
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discern this by comparing the Two Short Accounts of Psychoanalysis
in the Pelican series, or the larger accounts in the Introductory
Lectures as against the New Introductory Lectures, The Inter¬
pretation of Dreams emphasises the unconscious mental processes
which are repressed; The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence by
Anna Freud (although not by the Master, but his daughter) exempli¬
fies that the primary emphasis was not on that which was repressed,
but on t^at which did the repressing."'" Psychoanalysis, Miss Freud
claimed, could not concentrate only on the id, but on the whole
psyche and the three institutions working within it.
It is with this last phase that we are concerned, and the
focal point is the "new" tripartite structure to be found in The
o';0..and the Id. As already remarked, it is one of Freud's shortest
books, yet it is one of the most obscure. Even Joan Riviere, its
translator, herself an experienced analyst and student of Freud,
2
found it so. When she was pestering Freud about the obscurities
\tfith which she struggled in trying to translate it, and demanding
from Freud clearer expressions of his thought, he became exasper-
3
ated and repliedt "The book will be obsolete in thirty years."
Miss Riviere adds that nearly thirty years have passed since then
and nothing he wrote is obsolete, (She was writing in 1952.) In
fact she goes on to say that the original seed of the newer insights,
(she was referring to those of Melanie Klein) lay embedded in
1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 78-80
2. S. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.6
3. J. Riviere, in Klein and others, Developments in Psycho¬
analysis , p. 1
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Freud's own thought, unconsidered and undeveloped. It would be
true to say that the endopsychic structure worked out by Freud
has stood the test of time, and it still serves as a meaningful
model for workers in many psychodynumic fields. However, it has
not been generally accepted by everyone. Freud, no doubt, would
have expected this to happen, for he himself,as we have noted,
developed and modified his own theories.
Our task, therefore, wi.ll be to indicate some of the
changes in thinking about psychodynamic structure which has
followed on the work of Freud. After presenting in this chapter
the structure at which Freud himself eventually arrived, we
shall devote a chapter to Melanie Klein, as her contributions
and developments have affected subsequent writers. The thinking
of present day Freudians will be represented by the work of
Anna Freud and D.W. Winnicott in this country, and by Erik H,
Erikson and Edith Jacobson in America. All these writers we
would include within the Freudian school.
The second "school" is that of W, Ronald D. Fairbairn''"
whose work has been carried on by Dr* Harry Guntrip, and can be
found in the latter's monumental work, Personality Structure
and Human Interaction.
The third school, which also has Freud at its fountain
head, although it has moved even further away from him, whilst
1, Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality.
3^
still acknowledging its debt ot him, is that of Existentialist
Analysis, R.D. Laing and others in Britain, Binsvanger and Boss
on the Continent, and Rollo May in America are a few of its
adherents,
One must, however, add a fourth contemporary school whose
work in the field of this enquiry cannot be ignored, namely that
of C.G. Jung. As Jung broke away very early on from Freud,
historically his system has not the same affinity and contact
points with Freud1s as have the others, Jung lias worked out in
detail (in advance for us, as it were) his own explanations and
interpretation (and expansion!) of the Doctrine of the Trinity,
He has many followers who have subsequently written about their
master's findings, as well as numerous critics,
THE FREUDIAN STRUCTURE
We, therefore, turn to Freud's The Ego and the Id and its
interpreters. In this book Freud set out a more stable descrip¬
tion of the structure of the mind than he had previously held.
His original systeraatization of the mind as being divided into
two main sections (conscious and unconscious, with pre-consclous
intervening) failed him when considering the problems of
1. Guntrip, Personality" Structure and Human Interaction. p,93f*
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narcissism and melancholia."'" Guntrip has claimed that preceding
the publication of The Ego and the Id, Freud exercised some
considerable fluidity in his use of terms before he arrived at
2
the new formulation and how at times the term "Ego" was used
expansively to cover almost the total self before it was confined
to the role to which it was subsequently assigned.
It was in this book that the tripartite division of the
human psyche was first put forward and now its three terms, "Egd't
"Superego" and "Id" are in common usage today, even beyond
psychological circles. To speak of them therefore means covering
much ground that has been well worked already, since many books
have been written about this form of psychic structure, However,
the main argument of this thesis cannot proceed without indicating
what is involved in the various personality theories which require
some explanation.
Freud began with the id. "The core of our being, then, is
formed by the obscure id, which has no direct relations with the
external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only
3
only through the medium of another agency of the mind."
1. Freud, ♦On Narcissism', Collected Papers,Vol. 4 (1914)
'Mourning and Melancholia', Collected Papers. Vol,k (1917)
see Ego and the Id. p. 3^f
2. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.89-101
Guntrip carefully analyses the development of
Freud's ego - analysis prior to The Ego and the Id
demonstrating its fluctuations and contradictions
until it was stabilised in this book,
c.f, Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.121 etc.
3. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 67
The Question of Lay Analysis. (Two Short Accounts),p.110
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Originally everything was id. Guntrip described it as primitive
chaos which is present before the ego begins to develop; the
2
concept is purely a biological one of undirected goalless energy.
It is the part of the mind most closely related to the body,
therefore it is the most primitive and the most fundamental. It
is the reservoir of the instincts, supplying the energy and
3
driving force for all our life. "This means that it is the
dynamic matrix from which the other systems, ego and superego
k
derive." The id is governed by the inexorable pleasure
principle; it is controlled by "desire" and "I want, therefore
I must have", by magical thought and undying wishes "which
5
strive to be omnipotently maintained," It is self-seeking,
amoral, hedonistic and infantile, and can remain so for it has
not the need to adapt to reality, whereas the ego, as we shall
see, has this particular function,
Freud regarded the instincts which it contained as of two
kinds; Libido. or the Life Force, Eros (a unity of self-preser¬
vation and sexual instincts); and Aggression, the Death Drive,
Thanatos. These elementary instincts seek crude expression and
1. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis. p,23
2. From notes on a lecture given at theDavidson Clinic,
February 1965
3. Freud, ibid,, p.2
h. P. Heiman, Developments in Psychoanalysis. p.122
5. J. Biggar in a lecture at the Davidson Clinic, February 1965
"Omnipotence of thought" originates in Freud,
Totem and Taboo, Chapter III, p,8lf«
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satisfaction,"*" The id, moreover, has no idea of time; it is
completely timeless,^
3
The word "Id" was borrowed by Freud from Georg Groddeck
whose The Book of the It describes the life of man as "lived in"
by strange uncontrollable forces. This book will be considered
later on in this enquiry. However, it is worth recalling that
we owe the word "Id" and the word "Ego" also, not to Freud
himself, but to his translators, Freud wrote *Toh" and "Es",
i.e., "I" and "It" in German. (Also "TJheri nh" for "Super-ego".)
However, these two words used thus in juxtaposition carried
4
overtones in German which they obviously lack in English,
Groddeck's use of the word "Es" goes back to Nietszche, who
used the term for whatever in our nature is impersonal, i.e.,
5
subject to natural law ; and when Martin Buber wrote "I and Thou"
contrasting the "I-Thou" and "I-It" relationships, he was
likewise writing in the tradition which carried the overtones
mentioned.^
1. For Freud•s description of these, New Introductory Lectures..124
c.f., Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.7^
J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post Freudians, p.10-11
Fenichel, The Psychoanalytical Theory of Neurosis, p.5^-55
2. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, (1920) p.22, "We have
learned that unconscious mental processes are in themselves
•timeless1, This means in the first place that they are not
ordered temporarily, that time does not change them in any
way and this the idea of time cannot be applied to them."
3. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.27
New Introductory Lectures, p.97
4. J. Riviere's footnote to Freud's, The Ego and the Id. p.28
5. Groddeck, The Book of the It. p.28 footnote
6. M. Buber, I and Thou jj (1937) see Introduction, p.vi etc.
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Freud said that the impersonal pronoun seemed particularly suited
to express the essential character of this province of the mind."*"
Hence the id is not in the least personal} it is, of course,
unconscious,
Now Freud designated as "unconscious", "any mental process
the existence of which we are obliged to assume - because, for
instance, we infer it in some way from its effects — but of
2
which we are not directly aware," Philip Rieff states that the
3
Unconscious "functions for Freud as a 'god-term'" and he goes
on to say that the unconscious was thought of by Freud as somewhat
like a "hidden-god - indifferent, impersonal, unconcerned about
the life of its creation", and that it is always inferred in
negative terms. Not only is the id an unorganized reservoir of
Instinctual drives, contradictory and lacking in logical order,
it is also "where" the repressed material "goes". This material,
as Freud showed in The Interpretation of Dreams exhibits some
degree of logic and organization, yet operates according to
different principles from those which govern the system Conscious
and Pre-Conscious, It has its own dynamic laws and characteristic.
The id therefore has the twofold function of being an unorganized
reservoir of drives or instincts, and a repository of repressed
and forgotten material, all of which becomes organized in the
dream and phantasy,
1, Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.97
2, Freud, ibid,, p,9h
3, P, Rieff, Freud - The Mind of a Moralist, p.3^-5
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There remains some doubt as to whether Freud really inte¬
grated within the id both the instinctual endowments, and the
repressed material now unconscious. The instincts are inborn,
hereditary endowments; the repressed material owes its origin
to environmental influences. The repressed material belongs to the
earlier system when Freud thought of the mind in terms of functions,
Conscious, Pre-Conscious and Unconscious; the id, composed of
instincts, belongs to Freud's last theory when he thought of the
mind as structure. He did write, in 1938, in An Outline of
Psychoanalysis, "Id and Unconscious are as intimately united as
ego and Pre-Conscious," (p.23) This was Freud's last book, his
last "short account" of the system he had created. Yet more than
this statement is surely required to clear up all the misunder¬
standings that arise.
In his early days, Freud said, "The interpretation of dreams
is in fact the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious.,,,""'"
The dream, however, was to Freud, an ego construction; but if we
only know unconscious, id, material by inferring it from the ego,
we are therefore involved in a circular argument, Rieff points
out this circularity in the way in which Freud conceives the
unconscious part of the mind, with the "unknown part becoming that
through which the known takes on meaning. It is actually through
consciousness that we form an idea of our unconscious drives and
motivations, Yet at the same time we are invited to understand
1, Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p.60
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consciousness from what it appears to be if compared with what
1
it is not."
These contradictions have caused some analysts to find little
relevance in the term "id"; they find that the terra is used to
cover too many phenomena; not only are repressed organised
material and original unorganised material residing in the id.
there resides also, according to Freud, our forgotten origins -
part of the archaic heritage which a child brings with him into
2
the world, Freud no doubt meant the kind of material which he
reconstructed in the myth of the brother horde slaying the primal
3
father, in Totem and Taboo. The term "id" therefore is now seen
to include much besides the instincts and the repressed uncons¬
cious material. ^
The second institution of the mind, according to Freud's
scheme was the Ego, This comes into being in the course of normal
development where the child comes to terms %vlth external reality,
and a part of the id comes to be differentiated and organized to
fp-fm the Ego. This institution is the interpreter and mediator
4
of the various parts of the mind and the external world* Freud
c
describes (Hue Ego as part of the id but one which has become
1. P. Rieff, Freud - The Mind of a Moralist, p.35
2. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis. p.28 (For an example of
this see Introductory Lectures, p.324)
3. Chapter 4, Section 5» p.l4o
4. Heiman, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.122
Fenichel describes the ego as the part of the mind which handles
reality. Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. p«35
5. Freud, Inhibitions. Symptoms and Anxieties, p.123 where Freud
says that ego and id are part of the same organisation.
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modified by the direct influence of the external world, as a
bark grows on a tree, "The ego indeed is the organised portion
2
of the id", the id and the ego being part of the same organisation.
The ego was developed for the reception and exclusion of stimuli,
3
and it controls the paths of access to motility. But the ego is
characterized. by a "remarkable trend towards unification" towards
synthesis which the id lacks - contradictions and antitheses can
exist there without conflict, which the ego would feel that it
4
must resolve. In the task of bringxng the influence of the
external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, the ego
"endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure
principle which reigns supreme in the id... The ego represents
what we call reason and sanity, in contrast to the id which
5
contains the passion-." The ego is governed by conditions of
safety, for itself no doubt, in that it defends itself against
the id, but it also defends the id from reality, Freud also spoke
of the ego as being first and foremost a body ego, and he finds
an anatomical analogy for its formation in that of the"cortical
homunculusThe ego is a "precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes";
1. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p.153
2. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety.pp.32 and 123
3. Freiid, New Introductory Lectures, p. 101
4. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis. p,106
5. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.29-30
6. Freud, ibid,, p.31 and footnote by Joan Riviere,
c»f, Freud's description of the emergence of conscious¬
ness in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,(1920) p.19-20,
which clearly applies to what he subsequently called the
"ego", following 1923* Before that time his use of the
terra fluctuated, see footnote 16,
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it contains "the record of past object choices","*" and it is
"formed out of identifications taking the place of cathexes on
2
the part of the id which have been abandoned." Freud once speaks
of this process working in relation to himself. Following his
rupture with Fliess, he writes to Ferenczi as follows, "A part
of homosexual cathexis has been withdrawn and made use of to
3
enlarge my own ego." So far one has tried to describe the ego
solely in terms of Freud's own language* Flugel, however, who is
one of the most able Freudian interpreters, describes the ego in
more homely terms as "the part which we recognise most intimately
ourselves, the part which is conscious (or mostly so), which
interprets and co-ordinates the impressions from the outer world
and from our own bodies that reach us through the sense organs..."
It is therefore the part of the individual which he discloses
to the world; he tests reality by this institution. For the most
part, the ego is conscious, but Freud came to the conclusion that
parts of the ego (namely its defences) are unconscious, as are
5
the id and superego.
As has already been pointed out, the concept of the ego as
found in The Ego and the Xd differs from that to be found in
Freud's earlier books, like Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)
nnd Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921).
1. Freud, The Ego and the Id. p.36
2. Freud, ibid., p.68
3. Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, p.360
4. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society.p.43
5. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p.153
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Guntrip has shown how in the former "the ego has swallowed up
everything and has become in effect the basic unitary primary
self", and how similarly in the latter the ego is the primary
reservoir of all instinctive energies, libidinal and aggressive..,""*"
i.e., it has taken over the function of what Freud was later to
call the id. In The Ego and the Id however, the terms are
separate and defined. Freud also regarded the ego as the seat of
anxiety due to its being harassed on all sides - objective
anxiety results from the pressure of the external world; moral
anxiety in face of the demands of the super-ego, and neurotic
anxiety in the face of the strength of the impulses and passions
of the id. It lies at the centre of these forces and has no
easy task.^
The third category of institution is the "super-ego", which
Freud called a differentiating grade within the ego. When his
primary structure of the mind consisted of Conscious/Pre-Conscious/
Unconscious, Freud gave the name "censor" or "door-keeper" to a
force he postulated lying between the unconscious and pre-conscious.
said that this force proceeded from the ego. Also he had
used the term "ego-ideal" and referred to its origin in the early
narcissistic strivings t "That which he projects ahead of him as
his ideal is merely his substitute for the lost narcissism of
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, pp.90 & 92
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, pp.104 & 112
3. Freud, Introductory Lectures, p.26-2
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of his childhood — the time when he was his own ideal.""'" After
The Eko and the Id the term censor is dropped, and although
"ego-ideal" is still used by Freud, it is now but a component
part of the larger super-ego, and stands for the idealized
imaginative concept of oneself, which as we have seen, was con-
2
ceived as being built up by libido being directed narcissistically.
The super-ego has other components, for example, identi¬
fication with the father, "which takes place in the pre-history
3
of every person." Freud argued that it is not the consequence
or outcome of any object cathexis, but "it is a direct and
immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object—
cathexis•" This kind of statement is similar to that already
quoted in relation to the id, which Freud stated contained "our
forgotten origins - part of the archaic heritage which a child
4
brings with him into the world." When Freud talks in this way,
one naturally thinks of the psycho-biological mysticism which
surrounds Jung's concept of the "collective unconscious", which
seems to be handed on from generation to generation like the
genes of the body, in an hereditary manner.
1. Freud, On Narcissism, and. Mourning and Melancholia
Collected Papers. Vol 4, p. 51
2. "It would not surprise us if we were to find a special instit¬
ution in the mind which performs the task of seeing that
narcissistic gratification is secured from the ego-ideal, and
that, with this end in view, it constantly watches the real
ego and measures it by that ideal...we may say that what we
call our conscience has the required characteristics,"
On Narcissism, p.52 (see also Introductory Lectures, p.371 )
3. The Ego and the Id. p.39
4. see footnote p.^0 ^
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Freud, however, extended the identification to cover not only
the father but both parents, including also persons in authority.
As with the formation of the ego, these identifications are made
as "precipitants of abandoned object relations." But Freud makes
further qualifications. The first is that the super-ego of the
child is not really built on the model of the parent, but 011 that
of the parent's super-ego; it takes over the same content and
becomes "the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values
2
which have been handed down from generation to generation." The
second qualification is that the relation between the super-ego
and ego is not merely a reproduction of the relation between a
father and a child, but "is the reproduction, distorted by a wish
of the real relations between the ego before it was subdivided,
and an external object," Thus the severity of a person's super-ego
is not due to objects only, but to the child's aggressiveness
generated by those objects, and then introjected along with the
objects. So there is a highly subjective element in this aspect
3
of the super-ego, Freud goes on to show how the severity of the
1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p,119
c.f, Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, where She states that
the super-ego or ego-ideal arises through the substitut¬
ion of identifications for object-cathexes through intro-
jections, "the process first recognised in melancholia
but now known to occur frequently," p.29
2. Freud, ibid., p.90
3. Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, p.llOff.
An interesting discussion on the formation of the super-ego
between Prof, C.H, Waddington and Dr. Karin Stephen in
Science and Ethics,
c.f. M. Klein, 'The Early Development of Conscience in the
Child', Psychoanalysis Today, p.66
Freud, Introduction to 'Voodrow Wilson', Encounter. January
1967 p.1-24. On Wilson's installation of his Almighty
Father as the super-ego. See especially p.10
k6
super-ego in no way corresponds to the severity of treatment
which the child has experienced. The aggression, rebelliousness
and anger which the child generates in dealing with objects and in
meeting the prohibitions of life is built into this institution by
being turned back upon the self, no doubt to control further aggr¬
ession. Freud, of course, would say that these forces came from the
Death Drive, as he connected aggression \*ith it. However, he did
make clear that lenient parents are capable of producing children
with severe super-egos , as the children are denied objects upon
which they might appropriately project their aggressiveness, so
they internalize it and introject it. The conclusion of this fact
is surely that super-ego, far from being passed from generation to
generation, in fact varies from generation to generation. Perhaps
a way round this apparent contradiction would be to say that the
same standards are passed on from generation to generation, but not
with the same intensity. The difference would then be a quantitative,
rather than a qualitative one. However, this will not meet the
basic objection, as quantities of aggression built into the super¬
ego will change not only its quantity, or intensity, but also its
quality. It could be argued, however, that there are levels of
super-ego structure and that the aggression functions at a lower
level than that which is involved in making ethical judgements.
For example, Winnicott, in speaking of the introjected father-figure
element in super-ego formation, says that "the introject may become
human and father-like, but in earlier stages, the super-ego
introjects, used for control of id-impulses and id-products, are
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sub-human, and indeed are primitive to any degree." He also
1
defines introjection as "a mental and emotional acceptance,"
Freud also describes the super-ego as "the heir of the
2
Oedipus complex" for it originates at its dissolution. The way
this happens is that the ego of the child turns away from the
3
Oedipus complex in consequence of the threat of castration.
Fenichel bases this on the retaliatory idea of talion: "the
4
very organ that has sinned has to be punished." He also shows
how an inverted solution, by denying in phantasy one's penis,
can come about. It has therefore sexual, biological components.
It also represents "an energic reaction-formation against" the
5
earlier object choices of the id. In spite of their apparent
difference, the id and the super-ego have, according to Freud,
one thing in common; they represent the influences of the past
(the id, the influence of heredity, the super-ego, essentially
the influence of what is taken over from other people) whereas
the ego is principally determined by the individual's own
1. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating
Environment. p.18-19
c.f, M, Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children, p,198
2. Freud, The Ego and the Id. p.47-8
3. Freud,'The Passing of the Oedipus Complex', Collected Papers.
Vol 2. p.273
Brierley adds that the ego abandoning the parents as
sexual objects in the real world introjects them so
that the super-ego replaces the Oedipus Constellation.
Heiinann, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p. 133
Freud, Inhibitons. Symptoms and Anxieties. p.91f and p.111-2
(For his statement on castration in relation to the
Oedipus Complex*)
4. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.77
ibid., p.79
5. Freud, The Ego and the Id. p.44
Winnicott, ibid.,p.18
48
experiences.^ A split took place in the ego, with this separate
part now exercising an observing and criticising function over
2
the ego itself. The super-ego occupies a special place between
the ego and the id. "It belongs to the egoj but it has particular
3
intimate connection with the id," But it also takes up a kind
4
of intermediary position between the id and the outside world.
The character of the super-ego in its various operations can
be cruel, tyrannical and severe; it can hold the ego at its
mercy, and tensions between these two institutions are expressed
5
in our moral sense of guilt. Anna Preud claimed that "identi¬
fication with the aggressor", one of her mechanisms of ego defence,
6
plays an important part towards the formation of the super-ego.
As one interpreter of Freud has put it, the super-ego is the part
of the mind which "arrogates to itself the right to supervise
7
the rest." It possesses a compulsive character which manifests
1. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p.4
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.80-3* This idea emerged
earlier also in Mourning and Melancholia, p.157
3. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, p.137
Fenichel, Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.107
4. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p.79
5. see note 2
6. A. Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, p.124
see also; J.A.C, Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.70
Guntrip, Personality, Structure and Human
Interaction, p.109
Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.168 says
that indentification of the object of one's fear
can be an attempt to master anxiety.
7* R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.48
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itself in the form of a "categorial imperative"; according to
Freud it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved,^
The quality and stx^ength of super-egos vary from person to
person, and they play a large part in the determination of a
person's character. An over-conscientious or rigidly perfectionist
person may be said to have an over-determined, "totalitarian"
super-ego. On the other hand, certain persons categorized as
psychopaths may have super-egos xchich are underdeveloped and
insufficient.
One last point should be made agains the super-ego operates
unconsciously.
This statement of Freud's theory of the mind dating from
1923 has been given as far as possible in Freud's own words.
Writing about it in 1932, Freud said, "When you think of this
dividing-up of the personality into ego, superego and id, you
must not imagine sharp dividing lines such as are artificially
drawn in the field of political geography....After we have made
our separations, we must allow what we had separated to merge
again. Do not judge too harshly of a first attempt at picturing
2
a thing so elusive as the human mind." Some have judged harshly,
but generally speaking, the model has served as a meaningful one
in psychoanalytical and social-study circles until the present
time.
1. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p.49
2, Quoted by Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.135
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It will be seen,however, that the model is conceived in
spatial terms. Freud admitted that in psychology w© can only
describe things by the help of analogies, and therefore a spatial
analogy for the mind was justified. He admits, however, that we
constantly require to change the analogies which are being used,
for none of them lasts long enough . But in psychoanalysis "we
take spatial ways of looking at things seriously.Early on, he
compared the mind to various rooms, but after 1923, he provided
two diagrams. One occurs in The Ego and the Id (p.29) which
relates to these two institutions; another in New Introductory
Lectures (p.106) which takes into account the super-ego as well.
(Figs 1 and 2) Here also Freud wrote that the purpose of
psychoanalysis was "... to strengthen the ego, to make it more
independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of vision, and
so to extend its organization that it can take over new portions
2
of the id. Where the id was, there shall ego be." For Freud, the
secret of successful living lies in the maintenance of a reason¬
able balance between ego, id and super-ego. Dr. R.S. Lee has put
the matter as followss-
"...mental health and strength depends on a just
balance between ego, id and superego, so that the
ego is free to handle the world, yet full of energy
for its tasks because in good relations with the id,
and at the same time, under enough control from the
superego not to choose the first primitive satisfactions
1. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, p.105
2, Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.106
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which offer, but to build up its energy for greater,
more integrated and more permanent satisfactions.
Also later in the same book, Dr. Lee speaks of the harmon¬
ious co-operation or synthesis from which id, ego and super-ego
all grow in strength, because inner conflict is reduced to a
minimum; a healthy development is found in a balance of tensions
2
between these three forces. Similarly another Freudian inter¬
preter writess-
"The ego of the adult has to maintain a balance between
the three forces that besiege it - id, superego and
reality - in order to preserve the life-functions. At
the beginning of development, in the young child, the
absence of superego and the immaturity of the ego are
responsible for the unbalance that exists: the ego
alone is not capable of safeguarding the life functions,
and the child is therefore dependent on his environment.
With the gradual strengthening of the ego, and the
development of the superego, as the child grows older,
his personality structure more closely resembles the
adult's."3
1. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.77
What Freud offers is a psychological explanation to an
age-long problem of man, that of authoritarianism and
order as against freedom and self-expression. It has
been regarded by moral philosophers as a matter for
discussion, which is an intellectual pursuit, an
activity of the conscious mind. Freud would argue that
the problem is decided for each man in the unconscious
mind, according to the structure of that mind; in some,
id impulses are constantly breaking out because of
inadequate superego formation; in others, the superego
constraint is so strong as to be a ruthless threat or
tyranny, inhibiting the expression of true feelings,
and protecting the ego from forces which it is unable
to face and has to deny.
2. Lee, ibid., pp.176,179
3. M. Kris, Child Analysis in Psychoanalysis Today, p.53
(ed. Sandor Lorand J
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These statements show that more than spatial metaphors are
involved in the stating of psychodynamic theory; the reason
being that the material under consideration is dynamic and not
static. We are now concerned with the concept of a balance
between various forces or "institutions". This was put very
forcibly by Miss Anna Freud at the Sixth International Congress
of Child Psychiatry in Edinburgh, when she stressed that the
concept of health as developed in the physical field cannot
without alteration be carried over to the mental field. When
bodily functions work together there is health; but in mental
health, there are always some functions at variance with others.
Mental health depends on the compromise between various parts
and the resulting balance between them.^"
From all this one can see the xvisdom of Freud's remark
2
that "where the id was there shall ego be." If two of the
three institutions are unconscious, the task of attaining a
balance resides with the conscious part, the ego. In fact the
importance given to the ego in its need to extend its control
into the domain of the other institutions, so that the id shrinks
and the super-ego loses its power, as the ego colonizes areas
previously controlled by these other institutions, gaining
mastery over the whole psychic operations, indicates that not
only balance is required for psychic health, but also a shift
1. From Miss Freud's speech at the Congress meeting on July 25»1966
in Edinburgh,
c.f. The Ego and The Mechanisms of Defence, p.193
2. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.106
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of the boundaries resulting from this ego expansion. Ego
mastery and ego strength is therefore the main requirement for
balance of the institutions. We can now see the importance given
to that institution in the last of Freud's psychic formulations.
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CHAPTER II
CONTINUING WITH KLEIN
We have so far explained Freud's model of man's endopsychlc
structure as he left it. It was natural that the work begun by-
Freud did not stop with his death. Like all honest investigators
he had had the courage to change his ideas more than once in
the face of fresh empirical evidence. As we have seen he suggested
that his book.The Ego and the Id. which contained his final
revision of man's psychic structure would be "obsolete in thirty
years."
One of these developments took place in Britain between
the wars, where there grew up what eventually came to be known
as the "English School" of Psychoanalysis, under the leadership
of Mrs Melanie Klein, She embraced, in her thinking, Freud's
basic ideas, including his concepts of the Death Instinct and
the threefold structure of id, ego and super-ego| but she devel¬
oped them, modifying and embellishing them with further concepts
and ideas. Although we have no fresh structural model from Klein,
much of her work has received acceptance from present day
Freudians, tvho have assimilated some of it and rejected some of
it; also the Fairbairn-Guntrip theories cannot be understood
without reference to her work, even although they depart from her
findings. As her influence has been considerable in this country,
her work cannot be ignored in an enquiry such as this one.
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Her earliest large-scale work known over here - she began
her analytical work in Berlin under Karl Abraham — was The Psycho¬
analysis of Children, This book demonstrated that she had not
only extended the therapy originated by Freud for adults to
that of young children, but also the theorizing and dogma based
on that therapy. Her psychoanalysis of children was carried out
by her devising certain play techniques, whereby she claimed that
she was able to externalize the child's inner conflicts based on
their underlying phantasies, thereby relieving their anxieties
and strengthening their egos at the same time. Her methods have
been criticised by Anna Freud, who also worked with young child¬
ren, and the differences between them are considerable. The
bizarre material which she produced, plus her interpretations of
2
it, have been debated almost endlessly. These are extremely
subjective, and cannot be checked empirically by the methods of
experimental psychology. If one views this work from a strictly
"scientific" point of view, one will regard it as too speculative,
How far has she read into her material preconceived notions of
her own? There is also disagreement about her timing of the
developments of the individual, e.g., her dating the origins of
the super-ego and the Oedipus complex to the first year.
1. A useful summary is to be found in J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the
Post-Freudians. p.77-79
see also D.W. Winnicott, The Maturational Process^and the
Facilitating Environment, p.171
2. G, Gorer in Psychoanalysis Observed speaks of Klein as carrying
to a logical extreme the predominance of theory over observat¬
ion, p. 42
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As we have said, Klein accepted Freud's basic structure of
the mind} nevertheless, she wove into it her own distinctive
theories and concepts. She has her own terminology making use
of such concepts as: objects relations, internal objects, part
and whole objects} "good" and "bad" breast} splitting, project¬
ion and introjection, reparation; paranoid-schizoid position,
depressive position, manic defence. Definitions for most of these
terms can be found in the Glossary at the end of Kanna Segal's
book An Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein.(p.104-7)
However, as many of these terms are inter-related with one
another and with the structure of the personality as formulated
by Freud"*", some attempt shall be made here to describe them in
their relations, rather than as individual items.
Freud wrote: "In man, birth is a prototypic experience...
and one is therefore inclined to regard anxiety states as a
2
reproduction of the trauma of birth." In the same book he says
that anxiety is something like a reproduction of the situation
3
of birth going on in the mind. In his Introductory Lectures he
also associated it with the Latin word meaning a narrow place,
4
a strait, angustiae. or with the German Angst. Klein goes
further and describes the process of birth as involving the child
1. Flugel, Man, Morals and Societv.He draws on the work of
Klein to explain Freudian concepts, p.132-149 and
elsewhere.
2. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, p.99
3. Freud, ibid,, p.25
4. Freud, Iniroductorv Lectures, p.344
see also R.S. Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion, p.33
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in anxiety of a persecutory nature. He is at the mercy of forces
which he cannot understand or grasp intellectually} but he feels
discomforts unconsciously. However, this is partially mitigated
by the love, care and warmth provided by his mother; with her,
the infant has his first relation to a person, "or, as a psycho-
2
analyst would put it, to an object," This is the first object?-
3
relation, so these are present from the beginning of life,
(in jDarenthesis, we would meet an objection to psycho¬
analysis, on the grounds that by speaking of personal relations
as "object-relations" it turns what is basically an "I-Thou"
encounter into an "I-It" piece of phenomenon#with words of Buber,
"The particular Thou, after the relational event has run its
4\
course, is bound to become an It." )
To return to Klein, she asserts that objects-relations start
almost at birth and arise with the first feeding experiences;
she also asserts that all aspects of mental life are bound up
5
with object-relations. All experiences which the child has are
related to his mother, bad as well as good, Klein says that he
reacts to the good aspects of his mother by libido, the Life
Instinct, and to the bad, frustrating aspects of the mother when
the Death. Instinct is converted into aggression, and directed back
towards the "bad object" i.e., the bad aspect of his mother. So
1. Klein, Our Adult World. p. 4
2. ibid.
3. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.293ff.
4. Buber, I and Thou, p.33
5. Klein, New Directions in Psychoanalysis, p.21
c.f. Our Adult World, p.6
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here we have splitting; the mother has been split into two
internal objects, a good and a bad. This is due to the conflict
between the two basic instincts with the result that the object-
relations are relations, not with whole-v, but with part-objects.^"
All this takes place, according to Klein, during the first three
months, when the child is in the paranoid-schizoid position. All
the child's activities and patterns of behaviour during this
position are to help the child to defend itself from danger and
2
to master anxiety. The ego at this stage lacks coherence and
integration and it has to split to defend itself; it splits not
only the object, internal or external, but also itself, the ego,
3
which has a corresponding split in it. Hence splitting is one
4
of the earliest ego defences along with omnipotence and denial,
Also when the object is denied or annihilated, a part of the ego
5
is denied or annihilated too,
As well as the use of new concepts being brought in to
embellish Freud•s structure, one must ask if one can speak of
an ego at so early a stage in human development. Klein in 1959
stated that she assumed that the ego "exists and operates from
6 *y
birth onwards." However, in 1946, she was less dogmatic , and
1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.205
2. Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.248
3. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.298
4. Heinsann, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.25
c.f, Klein, ibid,, p.209 and Our Adult W orId. p.7
5. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis. p.299
6. Klein, Our Adult Korld. p.5
7. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.295-6
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admitted that little is so far known about the structure of the
early ego. She mentions some of the suggestions, for example,
Glover's concept of ego nuclei"'-, Fairbairn's central ego with two
split-off subsidiary egoS , and Winnicott's emphasis on the un-
integration of the early ego; she favours this last one of the
three. She admitted that the ego at the beginning lacks cohesion,
and possesses a tendency towards integration and also one towards
disintegration, falling to pieces. However, according to Klein,
there seems to be some sort of an ego present from the beginning,
and it has the task of defending itself against anxiety stimulated
by the struggle of two opposing instincts within, and the influ¬
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1. Glover's concept of ego nuclei which progressively integrate
into one unitary ego, is found in 'A P3ycho-analytical
Approach to the Classification of Mental Disorders',
Journal of Mental Science, October 1932
Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, pp.39,49,53,63,104
accepts the idea that there are these nuclei derived
from scattered instincts and that they all converge as
a synthetic integration above the age of two as an ego,(p.49)
Fenichel, Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis,p.49
also accepts Glover's theory.
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Whilst there is some ambiguity in Klein's thought about the
nature of the ego at the beginning of life, there is no ambig¬
uity as to how the ego develops. She asserts that introjection
and projection are used by the ego of the child from the very
beginning of post-natal life, and these are employed in build¬
ing up the ego and further, in strengthening it."*" This dual
mechanism is also regarded as the earliest of the ego defences
2
against anxieties from within and without• As food is taken in
and "introjected" so are the experiences associated with the
"good breast", Klein asserts. On the other hand, all painful and
unpleasant sensations are by this device of projection relegated
outside oneself; "...they belong elsewhere, not in oneself. We
disown and repudiate them as emanating from ourselves.».we blame
3
them on to someone else," To ward off anxiety, the infant aims
at keeping inside itself the. good object and identifying itself
with it; but, as xve have seen, it also wants to keep out the
bad object and those parts of its own inner world it does not
wish to acknowledge, Although the whole experience is pre-verbal,
it is as if the child were saying, "This does not belong to me;
it belongs out there to that unwelcome object," But this "thought"
is introjected. Now as this process is repeated, projection leading
to intcojection of that which has already been projected, then
1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.209
Our Adult World, p.5
2. The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.248
3. Riviere, 'Hate, Greed and Aggression,• Love, Hate and
Reparation, p.11
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on to further re-projection, the ego is built up over against
the inner and the outer world. Feelings go out, they are altered
by reality, and are brought back in again. Reality is brought in
and altered by feeling and is pushed out again. So with this
dual device, Klein asserts, the child's ego is built up and he
is able gradually to distinguish the "me" from the "not me",
and it is this to-ing and fro-ing which makes this possible.
Of the two terms which Klein uses, projection is the older;
it was already in general use in psychology as a concept relevant
to perception, Introjection, on the other hand, was originally
introduced into the vocabulary of psychoanalysis by Ferenzci,
and it was used by Freud with reference to the development of
the super-ego. Klein's brilliant combination of the two meant
that these terms were altered in their meaning, being broadened
to include not only intellectual data projected, but also, or
rather mainly,emotional data, possessing strong feeling tone.
It is clear that introjection and projection play their part in
perception as normally understood, Winnlcott speaks of the infant's
growth taking the form of a continuous interchange between inner
and outer reality, each being enriched by the other, where the
child is not only a "potential creator of the world" but populates
the world with samples of his own inner life, He adds, "percept¬
ion is almost synonymous with creation.""'' So with this dual device
1. Winnicott, The Maturational Processpand the Facilitating
Environment, p.91
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the child adds something new not only to its experience but to
itself, but also rids itself of something. This process,
according to Paula Heimann, one of Klein's circle, has "an
inestimable shaas in the modification of the original id into the
2
ego," She goes on to state that these mechanisms of introjection
and projection represent "not only an essential part of the
function of the ego, they are the roots of the ego, the instru¬
ments for its very formation." So we return to the question as
to whether or not there is an ego at the very beginning. It
would seem that Heimann accepted Freud's idea of the ego being
formed out of the id, as against Klein who asserts that there is
an ego from the beginning. But Heiraaxm states, further on, that
a sharp distinction cannot be made at the beginning between the
ego and the id, for the ego is formed from experiences -with the
outer world, "The earliest contacts (introjections and projections)
start this process. The infant's first sucking is then neither
an id-activity nor an ego-activity; it is both, it is an activity
of the incipient ego." Perhaps this phrase "incipient ego" expresses
1. Winnicott, ibid,, p.180 where he speaks of the object being
at first a subjective phenomenon which becomes an object
objectively perceived. The process of such perception
takes time, for the child needs a facilitating environ¬
ment which will give the infant an experience of omnipot¬
ence, whereby it creates and re-creates the object.
Hence Winnicott says on p.lSlj "A goodobject is no good
to the infant unless created by the infant. The object
must be found in order to be created. This has to be
accepted as a paradox,..."
2. Heimann, 'Functions of Introjection and Projection',
Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.126
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the general opinion among psychoanalysts. All would agree that
originally in the womb there is the "symbiosis" of mother and
child"*"; the undifferentiated oceanic feeling of the child in the
womb, before "self" and "not-self" are distinguished and differ-
2
entiated. Whether this continues after birth is a matter of
disagreement. It would seem that the child emerges from it from
time to time, but is always able to sink back into it again.
No doubt this would afford relief from the paranoid-schizoid
3
position of the first quarter of the first year.
However, projection and introjection operate from the
beginning and through them an inner world is built up which is
partly a reflection of the external one. Klein argued that the
interaction between these two continues through every stage of
life, and that even in the adult, the judgement of reality is
4
never quite free from the influence of his internal world.
Of these two processes Anthony Storr has written: "Whereas
introjection is the phenomenon in which characteristics belong
1. Erich Fromra, The Art of Loving, p.18-19
2. Klein, Our Adult World, p.5
Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.11-12
3. Segal, ibid, p.xiii, emphasises that Klein chose the
word "position" because she was describing not a
passing "stage" or "phase" but "a specific
configuration of object relations, anxieties
and defences which persist throughout life,"
Originally Klein called this the "Paranoid Position"
but modified it by incorporation of Pairbairn's basic
psychopathological position, "the Schizoid Position",
(see Developments , p. 292-320.)
k, Klein, Our Adult World, p.5-6. Her"conclusion" is quite
Kantian!
64
to others are attributed to oneself, projection is the pheno¬
menon in which characteristics belonging to oneself are attrib¬
uted to others. Balance between the two would be considered as
normal development. True ego development and object-relations
2
depend upon such a balance.
So far we have considered how the ego is built up during
the paranoid-schizoid position, through the reciprocal action
of projection and introjection. But according to Mrs Klein, not
only is the ego built up in this way and at this period, but also
the super-ego. Both aspects of the mother's breast, good and bad,
3
are introjected, and form the core of the super-ego. We feel
impelled to asks When does a good or bad object which is intro¬
jected contribute towards ego formation and when towards super¬
ego formation? Paula Heimann suggests that "the discriminating
factor lies in the attributes of the introjected parents with
which the child is predominantly concerned at the moment. The
emotional situation in which the child performs the act of
4
introjection decides the result." This is the only indication
1. A. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.88
2. Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.303
The Psychoanalysis of Children, p.203
In Envy and Gratitude p.19-20, Klein statess "Through the
processes of projection and introj ection, this inner
wealth given out and re-introjected, an enrichment and
deepening of the ego comes about." Klein asserts that
this comes through having assimilated the good object.
3. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. p.6l-2
4. Heimann, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.137
one can find of an answer to the question, and it cannot be
regarded as very conclusive, which is not surprising in view
of the inferred, if not speculative, nature of the theorizing.
Perhaps one could give a very rough answer and say that mainly
good object-relations contribute to the up-building of the ego,
and mainly bad object-relations to the formation of the super¬
ego ) but there are too many exceptions to allow even this.
Mrs Klein also pushed back the origin of the super-ego
and Oedipus Complex to the earliest stages of the child's life."'"
In this we are introduced to an incredible world of child phantasy.
Here the child, in the schizoid-paranoid position is at the
mercy of cannibalistic phantasies of being devoured, cut up, torn
to pieces, being surrounded by menacing figures, the evil monsters
of myth and fairy stories, which are features of the child's
parents as seen distorted by his aggression after undergoing the
devices of projection and introjection. The point is that the
child has projected his own aggression on to the internal figures,
which go to form part of his early super-ego, and his anxiety
is increased by the added guilt derived from his aggressive
3
impulses towards his first loved object. Strong repression is
1. Klein, 'Early stages of the Oedipus Complex and Super-ego
Promotion', p,179f. Psychoanalysis of Children.
'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child',
Psychoanalysis Today, p.4ff.
2. The Kleinian concept of phantasy will be dealt with fully
when we come to consider the id. Only that which
concerns the super-ego formation will be dealt
with here.
3. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.27^-
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required to defend the feeble ego against the super-ego which
1
xs so menacing,
Ernest Jones has said that Klein's phantasy world is one
2
that reminds us of Belsen and Walt Disney at his most grotesque.
Guntrip says that the symbolization is easily recognized as
3
falling into oral, anal, and genital categories. Winnicott
describes the infant at this stage of suffering talion fears,
and that the terrifying super-ego formations "relate directly
to the infantile impulse and to the fantasy that goes with body
4
functioning and with crude excitements involving instinct."
It was Klein, however, who by analysing the deep layers of the
child's mind and discovering enormous quantities of anxiety
which is translated into fears of imaginary objects and terrors
of being attacked in all sorts of ways - these in fact being
opposed by a corresponding amount of repressed impulses of
aggression - showed the causal connection between the child's
fear and its own aggressive tendencies. Hence we have the early
super-ego which is especially severe. Klein asserts that in no
period of life is the opposition so strong bet%*reen ego and
super-ego as in early childhood, where the tension between the
g
two is felt as anxiety. Although the child displaces his source
1. Klein, Contributions to Psychoanalysis, p.203
2. Klein, ibid., p.11
Storr compares them to horror comics or Foxe's Book of
Martyrs! (integrity of the Personality, p,56)
3. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.201
4. Winnicott, The Maturational Processcyand the Facilitating
Environment, p.101
5. Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children, p.198
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oT anxiety outwards by projection, and turns his objects into
dangerous ones and re-introjects them, the real source of all
this is his own aggressive instincts, or as Klein would say,
his Death Instinct. He will fear this internal object which he
has introjected in proportion to the degree of his own sadistic
impulses. With the reciprocal action, the to-ing and fro-ing of
projection and introjection, the savage super-ego of the child
is built up, at the period of "its first oral introjection of
objects,"^ In this way Klein dots the "i"s and crosses the "t"s
of Freud's original contention that the original severity of
the super-ego does not represent accurately the severity exper¬
ienced in reality, but the child's aggressiveness towards parental
2 3
figures. '
The point that Klein continually makes is that the Death
Instinct is responsible for all this. It converts itself into the
1. Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children, p.179
2. Love, Hate and Reparation, p.112
K, Stephens, Science and Ethics, (ed. Waddington) p.65,73
Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, p.43-49
3. Klein, in Contributions to Psychoanalysis, (19^5) p.339ff.
re-states her general thesis regarding the early
super-ego and Oedipus Complex, of how they set in
under the supremacy of pre-genital impulses in the
phase of maximal sadism. On p.287, she compares and
contrasts her ideas with those ofFreud, She states
that she assumes that a child has an unconscious
knowledge of the genital organs of the other sex.
She also deals with castration anxiety which Freud
said was the single factor determining the repression
of the Oedipus Complex. Although she regards it as a
dominating fear in a boy (cf. Psychoanalysis of Children,
p.3^0) it is the child's feelings of guilt about his
aggressive desires and his love to preserve his father
as an internal and external object which cause the
Oedipal situation to lose its jjower.
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aggressiveness with which the child invests the internalized
objects, turning them into terrible monsters. It was Freud, of
course, who first allied this "threat to the self from within
the self" with the child's innate aggressiveness, If this is pro¬
jected, it will be felt as an external threat. Klein claimed that
added to the devouring breast (the mother) is , the devour¬
ing penis (the father) and these cruel and dangerous internal
figures are used by the Death Instinct to become representatives
1
of it. Again, she speaks elsewhere of whole objects, where the
child displaces its own aggressiveness on to the father, turning
him into a veritable ogre, and re-introjecting him as the super-
2
ego. But in all her arguments she says that the fear of death
is there from the beginning and through the various processes
described, enters into the fear of the super-ego. She therefore
rejects Freud's supposition that the fear of death is the final
3
transformation of the fear of super-ego. To Klein the Death
Instinct is the cause of all developments described. Few agree
with her on this matter. Why is a death instinct required at all?
Would not the fact of innate aggression followed by its develop¬
ments through introjection and projection of part-and whole-
objects explain the matter? Could not the Death Instinct be built
1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.277
2. Money-Kyrle, New Directions in Psychoanalysis. Introduction p.xi
An example of this kind of internalised bad object
is to be found in Winnicott, The Maturational
Processgand thePacilitating Environment^ p.246-8
3. Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxieties, p.111-2
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up from the processes which Klein so ably describes? Winnicott
puts the matter for those who disagree with Klein. He argues
that the anxiety in these early stages of the parent-infant
relationship relates to the threat of annihilation — the annihil¬
ation of personal being, "At this stage the word death has no
possible application and this makes the term death instinct un¬
acceptable in describing the root of destructiveness. Death has no
meaning until the arrival of hate and of the concept of the whole
1
human person," In Kleinian language, the concept of death cannot
be entertained by the child until the depressive position is
reached.
There is another side to super-ego formation in Kleinian
teaching, and this lies in the idea of internalized "good" objects
(mother — breast) which helps to form a kindly and benign aspect
of this institution. It strengthens the infant's capacity to love
and trust his objects; it heightens the stimulus for the intro-
jection of further good objects, and is a source of reassurance
2
against anxiety, acting as a defence against it. In a similar
way, Heimann speaks of a kind super-ego formed by benign internal
objects, which enables the ego to integrate, develop and venture
1, Winnicott, The Maturational Processesand the Facilitating
Environment. p.47. cf,p. 191 where Winnicott says that
he cannot accept that life has death as its opposite,
except clinically in the Manic-Depressive swing. He
thinks it is not valuable to join the word death with
the word instinct at the immature phases of the infant's
life.
see also Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction.p.129
2. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p,198ff and p.298
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forth, such a kindly super-ego is no less potent than the
threatening super-ego which prevents activities.^ It is achieved
through encouragement being given by the parents, which is
internalized, so that the super-ego is not only a source of
2 3
guilt, but also an object of love. ' In asserting this, she is
also going against Fairbairn's contention that only the bad objects
4
are internalized.
Kindly figures in reality do help to overcome the sadism
of the primitive super-ego, for as the child relates thein to it,
5
it in turn becomes milder and more reasonable. The reduction of
the sadism enables the ego to have more "space", and the child
is happier as a result of the super-ego becoming more reasonable.
Klein was able to effect this change with disturbed children
1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.138
2. Klein, ibid., p.205
See also, Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p.62
3. cf., "^ere is a benign circle for in the first place we
gain trust and love in relation to our parents, next
we take them, with all this love and trust as it were,
into ourselves, and then we can give from this wealth
of loving feelings to the outer world again." Klein,
Love, Hate and Reparation, p.115
A comment on 1 John 4. 19 ?
4. Klein, ibid., p.295. For Fairbairn's contention see Psycho¬
analytic Studies of the Personality, p.93 "...it is
difficult to find any adequate motive for internalization
of objects that are satisfying and "good". I find it
difficult to attach any meaning to the primary inter¬
nalization of a good object," p.Ill
He says this because internalization of objects is
essentially a measure of coercion and it is not the
satisfying object but the unsatisfying object that
the infant seeks to coerce.
5. Klein, 'The Early Development of Conscience in Children',
Psychoanalysis Today, p.68
through her play analysis, and her optimism and trust in its
efficacy can be illustrated by the conclusion she gives to her
paper on 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child',
where she expresses the Utopian hope that one day psychoanalysis
will become part of every child's education,^
The child also leaves behind the primitive sadistic super¬
ego as it moves from the paranoid-schizoid position to the
depressive position at about the second quarter of the first year.
In the first position the child splits up the objects into good
and bad without realizing that they are in fact one object. In
the second (depressive) position the child perceives not part-
objects but whole-objects; no longer are they split up into
ideally good or overwhelmingly bad categories; they are seen
as they are in reality, both "good" and "bad", and this causes
the child to experience some depression because of the ambivalent
feelings due to the hostile components he has towards his loved
objects; he fears that he will lose their love because of his
1, Klein, ibid,, p.73
However, on p.37U of Psychoanalysis of Children she is more
realistic and says that all analysis can do is to relax
the pre-genifal fixations and diminish anxiety and thus
assist the super-ego to move forvrard from pre-genital
stages to the genital one. Every advance made in the
reduction of the severity of the super-ego means that
libidinal impulses have gained power in relation to the
destructive ones, and that the libido has attained the
genital stage in fuller measure,
2. For a description of this in detail seej
Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p,54-68
Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p,226ff,,p,284
a"d Contributions to Psychoanalysis, p.283ff., p.311
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1
hostility, and his inability to hold together destructive
impulses and feelings of love towards the same object (person)*
As these good and bad objects synthesise into one, the ego
assimilates the super-ego, which becomes more realistic. The
whole process of the depressive position mobilizes in the child
the wish to repair the damage which it thinks or feels that it
has done due to its omnipotence of thought. This takes the form
of restitution or reparation, in order to restore his loved
3
objects or bring them back to tirholeness. Alternatively, the
child may use what Klein calls "the Manic Defence" to keep the
k
depressive anxiety at bay. However, this position sets in a
process whereby reality intervenes on the child's psyche to a
greater extent than before, and the result is that as good and
bad objects are synthesized into one, the ego assimilates the
5
super-ego.
1. ¥innicott thinks this is a bad name for it, as being
depressed here means "an achievement and implies a
high degree of personal integration and an acceptance
of responsibility for all the destructiveness that is
bound up with living, with the instinctive life, and
with anger at frustration," The Maturational Processesand
the Facilitating Environment, p.176
For a good description seej
Segal, 'A Psychoanalytical Approach to Aesthetics', New Direct¬
ions in Psychoanalysis. p.386ff.
2. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis. p.283f
3. Segal, Introduction to the ¥ork of Melanie Klein. p.79f
4. Segal, ibid, p. 69f ~~
5. Klein links up some of these experiences with mourning,
whereby the ego is enriched through the process,
(see, Contributions to Psychoanalysis. p,311f.)
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We now come to the id as conceived in Melanie Klein's
thought. Already we have had to refer to certain aspects of it,
in connection with phantasy. It will be seen that it is diffi¬
cult to deal with the institutions separately, as they are all
inter-related, for example, she describes in almost identical
terms the formation of super-ego and ego, and constantly refers
to her other concepts in so doing. However, it is quite clear
that she regards the id, as did Freud, in being formed by the two
instincts, Eros and Thanatos, Libido and Aggression. We have con¬
sidered her view of theDeath Instinct already^". Now the expres¬
sion of these instincts takes place in phantasy and as instincts
are by definition object-seeking, and the ego from birth is
capable of object-relations, internalized objects are therefore
utilized in the phatasies.However, phantasy is not pure id; it
is the mental expression of the instincts through the medium of
the ego.
Fenichel distinguishes between two kinds of phantasy (he
spells it actually with an "f " - fantasy); one is creative
which prepares for later action; the other is day-dreaming, the
2
refuge for wishes which cannot be fulfilled. Segal puts the
matter a little differently. "Since phantasy aims at fulfilling
instinctual drives, as a defence against the external reality
1. See page 69» note 1. Another celebrated psychoanalyst
who accepts the idea of a Death Instinct is Karl Menniger,
whose book, Man Against Himself, abounds in descriptions
of masochistic,self-destructive acts which men commit
against themselves, cf. Flugel's 'Polycrates Complex',
Man, Morals and Society, p.176-201
2. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.50
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of deprivation,"^" However, Susan Isaacs says that she herself
is not concerned with day-dreaming, which is formed by conscious
phantasies. She has, therefore, adopted a special spelling of
the word with phantasy to be used only when referring to Uncon¬
scious mental content. Hence phantasy is "the primary content of
2
unconscious mental processes."
Unconscious phantasies are the source of every mental process,
and this is a primitive aspect of mental life which was in oper¬
ation before the higher functions developed. One of Freud's
first teachings was that everything conscious has a preliminary
3
stage in the unconscious. Phantasies are pre-verbal in origin,
they are active in the mind long before words, and continue to
operate alongside and independently of words. Reality-thinking
cannot function without the simultaneous operation of concurrent
and supporting unconscious phantasies, and these, as has been said,
are the primary content of mental processes. Phantasies accord¬
ing to Kleinian thinking underlie all we say and do,
Joan Riviere attempts to describe phantasy in more explicit
terms. She draws attention to the fact we have already noticed,
that the psyche responds to the reality of its experiences by
interpreting them,or rather by misinterpreting them, in a highly
1. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein.
2. Guntrip would re-word this: "...the primary content of the
unconscious mental processes is an emotionally active
psychic structure, and that phantasy is its emergence
into consciousness." Personality. Structure and Human
Interaction, p.224
3. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams. (1932), p.4l
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subjective manner. This increases its pleasure and preserves
it from pain. Freud called this act of subjective interpretation
"hallucination"} Riviere says that it comprises what we mean by
phantasy llfe.^"
When discussing the id as interpreted by Freud, we said/
that he regarded it as the part of the mind most closely related
to the body, almost in direct contact with somatic processes,
taking over from instinctual needs and giving them mental expres¬
sion! Isaacs regards this "mental expression" as unconscious
phantasies. They spring from the sensations and emotions of the
body, i.e., their source is internal, their origin is not "arti¬
culated knowledge of the external world." So phantasy is the
operative link between id impulse, which, through the instincts,
is biological, and the mechanism of the ego. Normal workings of
logic are not to be found in the id{ as with Freud, Klein stated
2
that contradictory phantasies can exist side by side ,and the
origin of this is no doubt due to the contrary instincts.
But how do we know all this? Isaacs states that views held
by the Kleinians about phantasy are based wholly upon inference.
Unconscious phantasies are always inferred, they are not directly
observed as such. She justifies her statement by saying that the
technique of psychoanalysis as a whole is largely based upon
3
inferred knowledge. Many, however, who would agree with the
1. Riviere, Developments in Psychoanalysis. p.4l
2. Klein, Love, Hate and Reparation, p.75
3. S. Isaacs, Developments in Psychoanalysis. p«69
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statement, would also object to the nature of what Isaacs has
inferred. Here are some examples from Melanie Klein's first book,
The Psychoanalysis of Children:
"Arithmetic and writing represented violent sadistic
attacks upon her mother's body and her father's penis
to her unconscious....They meant tearing, cutting up
or burning her mother's body, together with the ^
children it contained, and castrating her father."
"The little girl turns away from her mother and takes
her father's penis as an object of gratification.
At first, this gratification is of an oral nature, ^
but there are genital tendencies at work already...."
In Contributions to Psychoanalysis Klein states that in
both sexes there is an unconscious knowledge of the existence
3
of the penis as well as of the vagina , and in Developments in
Psychoanalysis. Klein speaks about devouring and scooping out
k
the mother's body and breast . All this, of course, is inferred;
but this does not mean to say that it is valueless. Yet, how
can a baby of six months know about sexual intercourse, or about
its father's penis? How can a child be aware of something of
which it has no knowledge? Her assumption of the child's uncon¬
scious knowledge of sex is for Klein a fundamental one; yet lays
5
itself open to obvious criticisms.
It is natural that the whole work of Melanie Klein should
have been criticised from many angles. The major difficulty,
1. p.69
2. p,210 and also pp. 269,326,331
3. p.380
k. p.206
5. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.212
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according to Brierley^"lies in her generalizations which "tend
to be expressed in perceptual rather than conceptual terms. She
seems to mix the language of phantasy with abstract terminology."
Whilst Brierley believes that our generalizations should be in
closest accord with our experience, she still thinks that Klein's
choice of terms was too close to the specific source material
to be of value.
In addition to this criticism, Dr. Jean Biggar stated that
Klein made the unwarranted assumption that the findings about the
developments of abnormal children whom she had to analyse could
be applied 'holus-bolus' to normal children - that the phantasies
she observed in the disturbed children worked in the normal ones
2
as well. Freud was more careful to say that the psychoanalysis
of neurotic patients provided clues towards normal development.
3
Winnicott acknowledged that Klein went cfeeper and deeper into
the mental mechanisms of her patients, but made the mistake of
assuming that deeper meant earlier, pushing them back in time
further and further! also that she failed to pay enough attention
to environmental factors. "I would say that Melanie Klein repre¬
sents the most vigorous attempt to study the earliest processes
of the developing human infant, apart from the study of child care."
Little or no consideration is taken into account as to how the
1. Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.68-9
2. Dr. Jean Biggar in a lecture at the Davidson Clinic, 19<$5




child has been treated by the parents, e.g., deprivation,
negligence or cruelty; only the child's reactions are stated.
In fact her exclusive concern' is with the inner world of the
child.1
As we have seen, Winnicott could not accept the concept of
2
the Death Instinct , and we observed too that he voiced the views
of most analysts except those of the inner circle of Klein's
3
own followers. Biggar thought Klein made a mistake to tie anxiety
up with the Death Instinct, as the child's primary anxiety is of
being left alone and not having his needs met, neither of which
are primarily associated with death. Fairbairn and Guntrip like-
4
wise reject the Death Instinct.
It is obvious that there are tremendous methodological
difficulties with the theories of Melanie Klein, They are derived
almost exclusively from the inner world of child phantasy which
she claimed to have discovered. This inner world, however, has
itself been inferred from the play of children, which has in turn
been interpreted according to Klein's own intuitions. If we are
to look for an empirical anchorage for these, it is to be found
1. "The only disputable aspect of Mrs Klein's clinically
based account of the Inner World is that it owes
more to the projection and re-introjection of innate
sadism than to external bad handling of the infant,"
Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction,p.230
One could think of others, e.g., the interpretation of the
child's unconscious knowledge of sex, the subjective
nature of phantasy interpretation and its impossibility
to be verified.
2. See page 69* note 1
3. Segal, Heimann, etc.
4. Guntrip, ibid., p.207-8 and Fairbairn, Pyschoanalytical
Studies of the Personality, p.78-9
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in the material which has been made available from the psycho¬
analyses of patients at later periods of life, which has been
read back into the earlier stages, and from this reading-back
the inner world has in part been re-created, If ever there was
an example of the dual mechanism of projection and introjection,
it is to be found in Klein's theories!
Her methodology therefore partakes of the same circularity
which Rieff observed in the creation of Freud's Unconscious. If
Freud's work was inetapsychological, Klein's is even more so,
in fact it is almost mythical in nature and cannot even be
regarded as a scientific hypothesis.
Yet, we do not regard it as valueless. Psychotherapy, we have
seen, is a technique which can use hypotheses which are both
unproved and unprovable; it is not a strict science. These
unproved and unprovable myths do lack sound scientific basis,
but they can still have value as descriptive schemata of a
provisional nature. To this problem we will return in the last
1
chapter of this Part.
1 (Both the phrases in italics are from Anthony Storr.)
CHAPTER III
PRESENT DAY FREUDIANS
As representatives of present day Freudian thinking, four
influential thinkers on psychoanalysis have been chosen; two are
on this side of the Atlantic and two in America. The first is
D.W. Winnicott.
1. P.N. WINNICOTT
Dr. Winnicott came to psychoanalysis through paediatrics,
as is evidenced by the title of his first collected papers,"'"
He is now well-known as an authority on child rearing, and has
2
published several books on the subject• However, much of his
thinking is to be found in his recent collection of papers called
The Maturational Processfeand the Facilitating Environment, to
which most of the references will be made here.
This collection of papers centres upon a study of the devel¬
opment of the ego of the infant, within the care of its mother .
"We can say that the facilitating environment makes possible the
steady progress of the maturational process. But the environment
does not make the child. At best it enables the child to realize
3
potential," It is the mother herself who not only provides, but
1. Collected Papers, (1958) Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis
2. The Child and the Family. (1957)
The Child and the Outside World, (1957)
(combined and condensed in aPelican paperback)
The Child, the Family and the Outside World, (1964)




is the facilitating environment. If the rnaturational process
depends on the quality of the facilitating environment it is
just another way of saying that the ego development of the child
2
depends on the quality of mothering which the child is given.
He says that maturational processes can become dammed up because
3
of a failure in the facilitating environment , and that "without
good enough mothering the early stages in development cannot
4
take place."
Our primary concern is with his use of the three-fold Freudian
structure of the human psyche and related terms. He speaks with
appreciation of Freud's introduction of the concept of the super¬
ego. "With this new term, Freud was indicating that the ego, in
coping with the id "(and endeavouring to control it)'" employed
5
certain forces which were worthy of a name." By the development
of the super-ego, anxiety matures into guilt, therefore guilt
appears as a result of changes taking place within the person's
psychical structure. Winnicott connects with this the contention
1. The Maturational Process and theFacilitating Environment, p.85
2. When we speak thus, we observe the hybrid kind of
language which Winnicott uses to describe human
development.
Brierley (page 77» note l) objected to Klein's language as
being too close to her material, using perceptual rather
■fchan conceptual terms. The same could be said of Winnicott,
perhaps even more so, for he uses terras of every day exper¬
ience, However, he is always clear, and because of this one
can dismiss very largely this linguistic objection,
3. ibid., p.207
4. ibid., p.74
5. ibid., p.16, 18
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of Burke that "guilt resides in the intention." In speaking of
the super-ego he adds in parenthesis? "It has been pointed out
that there is a parallel between the maturing of the super-ego in
the individual child and the development of monotheism as depicted
1
in early Jewish history." However, he does not say where this
has been done*
Winnicott also uses the word "id" as synonymous with the
2
instinctual life of the individual. The instincts themselves are
object-directed towards the "object mother" who by her reliable
3
presence as "environment mother"frees the baby's instinctual life.
The result of this is that the sense of guilt in relation to the
id drives becomes further and further modified into what is known
4
as concern.
Winnicott also speaks of the "repressed unconscious", which
is a special aspect of the unconscious, This he contrasts with the
"unconscious generally" which he regards as the "storehouse of
the richest areas of the person's self"} the repressed unconscious
is "the bin in which it is held (at great cost in terms of mental
economy) that which is intolerable and beyond the capacity of the




4. This means therefore that concern, so often associated
with care, originates, not as does care, in libido,
but in anxiety, and is the result of the modification
of anxiety, through libido to concern.
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1
experience." The unconscious proper can be reached in dreams,
but this repressed unconscious is not freely available for us and
"appears only as a threat or as a source of reaction-formation
(for example, sentimentality indicating repressed hatred)."
Although he does not use the word id in this connection, it is
difficult to fit this material into any other system than the id
itself, as he defines the id "for phenomena that are not covered
and catalogued and experienced, and eventually interpreted by
3
ego-functioning."
The main part of Vinnicott's book, however, is concerned
with the ego. He defines the ego as "that part of the growing
human personality that tends, under suitable conditions, to
4
become integrated into a unit." However, he emphasises the large
part which a mother plays in providing support for the infantile
ego and enabling it to grow. In traditional Freudian theory
where the ego is the part of the id modified by coming to terms
with environment, it was natural that emphasis was placed on
the structure of the ego together with the defences it employed.
Winnicott states that whereas the study of ego defences takes
the investigator back to "pre-genital id-manifestations", the
study of ego psychology takes him back to the nursing dyad, the








the mother's "holding" and care. Because of this emphasis,
Winnicott devotes much of his writing concerning ego formation
to the part played by the mother in providing support for the
infantile ego and enabling it to grow. He speaks of the "holding"
of a child, and of "good enough mothering." By these two activities
the infant is able to move from a "subjectively conceived object"
(the mother's being regarded as an extension of the self) to a
relationship with an object objectively conceived} the child is
able to develop from absolute dependence on the mother, through
the stage of relative dependence to independence.
As a result of the mother's care, there is built up in the
infant a continuity of being which is the basis of the child's
ego strength; if a child, however, lacks these essentials there
may be ego-weakness. Winnicott speaks about "good enough mother¬
ing" which, by meeting the infant's needs at the beginning,
enables it to have a brief experience of omnipotence.(author*s
italics). The mother is required to meet the infantile omnipot¬
ence and implement it. If the mother fails to sense her infant's
needs in this respect, the spontaneity of the child will be lost
and the child's "true self" will not be able to emerge 5 he will
then be obliged to adopt a "false self" out of compliance with
the mother whom he is afraid to lose.




develop along lines whereby the tendencies for integration within
the child itself work to bring about a state in which the child
in fact becomes a unit, "a whole person, with an inside and en
outside, a person living in a body more or less bounded by the
skin.""'' Then "me" and'hot-me" are distinguishable, and the
growth can continue by interchange between inner and outer
reality, each being enriched by the other. (This appears to be
the same process described by Melanie Klein as the device of
projection and introjection.) The surface of the skin is the limit¬
ing membrane and holds the position between the infant's "me" and
2
"not-xae" . "The psyche has come to live in the soma and an
3
individual psycho-somatic life has been initiated." The child
then has the "I AM" feeling.
One factor which facilitates the child's ability to inte¬
grate and become a unit is called by Winnicott "The Transitional
Object", He assigns a most fundamental place to this phenomenon
k
is human development, This Transitional Object consists of a
small woollen toy, such as a teddy-bear or a piece of soft cloth;
it need not have a specific shape as its feel and smell is what
matters most rather than what it looks like - and it is for the




4. The most straightforward explanation of this concept is
to be found in the chapter, 'First Experiments in Independ¬
ence1, in, The Child, the Family and the Outside World. p.l67f
86
significance and infantile omnipotence. It also belongs to the
mother in that it stands for her as a substitute when she is
absent. The child endows it with the qualities of the mother, but
it possesses for hirn the added advantage that it does not go
away as the mother does. Winnicott emphasises that it is not
the object that is transitional, but the rich emotional thought-
world which it represents} this thought-world is of the infant's
transition from being merged with the mother in a symbiosis to a
relationship with the mother as an object outside of itself. It
helps the child to sort out fact from fantasy, and to move from
omnipotent to more realistic and empirical ways of thinking.
Winnicott also speaks of this emergence towards the "I AM"
feeling in his recent book, The Family and Individual Development.
He begins with the complete symbiosis of the infant and mother
where "nothing has yet been separated out as not-me" to the child,who
through maternal support, as outlined, has developed an ego which
can organize its own defences against the anxieties which come
from within (the id) and without (reality).^" The environment has
to be favourable for the infant to be able to make its journey
towards autonomy and become integrated into a sense of unity
2
of personality.
The following quotation is a summary of this process:
"Before integration the individual is unorganised, a
1. The Family and Individual Development, pp.16-19
2, ibid,, p.25-8
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mere collection of sensory-motor phenomena,
collected by the holding environment. After inte¬
gration the individual IS, that is to say, the infant
human being has achieved unit status, can say I AM
(except for not being able to talk). The individual
has now a limiting membrane, so that what is not-he
onfr not-she is repudiated and is external. The he or
the she has now an inside, andycollected memories of
experiences,and can be built up the infinitely complex
structure that belongs to a human being,
I suggest that this I AM moment is a raw moment;
the new individual feels infinitely exposed. Only if
someone has her arms around the infant at this time
can the I AM moment be endured, or rather, perhaps
risked."
It will be noted later that this I AM experience to which
Vinnicott draws attention has close affinities with existential¬
ist thought. However, "being" for Winnicott is not a "ground
term" as with some Existentialists, because it is not there from
2
the beginning; the infant, after birth, has to emerge into being.
Being is the result of successful maternal care, in which the
infant can build up a continuity of being which is the basis of
3
ego strength. Vinnicott argues that the mental health of any
individual, in the sense of freedom from psychosis or liability
to psychosis, namely schizophrenia, is laid down by maternal care.
This implies that schizophrenia is psycho-genetic in causation,
which fits in with his idea of mental illnesses not being like
physical illnesses, but are "compromises between success and
1. The Family and Individual Development. p.l48





failure in the individual's emotional development.""'"
In the above account of ego development we have seen that
Winnicott has introduced into Freud's terminology two further
dualistic concepts. The first is that of the two mothers, and
the second of the two selves.
As the mother is the child's first object, she is naturally
the goal of the erotic and aggressive drives; in this capacity
she is the object-mother. However, the child also needs the
mother as part of the total environment on which he depends;
he requires a kindly environment to contain his discharges of id-
2
tension ; therefore the mother is required because of her survival
value as environment-mother. The child will then be able to
integrate the two aspects of mother, and to know that his omni¬
potent phantasies of destruction have not killed her. In typical
Winnicott thought, the mother meets the omnipotence of the child's
id drives; this permits the child's guilt to develop into concern
3
and provides opportunities for reparation for its feelings.
Elsewhere Winnicott speaks of the environment-mother as being-
human, and the object-mother as being a thing. One wonders if
this is the psychological origin of Buber's dichotomy of the
"I-Thou" and'T-It'' relationships?
1. ibid., p.222
see also "Collected Papers.(1958) p.162 where he says that
schizophrenia is "a sort of environmental deficiency disease."
and on p.291 he speaks of psychoanalysis itself as "a study




The second dualisjn is that of the "false-self" and the
"true-self". The former, we are told, is built up on the basis
of compliance, and in adverse circumstances it can perform a
defensive function which is the protection of the true self.
The true self is then "buried" and cannot be shown because of
anxiety and fear. The false self is built up more by introjection
than projection! by it the child puts on a show of being real
to adapt himself to whoever happens to dominate the scene, but
essentially the false self is a reaction of compliance to envir¬
onmental demands. The "true self" develops when the mother meets
the omnipotence of the infant, as we have described, and makes
sense of it; she allows id demands to be expressed so that they
can develop into the ego structure. When the mother meets the
child's omnipotence she permits the child to abrogate it, once
the child has expressed it. The child can enjoy the illusion of
being omnipotent, of creating and controlling, and then it is
gradually able to dispense with it, as it is no longer required,
simply because spontaneity has taken over. The "true self" is
spontaneous; the true self can be creative and feel real; whereas
the false self results in a feeling of unreality and a sense of
futility, Guntrip, however, connects Wrinnicott's "true" as
against "false" self with the original psyche-soma which Winni-
cott speaks of in his Collected Papers.'*' Winnicott would regard
it as a sort of id, out of which the ego is developed. Guntrip
1.pp.201 and 2kh
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says, "clearly the psyche-soma is not an impersonal id, but the
primary natural self, the libidinal psyche,and it is the true
self with which the patient must establish contact.,.. An
impersonal id is not the concept of a true self."'"
Charles Rycroft has pointed out that "true" and "false",
like authentic and inauthentic of the existentialist writers,
2
are evaluative concepts, not scientific causal ones. This is
undoubtedly true and must be accepted. Xn the same volume, how¬
ever, Peter Lomas writes that the distinction between the two
selves is important because it is immediately meaningful in terms




We have already referred to Anna Freud's work when consid¬
ering the structure of the human psyche as detailed by Freud
himself, following his re-systematization in TheEgo and the Id.
Her own book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence played its
part in the general movement of bringing the ego into the fore¬
ground of psychoanalysis. The ego is regarded as central, for
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.115-6
2. Rycroft, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.l6
cf. Guntrip regards this as a valuable concept but
then the term "true" is too tinged with evaluatory
meanings, and is not sufficiently scientifically
descriptive. He prefers "natural self" as would
Fairbairn also. Guntrip, ibid., p.^12
3. Rycroft, ibid., p.13^
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it is the medium through which we get a picture of the two
other institutions, the super-ego and the id."'' Too easily can
analysts devote their time to the analysis of the unconscious
id material, without gaining any deeper understanding of the
2
individual. The reason for this is that large portions of the
ego are themselves unconscious and these are concerned with the
defences which the ego has built up on all sides to master the
instinctual life, to deal with reality and to cope with the super-
3
ego. Although the analyst will meet great resistance from the
patient in this part of the analysis, unless these parts of the
ego are analysed, one cannot lay bare the deep-seated problems so
as to effect a change.
Anna Freud listed various methods of defence which the ego
employs} including regression, repression, reaction-formation,
projection, introjection, turning against the self and sublimation
or displacement of instinctual aims. She also added to these
denial in phantasy, restriction of the ego, identification with
h
the aggressor, and a form of altruism. In all this she emphasises
the magnitude of the achievement of the ego in employing the
defences it does, "establishing the most harmonious relations
possible between the id, the super-ego and the forces of the
5
outside world,"
1.A.Freud,The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence.p.6
2. ibid,, p.16
3. ibid., p.26-7
4. Anna Freud described this mechanism of identification with




Anna Freud came to England before the war, and since that
time she has worked with children and with adolescents, and has
contributed much to our understanding of their disorders and
1
unusual behaviour. Her most recent book, Normality and Path¬
ology in Childhood, again repeats some of her basic thoughts,
such as the over-valuation of the unconscious determination of
behaviour patterns and of the need to analyse ego resistances
2
before id content. She not only speaks, however, of resistances
of the ego to safeguard its defences, there is also the resist¬
ance of the super-ego which opposes analytical licence, and
that of the id, which resists change, because it is tied to the
3
principle of repetition, Melanie Klein, we saw, regarded
child analysis as a means of liberating the ego; Anna Freud still
continues to adhere to the view that the immature ego is threat-
it
ened by the process of analysis. The dxfference between adult
analysis and child analysis lies in the fact that in the former
the analysts emphasise unconscious psychic material, and in the
latter the powerful influence of environment: hence child analysts
look not only at the inner world of phantasy, but also at the
outer world of the child*s experience, (it is interesting to
observe that Erikson in discussing Martin Luther's stormy adoles¬
cence remarks that psychoanalysis ignores the work-history of
1.'Adolescence', The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol 13»
p.255-278




patients, concentrating almost exclusively on their inner lives. "*")
However, one significant point occurs in the new way in
which Anna Freud postulates psychic structure. She naturally
adheres to Freud's tripartite structure of the psyche, as ego,
2
super-ego and id, but often it is divided in a two-fold or
four-fold way, as follows} the ego and super-ego are considered
3
together as against the two Drives of Libido and Aggression.
It could be put diagramaticallyt-
EGO SUPER-EGO
LIBIDO drive AGGRESSION drive
She speaks of the series of steps which a child takes from un-
differentiation to structuralization of the personality into the
three categories; first of all there is division between ego and
id, followed by division within the ego; after which super-ego,
ego-ideal and ideal-self are given the role of guiding and critic-
4
ising the ego's thoughts and actions. Hence, apart from the
different division of the structure, her scheme is essentially
the same as Freud's.
3. ERIK HOMBURGBR ERIKSON
Erikson, like Anna Freud, his teacher, has worked extensive¬
ly with adolescent patients and young children, but he includes
1. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p.15




in his field of study the investigation of primitive societies
and has studied the effects of child rearing on the social
structure of society. ue deals with these implications in his
book Childhood and Society, which also contains his central con¬
cept of "ego-identity" or "identity-crisis"; the latter is also
to be found in his biographical study Young Han Luther, in which
psychoanalysis is used as a historical tool in order to re-eval¬
uate Martin Luther and his times.
"I have called the major crisis of adolescence the
identity crisis; it occurs in that period of the
life cycle when each youth must forge for himself some
central perspective and direction, some working unity,
out of the effective remnants of his childhood, and
the hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect
some meaningful resemblance between what he has come
to see in himself, and what his sharpened awareness
tells him others judge and expect him to be,"-'-
Erikson is a Freudian and he quotes the threefold traditional
2
structure with approval and considerable literary embellishment.
He also accepts Anna Freud's mechanisms of defence of the ego,
and concludes that the ego is "an 'inner institution' evolved to
safeguard that order within individuals on which all outer order
3
depends." The study of the ego to Erikson is a study of interde—
h.
pendence of inner and social organization.
1. Young Man Luther, p.12. The concept is fully explicated in
Identity and the Life Cycle.




"The human being at all times, from the first kick
in utero to the last breath, is organized into group¬
ings of geographical and historical coherences family,
class, community, nation. A human being, thus, is at
all times an organism, an ego, and a member of a
society and is involved in all three processes of
organization. His body is exposed to pain and tension5
his ego to anxiety; and as a member of a society, he ^
is susceptible to the panic emanating from his group."
Erikson therefore insists on three processes being studied
all at the same times the somatic process, the ego process and
the societal process; hence biology, psychology and the social
sciences are all required for the purpose of full understanding.
He says that his thinking is dominated by this trichotomy, and
that in his methodological approach, he is involved in observation
of somatic changes, personality transformations and social
upheavals. Erikson is critical of psychoanalysis at first having
little to say about the way in which the ego's synthesis grows -
or fails to grow - out of the "soil of social organization",
2
implying that it was too restricted. He also asserts that neuro¬
logical factors play a vital part in ego development. He claims
that a study of identity on the broader basis suggested by him¬
self is as necessary for our time as that of sexuality was for
Freud's time. Therefore, it may be safe to record that his psych¬
ology has for its central study "ego-identity", within a threefold
schema of biology, psychology and sociology.




Edith Jacobson who claims that it ignores infantile development
and the ontogenetic factors, and that he uses the word "ego"
too broadly, where he should really speak of man's whole self
including his instinctual development, his uneven super-ego
formation and his object relations and identifications, i.e.,
the whole psychic organization and its object world considered
together.^
EDITH JACOBSON
Dr. Jacobson's book The Self and the Object ¥orld is a con¬
temporary restatement of classical Freudianism, with some modifi¬
cations . It is natural that her work should be influenced by that
of the other writers we have mentioned, Klein, Anna Freud,
Winnicott and Erikson, but there is no uncritical acceptance of
2
anyone's work as Dr. Jacobson is an individual writer and thinker.
Her book is concerned with the development of the psychic
structure from the time of intra-uterine existence, through
infancy, latency, adolescence and adulthood. She begins with the
infant in the womb, accepting Freud * s descriptive term "narcis¬
sistic" for this state. Even in the embryonal stage, Jacobson
suggests that there is a "diffuse dispersion of undifferentiated
drive energy in the unstructured "primal" psychophysiological
3
self." At birth this activity continues as dispersions or
discharges to the outside possibly through "biologically
1. The Self and the Object World, p»24-32
2. ibid., pp.46 and 48
3. ibid., p.52
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pre-determined though limited channels" and these are the
precursors of object relations, At the beginning therefore these
drives are biologically pre-patterned, but undifferentiated, in
the sense of Freud's two instincts of Eros and Thanatos (the
latter, however, Jacobson cannot accept). But differentiation
does occur, "Libidinal and aggressive cathectic gathering poles
are formed around nuclei of as yet unorganized and disconnected
2
memory traces,"
It will be seen that when she speaks of drives being "psycho-
biologically determined" her concept of what is called the id is
rooted in biology. At first, the "undifferentiated energy of the
primal self" is discharged by the infant in the womb and soon
after birth, then it is differentiated into the two basic drives
of libido and aggression. She also conceives the "primary autono¬
mous" core of the ego lying in the who1e sensory and motor systems
waiting to be developed. The future structure of the whole psyche
is "biologically pre-patterned,
Jacobson follows Freud on the formation of the ego, whilst
rejecting, as we have seen, Erikson's concept of ego-identity.
All her writing betrays an intense style, in which every single




3, When we consider the concepts of Fairbairn and Guntrip, we
shall see that they regard the super-ego, for example, as
a psychic entity, of psychological origin, free from
biological factors or influences.
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".,«identity formation must, at any phase, reflect
man's complicated instinctual development, the slow
maturation of his ego, his uneven super-ego formation,
and the intricate vicissitudes of those object relations
and identifications with his family and his social
milieu upon which his individual, personal, cultural,
social adult life in and with his environment is
founded.
No psychic entity is ever considered in isolation? there is con¬
tinual interaction throughout the psyche. This is what one would
expect in a study of psychodyneunics, otherwise it would be psycho-
statics! With Jacobson, a structure of the psyche is surely
postulated? but the interaction between the various elements,
together with the underlying biology and the object world, is
seldom excluded.
Jacobson speaks of the mother's care of the child stimulating
both ego development and libidinal activity; and adds that the
mother's influence on the growth of the child's ego cannot be
2
better conceptualized than "in terms of our drive theory". She
asserts that it is in the "psychobiologically pre-patterned
(instinctive) responses" which provide for the discharge of psychic
drive energy that the child's emotional ties to the mother are
3
rooted. Long before the baby is aware of the mother, or of it¬
self, "engrams are laid down of experiences which reflect his





3. ibid,, p.34 footnote
4. ibid., p.34
In the groxirth of the ego, Jacobson considers both merging
with the mother (symbiosis) and efforts to imitate the mother"1"}
merging, however, she regards as the foundation of all object
2
relations and future identifications. Playful imitations are
forerunners of true ego identifications} but reaction formations
are but precursors of super-ego formation. By this a problem
raised in considering the psychology of the Kleinian school is
solved (see Chapter II.p) » We asked: When does an introjected
object contribute towards ego development, and when towards super¬
ego development? The answer then given by Paula Heimann was that
the emotional situation in which the child performs the act of
identification decides the result. Here Jacobson is more definite
in relegating the ego contribution to an identification following
the introjection, and the super-ego contribution to a reaction-
formation taking place. However, the emotional situation of the
child could still determine which.
By the second year, the child's body and ego growth have
proceeded, and he now competes with and rivals his loved object.
He develops "self-images" as well as being able to discriminate
between wishful and realistic images of the self out of which come
his ego-ideal and ego goals, i.e., realistic goals regarding the
future. The parents do not only stimulate the growth of the ego}
they also "support the control, partial inhibition, partial fusion,
1. ibid,, p.42. She quotes Fenichel in support p.31 Psycho¬
analytic Theory of Neurosis.
2. ibid., p.39
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neutralization and utilization of sexual and aggressive drives
in the service of the ego and of 'secondary' process functioning,
It is the parents who "promote the child's gradual individuation
and his advance from the psychobiologically determined dependency
situation to independent ego activity spreading out to social,
2
cultural and eventually ego-syntonic sexual pursuits," Like
^elanie Klein, Jacobson sees an important part played by frust¬
ration in the up-building of the ego, in that it causes the child
to turn his aggression towards the frustrating objects and his
libido towards himself, thereby reinforcing the distinctions
between object and self; this enhances the narcissistic endow¬
ments of the ego and promotes the "eventual establishment of
3
secondary ego and super-ego autonomy," Also frustration is related
to identification. Any kind of identification implies, "I don't
need you; if you don't want to do it for me, I can do it for
myself.,,," ¥here the frustration leads to taking over the role
of the frustrating person, it is a form of identification with
the object (parent) who frustrates us most.
The two following quotations on ego development and funct¬
ioning illustrate again both Jacobson's highly individualistic
style, and her constant practice of inter-relating the various






"Normal ego functioning presupposes a sufficient,
evenly distributed, enduring libidinal cathexes of
both object and self-representations,
"...all ego activity, being satisfaction of the self
on an object, must combine inter—related self and
object-directed (libidinal, aggressive and neutralized)
cathectic and drive discharge processes, must be valid
for emotional experience too."-
It is, however, in her consideration of the super-ego that
we find Jacobson's work most helpful. However, we again meet the
complex inter-relatedness of the various functions and the dist¬
inctive language which makes systernat ization very difficult. By
and large, she follows Freud, rather than Klein, in her explanation
of super-ego development. Klein erroneously backdated the super¬
ego's beginning to the first three months of life; this was
because she failed to "distinguish the constitution of self and
object representations, and of object relations and ego identifi-
3
cations, from super-ego formation." Although Jacobson admits
that love and identifications are difficult to differentiate at
the very early stages, she regards, however, the first pre-genital
formations which already begin to constitute internalized parental
demands and prohibitions, as forerunners of the super-ego.
"However, even though the foundations of ego-ideal and super-ego
are laid down during the first years of life, the super-ego seems








In this she follows Freud in regarding the super-ego as the
1
"heir to the Oedipus Complex."
From her section in the book mentioned dealing with the
formation of the super-ego, (which is complicated by her closely
woven inter-relatedness of each part of the psychic structure,
and, moreover, is repetitive) one is able to draw out the various
components of super-ego formation. She stresses that the whole
process is gradual and complex, and that it has pre-oedipal
forestages.
1. The first component part of the super-ego is the "ego
ideal". The super-ego is the place where a child's wistful, grand¬
iose longings and phantasies about itself can find a safe refuge
2
and be maintained there to the profit of the ego. In support,
she quotes Freud On Narcissism (191^) that the ego—ideal is the
substitute for lost narcissism of childhood, when the individual
was his own ego-ideal. But it is not only this; the ego-ideal
also contains the desire to be with one's loved object, %v*hich
is never relinquished, and persists throughout life in the
1. ibid., p.115« Jacobson is critical of Freud in his discussion
of the relation of the ego and super-ego in The Ego and the
Id. On the one hand Freud refers to simultaneous object
relations and identifications with the loved object; and
and the other, he asserts that the little boy's relations
to his father originate in his identifications, Freud
having said that identifications arise, as in melancholia,
from the renunciation of the loved object,




struggle for oneness between ego and ego-ideal. The ego-ideal
2
is moulded from both the self-images and the ideal object,
representing the child's narcissistic moral perfectionist striv-
3
ings. Jacobson resists any attempt to separate the ego-ideal from
4
the super-ego, and to make it a separate institiiLon, . She also
resists those who would make it an ego-forraation, and not part
5
of the super-ego structure. However, elsewhere she is willing
to regard it as a bridge structure, connecting the two systems
and belonging to both. In this role it permits the ego gradually
6
to support and supplement super-ego functions. However, this
description does in a sense make it a separate institution.
2, The second component part of the super-ego formation
during the pre-oedipal stage is "reaction-formation", where the




4. ibid., p.149. She quotes Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt.
(1953) and Lynd, On Shaine and the Search for
Identity, who suggest that shame arises when
we cannot live up to our ego-ideal. Guilt arises
through the super-ego, hence they would separate
the two; Jacobson linking the ego-ideal with
moral demands will not allow this.
5. ibid., p.186. Bing, McLaughlin and Marbury, The Metapsychology
of Narcissism,(1959) from the Psychoanalysis
Study of the Child 15, p.26, suggested this, as
did Erikson in'The Problem of Ego Identity'in
Identity and the Life Cycle.(Psychological Issues).
Guntrip also regards the ego-ideal as separate




from loved objects towards itself.1 This involves its using some
of its own aggression to cope with its own aggression. Rather
than lose the loved object, the child will increase the aggress¬
ion back against its own instinctual strivings, simply because it
2
prefers security to pleasure. The supreme examples of reaction-
formation are the castration threat and super-ego formation. The
former gathers together fears from earlier stages like separation,
loss of pleasure, loss of support, and loss of bowels (through
anal phantasies); also fears of being exposed, despised and
3
rejected. All these fears, and in particular, castration fears,
do not arise from without, but from the child's own talion wishes
based on retaliatory and irrational fears which are attributed
4
to the parents by projection. These fears are related to the
Oedipus Complex, and Jacobson follows Freud in saying that the
super-ego comes to life as a system taking over these fears -
being in fact "the heir of the Oedipus Complex" as Freud said of
super-ego •
3. More closely related to reality than either of these two
components is the "influence of the parents". There are two sides
to this; on the one hand, there is the desire to be identified
with the powerful parents whom the child needs; and on the other,







have seen that the child depends psychobiologically on his
parents, and he needs support from them in the building up of
his ego; he needs powerful parental images with which he can
identify. But there is the hostile side of the relationship,
in which the boy's hostility to the father is greater than to
the mother, hence the identification is greater. The male super¬
ego, therefore, according to Jacobson, bears mainly the impact
of paternal influences, where the female one bears partly that
of paternal, but mainly of maternal influences.
Jacobeon also deals with the internalized super-ego codes
passed down from generation to generation, a matter which has been
discussed when considering Freud. One of the main components here
is sphincter morality, the concept of Ferenzci, where the child
accepts the imposition of bowel training demanded by the parents.
Only, however, at the end of the Oedipal phase do we have firm
moral codes.
Dr. Jacobson's description of the development of the super¬
ego within the psychic structure is given in considerable detail,
but in the following quotation she admirably sums up her discussion.
"Thus, the super-ego must be regarded as a momentous,
comprehensive structure formation, developing in
reaction to the child's oedipal and narcissistic
strivings, to his forbidden sexual desires as well as
to his destructive impulses. It represents a compromise
in every direction. The oedipal conflict has been
resolved, the ambivalence struggle has subsided, but
1. ibid., p.119
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their vestiges reappear and continue in the inner
conflicts between ego and superego. The limitless
narcissistic strivings of the child have been curbed
and modified, but they survive in the ego ideal and
in the ego's ceaseless efforts to measure up to its
standards•
Jacobson also continues her arguments into the period of
adolescence, and shows how through biological changes acting
in the instinctual upheavals, through the powerful assault of
these forces acting on the ego, the whole psychic structure is
modified. The ego loses its grip on the id, and in turn the super¬
ego loses its grip on the ego. She relies largely on Anna Freud's
2
work on the emotional situation in adolescence* Anna Freud com¬
pared this period to mourning, and showed how the adolescent must
yet again say farewell to loved objects in the parents, and to
establish new object relationships, which involves, as Freud
showed, an alteration in the ego. Therefore the adolescent's
psychic structure is in a state of complete reorientation,
Jacobson develops these ideas, emphasising that the defences
established during latency may be so battered by the powerful
assault of these instinctual forces that they may even break down.
However, there is another side to adolescence; because of the
great fluidity of the psychic structure, it can be a period of
great creativity; but in the end the ego must re-establish control,
as mediator between the institutions.
1. ibid., p.129
2. ibid., p.159-60
see Anna Freud, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,13, p.255-78
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Jacobson's is the most up-to-date re-statement of the
Freudian viewpoint at the present time. Like Freud himself, she
never thinks of detaching psychology from its biological found¬
ations. Guntrip, as we have mentioned and as we shall further
see, criticises Freud for his psychobiology| he speaks of
liberating psychoanalysis from its excessive psychobiological
bias."'' Anthony Storr on the other hand, in his essay on 'The
2
Concept of Cure* writes that although psychoanalysis has been
accused of propounding a complicated hypothetical structure of
the mental apparatus, it has always recognized that man's emot¬
ional experience is rooted in the body and that it is emotion
which gives meaning to life. Hence man is a psychobiological
entity and health consists in being in touch with one's instincts,
without which there cannot be self-realization and self-fulfilment.
He also says that psychoanalysis is "the only way of regarding
human behaviour which, to date, possesses the twin advantages
of doing justice to man's complexity, and at the same time,
relating complexity to biological characteristics which make him
3
part of Nature."
If one accepts these statements of Storr as valid,then
Jacobson's work, like that of Freud, comes to terms with the
essentials laid down.
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, pp.55-86
and p.99
2. Storr, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.65
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CHAPTER IV
FAIRBAIRN♦S RE-STRUCTURING OF FREUD'S THEORY
"With Fairbairn, psychoanalysis ceases to be a
psychobiology with an ego psychology tacked on,
and becomes a psychodynamic theory of" the person
developing and fulfilling himself or being ^
frustrated in his personal object relations."
The above is the evaluation which Harry Guntrip places on
his teacher and analyst. Fairbairn has been extremely fortunate
in having in Guntrip a disciple who has been able to popularize
2
his work , and to work out its place in the general system of
3
psychoanalytical thought. Throughout all Guntrip's writings,
Fairbairn is tacitly assumed to be the absolute standard against
which all others are to be judged. One is able to quote from
either Fairbairn or Guntrip as we have here a single,unified
and coherent system.
The twin pillars of Fairbairn1s re-structuring of Freud's
theories are (a) that the schizoid state is the basic position
4 / x
of the psyche , and (b) that there exists at birth a primary
pristine ego, which although undifferentiated, is a unitary
organization. When he speaks of the schizoid position, Fairbairn
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.278
2. Guntrip, Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls
3. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, and
articles in British Journal of Medical Psychology.
4. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.8
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is using the word "position" in exactly the same sense as
Melanie Klein, but he regards his schizoid position as being
more fundamental than either her depressive or paranoid position,
(it was after Fairbairn had postulated the schizoid position
that Klein came to incorporate his term into her "paranoid
position" calling it the "paranoid-schizoid position".)"'" Fair¬
bairn regarded the schizoid position as the most deep-seated of
all psychopathological states, and held that it underlay a
2
great variety of personality disorders and traits. He gives
a long list of these, so that one might think that we have here
an "umbrella" or "omnibus" terra; but he safeguards this by
mentioning various common characteristics, e.g., an attitude of
omnipotence, of isolation and detachment, a preoccupation with
inner reality; the characteristic affect of this state, he regards,
3
as a sense of futility. The earliest psychopathological symptoms
to manifest themselves are hysterical, e.g., the baby's scream¬
ing fits; but whilst the earliest symptoms are hysterical, the
4
earliest psychopathological process is schizoid. The cause of
the baby's crying is the anxiety engendered by the condition of
a schizoid, isolated, unrelated state.
Fairbairn compares his schizoid position to Jung's concept
of the introvert; Jung has also related schizophrenia to introversion^
1. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.293 footnote
2. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.6
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.51
4. Fairbairn, ibid,, p.130-1
5. Fairbairn, ibid., p.7
110
But Fairbairn prefers his term to Jiang's as it is not merely
descriptive, but explanatory in a psychogenetic sense. He also
connects his term with that of Kretschmer's "schizothymic" - as
against "cyclothymic" — but Kretschmer's are based on constitut¬
ional factors, Fairbairn's on psychogenetic ones.
To speak of the term "schizoid" as "explanatory in the
psychogenetic sense" means that its significance is derived
1
from the splitting of the pristine unitary ego , and Fairbairn
2
relates this happening to the oral stage of development. Fair¬
bairn sees paranoid, obsessional, hysterical, phobic states all
as "a variety of techniques employed to defend the ego against
the effects of conflicts of an oral origin." When the child is
orientated towards objects in a relationship which is emotionally
unsatisfying, the whole objects are split into partial objects,
3
and so is the ego which cathects these objects. As the early
oral attitude is one which is characterized by incorporation,
internalizing or introjection, the child adopts these methods to
cope with anxiety. This conclusion is similar to that of Kleinj
but Fairbairn's concern is with the fundamental schizoid state,
where the child is faced with a frustration in which he has come
to feel"(a) that he is not really loved for himself as a person
by his mother, and (b) that his own love for his mother is not
4
really valued and accepted by her." The result of this traumatic
1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.9
2, ibid., p. 10
3. ibid., p. 13
4, ibid., p. 17
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situation is that his mother or rather aspects of her come to be
regarded by the child as bad objects, because she does not seem
to love him} and that his own love is bad} therefore to preserve
his love and keep it as good as p>ossible he tends to incorporate
it (as incorporation is the main activity of the child at this
period) and to retain it inside himself, so that his love relation¬
ships with external objects come to be regarded as bad, or at
least precarious, "The net result is that the child tends to
transfer his relationships with his objects to the realm of inner
X
reality," Winnicott approved of this aspect of Fairbairn's work,
"Fairbairn's most valuable contribution is the idea
that at the root of the schizoid personality is this
failure on the part of the mother to be felt by the^
infant as loving him in his own right as a person."
Fairbairn describes the crisis situation of the young child in
the schizoid position as feeling that his love is bad because it
is destructive to his libidinal objects; this applies not only
3
to the child, but to the schizoid adult too, Guntrip restates
the situations as follows
"Love made hungry is the schizoid problem, and it
rouses the terrible fear that one's love has become
so devouring and incorporative that love itself has
become destructive, Depression is the fear of loving
lest one's hate should destroy. Schizoid aloofness is
1. Fairbairn, ibid,, p.18
2. Winnicott and Kahn, Review in International Journal of
Psychoanalysis. Vol 3^» Part p.331 quoted Guntrip
Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p,286
3. Fairbairn, ibid,, p.25
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the fear of loving lest one's love should destroy,
which is far worse,"
The problem of the schizoid person is how to love without destroy¬
ing by love; that of the depressive person is how to love without
2
destroying by hate. According to Fairbairn, the schizoid and
depressive form the two basic psychological types into which
everyone can be classified. They also form the psychological
3
basis and content of the psychoses.
Fairbairn is indebted to Melanie Klein for her theory of
object-relations| however, he feels that whilst she undoubtedly
instituted this valuable theory, she did not follow it through to
its logical conclusion, which would involve a theory based solely
on object-relations, "because the ultimate goal of libido is
k
the object." The aim of libido is not therefore pleasure through
de-tensioning, but the object, i.e., personal relations. For
Fairbairn, libido is the urge to good object-relations, the sex-
drive being but one of its manifestations; it is "the basic
5
positive all-inclusive life urge."
We saw that Freud regarded libido as one of the two basic
biological urges of the id, the other being aggression. According
to Fairbairn the object in Freud was only the means for the
1, Guntrip, 'A Study of Fairbairn's Theory of Schizoid Reactions',
British Journal of Medical Psychology, Vol.XXV, Parts 2 & 3
(1952) p.90
2, Fairbairn, ibid,, p.^9, See also Guntrip, Personality Structure
and Human Interaction, p,282-3
3, Guntrip,ibid,,p.313-^- states "Psychosis is a direct manifest-
tat ion of infantile dependence, while psychoneurosis is a
defence against that condition."
k. Fairbairn, ibid., p.31
5. Guntrip, ibid., p.259
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person'& instinctive gratification; it is not intrinsic, but
utilitarian, says Guntrip, because any impulses towards the
object are not the ego's own, but they are "alien intruders"
coming from the id, through the ego.*" This is where the theory
diverges most from Freud, for Guntrip and Fairbairn regard an
instinct theory as necessarily biologically orientated, whereas
a psychological theory should be an ego theory, Fairbairn solves
this by removing the instincts from the id and distributing them
throughout the whole psyche, making it have dynamic structure.
Guntrip does not deny that there are instincts; but he feels that
such concepts belong to biology and not to psychology. They can
be taken for granted, and need have no further place in psycho-
2
logical theory, which must stand as psychology in its own right.
This Fairbairn-Guntrip theory would exclude impulse psychology
completely, as being biological, it is therefore incompatible with
ego-psychologyj Freud's mistake according to this theory was that
he developed his ego psychology on the basis of an unquestioned
instinct theory. Starting from Klein's object-relations, Fair¬
bairn would carry it to its conclusions on the ground that the
3
object is the ultimate aim of all libidinal striving. He achieves
1. Guntrip, ibid., p.30
2. Fairbairn also criticises the Freud-Abraham theory of
development named by the various zones of the body - oral,
and genital, for the zones are only channels by which the
libido may seek the object. (P,72) They are not the primary
determinants of libidinal aims but servants of the basic
aim, which is the psyche's, through the ego dealing with
objects .(pp.162 & 138) He prefers to re-interpret Abraham's
phases in terms of techniques resorted to by the ego in its
aim of object seeking. (p.l43)
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.29
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this by ceasing to tie the instincts to the id as a source of
energy for the whole psyche, which meant that the ego to perform
any function, had to torrow its energy from the id to do it. The
whole structure of the psyche is now, as it were, diffused with
the energies which were confined to the id by Freud. This is
what is meant when the total structure itself is said to have
dynamic structure. Fairbairn refuses to think of impulses in
the psyche existing apart from the structure which they energize}
there is no divorce between impulse and structure for impulse is
"inseparable from structure" and represents simply the dynamic
aspect of structure. Freud was following the thinking of the
physics of his day when he regarded the ego as having no energy
of its own, and having to be supplied with energy from the
reservoir of the id. Fairbairn replaces this notion with that of
dynamic structure,^
The difficulties inherent in Freud's structure are apparent
if one looks at the model of Anna Freud (Chapter I, p.93). There
one sees first the two organised structures at the top; they
are structures without energy; they are only capable of possessing
energy if it is borrowed from the id. But at the bottom there
are the two drives which make up the id; they are unorganised,
psychobiological drives without structure. A further difficulty
in Freud•s structure lies in the fact that any instinct theory
1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.l67
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is a de-personalized theory, a "process theory", after the manner
suggested by Brierley, and this, according to Guntrip, cannot
be reconciled with a personal theory,"'" But in this respect
Brierley did not originate the difficulty} it stems from The Ego
and the Id, where personal ego psychology was wedded to impersonal
id, and although attention was diverted from the repressed
material to the repressing agent, the biological id remained.
Fairbairn will not equate the repressed material with id notions;
"what are repressed are neither intolerably guilty impulses,
nor intolerably unpleasant memories, but intolerably bad inter-
2
nalized objects."
Ve have already mentioned that Fairbairn preferred his own
term "schizoid" to Jung's term "introvert", because it was not
merely descriptive, but explanatory in a psychogenetic sense,
and because the essence of the term "schizoid" is that of split¬
ting, referring to the splitting of the ego. He argues that it
is not only bad objects that happen to be repressed, but also
parts of the dynamic structure, of the ego itself split off with
them, thence to form the repressed unconscious. He gives a
lengthy account of a single dream and of how he analyses the
several characters in it, into the various categories of his
3
new structural formulation.
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.63
See Brierley, Trends in Psychoanalysis, p.101-5
2. Fairbairn, ibid., p.62
3. Fairbairn, ibid., p.100-1
116
To found a theory on one dream, would of course, be a very
slender basis, a precarious foundation for any theory} but,
this dream no doubt is used because it provides all the examples
together in one place, which Fairbairn had found dispersed
throughout his other clinical data.
We return therefore to the second of the two main postu¬
lates of his theory - that the ego, a pristine, personal, unitary
ego is present from the beginning.^" This unitary, dynamic ego
is "motivated by its primary libidinal need of good-object
2
relationships." The ego is split in three ways. First, this
central ego which is able to remain tied to good object relation¬
ships, and is largely conscious or pre-conscious. The frightened,
angry part of the ego which has been aroused by an aggressive,
rejecting parent image is repressed to form in the unconscious a
subsidiary ego called at first by Fairbairi} the Internal Saboteur,
later to be re-named as the Anti-Libidinal Ego, and tied to this
is the parent image which Fairbairn calls the Rejecting Object.
This is the part of the self which sabotages all spontaneous,
creative self-expression, and is close to theFreudian-Kleinian
idea of the sadistic super-ego. There is also the Libidinal Ego,
which is "the needy child craving for attention and love,"
1. Guntrip, ibid., p.278.
Fairbairn naturally rejects Freud's idea of the ego
being formed on the surface of the idi he also
rejects Glover's ego-nuclei theory, of nuclei which
synthesise into a unity.
2. Guntrip, ibid., p.322
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which is repressed along with the aspects of the parent which
excite him and do not fulfil, but rather deprive him, and this
aspectjFairbairn calls the Exciting Object,^" This libidinal ego
is like Freud's id, but Fairbairn would insist that it is personal
2
and not like an id in Groddeck's sense* The basic endopsychic
structure is produced by the splitting of the ego, and these
split-off parts of the ego are taken down into the unconscious
along with the repressed objects. Models of this structural
3
schema are to be found in both Fairbairn's own book and in
Guntrip.^ (See Figs 4 and 5) There is, however, a further split
in Fairbairn's theoretical formulation of the psyche's structure,
He argues that the nucleus of the original object, shorn of its
over-exciting and over-frustrating elements, assumes the status
of a de-sexualized and idealized object and is retained by the
1. Full accounts to be found in Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic
Studies of the Personality, p.102-112 and Guntrip,
Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.321-335
For more popular accounts see Guntrip, Mental Pain and the
Cure of Souls* p.Slff, C. Edward Barker's Psychology
Impact on the Christian Faith, p*29ff. Barker speaks
of a "central self" and "hungry self", and a "condeming
self". He, however, omits the subtilty of Fairbairn's
argument where object and part-ego are repressed together,
so that he might as easily have spoken of the more familiar
"id" and "super-ego".
2. Guntrip, ibid,, p.265 where Fairbairn's views are expounded
by Guntrip.
3* Fairbairn, ibid., p.105
4. Guntrip,ibid.,p.335 sets beside Fairbairn's a very inadequate
model of Freud. He ought to have been more accurate and
at least have used the model which Freud himself gives
in New Introductory Lectures* p.106, which is much more
subtle. (Compare Figures 2 and 3»)
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central ego as an ego-ideal"*", forming a "rational conscience"
uncorrupted by the Internal Saboteur. It will be noted that Guntrip
in his model does not make provision for this Ego-Ideal structure
to have contact with the Anti-Libinal Ego or Internal Saboteur,
2
for it is quite separate from it.
The main features of Fairbairn's developed theory of psychic
structure are as follows
1, He assumed a central unitary pristine ego from the
beginning.
2, When any object is repressed the part of the ego which
cathects it is split off and repressed along with it,
and this is what forms the unconscious,
3, The whole structure possesses energy, as the ego itself
can repress by the use of aggression at its disposal}
and once it has performed the repression, it keeps
the two subsidiary egos repressed, as well as the
objects to which they are tied. (One presumes that
the part of the ego which does the repressing is the
unconscious part, for repression is not a conscious
device.)
Fairbairn naturally regarded his new structural scheme as
an improvement on Freud's. What are the advantages of it as
1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.178-9
2. Guntrip, ibid., p.335
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compared with the older scheme?
1. Fairbairn claims that Freud worked out his structure in
The Ego and the Xd from a background of melancholic depression,
which to Fairbairn is not the basic psychopathological position;
the fundamental position is the schizoid one, Fairbairn argues
that if Freud had stuck to his studies of hysteria and had come
to his final theory from that study, his structural formulations
would have been very different. He argued that underlying the
depressive position, with its feeling of badness and guilt, there
is a schizoid condition, which is the real cause of the trouble.
He would almost reduce much of what is commonly considered as
depression into schizoid anxiety and a sense of futility. This
state requires a very different kind of endopsychic structure
from that of Freud in order to make sense of the phenomena it
presents. Fairbairn has a section called 'Back to Hysteria'
indicating that this was the point from which Freud ought to have
begun his theorizing. Orthodox Christians sometimes give a cry
"Back to the Confessional!"; however, could not much of the
repetitiveness of compulsive confession of sin be due to a basic
trouble of a schizoid nature which confession leaves untouched
and may sometime aggravated
A typical example of this practice can be found in the
relations which the poet and hymn-writer, William Cowper (1731-
1800) had with his friend, John Newton (1725-1307) also a hyran-
1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.90-2
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writer, clergyman and ex-slave-trader, at Olney in Buckingham¬
shire. Newton was much criticised by Cowper's cousin, Lady Hesketh,
I
for his too puritanical approach towards the poet's "melancholia".
We should now diagnose Cowper*s troubles as being basically of
a schizoid nature, whereas Newton's were of a depressive nature.
The Calvinist solution based on the depressive schema of sin
and salvation through forgiveness worked with the depressive,
extmverted Newton, but only made the introverted, schizoid
Cowper much worse. Newton's "manic-defence" can be seen in the
ways he suggested that every dark cloud of Cowper's ought to have
a silver lining! It is interesting that both men lost their
mothers very early in life, and both had suffered great depriv¬
ation} Cowper, however, had suffered the more
2. When we considered the id in Freud, we found that it was
a term used to cover two kinds of phenomena. On the one hand,
the biological urges - libido and aggression, and on the other,
the repressed unconscious. The first is unorganized, the second
organized according to its own laws, very different from the way
consciousness operates. Fairbairn's theory of object-relations
carries his theory into the structure of the unconscious itself.
As Guntrip has saidj-
"It has fallen to Fairbairn to carry out object-
relations into the structure of the unconscious
1. Bernard Martin, John Newton, p.260
See also Lord David Cecil, The Striken Deer, and Erik Routley,
I'll Praise my Maker! A similar comment could be made
Kierkegaard.
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itself, and to show that all our impulses can be
understood only as reactions to ob.jects, and that
many of our impulses are reactions not to external
ob jects but to ob.jects that exist inside our very
psychic make-up itself. The unconscious is to be
understood not as a matrix of impersonal id-impulses,
but as a repressed inner world, a continuous hidden
drama of relationships between the ego and objects
buried as it were within the psyche. This inner
drama, with all the roles played therein by both
the ego and objects perpetuate all the life of
childhood that the individual has been unable to
outgrow.
This concept of "the child within" is used more and more in
descriptive writings about the psyche. It is far from being a
scientific description, but, as we shall see, there are some who
regard a good metaphor in this field worth more "than the literal
truth".2
3. One of the many advantages which Guntrip cites in favour
3
of Fairbairn is his general attitude to science. We are told
that Fairbairn does not think it necessary for a psychoanalyst
who desires to be scientific to adopt the particular method
appropriate to physical science. He considers that the investi¬
gation of psychological research should "be conducted at the
level of personality and personal relations. Fairbairn would
regard science as an intellectual tool and nothing more,"
"The picture of reality provided by science is an
intellectual construct representing the fruits of
an attempt to describe the various phenomena of the
universe, in as coherent and systematic a manner as
the limitations of human intelligence permit, by means
1. Guntrip, ibid., p.58
2. Nigel Walker, The Listener. October 6,1955, quoted by Guntrip
Personality,Structure and Human Interaction, p.139
3. Guntrip, ibid., p.250-2
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of the formulations of general laws established
by inductive inference under conditions of maximum
emotional detachment and £bjactivity on the part of
the scientific observer."
Fairbairn states that the analyst is not primarily a scientist
at all, but a psychotherapist, and this role involves " depart-
2
ure from a strictly scientific attitude." The implication is
that the psychotherapist cannot be emotionally detached, although
he tries to be objective. Yet, Fairbairn claims to have adopted
his own psychology of object-relations and dynamic structure
because of the purely scientific reason (my italics) for its
correspondence with the facts, and its greater explanatory
3
power.
4. In traditional psychoanalysis and in the formation of
psychodynamic theories of the personality, much weight is jjlaced
on the Oedipus Complex and its resolution. Fairbairn has his own
4
ideas on the Oedipal situation. He goes behindFreud's tradit¬
ional statement of it and regards it as the end-product of a
constellation of factors which owe their origin to infantile
dependence. Freud's conception of it was not the basic one, but
the derivative of an endopsychic situation which had already
developed, through the child's splitting the father as well as
1. Fairbairn, 'Observations in Defence of Object Relations
Theory of Personality', British Journal of Psychoanalysis.
Vol 28, Parts 2 & 3 (1955) p.144-156
2. For a description of this attitude to the Psychotherapist
seeEric Wood, Contact. Autumn 1966
3. Fairbairn, ibid.
4. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.119-24
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the mother into good and bad internal objects, and then fusing
these into what are very complex structures. But for Fairbairn,
the basis of the complex lies in a "situation built around the
figures of an exciting mother and an internal rejecting mother."
This means that the Oed±x>us situation does not owe its origin to
the external situation of the child (the triangular relationship
of mother, father and child), but to the internal situation of the
child who constitutes the Oedipus situation for himself. At rock
bottom, the exciting object, says Fairbairn, and the rejecting
object are one and the same person, namely, his mother,
5, Finally, there is one aspect of Fairbairn's work which
has met with general acceptance, and this is his concept of
maturity. This is not equated with genital competence, which is
but one element in the true maturity based on object relations.
The infant at the beginning of life is dependent on the object
(his mother) and is identified with that object. But this has to
be abandoned in favour of relationships with differentiated
objects. As the child develops, he has to surrender the identi¬
fication, abandoning it in favour of relationships with other
objects (people)• He develops as he does this, "Development of
the individual and development of relations proceed pari passui
and one cannot take place without the other,""'' According to
Fairbairn, one does not move from dependence to independence,
but from immature infantile dependence to mature dependence;
1. A.Storr, Integrity of the Personality, p.^5
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maturity is seen to involve relationships and these in turn
involve some sense of dependence. This conclusion follows
logically from the object-seeking nature of the libido. Indiv¬
iduals cannot be considered apart from other individuals; a
person in isolation is not a person, which is in accord with the
teachings of many philosophers and theologians, who will be
dealt with later on in the enquiry. Good ego development is a
function of good personal relationships, which is another way
of saying that maturity involves dependence,
We now turn to difficulties:-
1. Fairbairn naturally regarded his theory as an improvement
on Freud's, and one of the claims he makes is that "Freud's theory
admits the operation of two structural and two dynamic factors
1
in all," The t%*ro structural entities of Freud possess no energy,
and the two energic entities possess no structure. However,
when he goes on to claim that his own theory of five structural
with two dynamic factors permits a much greater range of permut¬
ations and combinations, one must ask if this is really a relevant
argument. Does the possibility of making a number of permutations
and combinations also make it a good theory in itself? Should
not the validity of the theory rest on its capacity to interpret
the facts it seeks to elucidate in a significant way? There is
much to be claimed for Fairbairn's contention that Freud's theory
1. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.128-9
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has great difficulties by dividing structure from energy; but
speaking of the possibility of permutations and combinations by
itself could mean that the possibilities for speculations were
increased, whereas a theory exists for elucidating empirical
reality.
2. Fairbairn creates a second difficulty by only allowing
the internalization of bad objects, as described under the
1
principle of "Divide et impera". The object being split into
good and bad objects, the good is retained by the central ego as
the ideal object and the bad object is repressed along with the
part of the ego cathected towards it. Melanie Klein, as we have
seen, does not agree with this. She regarded the child's activity
as building up internal patterns on the basis of good object
relations; we have also seen that part of the Kleinian super¬
ego is formed from kindly object relations; the benign aspects
of the parents are internalized to form part of the super-ego.
Vinnicott has also said that it is best for an adopted child to
be breast fed by his natural mother before being handed over to
his adoptive mother who will have to bottle-feed hiin, for if he
is ever to be analysed in later life, he will have this basis of
2
good object relations on which to rest. This statement surely
implies the internalization of good objects, and other examples
1. Fairbairn, ibid., p.112-115
2. Winnicott in answer to a question at thel>avid3on Clinic
Summer School, 1964
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could be brought forward to augment the argument,^ Fairbairn,
however, admits that he sees no reason why an infant should
internalize the breast of the mother with whom he has a per¬
fectly good relationship already. The milk proves sufficient to
2
provide for his incorporative needs. He admits, however, that
good objects can be internalized later to defend the child's ego
against bad objects which have been internalized already. His
idea of the Ego-Ideal, (not to be confused with Internal Sabot¬
eur, or Anti-Libidinal Ego) is of such a good internalized
object.
If only bad objects are internalized, then our dreams should
consist of bad figures of threatening or exciting natures. But
this is not the case; our dreams are often beautiful, and we
loathe to be awakened out of them. Should this in itself not
indicate the internalizing of good objects? If as Guntrip states
(see p.12l) that our unconscious consists of a repressed inner
world of relationships between the ego and objects, is it nothing
but that which the individual has failed to outgrow and is thus
perpetuated within? Does it not consist of these factors, but
also of good object relations which are also repressed? Our
dreams would suggest that this is the case.
Moreover, there is a further consequence of Fairbairn's
1. For examples on John Robinson and the once born Christian
who is secure in his mother's love from the beginning.
See E.N. Ducker, Psychotherapy, a Christian Approach, p.108-9
2. Fairbairn, ibid., p.93 and footnote
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contention. Guntrip speaks of Melanie Klein's being charged with
having produced a doctrine of Original Sin, because she regards
infant sadism as innate, basing this on the Death Instinct of
Freud. Guntrip says "It is Freud, not Mrs Klein, who gives us a
doctrine of Original Sin,""'' He goes on to argue that the sadism
and aggression of the child are post-natal, and result from frust¬
ration of need. However, our concern is with the Unconscious,
regarded as a repository of Original Sin. If Fairbairn is right,
and only bad objects are internalized, how else can it be regarded?
Gf course, internalization of objects is post-natal, as would be
aggression arising from frustration; but introjection and project¬
ion are present from the beginning of post-natal life, so as to
make no difference. At any rate, according to Fairbairn, what
goodness there is to be found in the unconscious develops at a
relatively later stage and is brought in to deal with the badness,
3. We have mentioned above that Fairbairn•s views on sadism,
and infantile aggression are largely in agreement with the frust-
2
ration-aggression hypothesis. Guntrip says that Fairbairn
"regards aggression as unlike libido in that it arises as a
3
secondary reaction to frustration" of a libidiaal nature. There
is a great debate as to the nature of aggression; some claiming
that it is primary and instinctive, and others, that it is, as
1.Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.236
2. As for example in Dolland and Others, Frustration and
Aggression
3. Guntrip, ibid., p.338-9
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Fairbairn suggests, a response to frustration. The recent work
2
of Konrad Lorenz would seem to regard it as an instinct in its
own right, and that it has very valuable functions such as the
preservation of the species, the protection of the young etc.
Lorenz suggests that it is only in the highly aggressive animals
that personal relations develop. Commenting on this Storr has
said, "In other words love, at least in the sense of agape
develops as a defence against aggression; and, if -we were not
3
aggressive, we should be incapable of close personal relations."
Lorenz believes that human behaviour, far from being determined
by reason and cultural tradition alone, "is still subject to all
the laws prevailing in all phylogenetically adapted instinctive
4 IT
behaviour." He regards aggression as innate in man, and that
personal relationships, so favoured by Fairbairn, as a psycho¬
logist, by Macmurrary as a philosopher and by Buber as a theologian,
as well as by others, is only possible because man is innately
aggressive I
4. This following point arises not so much from the actual
statements of Fairbairn and Guntrip, as from implications which
could be drawn from their work, and not only their work, but the
work of Winnicott and Laing, In writing of the origin of the
schizoid position these authors claim that the child is faced
1. Storr, The Integrity of Personality, p.55-6
2. Lorenz , On Aggression
3. Storr, Review in the Sunday Times. September 18,1966 of
Lorenz, On Aggression
h. Lorenz, ibid., p.204
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by a situation which causes him to feel that he is not really
loved for himself as a person by the mother, and feels that his
own love for his mother is not valued} this idea is supported by
Winnicott. The implication that could so easily follow would be
that the "parents are to blame"} failure in maternal support is
the cause of the child's mental indisposition. This could well be
true} but if a child is innately aggressive as suggested in the
last paragraph, and if the child's world is dominated by omni¬
potent thoughts and wishes, even a"good enough" mother may find
it difficult to meet these. The point one wishes to make is that
the psychogenesis of mental indispositions results from the
relationship between the two involved in the nursing dyad, and
that the child has its part to play — and children differ con¬
siderably in this - as well as the mother. (This will be consider¬
ed again in the next chapter when considering Laing's concept
of "the double bind".)
5. Although Fairbairn's assertion that the fundamental
psychopathological position is the schizoid one is among his most
1
valuable contributions to psychodynamic theories of structure,
I would question the assertion that the first psychopathological
process is schizoid. Prior to the baby's crying after birth, it
has alx-eady experienced the trauma of being born in the constri¬
ction of the womb and the time spent during labour in the birth
1. Jung, Modern Man in Search of His Soul.speaks of one third
of his patients suffering from no clinically definable
neurosis, but from the senselessness and emptiness of
their lives.
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passages, with all the pressure against it that being born
involves. This experience is claustrophobic in nature and paranoid
in quality, as Klein suggested. Following birth the experience
is one of unrelatedness, agoraphobic in quality and the anxiety
is of a schizoid nature. This is the second psychopathological
experience, not the first. It may, however, be the more enduring
in its effects,
6. In Guntrip's model of Fairbairn's structure (Figure 5)
it will be seen that the Ego-Ideal is placed as far aways as
possible from the Ant i-Libidina.l Ego (internal Saboteur) and
the Rejecting Object, to which Fairbairn ties it,"*" This is in fact
similar to the divorce between Ego-Ideal and Super-ego which
Jacobson objected to. Guntrip, however, says that the total
super-ego includes the Rejecting Object, the Anti-Libidinal Ego
2
and the Ideal Ego, One wonders if he is merely describing the
Freudian super-ego in Fairbairn's terms, showing its composite
nature, or acknowledging the fact that these three entities go
to make up a fuller and more comprehensive entity. Is Guntrip
following the practice of most psychoanalysts in tr}>-ing to
preserve the super-ego as a totality of these forces, when at
the same time he separates them in drawing up his model? In
theory, of course, this is what all moralists would like — to
have conscience far removed from the irrational elements in one's
1 Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.335
l.Ibid. , p. 331
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make-up. But over against the theoretical refinements which can
be postulated, one finds in one's psychotherapeutic practice
that the various elements, rational and non-rational, sadistic
and punitive along with reasonable are disastrously intertwined,
so that one is forced to regard the phenomena presented as a
single unified entity, separate from other material. The work of
analysis consists of the freeing of these two which are so inter¬
twined, and allowing the ego to make rational judgements iirithout
the dominance of the sadism of the infantile super-ego, or the
Anti-Libidnal Egcy as Fairbairn would call it,
7, Fairbairn, and Guntrip following him, are very critical
of Freud, because he has allowed himself to be influenced by
the physics of his time, notably that of Belmholtz. There are
1 2
others who would agree with this, for example, Wyss and Jones",
3
Rieff mentions that Freud had a heavily inetaphoric cast of
thought, and that he "translated somewhat too easily into meta¬
phors the literally intended concepts of physical psychology,"
Where Helmholtz had talked of "neurological energy",Freud talked
of "psychic energy", "using the quantitative term energy without
any metaphoric reservations," At the very early period Freud
attempted to convert psychology into physiology or biology, and
may have felt that "human" science must follow the thought forms
1, Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.99
2, E, Jones. The Life and Work of Siground Freud, pp.15,197
3, Rieff, Freud, the Mind of a Moralist, p.20-1
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1
of "natural" science. Kris thinks that he did not abandon this
attitude until after his self-analysis as in The Interpretation
2
of Dreams. Fairbairn would no doubt argue that the ghost of
•Project for a Scientific Psychology' haunted Freud until the
end, and that his separation of structure and energy was the
hangover ofHeLmholtz's influence. To Helmholtz, the physical
universe was conceived as consisting of "a conglomeration of
3
inert, immutable and indivisible particles themselves." Fair¬
bairn, whose quotation this is, then continues to state that
today the physical universe is conceived very differently, with
energy and mass being wedded together, hence the absence of
energy from structure would be unthinkable. Guntrip writes:-
"Had Freud been trained in the post-Einstein physics
of the present day, even if he still took the thought
forms of physical science as the basis for his psychology,
he could not have evolved a theory, in which psychic
energy was conceived as an id separate and distinct from
psychic structure conceived as an ego and super-ego,
or as in his original scheme, psychic energy conceived
as a dynamic unorganized instinctual unconscious, and
instinctive tensions. This kind of dualism in basic
concepts has become untenable,
However, to prove that Freud was wrong to base his theories on
the scientific concepts of his day, %vhich have been subsequently
outmoded, and then to proceed to bolster up one's own theories
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human interaction, p.63
He quotes from Ernst Kris, Introduction to the Fleiss Letters.
2. Kris, ob.cit., p.hh
3. Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p.126-7
4. Guntrip, ibid,, p.l48
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on present day concepts is hardly convincing. For is this not
tying one's psychological theory to the fashions of the physics
of the day, and when fashions change, will not the theory become
as invalid as Freud's is now made to appear? If modern physicists
could not equate mass and energy, would Fairbairn's theory fall
or not? If psychology was tied to the formulations of physicists,
then it would; but the primary task of psychological theory,
whilst toeing indebted to borrowed concepts from other disciplines,
must provide models which elucidate the empirical data with which
one is confronted.
8. Fairbairn not only objects to Freud's tying of his theory
to physicists' concepts, he also criticises him for tying psycho¬
logy to biology, so as to present a psycliobiology. We have seen
how Guntrip would prefer to keep instinct to biological concept¬
ualization, and how psychology should be concerned only with
psychological conceptions; those derived from natural science
cannot understand motive, value and personal relations. We may
compare and contrast this attitude with that of Anthony Storr
who claims that psychoanalysis has always recognized that man's
emotional experience is rooted in the body, even though it puts
forward complicated hypothetical structures of the mental apparatus."'"
•tte agrees with Rycroft that the self is "a psychobiological entity
2
which is always striving for self-realization and self-fulfilment J'
1. Storr, Psychoanalysis Observed, p.65
2. Storr, ibid., p.69» See also p.21
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and that there is "an impersonal force within human beings from
which in illness they come to be separated," and that cure consists
of being in touch with instinct once again, by overcoming the
alienation from it. Psychoanalysis does justice to man's complex¬
ity and relates this complexity to the biological characteristics
which make him man.''' Now in fairness, one must state that Guntrip
does not deny that there are instincts, but he seems to wish to
leave them to biology - or, does he deal with them by diffusing
them all over the psychic structure? At any rate, whichever way
they are disposed of, one can detect in Guntrip and Fairbairn a
desire to cut psychology away from biology and to sever the
connection completely. The same kind of attempt has, however,
been made with regard to other disciplines, e.g., theology's
attempt to cut itself off from philosophy and psychology. Alan
Richardson's attempts to keep theology away from other disciplines
because he is convinced of the validity of the categories with
which he works, and believes that the subject matter with which
he deals cannot be dealt with under any other kind of discipline}
2
this subject matter is "revelation" and it is irreducible. He
also claims that theology stands or falls with the category of
revelation. We are not concerned with his idea of revelation at
the moment, that will be dealt with later in this enquiry} but
one regards Professor Ronald Hepburn as right when he speaks of
1. Storr, ibid., p.75-6
2. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics. p.55ff»
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the "charmed circle of revealed religion," into which none but
the theologians may enter. Likewise this attempt to keep psychol¬
ogy apart from biology is deprecated here; for if this line
were adhered to, this study would not be possible. Guntrip him¬
self would accept incursions of psychology into another discip¬
line, namely theology. He deprecates the lack of theological
interest in psychology and welcomes the work of Tillich and Harry
2
Williams, Yet the logic of his position of desiring to keep
psychology free from biology is identical with that of the
theologian who desires to keep theology completely free from
other disciplines. He would claim, as I have said, that his
studies take biology for granted} but is it completely possible
to work with purely psychological terms at all times? Need the
matter be a question of either object-relations or psychobiology?
One does not think so, John Wren Lewis has written, "The greatest
advances in science take place through cross-fertilization from
widely separate fields of discourse, sometimes from outside al-
3
together."-^ Instincts, both libido and aggression as Lorenz has
claimed make human relations possible, and therefore cannot be
omitted from a psychology of inter-personal relations.
In conclusion, Fairbairn's is a highly original formulation
of mental structure, certain aspects of which one feels could
be incorporated into the more traditional Freudian structure with
1. R, Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox, p.6
2. Guntrip, Healing the Sick Mind, p.125
3. Wren Lewis, Psychoanalysis Observed, p. 93-**
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with great benefit to the main body of psychoanalytical thought.
Storr, as has been mentioned, is kindly disposed to many of
Fairbairn's ideas, but they are incorporated into his general
scheme which is eclectic in its sympathies. Apart from Guntrip




In our description of the structural models of the various
schools of psychodynamics, we have seen that far from matters
becoming simpler and more easily comprehensible, there has been
a tendency towards complication and over-elaboration, towards
more and not less "Metapsychology". This is particularly apparent
in the case of Fairbairn, whose model is the most- sophisticated
so far considered. We noted then that one of the objections
which Fairbairn and Guntrip levelled against Freud was that his
"process" theory, which took its form after the manner of the
natural scientists of the last century, could not really be
reconciled with the "personal" theory of "internalized objects"
as developed by Melanie Klein. Guntrip regards Fairbairn's
theory, based on object-relations together with dynamic structure,
as an advance on anything yet devised.
When we turn to the Existentialists, however, we find them
even more dissatisfied with Freud than either of the two above
writers, for they regard all metapsychology as an encumbrance,
a hangover from the mechanistic physics of the last century, an
invasion of the natural scientific method into the sphere of the
1, An "object" at first sight does not appear to be any more
personal than a "process"} in the sense, however, in which
Guntrip employed the term "object", it was more personal.
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personal in which it is inappropriate. The Existentialists
themselves claim, however, to have a scientific approach; but
not scientific in the sense of the natural sciences, rather
scientific in the phenomenological sense. The phenomenological
method needs some description, and one cannot do better than
quote the following:-
"The phenomenological method stems from Husserl, who
developed it in reaction against the scientific
positivism which had begun to prevail at the end of
the nineteenth century. He pointed out that the
knowledge of nature gained by science never attains
certainty or finality. It is subject to constant
revision and correction. Further, the scientific
method is not itself a piece of scientific knowledge.
The scientist must make in his investigation of
nature assumptions and presuppositions which science
itself cannot establish. Husserl believed than cert¬
ainty is attained when the attention is directed to
the experiences of the self which stands outside
nature, without raising the question of the reality
to which these experiences are supposed to refer.
The exploration of the experiences of the self
consists not in reasonings but in descriptions of
what shows itself, namely, the phenomenon,
It will be seen that the phenomenological approach stands for
the complete abandonment of all metapsychology.
In this country, existentialist analysis is know chiefly
through the writings of R«D. Laing, whose book The Divided Self
is a brilliant description of schizophrenia as seen from the
phenomenological standpoint. Like Winnicott, he uses the concept
of the"true" and the "false" selves. Like Fairbairn, he posits
the schizoid position as the fundamental one. Moreover, he was
1. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.35
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trained as a Freudian psychoanalyst. His work, however, is much
more than a development of these schools of psychodynamics} in
fact it forms the introduction into Britain of existentialist
psychoanalysis (Daseinsanalysis) which had been worked out
earlier in Europe by Binswanger and Boss, and can also be found
in the writings of Sartre.
¥e propose therefore to examine four schools of existent¬
ialist analysis, all of which are current at the present time?
we shall follow this up by a discussion of the general position.
The schools are as follows 8-
1. The Continental School, represented by Binswanger and Boss.
2. The American School, represented by Rollo May.
3. TheBritish School, represented by R.D, Laing.
4. The "New Viennese" School, represented by Viktor E. Frankl.
1. BINSWANGER AND BOSS
We have seen how in R.D. Laing1s work the writings of
Fairbairn and Winnicott could be used along with existentialist
principles. This was because Freudianism developed in Britain in
ways congenial to existentialist analysis. However, when we come
to regard the work of Bingswanger and Boss, we must realise that
they work vis a vis orthodox Freudianism, which had not modified
or expanded as it had done in Britain and in America, Binswanger,
although he differed from Freud, was one of the few who remained
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friendly with him to the end} and both he and Boss express
their debt to Freud and his method. The difficulty arises with
them partly over Freud's method, but chiefly over his theoretical
constructions, and they believe that a fuller understanding can
be achieved by the use of a completely phenomenological method
(as in Husserl) together with the use of the Existentialia of
Heidegger.
Boss says that Freud took over the presuppositions of the
nineteenth century scientific outlook, forgetting that what were
presumed to be pure facts, were by no means "pure", but were
determined in advance by pre-scientific notions, concerning the
1
fundamental character of the world in general. He summarizes
the pre-suppositions as follows
1. There is an external, real world, existing in itself,
independent of man.
2. "Real" can only be what is measured, calculated and
thereby established with certainty. Reality is the
totality of those objects which constitute the world.
3. There is an unbroken chain of causal connection between
particles of every object, as well as connections
between one entire object to all other ones which is
predictable by causal connections} thereby we have
the unbroken chain of cause and effect.
The influence of Helmholtz, and more directly of Meynart and
2
Brucke, grounded Freud in these specific lines. The Existential¬
ists represent Freud as one who was at all times anxious to be
1. Boss, Dasiensanalysis and Psychoanalysis, p.28
2. E. Jones.The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. Chapters h and 5
(Pelican, p•59-88)
"scientific"j if he had no categories into which his data could
be placed, he was failing as a "scientist" - i.e., in the
sense of the term as it was then understood, Binswanger quotes
Freud as saying: "In our method, observed phenomena must take a
1
second place to forces that are merely hypothesized," According
to Binswanger this remark represents the natural scientific
spirit, for natural science never begins with just the phenomena}
indeed its main task is "to divest the phenomena of their phen¬
omenal! ty as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible...
The uniqueness of any phenomena is thereby absorbed by these
hypothesized forces and laws, (in parenthesis, this practice does
not appear to have held sway only in scientific circles; the
method was applied to the teachings of Jesus by Harnach and the
liberals, who tried to reduce them to a few general principles.)
Boss admits that this treatment of the phenomena produced
a system which was logically self-consistent, but it was achieved
"at the price of a tremendous reduction and mutilation of the
3
reality of man and his world," Binswanger says similarly that
these "scientific" constructs were based on man's destruction of
k
his knowledge of himself gained through experience. He continues
to make a very acute observation that when Freud represents the
apparatus of the psyche, at first glance it compares to the
1. Binswanger, Being in the World, p.156
2. ibid, " ~ " "" "
3. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Dasiensanalysis. p.131
4. Binswanger, ibid., p.165
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diagrammatic representation of a bodily organ. I would go
further and compare his model of the Psyche on page 106 of
New Introductory Lectures to the actual drawing of a body organ!
(See Figures 1 and 2) Binswanger therefore objects as much as
Guntrip and Fairbairn to Freud's psychobiology, and further
claims that Freud regards man as an object to be studied, which
amounts to the fact that less than the whole man is being studied,
for natural science cannot comprise the whole of man's knowledge
of man.There is also a further factor, that to use the assumpt¬
ions and categories of natural science is to alter the subject
matter and as a consequence to distort the results. Man overflows
and bursts the bounds of the kind of psychological constructs which
Freud set up; he is too big to be handled in this manner. Hence
Binswanger appears to be using a similar argument against Freud
which Freudians have used against academic psychologists.
Of the scientific presuppositions mentioned above, the first,
that of splitting the subject and object, made by Descartes in
the seventeenth century is the main object of the existentialist
analysts' criticism. It is this cleavage which has bedevilled
2
Western thought ever since. Joseph Needleman argues that
psychology is in very difficult position as it would examine
that which has been ruled out of the field of study since the
time of Descartes, namely the human psyche, for Descartes was
1. Binswanger, ibid., p.170
2. Binswanger, ibid., p.42ff Introduction
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responsible for separating the res commita from the res extensaj
the psychologist examines processes by which he conducts his
investigations, so the subject-object distinction is most acute
in this field,An example of the dilemma is well illustrated by
the following quotation by an Oxford undergraduate, Mr Jonathan
Dorling of New College.
"The kind of psychology which I am studying is not
particularly interested in 'introspection1. The
reasons are quite simple} introspection has not led
to results which are particularly intelligible, or
sufficiently reliable - they depend far too much on
the theoretic views of the person who introspectss
the mind is an entity we do not mention because we
are not sure what anybody means by 'the mind' - the
phrase may have several different meanings, and we
find that the use of this particular term tends to
obscure our problems rather than clarify them.
We are much more interested in the behaviour
of humans and of animals, and in trying to discover
the mechanisms underlying such behaviour. Our work ^
is closely related to that of the physiologist,,.,"
He goes on to say that hypotheses are built upon the mechanisms,
and then they are tested. This is an example of solution by
avoidance of difficult data and adherence to strict Cartesian
principles. How different are the words of a modern scientist,
Heisenbergj-
"Science no longer confronts nature as an objective
observer, but sees itself as an actor in the interplay
between man and nature. The scientific method of
analysing, explaining and classifying has become
conscious of its limitations, which arise out of
the fact that by its intervention science alters
and refashions the object of investigation. In other
1, Ramsey, Religion and Science, p,49-50
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words, method and object can no longer be separated,
the scientific world viextf has ceased to be^a scient¬
ific view in the true sense of the word,"
Or, /to quote)the words of a modern theologian speaking about
religion and science, of the part played by intuition in the
search for invariants, for some order or constant pattern in the
diverse elements of the spatio-temporal world around us, indicate
how this involves personal participation:-
"...the universe gives the physicist answers only in
terms of the language which he himself feeds into it.
But what is the fundamental implication of that, if
not that science is, at its best, a dialogue with the
universe, a personal interchange with what is revealed
to us in a disclosure?"^
This digression shows how the subject-object distinction upon
which "science" rested still lingers on in certain quarters, but
it does not command the authority it used to have. The existential¬
ist analysts have endeavoured to get behind the split of subject
and object to the reality, (so they claim) which underlies both.
This is achieved by using Hueserl's phenornenological method as
developed by Heidegger in his analysis of Dasein.
"The first jump from phenomenology to existential
ontology was maae when Heidegger introduced his
postulate of man's •Being-in-the-world• and this
brought about the radical change in the subject-
object relationship...."3
We have mentioned two technical words of Existential analysis;
1. W. Heisenberg, The Physicists' Conception of Nature, p.29
Storr, Integrity of Personality. Pelican p.17-18
2. Ramsey, Religion and Science, p.24
3. Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.392
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the first is Dasein. Da - there, sein - to he; Dasein refers to
a being whose essence is to be in the world,''" Dasein, man, the
self, involves "being-in-the-world", hence the second technical
term. Existentialist analysis claims to begin with an observation
of facts, with pure phenomena; without pre-conceptions and
prejudicial characters; it is completely pre-supposition-less;
it believes that man's essence consists of a primary awareness
2
of "being-ness" as such, Beingness is not an attribute of what
man has; it is what he ijs. So we return to the tautological
statement that Dasein means "being-there-in-the-iirorld," This is
3
anterior to the subject-object distinction. The psychotherapist
accepts Dasein without any following desire to objectify or
reify; there is no compulsion to interpret or place the data
into categories; it permits them to speak for themselves. When
k
giving case histories,Freud, says Boss, talked about experiences
in ordinary phenoraenological language; but he was always in a
hurry to resume the role of the natural scientist, and to theorize
in his own special language about his case histories. This lang¬
uage was always framed within a mechanistic system of thought, and
in no way did it reflect the humane sympathetic outlook which
Freud displayed towards his patients; rather it reflected his
anxiety to be "scientific," So what Freud gained in his under¬
standing of man in the therapeutic sessions was virtually
1. Needleman in Binswanger, Beinft in the World, p.67
2. Boss, ibid., p.35-6
3. Needleman, ibid., p.29
4. Boss, ibid., p.65
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destroyed as he proceeded to embark on theoretic formulations
and constructions. Boss therefore claims that Freud remained
fixed in his fidelity to the natural scientific outlook of his
day, which dealt with inanimate nature, and reduced human phen¬
omena to that same level where it could be "quantifiable,
calculable, predictable, producible and repairable" (t) as in
the second principle stated above (p.139-^0).^" Boss in a rather
grand eloquent passage says that Freud "was still a long way from
the insight that each man's history occurs by way of a continuous
disclosure of the particular beings which are sent to shine
forth, to come to pass, in the light of the meaning disclosing
2
relationships which constitute human existence." Binswanger
goes further and claims that by Freud's categorizing the self,
objectifying it, isolating it and theorizing about it, into an
ego, id and super-ego, Dasein is "driven out of its authentic
sphere of being, namely existence, and ontologically and anthro-
3
pologically suffocated,"
It follows therefore that the phenomological approach
involves restricting analysis to that which is really found to
h
be present in consciousness, Needleman describes the process
as followsj-
"To understand an entity, phenomenon, idea or
experience, is to approach the object to be under¬
stood on its terms, to see in it structures that
1. Boss, ibid,, p.103
2. Boss, ibid,, p.66
3. Binswanger, ibid,, p,3>71
k. Wyss, Depth Psychology, p.389
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emerge from its side, and not from ours. To understand
an object is to participate in it until it yields its
own essence to us who are understanding,"
The \vhole emphasis is on adhering to the given objects of man's
world and letting them speak for themselves, looking for no
2
psychic structure "behind" what is perceived, It is true that
what is found in the observation of Dasein as "being-in-the-
world" can be analysed into "existentialia"; but these cannot
be detached from human existence, and "they do not float in some
metaphysical world of their own," So by a combination of Husserl's
phenomenological method which gives one insights into the essent¬
ial structure of consciousness itself and of Heidegger's teachings,
which takes the phenomenological method further to give under¬
standing not only of consciousness and of human "being", but of
Being itself, the existentialists claim to have found the most
3
appropriate method for psychotherapy.
1, Needleman in Binswanger, ibid,, p.38
2, Boss, ibid,, p.59
3, Needleman, ibid,, p,23. Needleman is at pains to show of
how Heidegger's work ties up with that of Kant, and how
it differs from his. He puts the claim of the method in
the folloi>rings ",,,to confront the world from a preferred
frame of reference is not to understand the world as
constituted by the self, but is, in fact, to constitute,
the world. Therefore, phenomenology is the method par
excellence of apprehending that which is constituted by
self in its immediacy, and therefore the method par
excellence of apprehending the nature or form of that
process of constituting,"(p,25) Where Kant would have
stressed understanding, Heidegger stresses human being,
Dasein, Knowledge as developed by Kant is but one form of
Dasein: one mode of "being-in-the-world," Existential
analysis is concerned not only with "I am knowing", as
with Kant, but with what "I am knowing-feeling-willing,"(ob.cit.)
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This completely different approach of the analyst to the
patient is presuppositionless, save for the given structure of
Dasein; together with a reluctance to categorize the material,
always understanding the patient on his own terms, there follows
a radical reappraisal of psychoanalytical concepts, especially
the basic ones.
First, the Unconscious. According to Boss, Freud kne\vT that
the assumption of the Unconscious meant going beyond immediately
observed phenomena; however, Freudians have always justified
this on the following grounds, as stated by Fenichelj-
"The existence of the unconscious is an assumption
that forced itself upon psychoanalytical research
when it sought a scientific explanation and a
comprehension of conscious phenomena. Without such
an assumption, the data of the conscious in their
inter-relationships remain incomprehensible; with
such an assumption, that which characterizes the
success of every science becomes possible; to predict
the future and to exert systematic influence,"1
Boss argues that what had originally been a property of
mental phenomenon became a psychic locality, assuming the stature
of an independent entity with laws and properties peculiar to
2
itself. Freud regarded it as necessary because of the large
gaps in consciousness which needed to be filled; and as legit¬
imate, because the accepted method of inference of analogy is
being employed in its postulation. Boss insists, however, that
to argue back from successful procedures is not proof at all,
1. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, p.7
2. Boss, ibid., p.85-88
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and that nothing is gained by seeking to establish meaningful
connections by interpolating assumed processes. Boss therefore
claims that Existentialist analysis can dispense with the concept
of the unconscious, because it is able to elucidate without
difficulty on the basis of immediate experience alone, the
phenomena which caused Freud to postulate the existence of the
Unconscious, He sees no need of an inner psychic reality. "All
we need to do is to talk of the concrete meaning^disclosing
object relations in which, and as which, our Dasein exists at
a given moment,"''"
Binswanger follows in much the same argument; he includes
2
also the instincts, because of their reliance upon biology *, and
3Freud's threefold structure of ego, id and super-ego.
Boss also objects to the term "psychodynamics" for it relies
on those forces which Freud assumed to be operating within the
1. Boss, ibid., p.96
2. Needleman claims that the concept of instinct in biology
is a hypothesis that connects and brings into unity
phenomena of the highly complex thing, the organism
(See Needleman in Binswanger, ibid., p.51 footnote.)
3. Binswanger (p.188) also sees a point of contact between
Freud's ego, super-ego and id and that of Gressinger's
ego (Pathologie and Therapie der psvchischen Krankenheit.
2nd edition,1961), Binswanger claims thatjGressinger is
more modern than Freud in that he understands what is
"unassimilated" by, and oppositional to, the Ego not as
an Id (and It), but rather as a human "Thou", whereby
the genuine dialogical character of psychic conflict is
more strictly preserved. Binswanger adds in a footnote
(p.100) that when Freud wishes to represent the dialogical
character of psychic conflict, "he takes care to abandon
the role of the theoretician and relates a 'fairy tale'.,."
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psyche, e.g., instincts, and in doing this Freud was simply
copying the natural sciences of the time in postulating forces
within a mechanic frame of reference. Without a theory of
instincts, psychodynamics is a vacuous concept. Existentialist
analysis does not assume a causal energy, because it confines
itself to what is immediately experienced, to the phenomena
which show themselves with Dasein,^
Along the same lines, Existentialist analysis does not speak
of emotions as things we have, but as what we are — we are our
2
emotional states ourselves. Likewise, terms, such as "resistance"
and"repression" are dispensed with; instead of repression of
thoughts and emotions into the unconscious, the situation is to
be understood as inability of existence "to become engaged in an
open, free, authentic kind of relationship to that which is
3
disclosed in the relationship." As expected, the Existentialists
regard the transference in a similar way to that of Fairbairn-
Guntrip, as a genuine relationship between the analyst and
patient, disclosing themselves to one another as human beings;
the analyst's task being to assist the patient to relate as fully
1. Boss, ibid., p.108. Boss also argues that Freud was not
quite sure about his instinct theory and quotes the well-
known words from The New Introductory Lectures, p.124.
"The theory of instincts is, as it were, our mythology.
The instincts are mythical beings, superb in their indefln-
iteness." But Freud also said to Binswanger, on page 184,
"Mankind has always know that it possesses spirit; I had
to show it that there are also instincts," It would have
to be on other grounds than Freud's supposed uncertainty
that an objection to instincts would have to be lodged.
(See Boss, ibid,, p.105)
2> Boss, ibid., p.113
3. Boss, ibid., p.120
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the blind spots of psychoanalysis. Binswanger in his deprecia¬
tion of the scientific method did not seek for another technique
but rather for understanding of the foundations upon which all
techniques must stand.
"Existentialism in short is the endeavour to under¬
stand man by cutting below the cleavage between
subject and object which has bedevilled Western
thought and science since shortly after the Renais¬
sance, This cleavage Binswanger calls the cancer of
all psychology up to now...the cancer of the subject-
object cleavage of the world."l
May analyses the world "existence" into ex sistere, to stand out,
to emerge. To exist is "to be", hence one uses the word "ontology"
(Gk. ONTOS) the science of being. Existence, however, is not a
static concept, but a dynamic one.2
Like other existentialist writers, May appeals to Kierke¬
gaard and Nietzsche. "Truth exists," said Kierkegaard, "only as
the individual produces it in action." This idea of truth as
relationship is confirmed today even by physicists like Heisen-
berg (to whom, May, like other existentialists, appeals), "The
idea of a science which is completely independent of man (i.e.,
O
completely objective) is an illusion." So the old scientific
theory that the less we are involved in a given situation, the
more we observe the truth, is no longer tenable. And this truth
applies particularly to persons. May makes similar criticisms
1.May, Existence.p.10(See also May,Man's Search for Himself.p.70)
2. Could we speak of "psychodynamics" in this sense? The
term would not depend on "mythical beings" like instincts,
but on the very fact of human existence itself being dynamic.
3. May, ibid., p.25f« Heisenberg's address to Washington
University, St Louis, October 195^«
15^
rr\c^kc /
to those which Binswanger and/Boss of Freud for carrying the
scientific attitude of his times into his system, thereby
limiting the sphere of investigation in man to what fits the
sphere of science,"'" May insists that technique and data must be
subordinated to the personj the emphasis is on "Being", He quotes
Marcel as saying that in Freud's analysis we have everything but
2
being. May does not leave us with this nebulous term "Being"}
he defines it s
"Being is that which remains. It is that which
constitutes this infinitely complex set of deter¬
ministic factors into a person to whom the experi¬
ences happen, and now possesses some element, no
matter how minute, of freedom to become aware that
these forces are acting upon hirn. "3
This rather poetic or prophetic description demonstrates
how far existential language is from the usual scientific lang¬
uage. "Being" we are also told is a participle used of a person
in the process of becoming something, i.e., becoming what one
truly is. It therefore speaks of potentiality. May argues that
because "Being" has this broad reference, the "ego" as conceived
by Freud cannot carry the full meaning of "I am". It is merely
the subject of the subject-object relationship.
May also reiterates the existentialist teachings that guilt
and anxiety are ontological characteristics of man, rooted in
1. In fairness, it must be admitted that Freud did go far
beyond the strict confines of the science of his day
in order to explain his findings,
2. May, ibid,, p.40 quoting Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of
Existence.
3. May, ibid., p.4l
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his very existence. The very structure of Dasein involves one
in such experiences.
He not only defines "Being", but also the world} but May
is careful to stress that one cannot separate a person and the
world, for they form a structural whole, and to attempt to
separate them would be a capitulation to the Cartesian subject-
object dichotomy. Being-in-the-World is a structural whole —
the self implies the world, and the world the self. "World is
the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person
exists and in the design of which he participates." Neverthe¬
less, May does give us his analysis of the world} there are
three modes which are interrelated and simultaneous. Perhaps
we could regard this as an Existential Trinitarian patternj-
1. UMWELT. The world of nature, of biological drives}
the world around one, the "thrown world" into which
we must relate and adjust.
2. MITWELT« The world of inter-personal relationships
which includes the meaning which is dispersed by the
inter-relations of the persons in it. e.g., love
depends on commitment to other people, (in this sphere
the writings of Buber and Macraurray would be applicable.)
3. E1GENWELT. One's own relationships towards oneself -
this mode of relationship presupposes self—awareness,
The person sees himself as subject and object at once}
for a man, if he is to realise himself, must question
his own being.2 it is this self-conscious capacity
which is the unique and basic characteristic of human
existence, for with it goes the capacity for care.
(The above is similar to Erikson's triadic relationship of
biological, societal and psychological influences.)
1. May, Existence. p,6lf
2. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant. p.121 connects the first made to
Freud's work, the second to Sullivan and the third to
Jung's individuation.
156
In practical terms, Existentialist analysis therefore dwells
much less on the past than does psychoanalysis, simply because
this self-transcendence allows man to use the future to deter¬
mine the past. Existentialist analysis protests against the
over-emphasis of the past at the expense of the present and
future. There is also less emphasis on technique and interpret¬
ation and more on presence in the patient-therapist relationship.
May quotes Frieda Fromm-Reichmann,"The patient needs an experi¬
ence, not an explanation.
Existentialists have criticised the concept of the Uncon¬
scious for many reasons. Ve have seen how Boss regarded it as
part of the given "being" which is indivisible; Sartre rejected
it because people used the Unconscious as a means of escape, to
rationalise questionable behaviour, and to avoid their own "bad
2
faith." May is less keen to cut out the concept. He argues that
Freud*s great achievement was to enlarge the sphere of human
personality beyond consciousness as it was regarded at that time,
to include the irrational, the unacceptable, all kinds of urges
and hostile desires and unrecognized aspects of experience
ad infinitum. Freud used the word "unconscious" as a symbol for
this enlarged domain of the personality which is part of a given
human being at any time. He would not accept the spatial "cellar"
concept of the Unconscious used in orthodox Freudian circles, but
1. May, Existence. p.81
2. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant. p.123
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he would never dispense with this aspect of the personality
which Freud showed to the world for the first time with brilli¬
ance and clarity."'"
3. IN BRITAIN - R.D. LAING
1
In speaking of R.D. Laing in the Introduction to this
chapter, I mentioned that behind his work was not only the devel¬
opment of Freudian thinking in Britain, but that of continental
existentialist writers like Binswanger and Boss, as well as
Sartre. There is evidence in his work that he was also indebted
to Martin Buber. Buber•s best known work I and Thou can be looked
at in various ways: as a study of human relationships, as a poem
about existence, or as a generalized but penetrating analysis of
the kind of relationship which should be found within the psycho¬
therapeutic context. More specifically in his paper 'Distance
and Relation in Psychiatry', Buber speaks of a two-fold principle
of human life, where being is built up by a twofold movement
based on, firstly, "the primal setting at a distance", and
2
secondly,"entering into a relation." "Distance provides the
human situation} relation provides man's becoming in that situation.
"Man, as man sets man at a distance and makes him
independent, he lets the life of men like himself go
on round about him, and so he, and he alone, is able
to enter into relation, in his own individual status,
with those like himself. The basis of man's life with
1. May, ibid., p.90
2. Buber, Psychiatry. Vol, 20, 1957> P»97
3. ibid., p.100
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man is two-fold, and it is one - the wish of every
man is to be confirmed as what he is, even as what
he can become by mens and the innate capacity in
man to confirm his fellow man in this way, "■*-
2
In this paper, as in I and Thou Buber stresses how human life
and humanity come into being "in genuine meetings"} man is con¬
firmed in his being by fellow men, when I and Thou are in relation,
3
in meeting.
This is the fundamental philosophy which permeates Laing's
whole approach to psychotherapy. In mental indisposition, we
are not studying individuals who are ill, in the medical sense,
but those whose relationships are disturbed, Laing writes:
"The science of persons is the study of human beings
that begins from a relationship with the other as
person and proceeds to an account of the other still
as person,"^
This naturally leads on to his criticism of Freudian theory}
it lacks concepts to deal with how two human beings meet} it is
5
unable to deal with more than one person at a time, Laing argues
that phenomenology is equipped to do this task as it is "in ootentia,
1. Buber, ibid,, p.102
2. Buber, I and Thou. p.11
3. Buber, Psychiatry. Vol. 20. 1957, p.103
4. Laing, The Divided Self, p.21
5. Laing, in New Society. No.105, October 1, 1964, p.12. This
contention would be debated by those psychoanalysts who have
evolved group therapy out of Freud's original insights,
e.g., Bion, Experience in Groups, and Foulkes and Anthony,
Group Psychotherapy. The latter book says: "Our Bible, when
we seek to understand these dictations and to effect their
analysis, is Freud's book, The Interpretation of Dreams. " (p. 59)
However, it does remain quite true that Freud's traditional
approach is concerned with no mere than one person at a time.
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a primary discipline in the study of human relatedness,"
He sees other limitations in psychoanalysis. In his study of
Sartre's philosophy, along with D.G. Cooper, Laing complains of
the switch which certain psychoanalysts make from participation
in a relationship to making judgements about the patient "from a
point of complete exteriority in relation to a biological entity.
2
The person disappears."
"The original project, always a relation of self to
being, cannot be expressed in physicalistic metaphor
and biological analogy without fatal confusion and
ambiguity. Unfortunately, even the best psychoanalytical
papers are written in these terms or fall back into
them. Indeed, it is often unclear when a psychoanalytical
writer supposes that he is being metaphorical or
analogizing or attempting an explanation. Too often
the latter appears to be the case, and the work
becomes stultified with fetishized pseudo irreducibles."
We are back to the old question raised again and again by
existentialist %vriters that instead of a meeting of I and Thou,
a single person is taken in complete isolation and his various
aspects are conceptualized into "abstract like ego, id and super¬
ego," It is taking a relationship between two people and reducing
it to a form of interaction of parts of the mental apparatus
4
within one person,
1. Laing, Self and Others, p.15
2. Laing, Reason and Violence, p.24-5
3. ibid.
4. In The Self and Others.Laing criticises the postulation of
entirely hypothetical processes (metapsychology) which tend
to be confused with "attributions about action and experience."
All effort on the part of the therapist to be "objective" may
mean nothing more than a failure on his part to subject his
diagnosis into "signs" and "symptoms" to a critical examin¬
ation, regarding them as reliable and valid criteria for
making attributions about the other person, when in fact the
result is an impoverished and twisted view of the other
persons, (p.119) Laing calls this "monadic psychology" and
says that even if we could give an absolutely undistorted
and objective account of a person, we still have the task of
giving an account of what happens between two or more persons,
(p.69)
l6o
Existentialists regard obRectification and classification
as a nineteenth century custom, and do not appear to be unduly
worried with charges of subjectivity, for only by so-called
"subjective" involvement can one come to true reality of the
person and be concerned with him as he is. Francis MacNab whose
work on schizophrenics in groups follows very largely the Laing
thesis, describes this process as a reversal of the Platonic
doctrines existence comes before essence in the phenomenological
1
approach. Laing would even argue that his approach is scientific
in the sense that it is "a form of knowledge adequate to its
2
subject." He also writesj
"Physics and the other sciences must accord the
science of persons the right to be unbiassed in a
way that is true to its own field of study. If it
is held that to be unbiassed one should be "objective"
in the sense of depersonalizing the person who is the
"object" of our study, any temptation to do this,
under the impression that one is thereby being
scientific must be rigorously resisted,
He compares his method to that which Dilthey laid down as a
conditioning factor for comprehending an ancient text s it requires
1. Francis MacNab, Estrangement and Relationship, p. 133• To
show how close MacNab is to Laing, he writesj "The schizo¬
phrenic has lost the consistency of relationship both with
himself and with his world. He no longer experiences a
sense of mutuality as \<re know it in human relationships.
He is sensitive and afraid. He fears relationships, yet
longs for them." In his book MacNab describes the groups
he attended and how he sought to relate ; to the schizo¬
phrenic patients and understand them.
2. Laing,in New Society, No. 105, p.l4
3. Laing, The Divided Self, p.2k
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all the empathy and understanding we can bring to bear on the
other; our view depends "on our willingness to enlist all the
powers of every aspect of ourselves in an act of comprehension."'''
"My thesis is limited to the contention that the
theory of man as a person loses its way if it falls
into an account of man "as a machine or as man as
an organisinic system of it-processes,"^
To split man up and to divide him is a schizophrenic process
in itself. Splitting and depersonalizing are psychopathological
states, so why should they be regarded as normal for diagnostic
purposes and as concepts towards healing? True psychotherapy
is the opposite to splitting; it aims at wholeness; it is "an
obstinate attempt of two people to arrive at a recovery of the
3
wholeness of being human through the relationship between them."
Again he says, "The main agent in uniting the patient, in allow¬
ing the pieces to come together and cohere, is the physician's
love, a love that recognizes the patient's total being, and
4
accepts it, with no strings attached."
Laing's description of the schizophrenic has by now come
to be regarded as a classic. Like Fairbairn, he assumes the
existence of an original self which is split, resulting in
ontological insecurity, fears of engulfment, implosion and
petrifaction or depersonalization. He shows how the schizo-
1. Laing, The Divided Self, p.32, quoting Bultmann's essay
•The Problem of Hermenentics' p.234-61
2. Laing, ibid., p.23
3. Laing in New Society, No. 105, p.13
4. Laing, ibid., p,l65. This saying is undoubtedly indebted to
Ferenczi's well known words that it is the love of the
therapist that heals.
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phrenic tries to be omnipotent in his own being, without
relationships with others and so reaching the paradoxical state,
that the more he defends himself the more he is destroyed. In
place of creative, spontaneous living, involving natural
relationships, there is inner impoverishment. The schizophrenic
may so come to regard his body as external to himself, as part
of the world over against him. In his development of the "False
self" o|- Winnicott, Laing speaks of the "double-bind" which a
mother can inflict on a child by giving contrary injunctions,
This "double-bind" has been tersely described by Alan Beckett
as "polyvalent communications which do not allow the recipient
to take unequivocal action and prevent him from leaving the field,
and by Laing as a situation which is sealed off for the victim
"by further unavowed injunction forbidding him or her to get out
of the situation, or to dissolve it by commenting on it. The
•victim' is thus in an untenable position. He cannot make a
2
single move without evoking a single catastrophe J'
Finally, what is Laing*s attitude towards the Unconscious,
that key concept of Freudian theory? Existentialists, we lj.ave seen,
are wary of it. Sartre for example in Being and Nothingness
explains how the notion of Unconscious thought is a contradiction
3
in terms. As we have seen, he also objects to the concept
because people can use it as a means of escape, and they wish
1. Alan Beckett, in Views, No. 8, Summer 1965» p.^9
2. Laing, The Self and Others, p.138 e.g., Francis MacNab p.103
3. See Lomas in Psychoanalysis Observed, p.132
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to avoid their own "bad faith" by which is meant their self-
deceit. One would exjject therefore that Laing would follow
Sartre and Boss. In The Self and Others, he has a long and
penetrating discussion of Susan Isaacs paper on'The Nature and
2
Function of Phantasy.' Susan Isaacs regarded phantasy and the
unconscious as inferred but necessary, Laing says wittily that
with her phantasy has become both "the cause of itself as effect
and the effect of itself as cause." He is also very critical of
her working with antitheses, such as "inner" in contrast to
"outer", mental to physical etc., which result in the working
out of "an entirely imaginary problem." But he insists that
this unconscious phantasy is recognized as a genuine experience
which "antedates reflective awareness" and which persists
through life with modifications. He does not regard it, however,
as a separate institution cut off from consciousness and deter¬
mining it. The idea of repression, upon which Freud built so much,
Laing would like to replace with a concept more amenable to the
phenomenological approach. It seems that broadly speaking Laing's
attitude to the Unconscious is akin to that of May. He would not
use the spatial concept as though it were an actual place in
the mind where phenomenon having been repressed are stored;
but he would use it perhaps for describing certain unrecognized
experiences. Laing actually says: "What Freud and Jung called
1, Sykes, The Hidden Remnant, p.123
2. Klein, Developments in Psychoanalysis, p.67-121
Laing, The Self and Others.p.7-10
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'The Unconscious' is simply what we are, in our historically
1
conditioned estrangement, unconscious of."
4. THE NEW VIENNESE SCHOOL - VIKTOR E. FRANKL
One wishes to draw attention to this writer, not because
either he or his \\rritings can contribute much in this enquiry,
but because of his popularity, many regarding his contribution
as the true example of existentialist analysis. The reason for
this is not difficult to find, as his first book on the subject
included - in fact consisted largely of — an account of his
persecution by the Nazis, of death marches and two concentration
camps which he survived. In this most moving document, he records
how, in spite of most men sinking to an almost animal level of
existence, some were able to find meaning for their lives. In
these dark surroundings, he was able to work out a philosophy
of life which enabled people to develop a "consciousness of
responsibility", which is now called by the name of Logotherapy,
and is practised in his clinic in Vienna. He goes as far as to
call his school "The Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy."
The first was Freud's which concentrated on the will to pleasure;
the second Adler's, with its motive, the will to power; and now
Frankl's which speaks of a will to meaning, hence Logo-therapy.
(LOGOS to be understood as "meaning".) The purpose of the
therapy is to make the patient aware of the hidden logos of
1. Laing in New Society. No, 105t P«i3
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meaning within his existence. He used special terms like,
'
)
"Nodgenie neurosis" and "Nod-dynamics", He claims that his
method does not impose value judgements on his patients, and
that he is neither preaching, teaching nor giving moral exhort¬
ation, However, one feels that the evaluation of Gerald Sykes
on this first book of Frankl 's is not only correct, but
prophetic, "...his writing often seems like old-fashioned uplift,
itfith not a few echoes of the pulpit.""*" Sykes also claimed that
Frankl has a mind which sees things in black and white. These
contentions seem to be borne out by the fact that in 19^9 Frankl
wrote a book Per unbewusste Gott (The Unconscious God) in which
he endeavours to reconcile psychotherapy with Roman Catholic
doctrine.
He concedes unity in the human being when he is centred
around a single personality, which requires the unity of body,
soul and spirit, all three together, before one can talk of an
entity.^ He follows othei/Existentialists in pouring scorn on
Freudian structures, claiming that psychoanalysis concerns itself
only with the animal attributes of personality and fails to deal
3
with man's real spiritual and existential depth personality.
He denies Freud's contention on the origin of the super-ego,
from the ego, claiming that:-
1. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant. p.126
2. Wyss, p.377. Per unbewusste Gott. p.27-8
3. ¥yss, p.381. Per unbewusste Gott,p.24
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"What stands behind the super-ego of man is not
the ego of a super-man but the Thou of Gods for
conscience could never be a word of power in
immanence if it were not the word of Thou in
transcendence."^
He goes on to argue that the super-ego is not an introjected
father imago, for God is not a mere father-imago, but a father
is the imago of God, God being "the original image of all
2
fatherliness. " In view of the development of Frankl • s though!;
Sykes' words have truly been prophetic. Much of his writing is
intuitive, and dogmatic, so it is difficult to include it in
this enquiry,
5. COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS
Comments have already been made about some of the theories
we have outlined and we wish to follow the same procedure here.
However, we shall reserve the general comments to the last
chapter of this section,
a) One cannot help but notice how much vaguer are the
terms employed by the Existentialists compared with those in
use among psychoanalysts. "Being-in-the-Vorld", "Ontological
insecurity" are in no way so clear-cut as such terms as "super¬
ego" and "ego".
Moreover, to what do these existentialist terms refer?
Joseph Needleman, for example, speaks of a "meaning-matrix
1. Wyss, p.382, Per unbewusste Gott, p.85
2, Wyss, p.382, ier unbewusste Gott. p.86-7
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with the Being-in-the-World of the Dasein, which Being-in-1he-
World is anterior to the subject-object distinction." Now if
we look at these terms psychologically, then do they not refer
to the stage in human development before the differentiation
of self and not-self, of subject and object, that of the symbiosis
of the child with the mother, the "oceanic" state of undiffer-
entiation so often associated with religion? Freud regarded
this state as nothing but the survival of the primitive ego
1
feeling which is normal to infancy. One wonders therefore if
such phrases as"Being-in-the-World" and "anterior to the subject-
object distinction" do not refer to this basic underlying
psychological state which is grounded in infancy?
One asks further, as to the status of the terminology
employed, Gerald Sylces claimed that ontology is a:
"Handy word which means almost the same thing as
metaphysics, without having its disagreeable popular
association.
Boss, however, as we have seen, would disagree. He made the
claim that the existentialia, the meaning and essence of direct¬
ly observed human behaviour, "do not float in some metaphysical
world of their own", and that existentialist analysis never
5
attempts to find a psychic structure "behind" what is perceived.
1. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p.7-9 where he is
answering an enquirer, whom Rieff identifies with Romain
Rolland.
2. Sykes, The Hidden Remnant. p.122
3. Boss, Psychoanalysis andCaselnanalysis. p.39-40
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Which is the correct view?
Some existentialist analysts have sensed a problem here.
For example, Rollo May senses the danger of generality in the
existentialist approach,"'" Alan Beckett, writing on the psych¬
ology of R,D. Laing, has said that in their keenness to reform
the mechanistic aspects of psychoanalytical theory, the Exist¬
entialists have moved towards "phenomenography - the uncritical
2
acceptance of all experience as it is presented,"
Other criticisms follow different lines. One of the most
severe comments made of the Existentialist viewpoint is that of
Thomas S, Szasz in The Myth of Mental illness. Like Beckett he
regards it as reaction against organic psychiatry which the
Existentialists for good reasons regard as holding a dehuman¬
ized view of man. In this reaction, however, they have gone too
far, and have abandoned not only medicine but psychosocial
sciences, empiricism, and the philosophy of science. They have
then turned to a view of human life which is mystical, relying
on the writings of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, rather than on
one based on scientific psychology. He quotes Reinhold Niebuhr
that Existentialism is "a philosophic movement of dubious
3
scientific and moral value" , and adds himself that it is "a
ponderous and often pompous way of trying to make scientific
1. May, Existence, p.90




sense out of questions concerning the whys and hows of human
living.
I cannot think that ontology or "Being" of the Existent¬
ialists is anything other than a form of metaphysics, I accept
the contention that the thinking of this school is to be aligned
with the philosophical movement which stems from Hegel, Whilst
this is not the place to go into details, there is a similarity
between Hegel's idea of "pure spirit" and that of "Being" of
2
the Existentialists| both can be described as "God-terms".
I would therefore regard both the ontology of the Exist¬
entialists with their Existentialia, and the metapsychology of
Freud, with his spatial structural as of similar logical status.
The Existentialists may have claimed to put metaphysics and
metapsychology out of the door, but they have returned by the
window through the employment of ontological terms. Whichever
system, however, is barred, the experiences which it purports
to describe remain, like the grin after the Cheshire cat has
3
departed! Laing in The Divided Self gives two accounts or
1. ibid., p.96. It should be noted that Szasz wrote from a very
individual position. He regards mental illness as nothing
other than personal social and ethical problems in living,
(ibid., p.296) It is game-playing behaviour, a kind of
language employed when all other forms of language have
failed. It takes the form of cries for help in order to
secure certain gains. He also criticises Freud, who, with
Breuer, mistook hysteria for an illness, whereas it is a
condition which uses language of illness to secure gains,
(p.302)
2. Rieff, Freud, the Mind of the Moralist, cf, D. Jenkins,
Guide to the Debate about God, p.98
3. p.106f.
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interpretations of* self-consciousness, in Freudian and Exist¬
entialist terms. The former is certainly more speculative, but
is clearer. In the last resort one chooses that which is the
most significant to us, which can be either, depending on
ourselves. To use Ramsey's metaphors which will be anployed
later in the enquiry, it will be the one which "rings the bell"
or "breaks the ice" for us,
b) Laing in his work appears to have devoted his attention
almost exclusively to schizophrenia, as have^Cooper, MacNab and
others. Now a schizophrenic state is almost impossible to
classify or rather to categorize; even the Freudian may speak
of it as a "fragmentation of the personal structure", a "dissol¬
ution of categories". They may perhaps speak metaphorically
(which they have done already as the word "structure" as applied
to inind is a metaphor anyway), as "the ego being flooded by
unconscious phantasy"; and if that metaphor could be stretched
we could deduce that it is impossible to draw maps of a district
when everything is covered in flood water; one has to wait until
the floods subside for an accurate mapping to take place. In
such a way schizophrenia may prevent a "mapping" of the mind,
so that wider, vaguer concepts such as those used by the Exist¬
entialists can cope with the "flooded" condition of this mental
state, which obliterates structures, categories or institutions.
What one is trying to say is that we may be involved here in
1, Ramsey, Religious Language, p.^9. c.f. Models and Mystery p,13f.
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a circular argument; by the selection of patients whose indis¬
position involves an absence or destruction of structure, it is
natural to conclude that structure is irrelevant for dealing
with such patients, To this I would agree. But it is when this
line of thought is generalized to cover all individuals, one
must at least question this if not dissent from it. Are not the
ends prescribed by a deliberate selection of patients, so that
what is concluded from the argument is exactly what was inserted
at the beginning, namely that being initiallly absent, there is
consequently no evidence of structure?
c) One of the main arguments which occurs again and again
in existentialist psychological writings is that the categorizing
of patients' troubles is not reconcilable with their personal
1
natures it depersonalizes. The patient is a "Thou" and the moment
such categorization has begun, he is being treated as an "It".
It therefore makes the laudable stand against personal "Thous"
being treated as "Its". The logic of such writers compels them to
regard the patient as a "Thou" and only as a "Thou", and there¬
fore classifications cannot be applied. Personally I cannot regard
this as a valid objection, for the analyst who tries to understand
the patient in terms of categories, which to the existentialist
means regarding him as an "It", may be doing so in order to
understand him better as a "Thou". If categories or classifications
are applied as a means to an end, the end being a better
1. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinaanalysis, p.113
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understanding of the patient, then the application is completely
justified. For by the method he may be able in the end to act in
a more understanding "I-Thou" relationship than if he desisted}
also it may be a more loving action. To have to deal with a
person who is exceedingly difficult to help and resists help
may be alleviated by making a classification - i.e., that the man
is paranoid or that he has a harsh punitive super-ego. It would
not be necessary for the analyst to tell the patient this! One
would hope that he kept this concepts to himself as a sustaining
facti but having made the "It" evaluation, the analyst can then
return to the patient with renewed resources and widened
understanding, and so enjoy an even fuller "I-Thou" relationship,,
Models and concepts can be used to further our understanding and
to assist the "I-Thou" relationship; they are not meant to take
the place of "I-Thou" relationships. It is not a question of one
method or the other; the practice of categorizing can serve the
existentialist approach."'' The two can be combined.
d) There is a criticism which we have met, which the Exist¬
entialists and others make of Freud, regarding his tie to the
1. A similar dilemma in medicine was raised by Mr Wilfred Mills
of Birmingham at the Annual meeting of the Institute of
Medicine and Religion, in a provocative address on the two
possible approaches in medicine - "Computer or Samaritan".
This is cartoon language; but it expresses the detached
clinical approach which could be fed into a computer on
the one hand, with the personal care and concern which
brings with it such anxiety for the doctor iirho is carrying
it out. He pleaded for a blend of both in the practice of
medicine, (His address is in the Annual Report for the
Institute of Medicine and Religion, 1966, p.22-3)
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natural sciences of his time. It may well be true that Freudian
metapsychology is an inevitable nineteenth century product, and
that the strange language which he invented for his categories
is part and parcel of his age. However, Freud's work cannot be
disposed of so easily; for it took its initiative from the
whole scientific method, which no\ij as in Freud's day too, can
be described as "a search for invariants, a search for some
order and some constant pattern in the diverse elements of the
spatio-temporal world around us.11"'" Freud sought to discover
invariants in the mind itself; he invented names for the ways
in which the mental phenomena appeared to structure themselves
in patterns which he could discern. The vital question concerning
any postulates is surely not, "Is this fashionable? Is it new?",
with one eye on the latest thatphysics or some other standard
of reference can offer us for guidance, but "Is it significant
to us? Does it help us to understand the mind of man and his
behaviour?" Moreover, as we have seen above, how else can
recurrent patterns be described except by the employment of some
terms, which are metaphysical or metapsychological? We shall
return to this in the next chapter.
e) Regarding one specific point referred to in the last
chapter, Laing in his writing makes much of what he called the
"double-bind" by which a parent can restrict a child. In some
of his passages we get the impression that the child is a helpless
1. Ramsey, Religion and Science, p.4
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victim of the aggressive action of the parents or of the brothers
and sisters, Sometimes one gets the impression that "the mother
is to blame . " However, one feels that it is in such situations
that an existentialist approach, which accepts the phenomenon
as it comes, needs some support from Freudian concepts, for
example, the power of omnipotent thought and magical thinking,
of which Freud elaborated in Totem and Taboo, How much of what
is disclosed in the existentialist encounter is fact, and how
much is phantasy? How much of the phenomena presented is reaction
formation on the part of the patient, imputing to the parent
that which the child in fact phantisied towards the parent, and
consequently blaming the parent for the trouble? David Cooper"*"
dwells on the intricacies of the relationship between the mother
and the child, and shows how very easily relations between them
2
can in fact go wrong. Laing speaks of how the child from baby¬
hood may put the parent in untenable positions, and of how the
mother cannot "click in" or "get through" to such a baby, and of
how as a result she can become anxious and feel helpless as a
mother. "She then withdraws from the baby in one sense, while
becoming over-solicitous in another sense. Double-binds are
usually mutual," This is very true, and well put} however, the
total picture is not really dealt %\rith until the omnipotent
phantasies of the patient as a child are fully taken into account.
1. Cooper,'Violence in Psychiatry,' in Views. No. 8, p.l8f
2. Laing, The Self and Others, p.l40
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Unless these are faced and surrendered, no therapeutic change
can be effected.
f) In conclusion, I would wish to associate myself with the
comments made by Peter Loraas in the recent book, Psychoanalysis
Observed.^" Whilst admitting that this existential approach has
a theoretic orientation more suited to the study of persons than
that of psychoanalysis, he adds however: "In this country its
exponents are characterized by a preoccupation x^ith schizophrenia,
a tendency to support the under-dog, a leaning towards the
philosophy of Sartre and courage - and have already made some
useful contributions to an understanding of schizoid states and,
especially, of the relationships within a family containing a
schizophrenic member." But he regards the approach as limited
and considers that some fruitful channels opened by psychoanalysis
have been neglected, e.g., the transference interpretation,
primary process and secondary process, guilt, mourning, depression,
psychic-economy, child development and the fact that there are two
sexes. In these criticisms, Loraas is undoubtedly right.
1. Lomas, 'Psychoanalysis-Freudian or Existential?, esp, p.147-8
CHAPTER VI
JUNG
"It seems unfortunately to be the case that Jungians
and Freudians, like Liberals and Conservatives, are
born and not made, and those who sympathize with the
general viewpoint of one school are likely to find
that of the other incomprehensible• The present writer
may as \tfell admit that he comes into the Freudian
category, and gets much the same impression from reading
Jung as might be obtained from reading the scriptures
of the Hindus,Taoists or Confucians; although well
aware that many wise and true things are being said,
he feels that they could have been said just as well
without involving us in the psychological theories
upon which they are supposedly based,
The above expresses my own outlook on the writings of Jung,
It is said thejFreudiaris dream Freudian dreams to please their
analysts whilst Jungians not only dream Jungian dreams, but from
time to time bring along to their analysts Mandalas they have
painted! Is one therefore prejudiced from the beginning, having
been invalidated, not so much from being born a Freudian, but
by having a Freudian analysis and therefore being prevented from
appreciating Jung's thought fully? However, his work in relation
to the construction of the psyche, and on the Doctrine of the
Trinity, is both profound and extensive, and no enquiry would be
complete without adequate reference being made to it. On the
other hand, it may appeal" to be superfluous to write about his
work In view of all that has already been written by Jung and




So far in our enquiry, there has been some kind of devel¬
opment from each of the psychodynaniic systems to the following
one. To consider Jung, therefore, at this stage of the enquiry,
may seem like retreating our steps back to the stage of meta-
psychologies, Yet whilst it is true that Jung has developed an
elaborate metapsychology, if not a metaphysical system or a
mythology in some respects, his x*rork has affinities with the
Existentialists, Firstly, as distinct from Freud, who modelled
his metapsychology on the mechanistic scientific conceptions of
his time, Jung, like the Existentialists, has turned to philo¬
sophical ideas and mystical thought to supply meaning for human
behaviour and existence. Secondly, it will be seen that he does
not look so much to the past as did Freud, but to the present
and the future, as his chief concerns in therapy, which is also
an Existentialist practice.
1, The simplest introduction to Jung's thought is that of E.A.
Bennet, What Jung Really Said; another valuable introduction
is the Pelican book of Frieda Fordhamj there is a section
on Jung in Dieter Vyss' Depth Psychology; but the best of
all introductions is that of Xolande Jacobi, The Psychology
of C,G, Jung,
Regarding Jung's religious writings, we have Victor White's
two books God and the Unconscious, and Soul and Psyche.
H.L. Philp's Jung and the Problem of Evil, and D. Cox's
Jung and St Paul. Also R. Hosties Religion and the Psycho¬
logy of Jung. There are also Jung's own writings to which
reference will be made. Definitions of Jung's terms are to
found in the appendix to White's, God and the Unconscious,
by Gerbherd Frei, and in the appendix to Jung's own
Psychological Types where the definitions are in Jung's own
words.
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Jung claims the right to found his theories on empirical
observations, and to draw conclusions from them. He has no use
for the experimental method in his work, which because of its
restrictive nature, cannot study the whole of man's psyche, but
only those elements which are amenable to its methods. If psych¬
ology capitulated to the experimental method, it would sacrifice
its raison d'etre.^" He begins therefore with the empirical method
of phenomenal observation; but he does not stop there; Jung
argues that it is right to create scientific hypotheses on the
basis of his observations; therefore his postulates or categories
like "libido", the Unconscious, and the psyche itself, which
transcend empirical observation, are not only justified, but
2
required as essential.
"No practical science can get along without its tricks
of the trade (Handwerksregeln). That is the way to look
at anything X may say about the structure of the soul.
There is no question of my producing inconverterable
truths — they are simply ideas thrown out in an attempt
to bring a bit of order into bewildering conglomerations
of psychic realities... All our present psychological
theories are subjective assertions which we defend
jealously, in ahighly partisan spirit, because they echo
powerful currents in the human soul,,,,"
That Jung's method cannot be experimental is claimed by
Hostie simply because it aims at studying the whole of man's
psyche, not merely those parts which can be studied experimentally,
1. Hostie, Religion and the Psychology of Jung, p.8, 20
2. Hostie, ibid., p.20
Jung, Modern Man in Search of his Soul. p.200f
Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.103-4
3. Hostie, ibid., p.13 quoting Jung, Die Struktur der Seele.p.28
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whilst ignoring the rest, Hostie claims that it is an empirical
method., however, because it aims "to create scientific hypotheses
on the basis of observed fact."^"
With all the above argument,Freud would agree. But Jung
goes further than Freud did in many ways. He argues for example
that no one, either patient or analyst, can evade a philosophy
of life, a We11anschauung, to supply the meaning of human exist¬
ence, This again brings us nearer to the Existentialists than to
Freud, but in fairness it must be mentioned that whilst Freud
disclaimed the right to deduce a IbLtanscliauun;; from psycho¬
analytical studies, he did make an attempt at one himself in
his New Introductory Lectures. No, 35 which is largely a criticism
of religion.
Turning now to the psychic structure as developed by Jung,
we find that he accepts Freud's fundamental dichotomy between
the Conscious and the Unconscious, although it is developed and
elaborated quite differently. Consciousness is derived and
developed from the Unconscious; which is similar to Freud's saying
that the Ego is developed from the Id, "By consciousness I under¬
stand the relatedness of psychic contents of the ego in so far as
2
they are sensed as such by the ego," "Nothing can be conscious
3
without an ego to xvhich it refers, Jung differentiates it from
the whole psyche, which is much greater than the ego. Of the
1, Hostie, ibid,, p.20
2, Jung, Psychological Types, p.535
3, Beimet, What Jung Really Paid, p.57
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Unconscious Jung says:
"The concept of the unconscious is for me an exclusively
psychological concept, not a philosophical concept in
the metaphysical sense. In my view, the unconscious is
a psychological boundary-concept, which covers all
those psychic contents or processes which are not
conscious,. i . e. , not related to the ego in any percept¬
ible way. "
Jung would agree that a baby has no awareness of an ego; it
has to be developed, and that it is about the age of eight or
2
nine before the child realizes "I am". Likewise, Jacobi states:
"At the beginning of life, he (the child) must fight his way
from infancy, which is still wholly immersed in the collective
3
unconscious, to a differentiation and definition of his ego."
The ego is defined by Jung as "A complex of representations which
constitutes the centrum of my field of consciousness and appears
U
to possess a very high degree of continuity and identity." "Ego"
and "Consciousness" are almost synonymous terms in Jung's
writings, but both are within the matrix of the Unconscious; as
Frieda Fordham writes: "...the conscious aspect of the psyche
might be compared to an island rising from the sea - we only see
the part above the water, but a much vaster unknown realm spreads
below, and this could be likened to the unconscious. The island
5
is the ego, the knowing willing *1', the centre of consciousness."'
1. Jung, Psychological Types, p.613
2. Winnicott, whose life's work has been with children, as we have
seen in Chapter III, put this very much earlier,
3. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.lUU
k, Jung, ibid., p.5^0, See also Wyss, p,228-9
5. Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.21
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Bennet claims that Jung gave experimental proof both of
Freud's theory of repression and of the fact of unconscious mental
activity, through his word-association tests, "Jung was the first
and probably only person to provide such proof.
At first, Freud's theory of repression was a satisfying
one to Jung, as it explained why the unconscious became unconscious,
2
and showed that it consisted of only repressed materials.
However, as well as this personal repressed, unconscious material
Jung claimed to find other material of an impersonal, universal
nature, and this led him to postulate his well-known concept of
the Collective Unconscious. This collective unconscious "lies
below" the personal unconscious consisting of repressed material
and belongs to mankind in general; the whole spiritual heritage
of mankind's evolution is claimed to be born anew in each individ¬
ual, conveyed to him by the genes, and this is the collective
unconscious.
Jung also connects this collective unconscious with the
instincts, by means of his concept of archetypes. In fact, both
the repressed unconscious and the collective unconscious are
similarly organized, the first consisting largely of complexes
(a \*rord now in current use in psychological terminology, but it
owes its existence to Jung who introduced it.) The complex is a
sort of "splinter psyche"; "...the complex has its ultimate
1. Bennet, ¥hat Jung Really Said, p.34
2. ibid., p7^3
3. Jacobi, p,34 quoting Juno,"The Structure of the Psyche, p.154
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cause in the impossibility of affirming the whole of one's
individual nature,""'" "Archetypes", into which the collective
unconscious is organized, are described by Jacobi as "self
2
portraits of the instincts,"
",,,the instincts (inborn, unlearned tendencies)
form very close analogies to the archetypes - so
close, in fact, that there is good reason for supposing
that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the
instincts themselves 5 in other words, they are patterns
of instinctual behaviour. The hypothesis of the collect¬
ive unconscious is therefore no more daring than to
assume there are instincts,"3
It is tempting to one with a Freudian background to reduce
all Jung's terms to Freudian ones, regarding the archetypes as
pictorial representations of Freudian instincts. But we meet
here the danger of mixing models,
It has been suggested that the real reason behind the break
between Freud and Jung was their differing concepts of the term
"libido". Before Jung came to work with Freud, he had written
a paper on Dementia Praecox (now called Schizophrenia) in which
he refers to patients who have no "psychic energy" available,
being totally withdrawn from the world. When he and Freud came
1, Jacobi, ibid,, p.38
2, Jacobi, ibid,, p.43-4
Notes The word "Archetype" was taken by Jung from the Corpus
Ilersneticmyi, where Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite is writing
of the seal and the impressions or imprints which it is
able to make. The term Ideafe principalis was used by St August¬
ine to denote stable forms, eternal and always the same,
e»g», Plato's eternal ideas. Previously Jung had spoken of
"primordial images", a phrase of his history professor at
Basel, Jacob Burchhart,
See Jacobi, p.39-40. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy,.83f
3, Jung, Collected Works. Vol. 9»Part1,p.43-4 quoted by Bennet,p,66
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together, Jung began to use Freud's term "libido" to cover that
which he had meant by "psychic energy". Now Freud had always
used "libido" basically as a sexual endowment, which could only
be manifested in other ways, through the process of sublimation.
For Freud, sexuality was fundamental, and libido was his express¬
ion of it| Jung, however, regarded general psychic energy as
fundamental,using Freud's term to express it, which clearly
altered its meaning."*"
2
In his own definition of libido, Jung states that it is
synonymous with psychic energy; he also states that he does not
regard it as a psychic force, nor does he hypostasize the concept
of energy, but uses it as a concept denoting intensity or value.
"Like the analogous terra 'energy' in physics, 'libido' is employed
as an abstraction expressing dynamic relations and based on a
3
theoretical postulate which is confirmed in experience." It is
inferred, a hypothesis, and is not to be confused with any elan
4
vital or general force. One is not quite sure what Jung therefore
actually means by this concept; at least one knows that it does
not carry the Freudian meaning.
1. See Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.167-8
Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.17
Vera van der Heydt, 'On Psychic Energy', Davidson Clinic
Bulletin, No. 82 p.If. Cf. Pfister, The Psychoanalytical
Method, p.63 - for a description of Freudian sensuality
as meaning the sanie as "Love", which reduces some of the
differences between the two view-points.
2. Jung, Psychological Types. p,571-*2
3. Jacobi, ibid,, p.51
4. In this Grace Stuart in The Achievement of Personality is
surely wrong in equating them. p.100-2
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There are further differences which separate the Jungian
from the Freudian. One is the use of the word "symbol" which in
Jung is a very specialized one. Freud used the term to describe
something quite well-knowi though not recognized consciously; to
Jung it represents something indeterminate of which we have no
precise knowledge, J.A.C. Brown sees this usage as describing
the partially known in terms of the totally unknown, the symbol
no longer pointing from the general to the particular, but "from
the particularlized symbol to the generalized idea in the Platonic
2
sense of the word." This concept of symbol enables the conscious
mind to be united with the unconscious, so the Jungians claim,
3
But to a Freudian, this is unacceptable.
Another difference between the two is that Freud preferred
to use causal concepts to explain his phenomena. Jung, on the
other hand, used energic ones, inhere"the event is traced from
the effect to the cause, on the assumption that energy forms the
4
essential basis of changes in phenomena," The use of the energic
concept in place of the causal one meant a difference in psycho-
1. See David Cox, Psychology and Symbolism in Myth and Symbol,
p.51f, for a detailed explanation of Jungian symbolism,
2. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.44
3. Nigel Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy, p. 77. "(Jungs)
notion of 'symbolism' allowed him to interpret images
from dreams and phantasies on the assumption that a given
image always represents the same thing in the unconscious
minds of different people.,.. This assumption that there is
a universal symbolic glossary implies that our minds have
inherited not only the trick of symbolising, but also the
symbols themselves."
4. Hostie, heligion and the ,i. sychology of Jung, p. 27
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therapeutic emphasis; Freudians look back to the past to find
out "the cause": Jungians , as has already been stated, look at
the present and towards the future.^ Jung, however, did not
completely disregard the causal concepts, but used them along
with the energic ones.
The concepts of psychic energy and of energic concepts to
explain the psychic phenomena led Jung to postulate that there
was a conservation of energy at work in the psyche, lying dormant
in the unconscious, ", , .the energy charge of the unconscious
2
increases in proportion as that of consciousness diminishes,"
The mind to Jung is not partitioned; rather is it a Conscious/
3
Unconscious unit, in which a self-regulating "compensatory
4
mechanism operates between the conscious and the unconscious,"
similar to the principle of compensation to be found working in
the homeostatic mechanisms which impose a degree of self-regulat-
5
ion within the body.
So far we have spoken mainly of the Unconscious in Jung's
thought; it is now time to return to the ego-consciousness and
its detailed analysis by Jung, In the first place, he postulated
1. White, God and the Unconscious, p.168
2. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G, Jung, p. 5^
3. Bennet, What Jung Really Said, p.106
k, Bennet, ibid., p,91
5. Nigel Walker in his paper 'Freud and Homeostasis' contended
that this notion, which he found in Freud, anticipates the
notion of cybernetics by a generation. Walker's article
includes a detailed examination of the whole concept (British
Journal of Philosophy and Science, Vol. 7, No,25, May 1956.)
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the two fundamental types of human being, the tx*ro human attitudes,
1
for which he is so well known - introversion and extraversion.
The differences betwean the two types are to be found in every
2
summary of Jung's teachings. But each of the two types can
undergo sub-division, "My experience has taught me that individ¬
uals can be quite generally differentiated, not only by the
universal differences of extraversion and introversion, but also
3
according to individual basic psychological functions." From
this follow the four functions of consciousness; thinking, feel¬
ing, sensation and intuition - each person's ego having a bias in
one of these directions. F. Fordham describes the four functions
as follows:-
"Sensation, which is perception through our sense;
thinking, which gives meaning and understanding;
feeling, which weighs and values; and intuition,
which tells us of future possibilities and gives us
information of the atmosphere which surrounds all
experience.
She adds the following words of Jung as a footnote: "Intuition
5
is perception via the unconscious. "
1. This introversion - extraversion concept is one of the few
concepts of depth psychology accepted by Bysenck, who has
satisfied himself of its validity by experimental methods.
^ee Fact and. Fiction in Psychology. p,54f. Also Sense and
Nonsense in Psychology.
Bennet quotes Adler as an example of an introvert, and Freud
of an extrovert, p.50
2. Jung, Modern Man in Search of his Soul, p.68
Bennet, p.50f., Fordham, 29f•» Jacob!, p.18
3. Jung, Psychological Types. p.13-14
4. Fordham.An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.35
5. Fordham, ibid., p.35 footnote, quoting Jung, Psycho1ogical
Types, in Collected Works, Vol. 6,p.568
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Each of these four functions of consciousness can be further
subdivided by their being introverte^or extraverted. So there
emerge eight different types.^
We may ask why Jung chose only four functions? E.A. Bennet
is at pains to inform us that Jung has no special bias in favour
2
of the number four. We read, however, in Victor White: "A wit
has said that whatFreud did for sex, Jung has done for the number
3
four." Was Bennet replying to that "wit"? We shall find that
when we come to consider Jung's religious writings that the number
four has a great influence on his conclusions.
Having described the various functions of ego consciousness
as postulated by Jung, we have to consider a further concept of
his, namely that of the Persona. This is the part of the ego
which coines nearest to the outside world, and forms a kind of
cloak around, or shield to, the ego; it is a kind of compromise
between the individual and society, hiding the true ego of the
4
individual. The word originates in the mask worn by actors in
the Greek theatre to signify the role they are playing} perhaps
5
therefore "role" would be a good description of persona* Thus
1. For the most elaborate description of these types on which
most interpreters rely, see Jung, Psychological Types,
p. 428f, and p«480f. They are also well described with
illustrations by Jacobi, p.11-27
2. Bennet, What Jung Really Said, p.55
3. White, Soul and Psyche, p.95
4. See Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.26
Drever.Dictionary of Psychology, p.203
Bennet, ibid,, p.115
Fordham, ibid., p.47-8
5. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p.48 speaks of the persona
on "revealing and concealing the real self."
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considered, it appears to be the outer "crust" of the ego
similar to that described by Freud in the way in which the ego
is formed on the id as a cortical layer. However, when Bennet
considers it, he classifies it as one of the figures of the
1
unconscious or archetypes. David Cox draws attention to Jung's
description of the persona as a grouping of conscious and un¬
conscious components that are opposed to the non-ego and const-
2
itute the ego; moreover Jung calls a chapter in his Two Essays,
3'The Persona as a Segment of the Collective Psyche*. From this
we may conclude that there are unconscious elements in the persona,
which is nevertheless part of the ego. This paradoxical situation
is clearly reminiscent of Anna Freud's ego defence-mechanisms
which form the unconscious part of the ego, and need careful
analysing. A third similarity to the Freudian ego is found in
this passage of Jacobis-
"...a properly functioning persona must take account of
three factors; first, the ego ideal or wish image which
every human being bears within him and on which he
would like his nature and behaviour to be modelleds
second, his particular environment's view of an individ¬
ual 'after its own heart's and third, the physical
and'psychic contingencies which limit the realization
of these ideals,
This is very similar to a Freudian contention, that a properly
functioning ego is the result of maintaining balanced relations
1. Bennet, ibid,, p.115
2. David Cox, Jung and St Paul, p.120
3. Jung, Two Essays in Analytical 1 svchology. Collected Edition, Vol
4. Jacobi, ibid,, p.28
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between the Id, the Super-ego and Reality. Exact correspondence
between the two systems is not possible; nevertheless, there are
obvious similarities.
To Jung, the danger arises when a man identifies himself
with his own persona, which means that he denies the rest of his
2
personality, including his unconscious.
Such is Jung's account of consciousness. It is necessary to
continue the discussion about the compensatory relationship
between consciousness and the unconscious; for example, with
such statements as "where consciousness is extraverted, the un-
3
conscious is introverted," we are brought up against the fact
of the "opposites". The task of psychotherapy is largely one of
uniting these "opposites", of making the unconscious conscious,
or of accepting unconscious factors into consciousness. Jungian
analysts claim that there are two distinct stages in this process;
first, a reductive technique is employed which aims at dissipating
the repressed, personal unconscious and following this there is
a synthetic technique whereby the patient learns to accept his
collective unconscious. It is in this second part of analysis,
that the Jungians contend to come upon the Archetypes of the
Collective Unconscious,
1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.15^-5
Cf, Freud, hew Introductory Lectures, p. 10'} and 112.
Anna Freud, ThedSgo and the Mechanisms of Defence, p.6k
2. For example as in Bennet, p.117 see H, Williams in Soundin. ,s. p.69f
3. Jacobi, ibid,, p.19
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One of these Archetypes which Jung uses a great deal to
interpret the unconscious is The Shadow, sometimes employed to
refer to everything outside consciousness, both personal and
collective, and at other times, to refer to a factor in the
personal unconscious, which stands for everything that is opposite
to what our conscious mind stands for, for all the things we
disapprove of, for everything our ego is not!. Basically it
consists of qualities which the ego cannot use and often denies,
setting them aside as the ego develops. It is therefore similar
to Fairbairn's Unconscious, which is produced by ego-splitting.
The content of our shadow is revealed by our projections; the
person we dislike violently represents an aspect of ourselves
which we are disowning and fastening on to him, blaming him for
our shadow# "Projections change the world into a replica of one's
unknown face,Jungians speak about the exposure of the shadow
in a similar way to Freudians speaking of the analysis of the
defences of the ego; the ego has been painstakingly built up over
against the rejected material, and to be aware of such knowledge
is a threat to its structure. It appears that both schools of
psychodynamics are speaking of the same phenomena but from a
different view-point; theFreudians from the ego's side in the
defence built up against the repressed unconscious; the Jungians
from the side of the repressed unconscious itself, The Shadow.
1, Jung,'The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,*
Collected Works. Vol. 9» Park 1, p.8-9
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The term therefore stands for the opposites which, exist in our
unconscious, i.e., opposites to the conscious ego.
Frieda Fordham states that a man's shadow is personified
by a male, and a woman's by a female.^ Jung also speaks of a
complementary, rather than an opposed part of the psyche, which
is different in sex to the individual - in the man, there is an
Unconscious Anima. and in the woman an Animus. The Anima is the
Unconscious feminine element in the male, as is the Animus
the masculine element in the female.""Every man has his own Eve
2
within him*, says a German proverb." These figures arise after
the shadow has been encountered and represent the second stage
of individuation. At an even deeper stage one encounters other
archetypal figures such as "The Wise Old Man", in a male patient's
unconscious, and the "Deep Earth Mother" in a female's} the
figures emerge after the anima or animus has been dissolved.
It is in these last two sets of Archetypes that Jung's
theories become speculative; up to this point his thinking is
comprehensible, For example, his constant stressing of the over¬
valuation of consciousness, and the need for consciousness to be
able to accept the unconscious, the two being integrated in a
union of opposites are perfectly significant concepts and have
great therapeutic value. It is when Jung seeks to buttress his
arguments by applying his great knowledge of Alchemy and Chinese
1. Fordham,An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p.52
2. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, p.Ill
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Philosophy, and claiming that, as in nature, so the opposites
seek one another in the Archetype of Unity, that one can become
quite loet.^"
The final stage and goal of psychotherapy is that of the
unity which emerges in the individual's psyche as a result of
a successful analysis: this is called by Jung "Individuation,"
He describes the term as, "The process by which a person becomes
a psychological 'in-dividual', that is a separate, individual
2
unity or 'whole'," When this happens a person becomes his full
self; individuation is not achieved by conscious willing, for the
ego no longer takes control of his life, but TheSelf. which is
"a supraordinate totality embracing the Conscious and the Un-
3
conscious," In the same paper, Jung speaks of the "self" as
"an a priori existent out of which the ego evolves", and as "an
4
unconscious pre-figuration of the ego," The ego is assimilated
in this wider personality, The Self, which unites consciousness
and both the repressed and collective unconscious as well. As
a result, one has a feeling of oneness within, and a reconciliation
5
to life as it is, without. This is because the opposites are
united and are transformed into a third term or higher synthesis.
One regards the above paragraph as a statement which is
1, SeeDavid Cox, Jung and St 'aul, p,128 (quoting Jung Alchemy, p.30)
Jung, The Archety; es of the Collective Unconscious, p.275
2, Jung, Collected W'orks.Vol. 9» Part 1,
3, Jung, 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass', Collected Works.
Vol, 11, p.273
4, ibid., p.259
5, Fordhara, ibid,, p.63
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completely comprehensible. It is when Jung goes on to speak cj
a uniting symbol (using the word in his particular sense) of a
Mandala, that again one loses touch. The Mandala is a symbol of
a unified self which emerges naturally at the conclusion of a
successful individuation, representing "the primal order of the
total psyche,A Mandala is a symmetrical religious symbol to
be found in India, China and Tibet} it is usually a circle,
mathematically divided into four, illuminated with pictures and
elaborate decorations. Jung regards these as symbols of an inte¬
grated self, which forms the foundation of our psychic being.
As we have stated, patients undergoing a Jungian analysis
sometimes paint or construct a mandala, which is regarded by
both analyst and patient as a sign of Individuation, One has yet
to hear of Freudian patients doing this!
Jung claims more for the Mandala, and what it signifies,
however, than even this. The Mandala is not only the uniting
symbol and archetype of the self, but it is the iitia o-dei in man.
We have now arrived at the frontier between psychology and
religion. But Jung states his position clearly, or so it seems.
He states that psychology must guard against over-stepping its
proper boundaries by metaphysical assertions, and that when he
speaks of the Mandala as the imago-dei he is speaking psycholo-
2
gically and not metaphysically. In the East, God is supposed
1, Jacobi, The . ay cho logy of' C. . Jung, p,13^
2. See Cox's discussions: Jung and St Haul, p,300-309
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to lie behind the Mandala; Therefore it is a symbol of God. Its
function is to unify, both good and evil, darkness and light,
"Ying and Yang". As all sides of the personality must be
brought into a unified "self", so must all aspects be brought
into the symbol of God, The idea of the ineltision of an evil
component in the nature of theGodhead, has been discussed by
all Jungian theologians (e.g., Victor White, Cox, and Philp).
However, we shall have to return to this later, for the Mandala
is a frontier concept for Jung, when he comes to consider the
Doctrine of the Trinity and Jung's transforming it into a Quat-
ernity. Our task now is to sum up our conclusions and evaluations
on Jung's structure of the psyche.
I begin by considering a recent statement by a Jungian analyst,
Baroness Vera von der Keydt who makes the claim that it was
after Jung had expressed his own views publicly in his book
The Psychology of the Unconscious thereby disagreeing with
"a revered father-figure, that his libido flowed
freely, and his own genius became apparent. This
cutting of the umbilical cord which ties fathers
and sons, and which has to be done by the son and
suffered by the father, is an archetypal event
(my italicsFreud and Jung, both men, were
caught up in an archetypal situation (also my italics);
but Jung succeeded in liberating himself from the
incestuous tie.""''
She further states:
"Ax'chetypes are nodal points in the psychic make-up
they can never be known directly, only Indirectly
1, "vo.n der Heydt, 'On Psychic Energy' , The Davidson Clinic
Bulletin. No. 82, p.3
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through their effects. Personified in outer reality
they are projected onto people or things; in the
inner world they emerge in dream or phantasy as
people, animals or things. Archetypes represent the
spirit in man, and the energy flowing between spirit
and instinct gives rise to psychic processes,"
I have chosen this as a typical Jungian statement, which both
illustrates the confusion that exists when ambiguous terms are
used like spirit, instinct and energy altogether, but also the
use of the term "archetype" to explain a phenomenon which can be
explained in other terms. To the Freudian, the situation is
understandable as a classical expression of the Oedipus Complex,
which owes its origin to the environment, to the fact that one,
as a child, usually has a father and a mother towards whom one
has a variety of feelings. One therefore agrees with J.A.C.
Brown when he argues that we have no need to describe such
phenomena in terms of archetypes, when we already have sufficient
information to describe it adequately from the facts we already
know, namely that a child has an earthly father and a mother,
he takes Victor White to task for speaking of "Archetypal Father",
"Great Mother of All Living" and the "Puer Aeternus" as but
another example of the Jungian practice of describing "the partly
2
known in terms of the wholly unknown,"
Turning to the question of the Collective Unconscious common
to all humanity, Brown mentions Freud's partial recognition of
the idea of an archaic heritage and memory traces of experiences
1. von der Heydt, ibid,, p.3
2, J.A.C, Brown, Fretxd and the Post-Freudians, p.44-5
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of former generations, and adds that Freud did not believe that
it played any part in the dynamics of the mind,"*" and made no use
of the concept in psychotherapy. Quoting Geza Roheim in support
of his argument, Brown contends that there is "the largely
biological level of shared experiences universal to all mankind"
to which the analyst comes closer the deeper he probes, but this
could represent in a pictorial fashion the reaction to universal
experiences of the earliest days, of being born of a woman,
being dependent and having to be fed, and of coming face to face
with grown-up adults towards whom the child has the variety of
feelings, ambivalent or polyvalent. It is these feelings, not
the Archetypes as Baroness von der Beydt contends, that "in the
inner world...emerge in dream or phantasy as people, animals
or things." Melanie Klein has come closest in demonstrating
their meaning without recourse to a concept like the Collective
Unconscious, explaining them solely on the "experiences uni¬
versal to all mankind." The so-called Collective Unconscious,
which Jung contends appears in myths, which are universally found
in various cultures, and in symbols which keep recurring and in
phantasies of psychotic patients, can be explained as universal
pictorial representations of universally shared human experience.
But this does not dispose of the Collective Unconscious for
Jung, as we have shown, ties it up with the instincts, which are
hereditary, as against experience which is environmental.
1. X do not think this is altogether correct. See Part II, A,
regarding Freud and his Totem and Taboo myth.
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For Freudians, id and instincts are largely synonymous terms;
phantasy being the mental expression of instinctual needs, the
operating link between biological id impulses and the mechanisms
of the ego, they are inferred. Is this not an alternative
description of the same phenomena to that which Jung calls,
more poetically, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious"? They
seem to be similar, and both, moreover, are inferred from phen¬
omena, and are largely intuitive and speculative.
As with the Existentialist descriptions, we are back again
at choosing whatever concepts are the most significant to us;
again the choice is a subjective one. Jung in his writings gives
us much wisdom, and I personally find his work at its best when
he is least speculative and when he employs a limited intuition
on the basis of facts. As an example, I would quote an answer
which Jung gave to Philp regarding Jung's seemingly depreciating
consciousness through an over-evaluation of the unconsciousj
"The Unconscious is neutral rather like nature, if it
is destructive on one side, it is constructive on
the other. It is the source of all sorts of evils
and also on the other hand, the motherground of all
divine experience, and - paradoxically as it may
sound - it has brought forth and brings forth con¬
sciousness.
It is the further reaches of his conceptual thinking that one finds
difficult to understand,
1. Philp, Jung and the ■> robiem of Evil, p.12
Cf. Frieda Fordhani p.27-8,"The Unconscious therefore, in
Jung's viexvy is not merely a cellar where ina** dumps
his rubbish, but the source of consciousness of the
creative and destructive spirit of mankind."
CHAPTER VII
WHAT IS PSYCH0DYNAM1C STRUCTURE?
^ ~ """ ™"~ " —
So far in this enquiry, we have outlined several theories
of psychodynaraic structure which have evolved as the result of
psychotherapeutic practice. From these we are able to choose
as followsi-
1. The original Freudian Theory of Ego, Id and Super-ego,
as used by present day Freudians, following the theoretical
developments of Melanie Klein.
2. The structural theory of Fairbairn following his re-
systematization of Freud's work after Klein's object-relations
theory, into his six different component parts.
3» The theories of Jung, with the Conscious classified into
four functions and txvo types, and the Unconscious into Repressed
Unconscious and Collective Unconscious, which is composed of
other factors, such as Archetypes.
4. The Existentialist "protest" against structural models,
where the Existentialia and ontology take the place of structural
entities. This is a non-structural model.
However, it is one thing describing these schemes as out¬
lined by their exponents; we need to proceed to ask, what are they?
What is their logical status and their scientific status? While
outlining each of these theories, we have seen how they have
interpretative value to their adherents who use them in psycho-
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therapeutic practice. They can become valid also to a reader
if they "strike chords" in his own experience. But is the fact
of striking chords not a too subjective criterion of judgement?
It does not afford sufficient proof of the scientific status
which Freud and others claimed for their work.
We have already considered the criticisms of Freud's
scientific claims made by Fairbairn and the Existentialists,
who regard Freud's metapsychology as a typical product of
nineteenth century science. As Nigel Walker asserts, it is "an
attempt at a reconciliation between his technique and his
scientific beliefs. To be faithful to the traditional practices
of his time, Walker asserts, he had to construct categories into
which his data could be placed with the result that the unique
quality of any phenomena was lost when by objectification and
classification they were subsumed under universal hypotheses and
laws, Freud had to adopt this procedure in order to conform to
the scientific expectations of his time. "His desire was always
to find, in emergence, sameness; in the dynamic, the static; in
2
the present, latent pasts." To the Existentialist, this proced¬
ure amounted to destroying man's true nature by fitting him into
categories and mutilating the reality of his "being-in-the-\«>rld" *
Laing claims that Freud's theorizing in his own special language
was limited by a mechanistic system of thought; hoxirever, he also
1. Nigel Walker, The Freudian Unconscious. (Thesis) para.7
2. Philip Rieff, Freud, The Mind of The Moralist, p.216
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claimed that the existentialist approach is scientific in the
1
sense that it is "a form of knowledge adequate to its subject."
Fairbairn also claims that his theory of object relations and
dynamic structure is, for scientific reasons, closer to the
facts; but elsewhere he claims that the analyst need not be a
scientist, but rather a psychotherapist, because he is not
emotionally detached from his patient.
It is clear that there is confusion over the word "scientific",
its being used in different senses. To claim, as Laing does,
that a system is scientific and then to use vague words like
"being" is surely laying oneself open to criticism like that
2
which Szasz made of the Existentialists.
The scientific status of psychoanalysis and the other depth,
psychologies is a subject of great controversy, and has engaged
the minds of many. Freud has received most of the criticisms,
largely because his work still stands as representative for this
whole movement, and because of the claims which he made. If the
Existentialists regard him as being inappropriately scientific
in the nineteenth century sense, Eysenck and some experimental
1. Laing in New Society. No.l05» p.l4. See also Chapter 5» p.160
where we saw that they use the word "scientific" not in the
sense of the natural sciences, but phenomenologically.lt is
interesting that a similar definition of scientific has been
given by Prof. Torrance. Speaking as a Barthian theologian
he says that science is "the kind of knowledge we get when
we seek to know something strictly in accordance with its
own nature and activity", and that each science is bound to
its own field because of its chosen object. Central article
in The Scotsman. February 10,1964
2, See Chapter 5« Criticisms (a).
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psychologists claim that he is not scientific at all!
It is not necessary to go into Eysenck's arguments at length,
as they are so well known and so much has been written about
them. His three well-known Pelican books claim to take their
stand on an objective psychology, experimentally based and
capable of being factorized statistically} he sets Freud against
this absolute standard, and naturally, he falls short. In his
first Pelican book, Uses and Abuses of Psychology, whilst he
criticised Freud considerably, he did agree that Freud was offer¬
ing insights which helped to understand people, while Eysenck
himself was offering a psychology which explained behaviour.
They were concerned with different spheres, different approaches
to the study of man,^ But Eysenck has not left the matter there;
more and more has he been seeking to discredit Freud for not
2
providing experimentally testable hypotheses, and providing
instead "anecdotal evidence collected in a relatively haphazard
3
manner from individual case histories," It must be admitted
that by using the word "scientific" Freud and other depth psycho¬
logists lay themselves open to this kind of criticism; but one
must also admit that at times, one cannot avoid being impressed
1, See chapter on psychoanalysis in Uses and Abuses of Psychology
where he speaks of psychotherapy not as a substitute,
but as an adjunct to his more fundamental methods, p,219
2, Sense and Nonsense in Psychology, p.262
3, Fact and Fiction in Psychology, p,106
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by the almost over-determined desire of some of Freud's critics
to denigrate his work."*" Guntrip mentions the emotional hostility
which has been displayed by the critics towards psychoanalysis
2
since the earliest days, and states that Eysenck himself seems
3
stuck fast in the "natural science" philosophy of the last century.
Another critic of Freud who writes extensively about him
is Brian A, Farrell. He questions the validity of the therapeutic
technique because of lack of objective criteria, and claims that
psychoanalysis asks us to assume the validity of the very tech¬
nique whose validity we are investigating, which is to beg the
4 5
question. Analysts' statements are transforming statements
so their interpretations have no truth criteria. In his introduction
to Freud's Leonardo.Farrell says that "...the analyst will see
1. This has been well put in a critical notice by Dr. Alistair
Forrest in The British Journal of Medical Psychology (1965)
38, 181. Reviewing two books on conditioning therapy, he
writesj "One is impressed by the emotional need exhibited
by many of these authors to denigrate Sigmund Freud and
psychoanalysis." He speaks of one section reading "tnore like
a political smear than a critical comment," (p.lSl) Forrest
also writesj "These books have all the appearance of being
scientific, but none of the appearances of being humane,
and there is a feeling all the time in reading these diff¬
erent papers that the subjects are rats and not human beings,"
(p. 18*0
Guntrip, Healing the Sick Mind. p.l4l-176, and Mental Pain and
the Cure of Souls. p.l66f for two further criticisms.
2. Guntrip, Healing the Sick Mind, p.159
3. ibid., p.172
4. Farrell, 'The Criteria for Psychoanalytic Interpretation',




in the material the sort of thing he is on the look out for,
Analysts are "so maimed psychologically by their training as to
be incapable of and/or interested in, investigating the truth of
2
their theory*" So he regards psychoanalysis as not so much a
tool of observation and discovery, but as a technique of human
3
transformation, like religious conversion and brain washing,
and asserts that "it will be difficult to bring analysis satis¬
factorily within the world of medicine, or the universities, or
research institutes or the like, as long as strong suspicions
remain that their method of training resembles techniques of
4
indoctrination rather than those of education." He indulges
further in naming psychoanalysts as queer and insecure fish
"whom society cannot house, and who do not know themselves where
5
they belong."
This is emotive language, over-determined rather than reason¬
able. Farrell also is very critical of Freud's metapsychological
structure} he speaks of it as topographical mystifying talk,
but says that we cannot object to psychoanalysis because it uses
a model; other sciences do the same. But the model of psycho¬
analysis is a bad model which crumbles under scrutiny since it
is so crude and naive. He compares it more to myth, and quotes
1. In Freud, Leonardo. Introduction p«77 (Pelican edition).
2. In hew Society. No. 38, p.12, column 1.
3. In New Society. No. 39* p.12, column 2




Karl Popper in support. However, Farrell says that to imply
that this unscientific theory is irrational is to perpetuate a
howler, adding that this may be embedded in some of Eysenck's
criticisms of psychoanalysis. But he admits that Freud may
nevertheless have made important discoveries (Farrell actually
says "on to something") because psychoanalysis explains sets of
phenomena that it was not originally designed to explain.
Bearing in mind the fact that many of these quotations come
from a popular journal, one cannot fail to notice the emotive
tone of the writing.
The idea that science is an objective discipline conform¬
ing to a causal, deterministic scheme, is no longer accepted for
what it used to be. In the digression we made in Chapter V, p.l60
we saw that strict Cartesian principles of subject and object
could no longer be held, "Science has shifted its ground, and is
beginning to be more interested in the subjective determinants of
2
the patterns which scientists project upon the world," Heisen-
berg 's Uncertainty Principle that observation alters the behaviour
of atoms is but one example. Science also uses assumptions and
presuppositions which are unchecked; they are regarded as valid
1, Karl S. Popper,'Philosophy of Science1, A personal report in
British Philosophy in the Mid Century, edited by C.A, Mace,
p.161-2, "And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Superego
and the Id no substantially stronger claim to scientific
status can be made for it than for Homer's collected
stories from the Olympus, These theories describe some facts
but in the manner of myths. They contain most interesting
psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form."
2. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.19
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as they are able to inform the scientist about the subject in
which he makes his enquiry. They are tools which begin their
life as subjective assumptions or concepts in the mind of the
scientist; they are not entities, e.g., the wave or particle
mechanics of light. Many iirriters have pointed to the fact of
personal participation in scientific endeavour. Macmurray
speaks of the so-called scientific view as often "the uncritical
response to the success of science in its own field, which res-
2
ponse is emotional." As we have already mentioned, he maintained
that the physical sciences came first because the material world
is less highly charged with emotion than the field of organic
and personal life. All this means that the observer's partici¬
pation can no longer be ruled out. Although, of course, whilst
every attempt is made in experiments to exclude the influence of
the exj>erimenter, his part is acknowledged as a factor in the
procedure. Rieff therefore writess-
"And if determinism and the hope of perfect prediction
must be qualified in physics, with all the precision
of its quantitative data, how much more likely are
they to prove impossible in the case of the physician
observing the intangibles dredged up by human self-
scrutiny, "
It is true that Freud, whilst maintaining the scientific status
of Psychoanalysis, never included one fundamental claim of modern
1. Among them, Polanyi in Personal Knowledge, and Prof. John
Macmurray in The Boundaries of Science.
2. Macinurray, The Boundaries of Science, p.21
3. ibid., p.56
4. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of The Moralist, p.115. Cf. pp.26 & 28
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science, namely the pcwer of prediction. It is retrospective,
1
not predictive. The power of prediction seems to be applicable
or assumed to be applicable in the "central" field of scientific
studies, (although David Iiume has shown that it cannot logically
be taken for granted or assumed to be operative in the future
as it has appeared to be in the past.) The more impersonal the
phenomena studied, the more reliably "objective" will be the
result in that predictions can be assumed to be made; but the
more we approach human behaviour on the one hand, and the atomic
2
physics on the other, the less do these strict criteria apply.
Facts which emerge, however, from the study of science today
are that it cannot be considered as existing apart from man,
that a large part is played by man's insight, intuition and
imagination, and without these there would be no science at all;
moreover, this participation cannot be excluded from consideration
in the results of scientific endeavour.
One further matter is clear, however, namely that psycho-
3
analysis cannot meet the rigid standards of scientific theory;
4
it "is not, and probably never can be, an exact science." What
is it then? Ve could return to the admission which Bysenck made
that it is a humane study offering insight and understanding to
people, regarding the meaning of certain phenomena about themselves
1. Rieff, Freud. The Mind of the Moralist, p.117
2. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction, p.44
and Mental Pain and the Cure of Souls, p.107
3. Rieff, ibid., p.26
4. Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.19
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whereas the experimental approach is one which explains how
people behave. So here we have two different disciplines. But
as they concern the same subject matter, namely human beings,
it is natural that man should strive after unity and integrat¬
ion, The scientific attitude which demands correct experimental
evidence has not been dismissed out of hand by all psycho¬
analytical adherents, for in America and elsewhere there is now
a serious study of psychoanalytical principles by experimental
methods. These moves are to be welcomed, for it would not be
desirable, for the sake of ultimate truth, if two disciplines
dealing with the same basic phenomenon should keep apart from
each other, remaining within their respective "charmed circles".
In this enquiry we have maintained that an openness between
disciplines is desirable; that psychology should not cut itself
off from biology on the one hand, or that "theology should not
cut itself off from psychology on the other. How much more is
this valid when dealing with two studies both called by the same
name, psychology, and both dealing with the same phenomenon,
I would agree with Ernst Kris, that experimental verifi¬
cation of psychoanalytical principles is necessary, not so much
to keep psychoanalysis respectable as to establish unity in the
field of psychology.^" He even speaks of a movement of "Experi¬
mental Psychoanalysis" by which many of the largely intuitive
propositions of psychoanalytical theory are moving into the field
1. Kris, 'Psychoanalytical Propositions', ~ sychologlcal Theory,
ed. Marx, p.3hl
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of cominonsense psychology. Yet Kris is doubtful whether any
experimental method will ever be able to provide scientific
confirmation of all the psychoanalytical propositions. One is
always up against "the elusive nature of the subject matter,
One who has engaged in "experimental psyclioanalysis" is
Hobert S, Sears, who is known primarily for his learning theories,
h© admits that much of the behaviour with whichFreud dealt is
not amenable to the methods of experimental psychology; we
should not, however, continue to rest content with independent
kinds of concepts, those of academic psychology and those of
psychoanalysis, but that, through experimentation, the latter1s
2
concepts can be resysteraatized in terms of those of the former.
Sears concludes that psychoanalysis, by the criteria of the
physical sciences, is not a good science, but that its value
lies in the fact that it deals with many other things that science
ignores. Its methods and techniques do not permit repetition
of observation, and all these are "tinctured to an unknown degree
1. Kris, ibid., p.337
2. Sears, Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytical
Concepts. He quotes experiments done on several aspects
of Freud's work, e.g., infant sexuality, in which he claims
that Freud was mistaken in deducing cultural universals. He
also quotes an experimental study of object-choice, based
on questionnaires; but could not Freud have argued that
this procedure only dealt with conscious material, while
Freud himself was dealing with unconscious material avail¬
able only in the analytical session; arid here we depart
from objective data required for experimental work and enter
the more subjective field.
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1
with the observer's own suggestions." Whilst the procedure
may be beneficial for the purposes of therapy, it fails to
uncover the kind of psychological facts that are required for
objective evaluation.
The conclusion of the experimental psychologist's criticism
of psychoanalysis seems to be polarised in a choice whether one
remains strictly "scientific" in a limited field, dealing with
those aspects of human beings which are amenable to experimental
psychology, or departs from the strict canons of science in
order to cover the total field of human phenomena. Here we are
presented with a choice of adhering strictly to either the
method of the problem. The Existentialist by his phenotnenological
approach is able to concentrate on the problem, the encounter,
and forget all about scientific theories and dynamic structures
and the like, and although this method is called scientific by
faing, it is clearly a use of the word different from that employ¬
ed in the physical sciences. But if "scientific" means only to
be interested in those aspects of human behaviour which can be
analysed statistically, this does involve a severe limitation
within a very restricted range of endeavour, outside of which
one cannot depart. It must disregard such human phenomena as
dreams, inner beliefs of mankind available only through intro¬
spection, which is as much a part of human activity as those
selected by the experimental psychologists for their study.
1. Sears, ob.cit. p.133
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Ian T. Ramsay speaks of philosophers, who in earlier days,
allowed objects to have shapes but not really "colour", because
they maintained that there is a mathematical treatment for
shape in geometry, but none for colour; so they concluded that
colours do not really exist, Ramsey regards them as "silly" in
1
the learned philosophical sense. To understand all aspects of
human life, the subjective must be included; it is "silly" to
exclude it* The attempt therefore to find unity in the field of
all psychological disciplines is to be commended, and the search
for invariants must go on. Nevertheless, it is logically imposs¬
ible to include in the study which claims to be objective, that
which is by nature subjective in character, and cannot be altered.
The matter is well put by Storr:-
"In their efforts to be scientific and to restrict
what they have to say about human nature only to such
facts as can be proved by experiment, the academic
psychologists have been forced to omit so much of
what is obviously important about human beings that
to many people their findings appear sterile. But
even the experiments of the most laboratory-minded
psychologist rest upon unproved hypotheses, and are
bound to do so; and whereas the laboratory worker is
free to restrict himself to limited aspects of human
nature, the psychotherapist must deal with the whole
man, and may have to work with hypotheses which are
not only unproved but probably unprovable,^
Therefore the meta-psychology of Freud, and the other theories
of psychodynamic structure may be, as we suggested in the
Introduction to this enquiry, "not only unproved", but "unprovable"
1. Ramsey, Science and Religion, p.35
2, Storr, The Integrity of the Personality, p.13
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hypotheses, constructed by man.
Nowadays psychoanalysts are not so keen to press the claim
that their discipline is a "science". In the recent book of
essays Psychoanalysis Observed. Charles Rycroft, himself a
psychoanalyst writes:
"liThat Freud did here was not to explain the patient's
choice causally but to understand it and give it
meaning, and the procedure he engaged in was not the
scientific one of elucidating causes but the semantic
one of making sense of it. It can indeed be argued
that much of Freud's work was really semantic, and
that he made a revolutionary discovery in semantics,
viz* that neurotic symptoms are meaningfully disguised
communications, but that owing to his scientific
training and allegiance, he formulated his findings ^
in the conceptual framework of the physical sciences."
"To my mind, one of the merits of the semantic view of
analysis is that it completely undercuts the Eysenck-
Psychoanalysis controversy by showing that both parties
are not only, as Eysenclc himself has said, arguing ^
from different premisses, but from the wrong premisses.
This view is very near to that whichEysenck first held} actually
Rycroft's statement, comes at the conclusion of a long debate,
3
in which mainly philosophers have taken part. Stephen Toulrnin
claims that the kernel of Freud's discovery is the introduction
of a technique in which the psychotherapist begins by studing
the motives for, rather than the causes of neurotic behaviour.
It appears that the trouble over psychoanalysis has been that
we have thought too much of it on the analogy of the natural
sciences where causal explanations are the custom. Antony Flew
1. Psychoanalysis Observed. p,l4
2. ibid,, p.15
3. 'The Logical Status of Psychoanalysis'. Chapter 6, 'Logic,
Psychoanalysis and Morals, in Philosophy and Analysis*
ed. Margaret MacDonald, p,137f«
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following Toulmin claims that in practice Freud was concerned
primarily with the motives for neurotic behaviour, whereas when
he generalized or theorized about his work, it could be thought
that he x<ras dealing with something quite different, namely the
alleged efficient causes of such behaviour.^ Flew points out that
when Freud is close to a case he talks of finding the motives
or purposes of obsessive acts, or of ways of interpreting their
meaning; but when he starts to generalize and speak theoretically,
he writes "as if he had inferred the existence of something
concealed, as if he had discovered the unconscious mind 'in a
way' as Mr Toulmin has it, 'strictly comparable to Columbus'
2
discovery of America.♦.'" Flew therefore says that psychoanalysis
is not a rival explanation to neurology and physiology, but
provides an altogether different kind of explanation in terms
of motives, purposes and intentions and not causes. Toulmin adds
to the discussion on his and Flew's paper that what they are
concerned with is the divergence between Freud's case reports
and metapsychology, which has given rise to many philosophical
misunderstandings.
3
On a similar line of criticism, Nigel Walker points out
that Freud rarely used straightfoward descriptive language to
describe his mental phenomena, but that most of his statements,
1. ibid.
Flew on 'Psychoanalytic Explanation,' p,139f«
2. ibid., p.140
3. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh University, The Freudian
Unconscious.
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even the very general ones are about his own model."'' Perhaps
one can find a reason for this; when writing his Studies in
Hysteria. Freud apologized because his cases read so much like
novels, that "one might say they lack the serious stamp of
2
science." His later works sought to rectify his self-accusations
of being unscientific by his statements being in terms of his
model. Walker will not agree that Freud's psychic entities were
largely metaphors to help patients to visualize how their minds
functioned; they are more like bodies which interact according
3
to laws that closely resemble physical laws, i.e., they are cast
in a scientific "mould".
Walker follows Toulmin in The Philosophy of Science that in
present day science there are two kinds of statements to be
if
found, either descriptive, based on observations, or explanatory.
The former, Toulmin argued are to be found in "natural history
statements", the latter in physics. Walker maintains, as do
5
Toulmin and Alastair Maclntyre" that psychoanalytical statements
are descriptive statements and should not be mistaken for explan¬
atory laws. Freud's case reports are descriptive but his
metapsychology is explanatory, and it is in this that we find
the determinism by which motives and reasons are converted, into
1. ibid., para 135
2. Quoted by Rieff, p.9 (ref, to Freud SE II p.l6o)
3. Walker, Thesis, para 176. Cf. Rieff p.20-21
b. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy. p.6-7
5. A. Maclntyre, Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volume XXIX,
1955» P»^3f« See also his monograph The Unconscious.Chap.3
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causes. Walker concluded that The Unconscious, which is essent¬
ially a descriptive term has become "a piece of advice for the
would-be explanatory psychologist."^" It may have a facilitating
2
role in psychotherapy, but it is not a logically essential one*
Walker also distinguishes between science and techniques, and
points out that many professions call themselves sciences, when
3
they are in fact techniques using sciences. Psychotherapy is
not even a technique, but a sub-technique; it is "in itself
nothing more than a semantic group of remedial techniques for
k
treating psychogenic disorders." This brings us back to Rycroft's
statement.
Another writer who has emphasised the difference between
description and explanation in Freud's work is A.C. Maclntyre,
who in his book The Unconscious argues that both Freud's psycho-
analytical techniques and his doctrines are theoretical and
explanatory rather than descriptive. Both technique and theory
are all made to interlock with the central concept of the
Unconscious (used as a noun, not as an adjective); they are all
explicable in terms of one another, therefore one is faced with
a closed system. All kinds of behaviour are explained by the
5
Unconscious so that we do not have descriptions of reality,
!
rather they are always re-presented in terms ofFreud's own
1. Walker, Thesis, para 311
2. ibid., para 356
3. ibid,, para 336
4. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy. p,l66
5. Maclntyre, The Unconscious, p.l6
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model.^
Maclntyre maintains that although Freud himself" abandoned
the neurological explanation of the mind quite early in his
studies, he nevertheless "preserved the view of the mind as a
piece of machinery and merely wrote up in psychological terms
what had been originally intended as neurological theory♦"
Maclntyre quotes the phrase of James Strachey: this "highly
complicated and extraordinary ingenious working model of the
2
mind as a piece of neurological machinery#" A scheme of explan¬
ation derived from neurology is brought to the psychological
3
phenomena with which Freud is occupied. Following the above
writers, Maclntyre regards the Unconscious as used by Freud not
4
only as a descriptive term, but as an explanatory concept.
Having dealt at length with the difference between describing
and explaining, Maclntyre suggests that "an essential part of
Freud's achievement lies not in his explanation of abnormal
5
behaviour but in his re-description of such behaviour." he
therefore follows Wittgenstein in that "what Freud has done
was to give not an explanation, but a 'wonderful representation
of facts *,
MacXntyre sums up Freud's achievement as follows:-
1. Maclntyre, The Unconscious, p.18-19
2. ibid. , p.22
3. ibid., P.23
4. ibid., p.49
5. ibid. , p.63
6. ibid., P.73
216
"If I am right, then Freud's indisponsible terms are
'unconscious' and 'repression' used descriptively;
except in so far as illuminating descriptions may
count as a kind of explanation, their place as explan¬
atory terras is highly dubious. That Freud used them
in this dubious way is not surprising. All his theoret¬
ical work has a kind of creative untidiness about it.
He never presents usu with a finished structure but with
the far more exciting prospect of working through a
number of possible ways of talking and thinking. One
result of this is that his conceptual errors and
unclarities are usually far more interesting and
suggestive than the careful precision with which so
many writers on psychology equip themselves only to
find that the data of human behaviour and experience
are far richer than the conceptual framework into which
they want to see the data forced,^-
Similar criticisms to those already examined are to be found
in the paper of H.J.H, Home called The Concept of Mind, Mr Home
trained as a psychoanalyst, but is dissatisfied with the language
and concepts of his discipline. He complains that very often
psychoanalysts present their cases in the language of "the
literature", i.e., in the terms of Freud's own model, which he
compares to a practice in religious writings or in Communist
theory. To speak in such terms as "the level of libidinal cathexes
of the self" is meaningless as is much else of the language of
Freudian metapsychology, and the trouble lies in a lack of
clarity in the kind of matter being discussed. Freud's basic
discovery, Home argues, was that the symptom had meaning, but
because Freud used mechanistic medical terms, the symptom came
1, ibid,, p.79. Maclntyre, however, makes a similar remark about
R.D. Laing, "Perhaps Laing's confusions are not too high
a price to pay for his insights," The Observer, January 29»
1967 reviewing Laing, The Politics of Experience and The
Bird of Paradise.
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to be regarded as a fact, and a fact as the product of causes:
"In discovering that the symptom had meaning and
basing his treatment on this hypothesis, Freud took
the Psycho-analytic study of neurosis out of the
world of science into the world of the Humanities,
because a meaning is not the product of causes but
the creation of a subject." "V
In short, science deals with causes, the Humanities with reasons
and motives. We have these two different kinds of thinking,
and they are both appropriate when correctly applied. If either
mode of thought is inappropriately applied, we have the result
in the production of meaningless theories. Home criticises Marx
for creating a science of history, and for using such nouns as
Feudalism, Capitalism and Communism as if they stood for actual
objective events. Marx pointed out that there were unconscious
determinants of historical events in much the same way as Freud
did about the unconscious determinants of behaviour. Home regards
that Marx's mistake was to "treat History, which is an artifact
of man, as if it were a fact, as if the behaviour of people
could be accounted for solely as a direct consequence of causes."
He sees Freud having fallen into a similar fallacy when he
proposed his instinct theory and his theory of the Mind in terms
of id, ego and super-ego. For neither history, nor the Mind is a
fact or event such as scientific method can investigate.
Home argues that if we speak about the mind as if it were
a thing, we speak metaphorically5 but if we forget that we are
1. J. Home,'The Concept of Mine?, International Journal of
Psychoanalysis. 1966, 47 p.42-49
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using a metaphor and speak literally about the mind as a thing,
we have created, according to Home, a metaphysical fact. Now
metaphysics helps to impose an order on data, but unlike real
facts, the meaning of the metaphysical terms can change with
use or with some new experience. Home points to a parallel in
the early Christian Church and its difficulties with heresy in
the days when doctrine was being defined.
Home then argues that as meaning is the function of a spont¬
aneous living subject, which is known to us through identifica¬
tion, it cannot be investigated by the scientific method as it
only applies to a dead object or to an object perceived as dead.
But, one asks, what of biology? Is Mr Home not pressing his case
too far? What he is stressing is the fact that psychoanalysis
speaks in clinical practice of a free association and of a
spontaneous subject, and on the other hand, "it reifies the concept
of Mind and elaborates a scientific type theory in terms of
causes. To reify is to deify.,,," The result of reification is
the dead language of metapsychology, Freud set psychoanalysis
in a scientific framework without asking whether it was approp¬
riate or not| Home argues that to do justice to the concept of
a spontaneous subject, an unscientific logical framework is
required.
We have considered the work of the above writers in some
detail, as their contributions lie behind and lead up to the
position of Rycroft, with whose quotation we began this section.
We could summarize their arguments as follows:-
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Psychoanalysis should foe considered along with the Humanities
and not with the Sciences, for its concern is with meaning and
understanding, not with causes; i.e., the symptom has meaning
and is not to be considered as a product of causes. The nature
of psychoanalysis is semantic and not deterministic,"'" for it
deals with reasons and motives behind the symptom, the symptom
being a disguised way of communicating these, rather than being
caused by determinants in an iron chain of necessity, Mr Home
regarded the concept of mind as the meaning of behaviour preferr¬
ing this to any metaphysical expression. Therefore psychoanalysis
is essentially descriptive in nature (as Freud showed when he
was giving case reports which read like novels), and not explan¬
atory (as Freud tried to be when speaking of all phenomena in
terms of his model, thereby "divesting them of their phenomenality").
Some of the above criticisms of psychoanalysis we have
already encountered. Boss, for example, drew attention to the
two languages of Freud - the "novel" language, and the "model"
language, the former displaying human sympathy and understanding,
. 2
the latter Freud's desire to be "scientific". Jung, early on in
his relations with Freud dissented from the causal scheme of
explanation because creativity could not be explained by it.
Jung, however, did not abandon the causal concept altogether;
he used it along with his energic principles.
1. Walker, A Short History of Psychotherapy, p.166
2. Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis. p.65 (see above
Chapters V and VI,)
3. Jacobi, The Psychology of C.G. Jung. p.63-5
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In Mr Home's paper one can discern the inhibition concern¬
ing metaphysics which has become a feature of modern philosophy."''
One can appreciate his concern over the inis-use of metaphysics
and his timely warning against the creation of "metaphysical
facts" by the employment of a multiplicity of theoretical terms,
which could be regarded as additional to empirical data. Meta¬
physical terms and empirical data differ in logical status and
therefore cannot be used together in the hope of making a mean¬
ingful sentence or statement. They can be used in place of data,
but not in addition to J/ifca or alongside d>js/. Data are always
fundamental, but this does not exclude the use of metaphysics
for the purpose of bringing some order into the data, as we shall
hope to show.
Mr Home's desire to preserve the concept of a spontaneous-
subject-concerned-with-motives rather than a subject who is a
victim of causes, is a laudable onej for "motives" implies
responsibility, "causes" implies determinism, Man would always
prefer to believe that he is a free spontaneous agent, rather
than a plaything, resulting from deterministic causation. There
is, however, a paradox in the question of freewill in the sense
that the person who is most free is the person who knows how
much his conduct and behaviour patterns are motivated by
"Unconscious" or previously unrecognised factors. The more he is
able to come to terms with this aspect of himself, the greater
1. As for example A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic. Chapter I.
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will be his ability to make conscious choices in matters of"
behaviour. Of this paradox in Freud, Alastair Maclntyre writes:-
"Freud is so often presented as undermining the
rationalist conception of man as a self-sufficient,
self-aware, self-controlled being, that we are apt to
forget that although he may have abandoned such a
conception as an account of what man is, he never
retreated from it as an account of what man ought to
be, * Where id was, there ego shall be,' Freud's whole
recognition of unconscious purposes is a discovery
that men are more, and not less, rational than we
thought they were,"-*-
Freud seems to imply a notion of freedom which contradicts his
2
deterministic constructions. One wonders, however, if Freud
was not nearer to the truth behind what we have termed that
paradox of human freedom by holding the two sides together, than
those reformers who would dissolve the paradox, coming down on
one side or the other. Can the concept of cause be completely
deleted from an understanding of human behaviour? Was Jung right
to include it along with another? Is "meaning" a concept which
can describe all the phenomena without remainder, so eliminating
the possible use of the concept of cause?
Let us take practical examples. In an analysis the psycho¬
therapist is dealing with a patient who, as a child, had to face
some untoward, fortuitious circumstance* like the loss of a
parent or parental rejection, and was up against such great odds
that he was overwhelmed with anxiety, Aie has now developed
certain symptoms for which he is aaeking treatment, Would it be
1* Maclntyre, The Unconscious, p.93. The Freud reference is on
p.106 of New Introductory Lectures,
2, Jarrett-Kerr, The Secular Promise, p,128
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possible to find the meaning of these symptoms without at the
same time knowing that there was some objective factor, i,e»,
independent of the patient, which contributed towards them?
Could one not say that this objective factor was the cause, and
the symptoms the consequence? Rieff^" suggests in place of "cause"
we speak of "meaningful antecedents". But are there not two sides
to these meaningful antecedents: The objective event, and the
individual's reaction to it?
2
We have already looked at Laing's concept of the double-bind,
and seen how easy it would be for us to see the patient as the
helpless victim of causes beyond his control, without examining
the other side of the matter, which is the reaction of the patient,
the omnipotent phantasies or withdrawals which he produced
originally to cope with this situation, and upon which, he has
subsequently relied. Now patients under-going analysis will very
often spend much time describing what they have had to suffer
at the hands of those who brought them up. To recall such episodes
and live through them again in this one-sided manner does not
produce a therapeutic change; one must also examine the phantasies
which accompany the situation, and were produced to cope with
high level of anxiety. The real analysis, therefore, which is of
value, lies in the response. How far did the stimulus activate
already existing phantasies? Home, Rycroft and others would say
1, Rieff, Freud, the Mind of the Moralist, p.115
2, See Chapter V, p., 162, note *e'.
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that it is in the response that we find the meaning of the
symptom or complex} but there remain^ the stimuli, the factors
outside the patient's control and these may be decisive in the
formation of the symptom, which could even be that of taking
the form of complete absence of spontaneity.
Concepts such as stimulus and response can cope with simple
psychological situations as in controlled experiments, but they
are really totally inadequate to cope with the complex intricacies
of the phenomena produced in psychotherapy. Even although the
concept "cause" were to be kept for the idea of an objective
factor outside the person, this would amount to an almost
negligible use of it. Much more would need to be included in
the concept of "cause" than a single outside stimulus or stimuli.
Analysts have spoken for a long time about looking for the
cause of a certain symptom, or "of finding out the explanation"
of some disorder; some would find it as difficult to surrender
these concepts in favour of meaning and description, as it would
be for an orthodox theologian to surrender the concept of
revelation! 1 think, however, that the analysts may not need
to do so completely,
-^-s there not some sense in which the word "cause" could
be kept for legitimate use in psychodynamics? It is clear that
it could not carry the identical meaning as it would in strict
scientific experimental usage, I would agree with van Burens
"The word •cause* is used in human relationships in
a broader, less restriced way than in an experiment
22k
in Newtonian physics."^
Similarly Alston has said,wz'iting of those who would say that
a reason is one thing and a cause quite another:
"Of course a reason cannot be a cause nor can a
cause be a reason. They exist logically in different
realms. But that does not mean that a statement
about reasons cannot have implications concerning
causes and vice-versa,"-
The basic trouble seeins to arise from the fact that in
science, like experimental psychology, the various factors can
be isolated and kept out of the specific enquiries which are
being undertaken. In actual life, which is the concern of
psychodynamics, this cannot possibly be done. Psychodynamics
is concerned with a multi-factorial situation which makes its
practice largely qualitative rather than quantitative. Moreover,
the phenomena and data studied require much more personal part¬
icipation on the part of the observer in order to be understood,
than in the case of one conducting an experiment in a detached
manner. There are so many variables that it is almost impossible
to predict with certainty an outcome, for there could be so many
ways in which a situation could develop, and so many external
and internal forces which could be brought into play which could
alter any carefully %\rorked out prediction. Yet, I do not think
that the predictive factor can be ruled out absolutely, and
written off as completely as even some Freudians would assert,
1, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p.125
2, Faith and the Philosophers, p.90
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It is quite true that psychodynaraics is concerned with
quality rather than with quantity. This happens whenever a
difference of degree becomes so complex as to be judged as a
difference of kind, so that the subject studied has now come
under the category of a "humanity" rather than a "science."
Nevertheless, the motives which play such a great part in human
behaviour can, together with the objective circumstances and the
other determinants, be regarded as "causes", and explanations
can be given about them. The words "cause" and "explanation"
are therefore used along with "meaning" and "description" without
carrying the same degree of precision as they ("cause" and
^explanation") would do in the natural sciences.
Richard Peters''" does not feel the need to distinguish so
clearly between motives and causes as Toulmin and Flew do,
2
Nor does Peter Alexander who argues that whilst the therapy
side of psychoanalysis may not be a science, there is a body of
theory about the formation and removal of symptoms which may be
scientific. Alexander also points out that in the Introductory
Lectures of Freud on which Flew bases his argument for the
3distinction between motives and causes, Freud uses motives and
purposes simultaneously, (p.33) and that although psychotherap¬
ists1 explanations are different, say, from those of a chemist,
1. R, Peters whose paper follows Flew's and Toulrain's in
Philosophy and Analysis (ed, Margaret MacDonald)
2. 'Symposium: Cause and Cure in Psychotherapy', Aristotelean
Society Supplementary Volume XXIX, 1955» p.25f«
3• Introductory Lectures.p,2jh
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they can still be causal. He pleads for a detailed elucidation
of the methodology of psychotherapy. He adds, however, that if
Freud was right that it is impossible to understand psycho¬
analysis without having been through a fullscale analysis,
after this it may be impossible not to be convinced of the truth
of his theory! (p.42)
It is quite true that analysis is a process whereby a
patient learns why he needs the symptom, and of how various
determinants, some of these unconscious"'" have entered into the
symptom formation so that it comes to be understood as the result
of certain motives and wishes which now have a meaning. One can
look back, see the reasons and understand. Suppose that there is
a chain of reasons behind the symptom, so that "one thing led
to another", this chain could not be considered as strictly
causal in the scientific sense, nor would it be a logical chain
of reasoning as in the philosophical sense, but it would possess
its own innate logic, being regulated by motives, wishes and
responses of the person. Could these not, ho\irever, also be causes
if we define the word carefully? It is quite true that in his
early days Freud talked much about the wish; it is also true that
he called his great book The "Interpretation" of Dreams, not
The 'Explanation"...,or The "Causation"..., for he regarded the
1, Marjorie Brierley, Trends in Fsyclioanalysls. p. 96
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dream as a wish-fulfilment.^ Nevertheless, this does not remove
completely the whole notion of cause or explanation as we have
detailed it above. In practice, psychoanalysis is a means of
dissipating symptoms and of demonstrating that there are reasons
for them which can become meaningful to the individual under¬
going analysis. This does not exclude the possibility of these
reasons being also understood as causes in the limited sense.
To return, therefore, to the paradox of freedom, that the man
is most free who begins to recognize his underlying motives of
which he has previously been unaware, that man may also regard
these and the other determinants as the cause of his condition,
and explain his condition on the basis of these new facts which,
through analysis, has been made available to him.
******
Important as the above argument may prove to be, it is even
more important from the point of view of this enquiry to consider
the logical status of Freud's structure of the psyche, rememb¬
ering that in considering Freud•s we are virtually considering
the others, as the same principles apply to all psychic structures.
We have seen how Freud met the criticism that he was using
pretentious jargon for very ordinary facts about the human
personality which were already well know, and how Jacobson
1. Binswanger has shown how Freud attached this on to the large
psychic apparatus, the mechanisim of which was set in
operation by "the wish". The wish is the "motive", and there
are some would prefer to translate Trieb not by instinct
or drive, but by motive, as in German there is another
word for instinct, namely, Instinkt.
228
agreed that Freud's theories were tied to "significant inner
experiences", the id to temptation, the ego to reason and the
1
super-ego to conscience. Was this procedure not similar to that
of the seventeenth century medical profession when they allegedly
"explained" events by constructing impressive names for thern,
so earning the criticism of Moliere? Frederick Ferre describes
this as disguised ignorance of genuine explanations. Could not
this cx"iticism be made of Freud's psychic structure? Freud,
however, met it in part by saying that his work consisted of
3
a new way of looking at things, a new grouping of facts.
At the same time as claiming ordinary assocations for his
structure, Freud named it, however, as part of his "Metapsychology",
which meant that it went beyond psychology, "part of the spec¬
ulative superstructure of psychoanalysis", as Bowlby has
k
described it. Is it a sort of "psychological metaphysics", as
Mr Home has regarded it, or is it a "myth" as Popper claimed,
or a "model" as Walker and others have claimed?
In contrast to Professor Ayer who regarded the metaphysician
5
as a kind of misplaced poet who "produces sentences which fail
1. Jacobson, The Self and the Object World, p.123 (See Chap.I, p.29)
Cf. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of The Moralist. p,21 where he
speaks of the trio of inner voices, id desiring, ©go
steering and super-ego exhorting, like the Old Miracle Plays.
2. F. Ferre, Language, I^ogic and God, p. 22
3. Freud, Mew Introductory Lectures, p.82. Cf. Wittgenstein, who
called Freud's work a "wonderful representation" of the facts.
See Maclntyre, The Unconscious, p.93
k. Bowlby in Mew Society, Correspondence Column (No.4l)
5. Ayer, Language, Logic and Truth, p,44 (19th impression)
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to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can
be literally significant,Professor Dorothy Emmet regards
metaphysics as starting "from the articulation of relationships
which are judged to be constitutive of an experience or exper¬
iences in a significant way;" metaphysics is "an analogical way
2
of thinking," Professor Emmet's book is an exceedingly rich one,
and any attempt to reproduce her arguments must necessarily be
inadequate *
She argues that the formation of metaphysical concepts
results frotn our minds being what they are; we possess two
a priori mental faculties which contribute to the making of
metaphysical concepts. The first is that we have an impulse
3
towards the creation of forms in which the imagination can rest
and that this impulse towards the creation of form is funda-
4
mental, lying at the root of all mental activity. Experience
itself - and Professor Emmet uses the word "experience" while
admitting that in some ways it is unsatisfactory - includes our
forms of interpretation; not only have we feelings, impulses,
intuitions and the like, for we always have along with these the
thinking which seeks to find or create some significant order
5
in them. We just cannot get back to primary experiences, simply
because we cannot think away all forms of interpretation, and
1, Ayer, Language, Logic and Truth, p.35
2, D.M. Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking. Preface, p.v.
3, ibid. p.2
4, ibid. p.189
5, ibid, pp.4, 19
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"catch, ourselves with some raw pellet of experience*" To be aware
is to have begun relating and distinguishing, which means that
we are employing some rudimentary schema of interpretation,
Gestalt psychology bears out this contention of Dr. Emmet1s,
that we all have our systems or "sets" for perception*
Her second assertion about a priori mental activity is that
it is essentially symbolizing activity, and that it seeks to
understand a thing by expressing or seeing it symbolized in
terms of another,^ That our minds possess an innate tendency
towards symbolizing is an assumption of all depth psychologists,
based on empirical evidence. Dream interpretation, whether it
be by Joseph in the Book of Genesis or Freud in his The Inter~
iiretation of Dreams* emphasises the truth of a quotation which
Dr. Emmet employs, that "man is an analogist." Along the same
lines, Groddeck has statedj-
"Symbols are not invented, they are there and belong
to the inalienable estate of mans indeed, one might
say that all conscious thought and action are the
unavoidable consequence of unconscious syrnbolization,
that mankind is animated by the symbol»"2
Whilst one would not wish to press the assertions about the
underlying unconscious which Groddeck makes in this quotation, it
nevertheless asserts the truth that man is an analogist, and
that symbolization is an a priori form of mental activity.
1, ibid*, p. 61
2. G. Groddeck, The Book of the It. p.h3—kk
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Professor Emmet gives an analysis of the various kinds of
metaphysical thinking, dividing these "illustrative analogies"
into five categories: deductive, projective, hypothetical,
co-ordinating and transcendent. She claims that it is the nature
of conscious thought to go beyond the actual perception and
attempt to translate a multiplicity of data into some definite
form.
In speaking of the development of symbolical forms, Emmet
draws on the work of Cassirer, who, in his Philosophie der
Symbolischen Formen. traces three stages in the developments of
forms of speech. The first is the Representative Stage, where
words have power in themselves and are a magical duplicate of
the things they represent, possessing the potency of those things
themselves. The second stage is the Analogical Stage, in which
words are not duplicates of things, but held in some way to be
structural models of things. The third stage is the Symbolic
Stage, in which there is no natural connection or model relation
between word and meaning, as in mathematics, where we can get rid
of the "thing" concept altogether,"'" Emmet selects the second of
these as illustrative of her idea of metaphysical activity, of
relations within rationally connected experience described
analogically to express indirectly the ways in which "things"
may be connected in the external world. Metaphysical systems
1. Emmet, ibid., p.73
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to Emmet are not the same as those to which Professor Ayer
objects, i.e., those assuming a knowledge of transcendent real¬
ity; they are systems of assumptions necessary in order to under
stand our observations and experiences."'"
Emmet also includes mythical thinking as an a priori
symbolic activity of the human mind, and therefore one of the
2
irreducible ways of interpreting experience. Following Cassirer
"myth thinking" cannot be looked on as a rudimentary and un¬
successful kind of scientific thinking; rather it is an alter¬
native way of looking at the world complete within its own limit
She also described it as "an imaginative picture of the world
shaped in terms of the powers and feelings of man's own inner
life."3
This argument is carried into the realms of theology and
history; the former springs from man's unwillingness to "rest
satisfied with mere arbitrary mystery; we feel impelled to
construct some coherent thought forms in terras of which we can
4
order our experience and make sense of the world." The idea
of ordering experience is applied to history in the sense of
the selection and grouping of facts, plus the interpretations;
5
otherwise, a historian would be a mere chronicler,
1, For an answer to Ayer see Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho¬
analysis , p.266
2, Emmet, ibid., p.98 footnote quoting Cassirer.
3, ibid,, p.100
4, ibid,, p.116
5, ibid., p.162-6, See also Dodd, History and the Gospel, p.26f.
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Emmet's conclusion is that we cannot escape metaphysics,
as the experiencing subject inevitably interprets his experience
through symbolic forms, this being an example of analogical
activity?" Without this creation of intellectual form, nothing
can be grasped} "there is a vague multiplicity of confused
impressions," She regards these symbolic forms which man uses
to order his experience as part of his proper study.
This conclusion, that metaphysics is necessary, is echoed
in many quarters. For example, Professor John Wisdom writes
"In order to grasp complex and unmanageable patterns
we are ul\tfays using models, other patterns which we
have grasped. With every name we apply we compare
one thing with another, with many others."2
or Professor Howard Roots-
"Metaphysical construction, crude or inolished, is
natural to human beings."-'
"...the question is not whether men can or will do
metaphysics, but only whether they will do it well
or badly.
These metaphysical constructs, however, are not statements about
a transcendent reality in the older sense of metaphysics} they
may be regarded as revolts against such systems, or "metaphysics
5
from below." In this sense,Freud's metapsychology could be
regarded as justifiable and perhaps necessary as "metaphysics
1. Emmet, ibid., p.191
2. J, Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p.2?4
3. H. Root in Soundings. p.l4
4. ibid., p.15
5. This phrase is found in a footnote in Colin Williams,
Faith in a Secular Age, p.42
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from below"; our concern here, however, is not with his total
metaphysical construct, but with his structural model of the
mind of man, which will be used considerably in Part II, What
then is its logical status?
In -his study of models,"*' Bishop Ian T, Ramsey points out
that many disciplines which qppear in isolation from each other
have one thing in common, they make use of models. This most
obvious kind of model is the scale-model or replica, the kind
that Lord Kelvin revelled in, Ramsey calls these "picture models";
they enable th^jscientist and the theologian alike to be articu¬
late about the subjects of their respective disciplines, and
being replicas, they provide them with "reliable genuine
descriptions," But they have their limitations and deficiencies,
which leads Ramsey to consider a new type of model which stands
somewhere between a picture model and a formula (by "formula"
he is referring to the "Symbolic" stage of Cassirer, as in
mathematics, where the "thing" concept has been got rid of
A
altogether.) Ramsey calls this a "disclosure model" (after
Max Black's analogue model), the dominating principle of which
4
lies in what mathematicians call "isomorphism", "The model echoes ^
and chimes in with those phenomena in respect of which it is
used and is incorporated, with them, in a disclosure," In so
1. Ian T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery
2. ibid., p.5
3. ibid,, p.18 in discussion of Emmet.
4. ibid,, p.10 quoting Max Black, Models and Metaphors, p.222
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doing, it forms a bridge between theory and fact, and at its
heart lies a disclosure, or insight, about some mystery in the
universe. In his earlier book*', Ramsey makes much of disclosure
situations, which lead to a particular commitment, when the
penny drops, or the ice breaks. But a model in science should be
able to do more than this; from it we should be able to yield
possible verifiable deductions, over a wide range of phenomena.
A theological model, on the other hand, stands or falls according
to its success in harmonizing whatever events are to hand, no
derivative deductions being required of it, "From theological
assertions no verifiable deductions can be made; from scientific
2
ones, they can and must be." The theological model works more
like the fitting of a boot or shoe rather than the "yes" or "no"
3
of a roll-call. "It is judged by a question of 'empirical fit'." <■
Hence models for science make deductive experimental verification
possible whereas models for theology make for empirical fit.
"They each arise out of, and in this way become
currency for, a universe that discloses itself to
us in a moment of insight."^
"Models, whether in theology or science, are not
descriptive miniatures, they are not picture en¬
largements; in each case they point to mystery, to
the need for us to live as best we can with theolog¬
ical and scientific uncertainties."5
1, Ramsey, Religious Language, p.49f.
2, Ramsey, Religion and Science? Conflict and Synthesis, p.75




Ramsey also considers psychological models"'',but these are
applicable to experimental psychology and not to psychodynaraic
models. However, he reminds psychologists that their models
are fulfilled in insight, and that the topic of experimental
2
psychology is persons like the psychologist himself!
Ramsey also considers similes and metaphors, comparing the
former to picturing models and the latter to disclosure models,
the disclosure being the "tangential meeting of two diverse
3
contexts." Metaphors are not just link devices, but the lang¬
uage of the second infiltrates into the first in a most selective
4
and subtle way. Models and metaphors, both being grounded in
inspiration or intuition, enable us to be more articulate about
an insight which we cannot fully comprehend though we may spend
our lives trying to do so.
He speaks also of qualifiers to models, a subject which
he dealt with in his Religious Language, claiming that they do
5
not lead to "a death of a thousand qualifications", but to
1. Ramsey, Models and Mystery. Chapter 2,
2. ibid,, p.29. See also Religion and Science, where he discusses
the issues involved in cybernetics; he also mentions the
limitations of physiology and psychology to give an adequate
account of human behaviour. (p.6l)
3. Models and Mystery, p.52. Cf, his discussion of the aim of
parables in Christian Discourse, p.ll
4. ibid., p.53
5. Antony Flew in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, p.97
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"life by a thousand enrichments."'1' Qualifiers remind us of the
inadequacy of all models: when dealing with mystery there is
"no single inward track", and "no single outward road from the
infinite." The aim of religious language is to ensure that the
universe and ourselves corne alive together in a cosmic disclos-
2
ure, when the universe reveals itself to us.
A discussion of religious models may seem irrelevant here,
or at least premature in this stage of the enquiry. However, of
all the models which Ramsey considers, the one most applicable
to the models of psychodynaraic structure ijs the theological
model; if we regard the mystery which it seeks to elucidate as
neither the universe nor the nature of God, but the mind of man,
we see that the use of a disclosure model of the same logical
status would enable our understanding of it to come alive in a
disclosure situation, where the secrets of that mystery (which is
1. Not everyone shares Ramsey's optimism about the use of
qualifiers, Hepburn, for example, writes: "Theologians
constantly declare that no analogy or image can adequately
express God's nature. He is Father, but not in all respect
like earthly fathers: he loves us, but with more than a
human love,,.and so on. The best that can be done is to
assert some analogy and then say, 'But no: he is not quite
like that', and then another analogy, and largely cancel it
in turn. No shot is a bull's eye, but the cluster of near
misses manages to locate the target in a rough and ready
fashion. More seriously; the progress towards knowledge of
God includes the destruction of successive symbols, the
endless pruning away of misleading associations. The aim of
all this labour (to the Christian) is a knowledge of a God
who in some sense is," - Christianity and Paradox, p»199
2, Models and Mystery. p»69. Professor John Mclntyre in The Shape
of Christology also speaks of the negative aspects of
models. This however seems to have been answered in advance
by Ramsey in Chapter 5 of Jeligious Language«
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called the mind of man) reveal themselves to us. This we regard
as a justification for our use of these models*
What Ramsey calls a disclosure situation is similar to
what the psychotherapist considers as a therapeutic moment, If
the therapist is not bound to any one dogmatic creed, he will use
any model, or anti-model to effect a disclosure in which meaning
can be imparted to the patient * The fact that we have chosen
more than one model is perhaps inevitable. The mind of man,
being of such a complex character is such that no one model
could exhaust its mystery and explain to us all that we would
wish to know without remainder. Even physics uses different
models to explain one phenomenon: wave mechanics and particle
mechanics are both needed to explain the phenomenon of light.
We would therefore draw the following conclusions to this
part of the enquiry
1, As metaphysics ("from below")^can be justified as an
inevitable consequence of the a priori workings of the mind of
man in ordering experience in a symbolic manner, as explained
by Emmet, so also can metapsychology be justified on the same
grounds.
"It was necessary to sift the enormous amount of
material which the new method had collected and to
classify it scientifically. Whether for good or evil,
Freud had to formulate a skeletal outline for his
theory, a construction which, though it has been
altered, modified and remodelled many times, remains
sound in its main details up to the present day. This
1. See note 5, P«233
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construction is the so-called Metapsycliology. . .
every scientific theory is fantasy, and it is
serviceable as such as long as it meets practical
requirements and agrees with the facts of experience.
Freud's raetapsychological system does this fully.
2. Ferenczi still thought of psychoanalysis as a science,
as the above quotation shows. Ramsey's work on models has made
it clear that the disclosure models which are justified in psycho-
dynamics are not of the pattern of scientific models but of theo¬
logical models.This is due to the facts that causal explanation
is not fully operative and that prediction in any sense comparable
with that of the physical sciences cannot be claimed. This clears
up the misunderstandings expressed above by Ferenczi and below
by Victor White,
"Like every empirical science, psychology also requires
auxiliary concepts, hypotheses and models. But the theo¬
logian, as well as the philosopher,is apt to make the
mistake of taking- them for metaphysical a priori assert¬
ions. The atom of which the physicist speaks is no
metaphysical hypothesis, it is a model."2
No model, theological or otherwise, is an a priori assertion,
although the making of models may be ultimately ascribed to the
a priori activity of man's mind.
3. As deductive experimental verification is not required,
these disclosure models are of a descriptive nature so as to
impart meaning, and their success or failure, as Ramsey asserts,
1. Ferenczi, 'Freud's Influence on Medicine, Psychoanalysis Today, p.3
2. God and the Unconscious, p.20. Cf. John Wren Lewis in
Psychoanalysis Observed, p.92 speaks of science's concepts
of matter, energy and force, not as discoveries, but
intellectual models.
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lies in their "empirical fit"; when "the bellrings", or "the
penny drops", or "the ice breaks" the model does its work. This
may seem a very subjective criterion; but once it is acknow¬
ledged that the psychodynamic model, like the theological one,
works by meeting empirical needs in imparting meaning, there
can be no other criterion than the subjective one. Having a
subjective criterion to evaluate subjective material may seem
like the blind leading the blind. However, although it is sub¬
jective, it is not purely personal, for its validity is constantly
being tested in the therapeutic situation over and over again
as the way the patterns of the mind, inferred from human behav¬
iour, disclose themselves to us.
4, The Existentialist analysts ttfould demythologize psycho-
dynamic models in much the same way as the Existentialist
theologians would demythologize the Bible and the creeds of the
Church, reducing everything without remainder to simple Exist-
entialia, ^et their anti-model serves as a theory behind their
practice of therapy. We have seen that the strength of existent¬
ialist analysis lies in its ability to impart meaning to unstruct¬
ured personalities, as in schizophrenia; but everyone is not
schizophrenic all the time; therefore these metapsychologies of
Freud, Fairbairn and Jung can supply meaning when those of the
Existentialists cannot, and vice-versa. Each system is able to
do something for us; none is complete or ever could be, because,
as we have already stated, of the elusive, mysterious nature of
the subject matter.
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5. One cannot accept the contention that the application
of analysing methods to a person necessarily depersonalizes hini,
Guntrip is right when he states that "when science begins to
treat a man as an object of investigation, it somehow loses him
as a person,"^ The Existentialists take this to its logical
conclusion and dispense vrith structural theories, (That Guntrip
does not do so may be due to his equating "Object-Relations"
and "Personal Relations".) However, as I have agreed, I would
maintain that one can hold on to an "I-Thou" relationship whilst
analysing the material presented into "I-It" categories. It is
not a matter of "Either/Or" but of "Both/And".
6. Finally, in spite of all the criticism made of Freud's
biassed "scientific" outlook, one still finds in his work the
most valued insights. It is a fact that without Freud's pioneer
work such an enquiry as this could not be undertaken. Develop¬
ments have taken place since his time as we have shown, but they
have not rendered him or his contribution valueless. One would
therefore subscribe to these words of Eriksons-
"Freud used the thermodynamic language of his day,
the language of the preservation and transformation
of energy. The result was that much that was meant
to be a working hypothesis appeared to be making
concrete claims which neither observation nor experi¬
ment could even attempt to substantiate.
Great innovators always speak in the analogies and
parables of their day. Freud, too, had to have the
courage to accept and to work with what he himself
called his 'mythology*. True insight survives its
first formulation,"2
1. Guntrip, Personality Structure and Human Interaction. p.l6
2. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p.58
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V© have now completed the first task of this enquiry which
was to detail the various theories of psychodynamic structure
which could be used in the examination of the foundations of
the Trinity# We have also attempted to indicate the logical
status and validity of these theories, and have answered critic¬
isms made of them from various directions, as well as making
our own criticisms. We would wish to state our particular
preference, which is to work from a Freudian basis, whilst by
no means excluding the insights from the other schools.
In Part Two we now turn therefore to the three component
parts of Trinitarian dogma, to the "Three Persons", dealing
with them in the following order: Father (or rather, Monotheism),
Spirit and, finally, Son.
PART TWO
TRINITARIAN COMPONENTS AND PSYCHODYNAMICS
SECTION A
MONOTHEISM IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
AND THE SUPER-EGO
INTRODUCTION
I would begin this section by considering the criticisms
made of the Biblical idea of Monotheism by Freudians and others.
I do so since I regard monotheism as the basis of the Christian
faith which it inherited from Judaism, and upon this foundation
it was built up. In this, I follow John Whale"'" rather than
2
Claude Welch who, following Barth, would regard Christ as the
sole source of our knowledge of God, making the self-revelation
of God in Christ bear the xirhole weight of the massive structure
3
of Christian dogma. Christianity was founded on the fundamental
monotheism of the Old Testament. From the beginning many of
the ideas of the Old Testament were built into it, for Hebrexi?
religious faith formed the basis upon which Christ could
operate his ministry. As T.W. Manson pointed out, Jesus when
he spoke of God as Father, "was not presenting a new and
revolutionary doctrine for man's acceptance} but rather taking
up into his teaching something that had been part of the faith
4
of prophets, psalmists and sages for centuries before...."
The early Christians used any relevant concept available to
them to explain Christ's significance, and most of these came
from the Old Testament. It would be unfortunate at this stage
1. Christian Doctrine. p,U2f.
2. The Trinity in Contemporary Theology, p.233
3. For a contemporary discussion see J. Mclntyre, The Shape of
Christolftgy*
4. The Teaching of Jesus, p.93
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to revive the Marcionite error of there being two Gods - one
from the Old Testament and another from the New Testament,
Therefore I believe any discussion on Trinitarian matters must
begin with the idea of God in the Old Testament. If we may put
the matter in a highly metaphorical way} we are beginning this
study not merely at the "ground-floor level", but in the
"basement"!
CHAPTER I
MONOTHEISM AND FREUDIAN CRITICISM
Freudians regard the super-ego as that part of the psyche
which stands over against the ego, and consequently, it tends
to carry strong convictions of objective reality. This notion
it forms
of the super-ego has suggested to some writers that/the found¬
ation upon which the idea of "God" came to be built. It could
be argued that the ancient Hebrews, lacking the knowledge of
psychodynamics which we now possess, projected their super-ego
experiences, because of their inherently objective quality, and
they gave these the ontological status of "God", Theologians
usually have disregarded this claim ofFreud, and have continued
their theologizing without interruption. It is our intention
to examine the claims which the psychoanalytic critics have made
in this direction.
This task, however, is far from easy, for as Alston has
2
pointed out there is no canonical presentation of the Freudian
thesis, and we have to rely on scattered and relatively undevel¬
oped remarks in Freud and his followers. To make a start I
would quote these words of Dr.Winnicott:-
"It has been pointed out that there is a parallel
between the maturing of the superego in the individual
child, and the development of monotheism in early
Jewish history."3
1. See David Jenkins, Guide to the Debate about God, p.75
2. Faith and the Philosphers, P«71
3* The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, p.19




This claim is not only for similarities and. parallels beti^een
the two systems as they are found in completion, but in their
actual development, IIow far can this be said to be true?"*"
In his late book Moses and Monotheism speaking of the
renunciation of instincts, Freud argues that the Jewish people
effected such a renunciation at the instigation of their great
leader, Moses (whom Freud regarded as an Egyptian), As a child
has feelings of both security and pride when he achieves an
instinctual renunciation out of love of his parents, the Jews
found the same when they accomplished it for Moses, However,
as the argument proceeds, Freud calls in the aid of his own myth
from Totem and Taboo, which purports to explain the origin of
religion. This mytii tells of the brother horde slaying the
primal father, an act which eventually led to instinctual renun¬
ciation in the forms of exogamy and the \v-orship of the totem
representing the father. He then compares this phenomenon to
human development, where the authority of the child's parents,
especially the autocratic father, threatening with his power to
punish, calls on the child for a renunciation of an instinct,
which decides for him what is to be allowed and what is to be
forbidden. Later on , society and the super-ego take the parent's
place. Freud regarded holiness, which lacks a rational basis,
but possesses strong emotional tone, as a prohibitive factor}
1. Being confronted with the same difficulty as Alston mentioned,
I \»rrote to Dr, Winnicott, who replying "in a personal
communication" directed my attention to Freud's Moses and
Monotheism,
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for the sacred is nothing else than the prolongation of the
primal father, it was the father's will that demanded this kind
of painful instinctual renunciation: Moses did this by making
his people holy through the introduction of the rite of circum¬
cision, being the symbolic substitute for castration, which the
primal father "in the plenitude of his power" once inflicted
on his sons. Therefore, Moses by his acts reserves the credit
for impressing Israel's character and increasing their self-
esteem through re-enacting the psychodynamic bases of this myth.
Now Moses and Monotheism is a book about which there has
been endless controversy; its conclusions have not only been
doubted by theologians, who find themselves unable to accept
Freud's reconstruction of early Jewish history, which amounts
almost to a complete re-writing of it, but also by some psycho-
1
analysts. The idea that there were two Moses, the first being
an Egyptian who tried to impose monotheism on the Jews and was
murdered for his efforts was taken by Freud from Sellin, who
2
deduced his theory from the Book of Hosea. Rieff is right to
3
name Freud's work as "a triumph of psychological romance."
That Freud used history unhistorically, i.e., for his own
1, For example, Maryse Choisy, Freud, A ^ew Appraisal,
2, Alston describes Sellin as one of the "heterodox off-beat"
Old Testament scholars. Faith and the Philosophers, p.70
3, Freud. The Mind of The Moralist, p.284. He also draws
attention (p.282-3 footnote) to the personal identifi¬
cation which Freud made with Moses, evidenced by his
long monograph on The Moses of Michelangelo. Collected
Papers, Vol. 4, p.257-8
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dogmatic ends, is a charge which cannot be refuted. Neverthe¬
less, the book may not be altogether valueless. The imposition
of a system of laws demands a renunciation of instincts by the
super-ego, similar to that made by the child to the father}
the rite of circumcision may be a symbolical form of castration.
But as Alston points out, similarities in themselves provide no
evidence for a causal connection; at best, they only furnish
a clue."'"
In addition, however, to his ignoring the careful study
of Old Testament historians, there is a further and, to my mind,
more serious objection to be made to Freud's claim in this
direction; I refer to his use of the Totem and Taboo myth referred
2
to above. Naturally, Freud justifies his use of the myth, and
its validity. Writing in Moses and Monotheism he saysx-
"In that book (Totem and Taboo) I made use of certain
theoretical reflections of Charles Darwin, Atkinson
and especially Robertson Smith, and combined them
with findings and suggestions from psychoanalytical
practice, From Darwin I borrowed the hypothesis that
men originally lived in small hordes, each of the
hordes stood under the rule of an older male, who
governed with brute force, appropriated all the females,
and belaboured and killed all the young males including
his own sons,,,,"3
Here we have what amounts to a confession that Freud selected
his material from those writers whose work suited his theories
1, Alston, ibid,, p.72
2, See Totem and Taboo, p.l40f. Useful summaries of this myth
can also be found in Alston, ibid., p.67-8; R.S, Lee,
Freud and Christianity, p,129-131
3» Moses and Monotheism, p.205-7
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best* Even after all the criticism he had met on this account,
he could writej—
"I still adhere to this sequence of thought} I am
not convinced...of Robertson Smith's errors..,. Above
all, however, I am not an ethnologist, but a psycho¬
analyst* It was my fcood right to select from ethno¬
logical data that would serve me for my analytical
work* The writings of the highly gifted Robertson
Smith provided me with valuable points of contact
with the psychological material of analysis and
suggestions for the use of it. I cannot say the same
of his opponents." *•
Here is the frank confession of the inventor of the myth; he
selected his material from that which was available only that
which suited his purpose and neglected the rest which did not fit.
Moreover, it was selected not primarily for his analytical work,
but for his dogmatizing in theological matters* To choose data
and select only that which fits in with dogma is hardly a
scientific pursuit* One must admit, however, that the status of
any selected material is debatable. Does it represent a strict
account of what it purports to explain or describe, or does it
represent the presuppositions, prejudices or even phantasies of
the inventor? No doubt both factors enter into the matter. It is,
for example, virtually impossible to write history without some
forms of interpretation, otherwise we would be faced with
chronicles of facts which would be unrelated and meaningless,
Some superimposed structure, presuppositions and selection are
2
necessary. When such writing, however, is carried through with
l". ibid* , p,207 (my italics)
2. See G.A.F. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament.p.140
J* Mc-i-ntyre, The Shape of Christology. p*42 speaking of
Collingwood's The Idea of History.
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one end in purpose, which is to make the history fit in with
dogma already held, and when much which is significant is
disregarded, then it is questionable whether the eventual result
can be considered as valid, or universally applicable.
There is no doubt about one facet of this myth; it is
Freud* s own creation, even although he used the tirork of various
anthropologists and etlmologists; therefore, it tells us about
his own psyche. It is also a fact that the feelings which Freud
postulated can come to the fore in group meetings when there is
an attempt to de-throne the leader of the group. Rebellion,
guilt, identification, and perhaps deification can all be
revealed in the feelings of a group. The myth can be valuable,
therefore, in imparting insight in such a situation. But Freud
did not use the myth primarily for these purposes; it was not
for imparting insight in psychoanalysis, whether individual or
group analysis, but as the purported explanation of the origins
of religion, even its explaining-away, which is a very different
matter. The fact that Freud selected, and selected arbitrarily
in both historical and anthropological fields, rules out this
myth for use as an independent criterion of judgement.
It is unfortunate therefore that so many Freudian inter¬
preters have felt it necessary to use the myth in their xv'ritings
about religion, R.S. Lee, who is one of the most able inter¬
preters in this field, makes an excellent protest against the
over-identification of God with the super-ego, and he demonstrates
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how conflicts can be kept recurring as a result of this ident¬
ification* ^ "Freud says that the Superego is the seat of religion,
2
and there is much truth in this contention." He goes on to
point out that this identification is inadequate because it
3
ignores so much serious scholarship. However, Lee asserts that
the super-ego is not only the introjection of the father image,
God being the ultimate Father-substitute, but that it is "the
4
primal father image come back in a new form." Lee claims that
Freud did not base his psychological theories on this venture
5
into pre-history, , but one would venture to question this
contention! whilst Freud may not have based his theories on the
myth, it was soon impressed into service by Freud as a funda¬
mental concept rather than as an illustration. Lee says, "...
the theory of the primal father corresponds very closely with
what happens in the development of the mind through the Oedipus
complex." But is this not tautology, as Freud based the myth
on the Oedipus complex? The argument is in a circle. Lee also
explains Freudj "...Freud thinks that the long period in pre¬
history, when human society was evolving through the primal
father stage, has left its mark on the mind in a kind of racial
memory, by which he means more than a simple pre-disposition






to the formation of conscience.In Lee, therefore, we find
an example of one who uses the myth in his arguments, as this
surely forms an example of what Alastair Maclntyre has described
2
as "already moving within the Freudian circle."
¥e would, therefore, sum up the difficulties in this rnyth
of Freud's as followsj-
1. Freud's arbitrary selection of material may be due to
his analogical turn of mind, which caused him to move from
psychological criteria to historical or pseudo-historical,
"anthropological" material, without realizing what he was actually
doing in mixing disciplines whose logical status was fundament-
3
ally of different natures. Alston speaks of speculative
extensions made by Freud by means of analogies, which at best
4
are suggestive rather than evidential, Rieff sees this proced¬
ure as one of Freud's deficiencies which he took over from
nineteenth century anthropology in substituting "for historical
documentation a logical history backward along the parallel
lines or diffusional routes of cultural invention." He cites
1, Whilst Lee is always explaining Freud's theories, it is
sometimes difficult to discover which is Freud's theory
as distinct from Lee's and how far Lee endorses it, e.g.,
when on p.l48 Lee states that the super-ego was created
to deal with the two primal crimes of parricide and
incest, is Lee only expounding Freud or endorsing his
viewpoint? Again on p,l49» Lee speaks of "exposing the
ego to destruction at the hands of the primal father",
is this Lee's, as well as Freud's view?
2, Faith and the Philosophers, p.Ill (ed, John Hick)
3. Alston, ibid., p.76L7
4. Rieff, ibid., p.205-207
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the name of Bochofen as one who raided archaeology, mythology
and poetry to discover pre-history; this method certainly
prepared the way for Freud's conjectural constructions.
2. We have shown how Freud claimed that he was right to use
the material he did for clinical purposes, but that in fact,
the myth was used not as a therapeutic concept, but as a sort
of clearing house, or reductionist machine, or a prehistoric
"transformer" which automatically turned everything connected
with religion back into its original psychological state. But
the myth informs us not so much about religion, as about Oedipal
feelings and group dynamics, as well as about Freud's own psyche.
Alston regards it as perhaps "a mythical exposition of the un¬
conscious complex which every individual gets from his own early
relations with his parents,But this evaluation assumes that
2
the Oedipal conflicts are as universal as Freud claimed they were,
3. In fact, Freud uses the Totem and Taboo myth in much
the same way as traditional Christianity has used the myth of
Adam and Eve, as the cause of "the trouble". Now the value of
myths lies in their being able to give insights and interpretations
of human problems, i.e., meaning to man's existential situation.
They are, however, not now to be understood causally at all.
1.Alston, ibid,, p.71
2,Rieff also mentions that the basic theme of many of Freud's
examples are not illustrative of parricide but of
fratricide, e.g., the murder of Hamlet's father by
Hamlet's uncle, and that the first murder in the Old
Testament is of brother by brother. Also in the Abraham
myth (which will be considered later) the father would
kill the son, and not vice-versa.
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Freud speaks of "the deed" of which the myth speaks as leaving
ineradicable traces in the history of mankind,"'" leaving its
mark on the mind as a kind of racial memory. But when he
speaks like this, he is in fact using the myth as proof, and
in so doing Freud is, in fact, committing himself to something
like Jung's concept of the Collective Unconscious, although
he may have disclaimed such a contention. Traditional Christ¬
ianity, however, following the Augustinian tradition is in no
better position in explaining man's fallen state as a result
of Adam's fall; if we are inheritors of Adam's primal sin,
is our inheritance conveyed biologically by the genes of the
body? It would appear to from such statements as "being born
in sin". This is but another example of treating myth as proof,
basing a spurious causal argument upon it. The myths of both
Freud and Genesis are illustrative and descriptive; when more
2
than this is claimed, they are being used illegitimately.
However, having stated our inability to accept the myth
of Freud as it stands for use in any of our arguments, we find
1. Totem and Taboo, p. 15^
2. Perhaps along with the myth, we would wish to exclude Freud's
application of the principle of "the return of the repress¬
ed" to the history of the race; the concept is perfectly
understandable in the case of an individual, who, during
adolescence has religious experiences in which he transfers
to God the positive (and perhaps negative) feelings he
has had towards his father, but which he has repressed
in early childhood. When this is applied to the history of
a race the concept becomes more dubious. It is, however,
tied up with the idea of the primal father, which is it¬
self part of the myth, so both these notions stand or fall
together.
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that much still remains which is of value,
For example there is the fact that a set of commandments
is related to the super-ego, which, by being the super-impos¬
ition of an external authority, supports the super-ego and
demands instinctual renunciation. This fact forms one distinct
parallel between the two systems, of super-ego and the Jewish
acceptance of the Law as from God. The latter appeals to and
reinforces the super-ego orientation; this is the permanent
value in this rather chaotic book, Moses and Monotheism.
If we look at the earlier writings of Freud, we can see
that he adhered to much the same sort of arguments as he
propounds in this later book. Although his first specific
writings on religion came in 1907"*", he wrote in 1904 in the
Psychopathology of Everyday Lifei-
"As a matter of fact, I believe that a large
portion of the mythological conceptions of the
world which reaches into the most modern religions
is nothing but psychology pi"o,iected into the
outer world. The dim perception (the endo-psychic
perception, as it were) of psychic factors and
relations of the unconscious was taken as a
model in the construction of a transcendental
reality, which is destined to be
1. 'Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices', Collected Papers.
Vo4, II, p.25-34
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changed again by science into psychology of the
unconscious.
He writes in the next paragraph of transforming metaphysics
2
into metapsychology«
In his study of Leonardo da Vinci, written in 1910, Freud
returned again to the intimate relation between the Father
3
Complex and belief in God,
"Psycho-analysis has made us familiar with the
intimate connexion between the father complex and
belief in Godj it has shown us that a personal God
is, psychologically, nothing other than an exalted
father,,.
Therefore the idea that the root of religion lies in the parental
complex is to be found in Freud prior to re-structuring of
the psyche (1923) which included the super-ego. The same basic
argument underlies Freud's discussion of Kant, in which he
focuses his attack on the kind of religion which is identified
with authority, "the apprehension of our moral duties as divine
5
commands," Writing of Kant, Freud states:
"The philosopher Kant once declared that nothing
proved to him the greatness of God more convincingly
than the starry heavens, and the moral conscience
within us. The stars are unquestionably superb, but
where conscience is concerned God has been guilty
of an uneven and careless piece of work, for a great
many men have only a limited share of it or scarcely
The flsvchopathologv of Everyday Life, p.166
2. Freud's own italics throughout. For discussion see Ernest
Jones, Sigmund Freud, his Life and Work, Vol,III, p.377
3, Leonardo, p.168-9(Pelican edition)
4, ibid., p.169
5. Rieff, ibid., p.297
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enough to be worth mentioning.... Conscience is no
doubt something within us, but it has not been there
from the beginning,"
Later on in the same book, writing about "A Philosophy of Life",
Freud saidi-
"The third main point of the religious programme, its
ethical precepts, can also be i~elated without difficulty
to the situation of childhood. In a famous passage,.,,
the philosopher Kant speaks of the starry heavens above
us and the moral law within us as the strongest evid¬
ence of the greatness of God. However, odd it may
sound to put these two side by side - for what can the
heavenly bodies have to do with the question whether one
man loves another or kills him? - nevertheless it
touches on a great psychological truth. The same father
(the parental function) who gave the child his life,
and preserved it from the dangers which that life
involves, also taught it what it may do and may not
do, made it accept certain limitations of its instinct¬
ual wishes, and told it what consideration it would be
expected to show towards its parents and brothers and
sisters, if it wanted to be tolerated and liked as a
member of the family circle, and later on of more
extensive groups..,. This whole state of affairs is
carried over by the grown man unaltered into his
religion,..the religious tbLtanschauung is determined
by the situation that subsisted in our childhood.
The ethical implications of Kant's dictum, as well as
Freud's criticisms are considered at length in Paul Lehxaann,
Ethics in a Christian Context, where he quotes Kant as speaking
on the one hand of the business of conscience as a business of
man with himself, but also that man "finds himself compelled by
his reason to transact it as if it were the command of another
1. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p.84. Freud, however, did





Thus Kant's teaching on this aspect of God, orientated
around a super-ego bias, whereby duties were regarded as divine
2
commands, has been noted by other thinkers too.
We have made this lengthy digression on Kant for two reasons.
Firstly, because his identification of God with Lawgiver and
Creator comes very close to the central ideas of the Old Testa¬
ment conception of god. Secondly, because it demonstrates that
Freud can carry through such criticism without any recourse to
his myth. It therefore becomes clear that the myth is not really
essential to Freud's basic argument; in fact, it is expendable -
the most expendable part of all Freud's writing, as far as
religion is concerned.
One Freudian writer, who has contributed considerable work
to our understanding of the super-ego, and to whom we have not
1. Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, p.336f, quoting
from Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. Part II,
Section 13» p.271-2, the above being Lehmaim's translation.
Lehmann argues that Kant prepared the way for the fall of
conscience which was accomplished by Freud, ibid., p.3^2,
Freud gives another example of his relating Kant and the
super-ego in'The Economic Problem in Masochism*in Collected
Papers. Vol. II, No, XXII, p.255-268:
"The superego, the conscience at work in it, can then
become harsh, cruel and inexorable against the ego in
its charge. The categorical imperative of Kant is thus
a direct inheritance from the Oedipus Complex." ibid. p.264
2. H.H. Farmer, Revelation and Religion. p.l46 who maintains that
the moral imperative "shines in its own light, and stands in
its right, independent and autonomous;", Cf. J, Mclrxtyre,
On the Love of God, p.227 that there is a corresponding
suspicion of the inclinatioxis in the Kantian tradition. Like¬
wise Clement Webb in God and Personality (1918) emphasises the
aspect of duty towards God, and shows that there is no place
in Kant for any love of God. p.118-120.
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yet referred in this enquiry is J.C. Flugel in his book, Man.
Morals and Society, Of this book Marjorie Brierley has written
that it isi-
"...almost a super-ego encyclopaedia, since it
includes practically everything that has been
formulated concerning super-ego development and
function."
That we have delayed the consideration of his contribution until
this stage in our enquiry may seem strange; however, our purpose
is served by the fact that Flugel draws parallels between the
various components which he claims are part of the internal
super-ego and refers these to its projection "on to the external
2
figure of God, as the notion of the all-seeing eye of God."
More than this, however, although he mentions Freud's myth,
he does not employ it in his basic argument.
Before, however, we look at Flugel's special contribution,
it may be wise to gather together the main conclusions reached
about the super-ego in Part One. There we found that it was
a highly complex formation, involving inter-relations of various
functions in many directions. The following summary, in view of
the above, makes no recourse to the myth of Freud.
In the first place, we noted four parental influences:
a) Identification with the father or the more powerful
parent. It has been suggested that the child identifies with
the parent who frustrates him the more, this identification
!• Trends in Psycho-analysis, p,l67
2. Man. Morals and Society, p.319
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being a means of mastering our anxiety engendered by the
frustration.
b) The super-ego of the child is not really built up
upon the model of the parents, but upon that of the parents'
super-egos; in this way the child takes over the same content,
which act enables him to become a vehicle of tradition, so that
moral standards are passed down from generation to generation.
c) The direct parental demands and prohibitions can be
internalized or reacted to. In this classification one would
include Ferenczi's concept of "sphincter morality".
d) The kindly, benign or gentle aspects of the super-ego
result from the internalization of "good objects", usually
emanating from the mother, which means that the super-ego is
not only a source of guilt, but also an object of love and trust.
In the second place, we noted the contribution which the
child himself makes to the formation of his own super-ego.
a) The Ego Ideal, this idealized image of the self has
narcissistic origins. Some psychodynamic writers, we saw, would
separate this from the super-ego, but generally the tendency
has been to keep it as part of the larger institution. Jacobson
regarded it as both part of the super-ego, and as a bridge
between the ego and the super-ego."'"
b) Inturned Aggression, the process whereby the child turns
1. See also the discussion in T.S, Szasz.The Myth of Mental
Illness. p.172-3
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its own aggression against himself, is carried out to master
the anxiety generated by his original aggression and libidinal
desires| the child thereby places a form of taboo on his own
destructive impulses and forbidden sexual desires. Fairbairn
called this aspect the "Anti-Libidinal Ego", or formerly, the
"Internal Saboteur",
c) Distortion by Phantasy is closely related to Inturned
Aggression. As the phantasy life of the child becomes involved,
the parental influences as detailed above in (a), (c) and (d)
can be distorted, and in the end bear little relation to
reality, A male child, for example, may have severe castration
fears, which are attributable to the parents, but in reality
have resulted from the projection of his own talion wishes,"'"
Inturned aggression and distortion by phantasy can together
cause the severity of the super-ego, its punishing and irrational
nature, which, as we have seen, may not be due to experiences
of the child in reality, but to the way the child copes vrith
these two factors.
Turning now to Flugel, we find that he takes the above
argument further and relates the internal super-ego and its
1, Melanie Klein equated the above with the child's own innate
fear of death, R.S.Lee follows her J
"Death in the Unconscious, which is infantile in its
nature, is the equivalent of castration, feared by
the infant son at the hands of the jealous father."
Freud and Christianity. p.l67
Ve have, however, argued against the concept of an infantile
death instinct.
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formation to the notion of an external God, He employs the term
"Nemesism" for the aggression which is turned inwards against
the self, which forms that unadaptable, archaic part of the
super-ego. He goes on, however, to see similar qualities in
certain concepts of God, and in ethical behaviour required in
religious systems of those gods, such as ascetic sacrifice,^
Related to this is "Taboo", defined by Flugel as "a prohibition
2
that carries a supernatural or social sanction," and is likewise
found in both the superego and religious systems} it forms a
basic factor in moral control, but like Nemesism, it can be
primitive, archaic and irrational.
In addition to Nemesism and Taboo, there is also the
"Polycrates Complex". With the setting-up of the super-ego, a
sense of guilt can arise, which is a state of anxious tension
between the ego and super-ego and which must be resolved. Guilt,
we have seen, arises in the depressive position, and the ability
to experience guilt can be regarded as something of an achievement.
It is a feeling akin to that which results when love is \vith-
3
drawn.
When love is withdrawn and psychological well-being has
vanished, the super-ego causes the child to feel himself respons¬
ible for his unpleasant condition. One way of solving the
Man, Morals and Society, p.9^f.
2. ibid., p.151.
3. The psychopathic personality does not experience guilt and is
unaffected by punishment, because, not having experienced the
love originally, he is not able to understand the meaning
behind its withdrawal.
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situation and thereby ending the anxious tension, is to seek
out punishment or to provoke suffering, after the endurance of
which, the individual secures relief. Those who desire such
punishment as a means of expiation exhibit, according to Flugel,
what he calls, the Polycrates Complex, In reality one may be
guilty of nothing, but one feels guilty, owing to feeling being
equivalent to the actual deed in the unconscious, and one desires
to end the state of tension.There are, of course, more creative
ways of ending tension of this kind, by reparation, restitution
or confession, but these are not chosen by the person who has
this complex.
A mild parent figure fails to meet the needs of those who
suffer from this complex, as these people provoke punishment
on themselves, and search out for a harsh authority to serve.
If they are religious, they will feel uneasy and dissatisfied
with a rational preacher who proclaims a God of love, with
corresponding ethical virtues like meekness and gentleness;
rather will they seek out a "Hell-fire" preacher who will present
a message of a God who is jealous of any pleasure or success of
mankind, and who signifies his disapproval by means of disasters
1
and the like which are interpreted as his judgements.
In this connection, R.S. Lee2 points out that such people
select from the Gospel picture those elements which fortify
1. Man, Morals and Society, p,176f,
2. Freud and Christianity. p,171
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the quality of their super-ego, "or have even read into him
their own preoccupation with the wrath of God and the virtues
of suffering and obedience." Following this he speaks of the
castration complex in this super-ego religion, the savage super¬
ego which lashes the guilty, punishment-seeking ego.*'' Flugel
speaks of man being as much a punishment-seeking animal as a
pleasure-seeking one,^
The contention that people whose psychic state exhibits
this complex turn to the more severe conception of God is no
doubt correct. When they do this, and posit a God of strict
justice, they may supplement the Godhead with the addition of
some figure of love, like Jesus, or like the Virgin Mary} or
conversely, if they hold to the idea of God as love, they may
set between God and man a kind of "moral order" which copes with
punishment and wrath, which is posited, no doubt, to cope with
the urges of the punitive super-ego. To satisfy all the demands
of the super-ego is not an easy matter, and one must conclude
that a deity which would meet the needs of every believer's
subjective state is almost an impossibility.
The final aspect in Flugel's work to which I would draw
attention, is the fact of"Distancing"(my name) between the ego
and the super-ego. Flugel does not work out its correspondence
1. Lee, ibid., p.172
2. Similarly, Karl Menninger in Man Against Himself provides
innumerable examples of this phenomenon, but he relates
it to the Death Instinct, which we refuse to do.
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to religious beliefs and practices, but I believe that it has
most important theological implications and helps us to under¬
stand many theological anomalies. Following on ideas from Freud1s
1
paper on Mourning and Melancholia ,Flugel points out that a
patient can feel very guilty and unworthy in melancholia; he
is depressed and distressed with doubts about himself, or states
that he has committed the "unforgivable sin" so that God will
not ever forgive him. In this pathological state, God is very ~faX
away and distant from the person, so that he feels "bad". The
"empirical" distance, Flugel would argue, is psychological, and
lies between the ego and the super-ego, "God" in this case,
being a projection of the latter. By contrast, in times of mania
and creativity, the person feels "good"; there is a fusion of
ego and super-ego; their unity leads to harmony and power, a
sense of exaltation and well-being. In such times, it would be
appropriate to speak of the "nearness of God." Optimism and
confidence therefore depend on a closeness between these two
2
institutions, the ego and the super-ego.
This concept of "distancing" (as we will call it) is, of
course, a spatial model or metaphor; the whole idea is inferred
from phenomena which Freud originally encountered in his clinical
practice. Nevertheless, it is a valuable one, as theologians
1. Collected Papeffi. Vol. IV, p.152-170
2. Flugel's argument has been condensed from pages 67-8, 220,
282 of Man. Morals and Society,
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and the men of the Bible make use of similar models and metaphors."''
In his discussion on the religious significance of the
super-ego, Flugel also cites the need for vicarious punishment
of guilt which could be felt by divine victims. He concluded
that God is the most suitable figure for all man's projections
of the super-ego. He can be like our parents, loving and protect¬
ing, but also frustrating and punishing} but as his ways are
regarded as inscrutable, he is able to absorb all these ambiva¬
lent feelings. His way may be arbitrary; but it is never for man
to question them. Flugel therefore concludes that in God, the
prohibitive, punitive, aggressive aspects of the super-ego can
2
reside, as well as the protecting, kindly, omnipotent ones.
We have now, I believe, examined enough material from the
side of psychoanalysis to demonstrate certain distinct similar¬
ities between the super-ego and certain concepts of God which
can be found in the Bible. These arguments employed, however,
have all proceeded in one direction} i.e., from psychodynaraic
theory to "God". It would be logical and perfectly possible to
continue in the same way, by working through the Old Testament
in order to find corresponding ideas in specific passages to
the claims made by Freudians and others on this matter. However,
1, For an illuminating theological study of "distance" see
Cleraent C.J. Webb, God and Personality. p,139f»
2. ibid,, p.320. Cf. Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p.45,
who claims that it can be equally argued that the super-ego
is an unconscious introjection of God. Viktor Frankl,as
we saw in the examination of Existentialist Analysis in
Fart One, made a similar contention. But one asks, how can this
be, when it is to be found in those who have no religious
pretensions ?
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one fact is clears rarely, if ever, do those who advocate
such similarities take account of the serious scholarship
which has been carried out by Biblical scholars on the text
of the Old Testament. Freud's bad example of choosing only
what suited his purpose is the extreme case of a procedure
which can only lead to distortion of the truth.
Therefore, rather than follow this course, trying to link
up these concepts and notions with the Old Testament, I would
prefer to turn to contemporary Old Testament scholarship to





As indicated in the last chapter, so many psychoanalytical
critiques of the Old Testament move in one direction only -
from psychoanalysis to the Scriptures, paying scant attention
to the work and interpretation of Old Testament scholarship.
Scholars have been mentioned, but these are chosen because their
views fit in with the preconceived notions and hypotheses of
psychoanalysis,
To remedy this, we now turn to a consideration of contem¬
porary Old Testament scholarship, which must perforce be
selective; we trust, however, that the selection made is
broadly based as well as being relevant to our central purpose.
Our contention is that the origin of Christian belief in God,
which eventually blossomed into the Doctrine of the Trinity,
lies in the monotheistic faith of the Old Testament, To this
we would no\»r turn, before proceeding any further with psycho¬
analytical theories.
We begin with two specialized studies of the Old Testament
after
on the Trinitarian Faith, and/comments, proceed to a statement
of the present trend in Old Testament studies, and followed
by an evaluation of the same.
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a) TWO TRINITARIAN STUDIES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
As the subject under enquiry is Trinitarian thought, it
would seem appropriate to consider firstly two particular
studies which claim to have a direct bearing on the origins of
the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Old Testament. The second of
these also represents the standpoint of one particular school
of contemporary Biblical theology.
The first is Aubrey Johnson, The One and the Many in the
Israelite Conception of God, who begins by considering certain
aspects of Hebrew anthropological thought, particularly the
nature of personality. He claims that to the Hebrews the idea
of personality is by no means a fixed unitary one, but it can
be extended in various ways, for example by a blessing (as
in the story of Isaac*s blessing of Jacob)^" or by one's house-
2 3
hold , or by one's property. This concept of extension can be
applied in matters relating to individuals and groups, in that
the individual is never thought of as an isolated unit, but lives
in constant relations to others j the whole group can also be
I 4
conceived as a person under the concept of corporate personality.
In Israelite thought, there was no sharp distinction between the
community and the individual members of iti there is an
oscillation between the concept of the social unit as an
1. The One & the Many in the Israelite Conception of God, p.7
2, ibid., p.8
3* ibid,, p.10
4. This follows Eissfeldt.See article in Supplement to Old Peake's
Commentary, p.12 col.lj in this country it has been developed
by Wheeler Robinson.
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association of members (with the result that plural forms are
used), and as a corporate personality (where the singular form
is used). This oscillation and fluidity are to be observed
particularly in the Psalms,
On the basis of the Priestly School's affirmation that man
%*as made in the image of God, Johnson applies his anthropological
notions of Hebraic personality to the conception of God, where
Yahweh's personalit}r can be extended by His Spirit, His Word
and His Name (or rather, The Word and The Name),''" These extensions •*
allow Him to have a mysterious influence upon mankind; but
Johnson argues that the sort of extension of personality as
applied to God can go further, embracing a social unit so that a
plural form is used of the deity. So in God also there is an
oscillation between the One and the Many, He regards this fact
as a means of providing a new approach to the New Testament
extension of Jewish Monotheism in the direction of later Trin-
itarianism, *
'^,,,we can see how it was possible for a Jewish
Christian to relate His Messiah closely with the
divine Being as to afford a basis for the later
(and Greek) metaphysical formulations of the Doctrine
of the Trinity,"2
This approach, therefore considers the Trinity in respect of a
social, rather than a psychological model.
Even more positive is the approach of George A.F, Knight
as in his monograph A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the
1, Johnson, ibid,, p,21
2, ibid,, p.4l
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Trinity. which, is the second study to be considered.
Knight takes over where Johnson leaves off, accepting
Johnson's contention that the Hebrews used a personal model for
the understanding of the deity, "The Hebrews daringly posited
the statement that man was made in the image of God} that being
his hypothesis, he naturally took the step of picturing God
2
in terms of his own nature," "How else," asks Knight, "after
all, can we picture God except in terms of what we know it means
3
to be a human personality?" He reminds us that the Bible "is
4
not afraid of using the argument from the human to the divine,"
Therefore, we need to have an adequate knowledge of Hebrew
5
anthropology in order to understand the theology. However,
Knightprimary concern is the inversion of this, "the revel¬
ation from the divine to the human" ^
Knight accepts Johnson's idea that the image of God is
posited, as is the nature of man, as being One and Many at the
7
same time. He also accepts the idea of "extensions", although
he speaks of "The Name of God" and "The Word of God" as phrases
1, Some of the ideas presented in this paper are amplified in
his larger work, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament,
2, A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity. p,10
3, ibid,, p.36
4, ibid,, p.62
5, Cf, Christian Theology of the Old Testament, where on p.22 he
works out similar arguments urging the need for an under¬
standing of the basic Hebrew anthropology,
6, p,53 of "Trinity monograph",
7, ibid., p.26,37
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which describe the "alter-ego" of God; he includes "angels"
in this category,^" He is, however, careful to stress that The
Name and The Word, etc*, are not separate metaphysical entities
of their own, or hypostases existing in their own right apart
from God Himself: they remain pictorial expressions, so they
do not disturb the unity of the being of the deity: Knight uses
Barth's concept of God repeating himself; so again a social
theory of the Deity is found in the Old Testament which could
be an embryo of the Trinity. Knight claims that The Holy Spirit
led the Hebrews to think in terms of angels, because of the
truth which lies behind them, which "is indeed a communion with
2
Himself, an organism, a Trinity."
It is clear from the last statement that there is much
more in Knight's contention than in Johnson's, Knight admits
that the Trinity is not a Biblical doctrine, but is a just
interpretation of what we find in the Bible; like Johnson he
claims to look at the concepts underlying the doctrine of the
Trinity, as they can be discovered from Old Testament thought;
but he adds, "All the theologizing we have to do, all the
theologizing we must do as rational beings, must be based on
3
the Old Testament."
By the Old Testament Knight means nothing other than the
Hebrew Bible, the Masoretic Text. He claims that God chose the
1• ibid., p.2k
2. ibid., p.28
3. ibid,, p.59»(his italics)
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Hebrew language, which implies that it has a special signifi¬
cance; He also chose Israel's thought forms as well. In the
Masoretic Text we find a Doctrine of God "which is consonant
with that which flowers in the full Christian concept of the
Holy Trinity."*" The Hebrew language possesses, in its own right,
a certain theological status. He regards it as a tragedy that
at the time when the basic doctrines of the Church were worked
out, there was great enmity between the Christian Church and
Synagogue with the result that the Christian theologians \jere
deprived of studying the scriptures in the original Hebrew text,
but had to rely on the Septuagint which is more of a paraphrase
than a correct translation. The Church, therefore, deprived
itself of the Word of God in the language in which God intended
it must be transmuted to the world.
This leads Knight to compare and contrast the Greek ways of
thinking \\rith the Hebrew which follows traditional lines,
Hebrew thought is dynamic, whereas Greek thought is static;
Hebrews were concerned with history, Greeks with Being or
Unchanging Reality; the Hebrews were concrete in their thinking,
there being few abstractions in the Hebrew language, butGreek
1. ibid., p.5
2. This antithesis between the two systems of thought goes back
to Ritschl, who claimed that "ellenistic influences on the
Gospel brought about the transformation of Hebrew dynamic
thought into the speculative metaphysics of theGreeks, so
that the thought world of theFathers was very far from the
Bible, See Paul van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the
Gospel. pp.33 and 45.
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thinking is abstract. The Hebrews thought in terms of actual
objects in experience, the Greeks in terms of abstractions from
that experience; and so on," Knight contends therefore that such
terms as "eternal generation of the Son" and "consubstant-
iality with the Father" are impossible to visualize and are
therefore unbiblical in form.
His central thesis lies in the following statement:
"...the mystery of the Holy Trinity was not entirely hidden
from the minds of God's people even before His coming to earth
3
in Christ,and in his assertion that the revealed nature of
God in the Old Testament is "a priori possibly that of a Trinity,
and not that of a Monad."
It is difficult to be satisfied with Knight's development
of Johnson's thesis. In particular, the whole theological stand¬
point which Knight represents is very far from that held in this
enquiry. I would therefore endorse very much of the criticism
which Barr makes in his Semantics of Biblical Language. lie argues
that the claim made by Knight and others for the Hebrew language
does not rest upon the actual examination of the language at all!
The methods such advocates use are unsystematic and haphazard,
and the philosophy behind the idea that Biblical language
"corresponds to or coheres with the inner thought of the Bible,
is a reproduction on another level of the idealist picture of
1. Knight, Trinity. p.8




reality or spiritual power bringing; forth its own expression in
language,Barr also severely criticises the strain placed
on individual words in Hebrew, whereby in order to get away
from propositional truth, the smaller unit the word, becomes
loaded to relate it to the inner world of thought. In place of
proof texts, we have proof words. The message of the Bible is
not conveyed by such individual words, but by larger units such
as sentences} therefore it is in terms of these larger linguistic
complexes that the relation between Biblical language and theo¬
logy must be considered, i.e., by the things which the writers
say, and not by the words they use to say them. Barr also
indicates a point to which w^e shall pay much attention, namely,
that in order to be objective this whole approach neglects the
mental, psychological aspects. In "Biblical Theology", Barr sums
up, the interests of dogmatics have been allowed to dominate
over responsible exegesis.
The inhibition of subjective factors in so-called objective
Biblical Dogmatic theology, and the preference for an unpsycho-
logical theology may themselves be subjective facts. Writing in
Twentieth Century Religious Thought. John Macquarrie states}
"...a purely dogmatic theology which disclaims any
connection with philosophy may nevertheless carry
its own hidden philosophical implications."^
1. Barr, ibid., p.29
2. p.15
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If -we substitute "psychological" for "philosophical", I believe
that the statement would still be true. What are the hidden
psychological implications? Without hesitation, a Freudian
would say that the desire for objectivity in the form of some
infallibity, which can be regarded as authoritative, satisfies
our undying omnipotent wishes. Therefore in many cases where
theologians claim to exclude psychological factors, we may be
guided to most significant psychological material} we must pay
attention to the very matters %vhich the dogmatic theologians
deliberately exclude. Yet the Freudian criticism is not wholly
valid, as conclusions which conform to Freud's concept of
omnipotent thought may be correctly reached by perfectly logical
means and can be valid therefore in their own right.
To return to Knight; there are further questions one may
ask as a result of his position. If God, as Knight contends,
had intended The Word of God to be transmuted to the world in
Hebrew, then why did He allow His Son to speak in Aramaic, and
His Son's followers to transmute the Gospel into Greek? They fell
short of Professor Knight's high standards. Moreover, even if
there were extensions to God's being - one could almost add the
Hebrew language as one of these extensions - had there only to
be t\fo others? Why a Trinity? Neither Johnson nor Knight show
us why the religion of the Old Testament is actually Trinitarian
in nature. They only suggest possible extensions to the being
of God. As Arthur W. Wainwright has pointed out, neither of the
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writers shows that there was any development from the trinitar-
ianism which they see in the Old Testament to the actual form¬
ulation of the doctrine. In all fairness, however, Knight
would claim that this might have taken place if only theFathers
had had an adequate knowledge of the Masoretic Text and not
the Septuagint; but Wainwright points out that the Septuagint
retains the very texts upon which the argument for plurality is
2 3
based. Therefore Knight's argument in this matter falls.
We have paid attention to these particularized, specialized
studies in the theology of the Old Testament because they refer
to the subject under enquiry; however, the lines opened up by
these scholars do not help, except that they give insights
regarding the personal model being applied to God, and, negatively,
that the exclusion of psychological factors may point us in
the opposite direction towards their inclusion.
We now turn from the particular, to the general trend in
Old Testament studies today.
1. The Trinity in the New Testament, p.19
2. ibid., p.23
3. R.P.C, Hanson in God - Creator. Saviour, Spirit, p.91 speaks
disparagingly of the "utterly futile labour expended upon
dressing up a number of wretchedly flimsy pieces of
evidence to look like forshadowings of the Trinity" in
the Old Testament by the early theologians, which has
"occasioned modern theologians to press far beyond their
much restricted limits, the evidence provided...in the
Old Testament."
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b) PRESENT DAY OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES
1. General Trend
One striking feature of present day Old Testament scholar¬
ship is that the idea of development of religious ideas, which
played such a prominent part in the studies of the last century,
emanating from scholars like Vellhausen and Herder, is no
longer to the fore. Scholars do not spend so much time on
getting the documents in the right order so as to understand
the historical process, or dividing out the components of, for
example, the Pentateuch, into J,E,D, and P, regarding P, the
Priestly editors, as the selectors and combiners of the various
strands. This situation has no doubt arisen because the former
certainties about the actual dating have been questioned.
The result is that the emphasis has moved from history to
theology. J.H. Schofield, whose writing is much influenced by
continental scholars, like Eichrodt and von Rad, has stated that
the concern of Old Testament students should be with the finished
product rather that with the sketching of its development. We
should look at the book in its final form regardless of the
use of archaeological and historical research; the dating of
Biblical material does not affect the import of its message.
"A wall should always be dated by its mortar, the
date when it was built, not the date when its stones
were formed in the bowels of the earth, or hewn from
1. Introducing Old Testament Theology, p.7
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its quarries, not the date when its latest additions
or repairs were made."
Therefore in present-day Old Testament writing, the emphasis
has undoubtedly moved its direction from history to theology.
The titles of some present-day books show how the wind is
2
blowing.
The writers of the Old Testament were continually using
the older traditions over and over again, impressing them into
fresh service in order to bring out new and contemporary meanings;
therefore, it is argued, it is more important to discover why a
story was told, than to know about its date, its origin and its
3
historicity.~
One consequence of this approach is that it inhibits us
from pursuing a study of the development of monotheism, side
by side with the development of the super-ego in the infant, as
suggested by Winnicott's quotation made earlier in this section.
Present-day Old Testament studies cannot be utilized in this
way. However, one does not wish to use some other Old Testament
studies, as those of the past century, in order to "prove" a
1. introducing Old Theology, p.23-^. If this kind of argument
were applied to this present undertaking, it could not be
undertaken! The difference lies in the fact that we have
much more historical evidence available to know accurately
the various developments, component thoughts etc., whereas
with the Old Testament studies, much more inferential work
is needed to separate them out, and it cannot be done with
the same certainty as was assumed previously.
2. Eichrodt, Theology* of the Old Testament: von Had, Old Testament
Theology1; Schofield, Introducing Old Testament Theology*;
Knight, A Christian Theology* of the Old Testament.
3. Schofield, p.9-10
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theory. This procedure would be virtually similar to Freud's
selection of the data which suited him. We wish to indicate,
therefore, the present-day conclusions and see what can be
deduced from them.
2."Saving History"
It may seem rather strange to speak of history at all,
after having shown that it is no longer a major emphasis in Old
Testament studies. But if one turns to von Had *s two volumes,
one finds that the Old Testament theology is laid out in an
historical setting. Moreover, von Rad does not capitulate
completely to an absolute theological outlook, in seeing the
Old Testament as a dogmatic unity, its theology all being in one
piece. "I. very much doubt whether the main task of an Old Testa¬
ment theology is the understanding of Israel's legacy as a
unity,and he affirms that all conceptions of unity which are
not fully authenticated by the material itself should be avoided.
He uses as his basic theme "Saving History", which is not
"history" in the older sense of separating out the various
strands and placing them in various periods in a chronological
scheme,
He regards it as impracticable to give a history of credal
2
statements of Israel in the form of a chronological sequence
for the Israelite wxdters were always trying to make new attempts
1. Old Testament Theology. Vol, I, p.427
2. Von Rad, Vol. X, p.vi
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to present the past divine acts as meaningful and relevant to
each new age. Old ideas were discarded and fresh interpretations
were placed on the old stories to provide new meanings. In the
Sinai tradition, for example, we are presented with a whole
cluster of traditions made up of many strands, out of many ages,
for the material has been worked over again and again. Von Rad
also warns us that we may think that we are reading history when
in fact we are reading about cultic traditions, or confessional
statements clothed in history. There is a mounting up of
tradition in a continuity of historical writing which makes
precise dating a highly speculative matter. In this process,
however, one can discern what von Rad calls "Saving History",
Many writers have previously pointed to the fact that the
2
Hebrews were pioneers in the art of writing history. There is
no older example of series of events which are coherently
related in a historical pattern than that of the Old Testament.
The Hebrew writers looked back and saw the acts of God in the
past, and also looked forward into the future, contemplating
what God might do, and from this their eschatological thought
developed. It was their looking back and reading into the events
the acts of God, or rather as seeing' them solely as acts of God,
which enabled them to look forward and speculate on the future
1. A similar comparison is to be found in the respective
treatments of the Arthurian legends by Mallory, Tennyson
and T.H. White.
2. My former teacher, Professor Marsh of Cambridge laid great
stress on this.
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from the basis of their faith in God, But a religious faith to
be passed from generation to generation needs some embodiment
in institutions, some forms of organisation around religious
observance* For the Hebrews themselves, the writing of history
was a by-product of their faith in the Living God, a God who
acts in history and saves according to His purpose. But an idea
of God and faith in Him, it can be argued, is not sufficient to
explain why this remarkable phenomenon is to be found in Israel
alone. This idea of historical continuity, which made Israel's
contribution unique, was integrated according to Eichrodt by
the single religious concept of "The Covenant", to which we
presently turn.
3. "The Covenant"
Whereas von Rad speaks of "Saving History", Eichrodt speaks
of "The Covenant" as the fundamental concept, not only for
understanding the "interior attitude" which Israel possessed
towards history, but also towards understanding the Old Testament
as a unity. As distinct from von Rad, Eichrodt does see the Old
Testament as "a self-contained entity" which desx>ite all the
changes which come about through history demonstrate a "constant
basic tendency and character."*' Eichrodt also stresses, however,
that it is impossible to reduce the whole realm and variety of




without doing violence to it. Nevertheless, his general emphasis
is along dogmatic, theological lines,
"The Covenant" concept gives cohesion to and integrates the
whole corpus of the writings of the Old Testament, Basically,
it is a free act of God which raised Israel to the rank of being
a people of God, giving the nation a sense of cohesion, as well
as a unique dignity; it is within Israel that the will of God
2
is revealed* The Covenant is not just a doctrinal concept, but
refers to a living process, which continued through history.
All processes, however, have to have a beginning; Eichrodt
finds the beginning of the Covenant concept in the Sinai story
with Moses: bearing in mind von Rad's contention that it repre¬
sents a whole cluster of tradition out of many ages, it may seem
a rather insubstantial foundation on which to build, Eichrodt,
however, regards it as an original element in all the sources,
3
"founded on a primal act in history,"
A Convenant is basically an agreement between two parties.
The word Berith is found in the story of Jonathan and David
(i Sam, 18,3)• We read that Jonathan "made a covenant with David
because he loved him as his own soul," The content of this
1, Eichrodt, p.28
2, ibid., p.l4
3, ibid., p.36, Von Rad in Vol.1, p.6,claims that "Israel" is a
term which cannot be applied until after the settlement:
Schofield (p.45) doubts Eichrodt's assumption, here arguing
that there was no decalogue before the time of Jeremiah.
G.A.F, Knight, however, sides withEichrodt. "The Sinai event
must have been historical." (A Christian Theology of the
Old Testament. p.l4l)
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covenant was of love, "wonderful, passing the love of woman."
(IX Sam. 1,26). The agreement was a mutual one, each party
having equal privileges and responsibilities, based on that love
which formed the bond between them.
When the term, however,is applied to Yahweh and Israel, it
is naturally two-sided, but the partners are not equal, the
burden being unequally distributed between the two contracting
parties.^" The dominant partner is the Divine Lord of the Covenant
He, this absolute transcendent God, who out of his freedom has
chosen Israel, breaks in on his people in his dealings with
them and moulds them to his will, giving them knowledge of his
3
being,and this creates an act of trust. Porteous claims that
this absolute transcendence of the one partner makes it possible
for him to lay down the conditions and to demand obedience which
will express itself in certain ethical patterns of conduct, by
the other partner. God is always the strong partner, and He impos
the conditions which must be carried out 5 but he enables Israel
to carry these out by his grace. "We may say, in fact, that the
God of the Old Testament evidently loves covenant-making with
4
his people Israel." The Covenant therefore is a gift of Gods
he has entered into it freely, He can dissolve it or annul it at
1. Eichrodt, p.36
2. Cf, Barth, Dogmatics. i/l, p.235» on the inequality of our
relationship with God.
3. New Peake Commentary, p.153
4. Knight, p.189
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any time. Only He can do so; Israel cannot."1"
4. Quality of Covenant "Relationship
Even within this extremely unequal relationship, the quality
of the Covenant-relationship can vary. It can partake of the
warmest qualities known in human relationships or be almost
inhuman and impersonal in character, I would illustrate this
froro two of the scholars we are considering*
"The berith. then,the covenant bond, was but the
outer husk of the nut. Inside there lay the covenant
fellowship as the real inner kernel of the union
between God and Israel. Now, this inner hejrt of the
bond was known by the Hebrew word hesedh."
We inay compare this following statement made by Eichrodt:
"It is the manifestation of power with which Yahweh
preludes the actual covenant-makihg which gives the
Yahweh worship of the Mosaic period this character
of trembling prostration before the jealous God,
who will admit no de|~rogation from his majesty.,..
The terrifying power of God, who will turn his
weapons of leprosy, serpent and plague (Cf. Ex. 4,175
Hum, 21.6f; Num.11.33f•) even against his own people,
leaves men in no doubt that the covenant he has
created is no safe bulwark behind which they can make
use of the divine power to prosecute their own interests.
The covenant lays claim to the whole man and calls him
to surrenderwith no reservations. "2
Now there is all the difference between these two covenant
*
relationships. The first implies a close, loving quality; in
the second, God is outlined as a "distanced", menacing; almost
sadistic, figure* The paradoxical nature of the character of
God as both loving and just, merciful and angry , has occupied
1. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.195
2, Eichrodt,p * 45
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man's thought in all ages.
The prophets sought to make the people realize that the
quality of the relationship dex>ended on their conduct, that
their link with God was,in some way, conditional on obedience
above
to Ilis will | fox/all else God demanded fidelity and loyalty
to him alone. There are dangers in this doctrine that adversities
and misfortunes which fall on people in life are to be regarded
as punishments which God inflicts upon his people because of
their transgressions} one great question mark was raised against
it in the Book of Job. Another danger is that of legalism, for
when the will of God is embodied in laws and codes, the code
becomes all-important and the relationship is forgottens the
one who raised the voice of protest against this was Jeremiah.
Perhaps it was due to this latter reason that the prophets were
shy of the term "covenant" and preferred to speak of the relat¬
ionship between God and his people in more personal metaphors.^
In one writer in the Old Testament, lioitrever, we find the use
both of personal metaphors and of the Covenant concept side by
side. In the book of the prophet Hosea, the paradox of loving
and a just God finds its most vivid expression. Eichrodt speaks
of "the quite emotional power of love as the ultimate basis of
the covenant relationship." Hosea compares Israel to Yahweh's
wife (Hos. 2), to his favourite child (Hos.ll.i) and perhaps to
1. See Eric Heaton, Old Testament Prophets, p.63
2, Eichrodt, p.251
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a pet animal trained to plough (llos. 11,4), But the dominant
model used is that of the intimate, personal union of marriage
which has broken down, one drawn from his own experience. It is
this tender love of God, who wooed Israel which cannot let the
disobedient nation go< it prevents him from drawing the darker
conclusions of the earlier prophet, Amos, who could see nothing
but disaster coming to Israel, Amos was detached and showed no
feeling of sympathy towards those whom he denounced; Hosea was
involved, implicated and could not go so far, Yahweh loves
Israel and cannot let Israel go.
How can I give you up 0 Ephraim!
How can I hand you over, 0 Israel!,..
My heart recoils within me,
My compassion grows warm and tender*
I will not execute my fierce anger,
1 will not again destroy Ephraimt
for I am God and not man,
the Holy One in your midst,
and I will not come to destroy, (Hos*11,8—9)
Here is identification in suffering of one whom he regards as
dear. The dominant word is hesedh. which is steadfast, devoted
love, which "corresponds to some extent to the New Testament
word agape.
But Hosea has also strong words to say about the breaking
of the Covenant. (6.7-10; 8.If.) He is horror-stricken at the
priesthood, and claims that the people have no knowledge.
(4,1; 4.6-8; 5»lj 6.9) Lying, stealing, killing, committing
1, Porteous, Newr Peake Commentary, p,156
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adultery are to be found in place of knowledge of God,"*" Hosea
claims that people do not know Yahweh because they seek after
the right cultus and forget right conduct. As with the other
prophets, the meeting of the ethical requirements of God, of
recognizing his works and acknowledging his demands is knowing
him. ^
One can conclude, therefore, that when a man or a people
3
sins, God withdraws his hesedh. and the covenant is suspended.
There is always a reason for God's suspending, abrogating or
annulling the Covenant, and that reason is to be found in man
or in Israel. ThenGod is no longer near to his people; he becomes
k
"distanced" and menacing, wholly other and transcendent.
The distance is reduced or diminished by the knowledge of
God, which is obedience to him. Therefore along with hesedh.
which speaks of the loving kindness and almost feminine, maternal
character of God, there is rahamain which means compassion and
is derived from the word meaning "womb", so again we have the
1. Obedience to the will of God as the condition of knowing him,
is also developed in Jeremiah, in the well-known passage
where he denounces Josiah's ne'er-do-well son, Jehoiakin,
and says of Josiah: "He judged the cause of the poor and
needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? saith the
Lord." (22.16)
2. See Heaton, Old Testament Prophets, p.66, p.115-123
3« See Jer. 16.5
4. This will be dealt with later when considering the myth
of Adam andEve.
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emphasis on the mother-love of God. Also linked with Yahweh's
hesedh is His mishpat. his righteousness, his right behaviour,
which requires in man a similar response as to God's hesedh. in
2
right behaviour and conduct.
These intimate qualities, however, become lost, when man,
or rather Israel, sins himself into the wrath of God. Knight
asserts that "the attitude of the all-holy God to sinful
3
Israel is that of wrath against, not the sin, but the sinner,"
Eichrodt also affirms:-
"This connection between God's anger and human sin
is a standard element in the religious beliefs of
all civilized people among whom the Deity is
worshipped as the guardian of justice and keeper
of laws,""
Eichrodt admits, however, that unlike holiness and righteousness,
wrath is never one of the permanent attributes of the God of
1. See Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.196
and Schofield p. 100. Schofield says that to express the
sentiment, "to believe in God" or "to put your trust in him",
the word aman is employed, which is used in Hebrew of the
child taking in food trustfully at the breast - relying on
God as a baby relies on his mother. See Schofield, p.40-l,
2. Eichrodt points out that this word was not originally a formal
concept as iustitia distributiva (p.239)» hut that later
Judaism interpreted it as such, as the impersonal allocation
of rewards and punishments according to the standards of the
law. In origin, mishpat was not impersonal at all, but
referred to a quality of personality which transcended all
laws and standards, an essentially religious quality; and
this is how Deutero-Isaiah develops it.
3. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.122
Knight quotes: Exod, 32.9-10; Cf. Jer, 12,8
4. Eichrodt, p.259
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Israel, and can only be understood as a footnote to the "will
to fellowship of the covenant God," He would argue, with Knight,
1
that it is never impersonal,
We have considered the fact of different qualities operating
within the inherent relationship of the Covenant, One must
mention one of its finest achievements, in addition to the
"interior attitude to history" already dealt with, and this is
the sense of unity which was given to the nation through the
imposition of a common law and religious system, "Whether this
was done by Moses or not is a matter of debate, Perhaps the
welding of the tribes was not accomplished until the time of
Saul and David, and the "laws" came even later than that. How
far these laws were original or borrowed from the religious
systems of other nations, or from secular thought, scholars
must decide, If we look at the'Wall", rather than the "stones",
a magnificent edifice was built around the concept of Yahweh
as Legislator or Lawgiver. Law, however, does not mean simply
legalism but has a much wider connotation, for torah meant
2
instruction and much besides.
1, This differs from the argument in Dodd: "Romans" who would
see wrath as an inevitable process of cause and effect in
a moral universe, and would not wish to attribute to God
the irrational passion of anger. (p,24) Dodd would not see
it as a personal action; cf, A. Hanson.The Wrath of the Lamb,
Eichrodt, however, would say that whilst God's anger operates
in individual act, it is his loving-kindness and righteousness
which are permanent.
2, See G.A.F, Knight, Law and Grace, p,51-^1 Dodd, The Interpretation
of the Fourth Gospel, p.75f«» where he asserts that torah is
the authoratitive basis of the whole x^eligious life and thought
of the Jewish people, (p.77) See also Dodd.The Bible and the
Greeks, p.25-^1
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5. Other Attributes in the Old Testament Conception of God
a) The Holiness of God, with which is associated the
"Numinous", the nrysteriuin tremendum et fascinans as developed
by Otto, is regarded by Eichrodt as the marvellous power which
removes God from common life and is shared by other near Eastern
religionsHowever, in Hebrew thought holiness is ascribed more
to the deity than to sacred objects, and it had, for example in
Isaiah, a moral, ethical quality, signifying dedication to God's
will. Thus the system of taboo is pressed into the service of
a higher God. This aspect of God's inapproachability and perfect¬
ion was stressed by the Priestly editors - Yahweh's complete
wholly otherness and utter transcendence as compared with all
other created things. But his inapproachability, inaccessibility
and hiddenness are also found in the Sinai narrative, which
suggests that von Rad's contention that it is a cluster of trad¬
itions from many ages is correct.
b) Related to this wholly-otherness of God, Eichrodt quotes
Archbishop S^derblom of Uppsala, who speaks of God not as a
loving father or as a judge of sin, but "that sense of God,
characteristic of a Luther or a Pascal, which struggles on the
edge of an abyss of despair." Eichrodt addsi-
"A Christianity which has ceased to be aware of
this ultimate fact of the opposition between God
and his creatures would have lost that note of
absolute urgency without.which the Gospel entrusted
1. Eichrodt, p.270. Otto, The Idea of the Holy
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to it can never be other than unthinking and
superficial.
We have here the Kierkegaardian "infinite qualitative distinc¬
tion" which is the starting point of so much of modern dialect-
2
ical theology.
c) To this aspect we need to add the other "commonly
accepted 'natural* divine attributes" as Knight calls them -
God is eternal, (Ps. 90.2), unchanging (Ps. 90.4)(Mai,3•6),
omniscient (isa. 40.28), omnipotent (isa. 40.15, and Ps.139.12)
O
and as Creator (isa. 40.26; Gen.1.1 etc.).
6• The Practice of Sacrifice
Although we have considered largely the theology of the
Old Testament with reference particularly to the nature of God,
something must be said about the practice of sacrifice. There
has been argument whether sacrifices were intended to be prop¬
itiatory, in the sense of their efficacy depending on changing
the mind of God, or expiatory, in the sense that any change should
k
be in the mind of the worshipper.
1. ibid., p.2?6-7
2. See Barth, Epistle to the Romans, (English translation) Preface
to the 2nd edition, p.10. "God is in heaven and thou art on
earth." Regarding the Old Testament, Knight, p.89 J "God's
essence is divinity, while man's is only personality." Knight
quotes the chant of the angels in Isaiah's vision,(Chap.6)
as an example of God's being utterly other than his created
world, utterly transcendent,
3. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.94-6
4. Cf. Dodd in Romans. p.54-5 on hilasterion (Gk.) and Vincent
Taylor in Jesus and His Sacrifice, p.51-2 on Kipper (Hebr.)
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There are certainly texts wltere it appears that God's
attitude could be changed by sacrifice, e.g., Gen. 8.21, where
God, as a result of Noah's sacrifice says that he will never
again destroy every living creature; also, in II Sara, 24.25
where the Lord heeded a sacrifice and turned away the plague
(cf. I Sara. 26.19)* It seems therefore that both ideas are present.
7• Summaries.
For summaries of the Old Testament conception of God,
Knight says that He is "sovereign Lord of all, as King and
1
Creator of the ends of the earth." Eichrodt regards the picture
of God in ancient Israel as "the attempt to hold together the
ideas of a divine power without limitation and of a divine act
of self-limitation in the establishment of the covenant - an act
2
whereby God makes himself known as sovereign and personal will."
He adds that "the ultimate secret of divine personhood is mani¬
fested as love concealed in wrath, redeeming righteousness, the
loving-kindness that remains constant despite the instability of
the covenant."
8. Conclusions.
In so short a review of current Old Testament studies, there
are bound to be many omissions and deficiencies. Nevertheless,
in this statement one cannot fail to observe the similarity
between its presentation and the current dogmatic trends in
1* A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.95
2. Eichrodt,p.286-7
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continental theology. It is not merely descriptive, but, as
Barr has said "descriptive-authoritative". Barr also, whilst
admitting that this synthetic approach to the Old Testament is
necessary, regards it as a mistake to assume that this is the
final approach or the highest or deepest stage in Biblical
study. From our point of view we must also endorse Barr's
criticism that it disregards the psychological and subjective
factors, and that the interests of dogmatics dominate,^ Little
reference is made to the borrowing by the Hebrew writers from
other systems of thought; to admit this would no doubt detract
from the idea of Revelation which is fundamental for most of
these scholars, even if it is not mentioned specifically.
Revelation is a concept which has been taken for granted in
theology until recently; in view of this, a digression on the
idea of revelation may not be out of place at this juncture
in the enquiry.
1. Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, p.27^-5 and elsewhere
Barr adds that the interests of dogmatics dominate "overfe




It may seem rather odd to have a chapter on the subject
of Revelation at this stage in the enquiry, when our primary
concern is monotheism in the Old Testament. However, Revelation
happens to be a concept which is used so widely in most theo¬
logical writing today, that it is impossible to ignore it.
Among the Biblical dogmatic theologians it is particularly
conspicuous, where often it is used as an autonomous concept
operating in its own right, resisting the interference of
disciplines other than theology. When one comes up against
revelation, as in an enquiry such as this, one is therefore
confronted with a stumbling stone which can appear to block
further progress. Revelation concerns God, we are told; it is
its own criterion, it has nothing to do iifith man, only in so far
as God discloses himself to man. To make psychodynarnic inroads
in face of such a concept seems an impossibility. However, I
believe that this stumbling-block can be removed, and that we
can see much more of the activities of man within this concept
than his being a mere passive receiver.
We would point out that the concept does not always mean
the same thing in the hands of different theologians; too often
it is taken for granted and used without definition. Now it is
an impossibility to review all usages by thewriters, so a
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selection is necessary. To make an arbitrary beginning, I turn
to ray own theological teachers, H.H, Farmer and G.H. Dodd, who
with John Baillie and Leonard Hodgson can be regarded as moderate
in expression. We shall then considerBritish scholars whose
position displays a hardening in their use of* the term, due no
doubt to the influence of Karl Barth. We shall then proceed to
detail Barth's position at some length, and then it will be
critically examined from three angles. After this we shall pass
to two views of Revelation which are in the main acceptable to
us, "Wheeler Robinson and Tillichj finally, we will draw conclu¬
sions ,
THE PROBLEM OF REVELATION
In his book, The ¥orld and God. H.H, Farmer would have
revelation clearly distinguished from discovery, as with the
latter there is activity on one side only, and it deals with
impersonal objects which cannot convey themselves to us. Revel¬
ation is a two-term personal relationship, and refers to an
activity of impartation. In religion, revelation implies the
action of the living God entering into personal rapport with
the soul, as holy will, or absolute demand, asking obedience
and guaranteeing that through it the soul will receive its
ultimate succQur. It is a personal experience, not a revelation
of propositional truths, and the proper response to it is faith,
which involves obedience and trust. Similarly C.H. Dodd regards
revelation as a meeting of man with God in and through the
world of things and events, the initiative lying with God, who
speaks to us from beyond this world. He too would distinguish
revelation fx*om discovery. "The Word of God", a phrase which Dodd
regards as a metaphor which is a meaningful one, comes as both
judgement and the power of renewal, and calls for a response
from man which is obedience. One difference between Dodd and Far¬
mer is that the former ties up revelation with history. Dodd
also sees the act of revelation as more than a psycholpelogical
!• The World and God, p.65,85
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experience; the psychology deals with the mechanism, but is
unable to say anything about the validity of the experience or
the truth of the interpretation of life which it conveyed,"*"
Dodd argues that the "test of revelation lies in the fact that
if the thing which they think they received from God acts
creatively in human life", then we must conclude that those who
2
received the revelation were not deceived,
Leonard Hodgson is another theologian who uses the concept
extensively. For revelation to take place, there must be "both
the divinely given revelatum and also the psychological predis-
3
position to appreciate it on the part of the human recipient,"
Hodgson distinguishes between propositional statements and the
revelatum, the former bearing record to the latter* Hodgson
regards the doctrine of the Trinity as a product of rational
reflection on the self-revelation of God; but it could not have
4
been discovered by man's reason alone apart from revelation,
5
John Baillie both in his book on the subject and in other
writings, follows similar lines; he quotes Caird^ that "the
1, The Bible Today. p.99»101; The Authority of the Bible, p,84
2, The Authority of the Bible. p,274
Farmer also develops the concept of revelation in his Gifford
Lectures, in which he follows largely Brunner in claiming
that God uniquely and savingly gives himself "personally to
man in his sinful darkness and perversion,", Revelation and
Religion. p.40-l.
3. The Doctrine of the Trinity, p.28-9
4. ibid., p.25,35
5• The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought.
6. The Fundamental ideas of Christianity, 1899* P»39»
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primary organ of religious knowledge is not reason but faith,"
and Oepke"*" that revelation is the "self-disclosure of God", and
not the communication of supernatural knowledge. Baillie endorses
Tillich's view of revelation as "the manifestation of what
concerns us ultimately", which is "the ground of our being",
but he cannot agree with Tillich when he ties it up with the
experience of ecstasy, "In what is given," writes Baillie, "there
can be no imperfection of any kind, but there is always imper-
2
fection in what we may call the 'receiving apparatus'." As in
all Baillie's writings, there is a tendency to give priority to
kno%irledge and will, with a corresponding blight on all things
emotional. In his Gifford Lectures that "sense of the presence
of God" is devoid largely of emotional tone. He connects faith
with the cognitive element and makes the emotional and volitional
3
elements depend on the cognitive, and later on he refers to
faith as only cognitive and volitional, without mentioning any
4
emotional element. As a true Kantian, he distrusts the emotions,
and this may be why he cannot accept Tillich's ecstasy, (although
Tillich was not referring to pure emotion,) Religious awareness
or faith may concern "the bottom of the heart" as well as "the
top of the mind", but are there not emotions residing in those
1. In Kittel's Theological Word Book of the New Testament, p.28
2. The Idea ofRevelation in Recent Thought, p.43
3. The Sense of the Presence of God, p.65
4. ibid,, p.90
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depths - or anywhere significant?"'' His basic position can be
best stated by the following quotationi-
"What is true in any religious system is from God;
what is false is of our own imagining. Man can knoxir
nothing of God except as God reveals himself to him.
No man can by searching find out God, except as God
himself takes the initiative both in prompting the
searching and directing the finding,"2
Ve would now pass to the consideration of the work of two
scholars whose position displays considerably more "hardening"
than the above: this we would attribute to the influence of
3
Karl Barth. The first is George S, Hendry
"The proper subject of revelation is God, God himself
in his being and works, God reveals himself, and we
are dependent on his revelation of himself for all
our knoxv'ledge of God.
In other words, whilst other religions claim to have ideas
of revelation, we only find revelation in the strict and absolute
sense in the Bible. "Here God himself is at once the subject and
object of it." His article contains many texts from the Bible
to illustrate his view-point, but in many of thern the word
revelation or the idea of it does not occur; he has read it into
them. (E.g., Amos 2.10; I-Ios.11.1; Ps.8l.10, all of which can be
understood without the word "revelation".) Hendry states that
the purpose and end of revelation is the establishment of
personal relations between God and man, and that Jesus Christ
1* Baillie•s position is little altered in this matter since he
wrote in 1926 The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul.
2. The Sense of the Presence of God, p.187-8
3. Article on Revelation in A Theological Word Book of the Bible.
ed, Alan Richardson.
4. ibid., p.196, col.l.
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is the key to the understanding of the revelation of God, A
naive, unquestioning acceptance is the most appropriate response
to revelation, and that there is no criterion of revelation
apart from revelation itself.A
Perhaps the strongest claim made for revelation by a British
3
theologian is to be found in Alan Richardson.
"Theology as a science stands or falls with the
category of revelation; if there is no distinct¬
ively Christian revelation in history, the special
categories of theology will not be needed, and in
place of theology the scientific study of religion
could be more competently undertaken by the psycho¬
logists, sociologists and anthropologists."
In fairness, it must be pointed out that Richardson does not
object to the work of various disciplines having relations one
with another, and that insights from one discipline are able to
illuminate another. He is also willing to admit that theology,
like othor scientific pursuits, is conditioned by the categories
which the investigators adopt. But as other disciplines have
their special categories for their work, so has theology, and its
category is revelation, and he is averse to any dilution of the
4
concept of revelation,
1. ibid., p.198, col. 1.
2. ibid.,
3. Christian Apologetics, p.57
4. Similarly, David Cairns in A Gospel without Myth speaks of
the supreme loyalty and only one loyalty to the revelation
of God in Christ (p.19) and that theology is a subsidiary
norm, itself under revelation (p.19), and that theological
concepts can never cut themselves adrift from the event of
revelation, since they have this event as their object, (p.62)
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Finally, the most popularized radical theologian of today
has reiterated Richardson's words, albeit unacknowledged,
"Christianity stands or falls by revelation..*
The reason for the distinctive place given to revelation in
most theologians may in part be due to the prominence it has
been given in the writing of continental dogmatic theologians,
and their great influence over all theology today. Karl Barth
gives it the central place in his dogmatic, and, as we shall see,
his doctrine of the Trinity is largely held together by this
concept and is dominated throughout by it. His concept of revel¬
ation has percolated through to Biblical studies, and has influ¬
enced very many scholars; therefore it will be best to consider
it at this point.
Earth's position begins with the fundamental separation
2
between God and man. On the one side is the wholly other
sovereign transcendent God, who would not be known unless Ke
revealed Himself,
"G 0 D reveals Himself. He reveals Himself T II R 0 U G H
HIMSELF. He reveals HIMSELF. If we wish
really to regard revelation from the side of its
subject, God, then over and above all we must under¬
stand that this subject, God, the Revealer, is ident¬
ical with His act in revelation, identical also with
its effect."3
In revelation God becomes God a second time, his alter-ego,
1. John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God, p.128
2. A good statement of it can be found in John Baillie, Our
Knowledge of God, p.17-27
3. Church Dogmatics, i/l, p.3^0
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his own double, distinguishing himself from Himself. God cannot
be known by man because of his sinfulness and because He is
qualitatively different from man who is fallen creaturely.
"Acknowledgement of the Word of God by man is thus,
of course, approval of the Word of God by man, but
not such approval as is based upon persuasion between
equals, but such as is based upon obedience, upon
submission as between the utterly unequal. To have
experience of the Word of God is to give way before
its superiority."^-
"...He cannot be known by the powers of human know¬
ledge, but is apprehensible and apprehended solely
because of His freedom, decision and action.
Knowledge of God, therefore, can only come from God as He reveals
Himself, otherwise He would be unknown.
"Revelation in the Bible means the self-
unveiling, imparted to man, of the God who
according to His nature cannot be unveiled to men.
The element of self-unveiling in this definition may
be described not as the logical material, but as the
historic centre of the Biblical concept of language."3
Barth goes on to speak of this God "who according to Ilis nature
cannot be unveiled to man" as, nevertheless, One who "unveils
Himself there". This is done by a sheer miracle of grace coming
down vertically from above, as between God and man a great gulf
is fixed, there being nothing common to God and man.
"Without revelation man is unaware that there is a
Lord, that he, man, has a Lord, and that God is this
Lord. He is aware of it through revelation,
1. ibid., 1/1, p.235
2. Dogmatics in Outline, p.23
3. Church Dogmatics. l7l, p.3^2
4. ibid,, 1/1, p.352
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Therefore we are wholly dependent upon God's giving us that
knowledge of Himself} for revelation does not mean creation by
man, but something imparted to raan.^ Nowhere in the Bible do we
find that man can produce revelation for himself.
God has provided us with this revelation who is His Word
in Jesus Christ, of whom the scriptures testify, "God's Word is
2
identical with God Himself." Revelation, however, is "not real
or true from the standpoint of anything else, either in itself
3
or for us." and we have to stand or move within its closed
circle or stay out.
However, the closed circle is not that of the Gospel
account of Jesus, for Barth regards Jesus of Nazareth as rather
"commonplace alongside more than one other founder of a religion
and even alongside many later representatives of His own
4
religion". The closed circle in which knowledge comes to us
is in personal encounter in and through the Word which He has
addressed to us in Jesus Christ, Truth can only be known by God's
revelation of Himself in Christ, therefore dogmatics is largely
a study of Christology.
Barth regards religion as man's attempt to reach God, and
that it is discontinuous with faith in the revelation which comes
to us from God's side wholly and completely as an act of grace.
1. ibid., 1/1, p.376
2. ibid., 1/1, p.3^9
3. ibid., 1/1, p.350
4. ibid., 1/1, p.188
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"Religion" to Barth represents man's unbelief, his faith in
himself. He therefore has no basic disagreement with writers
like Feuerbach (or Freud, for that matter) who claimed that
religion was a projection of man's ideas of God,"*" The psychology
of religion can investigate religious experience, but it cannot
tell us anything about the God who chooses from his own freedom
and sovereignty to reveal himself, for the simple reason that,
as we have seen, fallen man has no point of contact with God
at all. How then can man receive the revelation? The answer lies
in the Divine Revelation of the Word of God creating the capa¬
city, which we by our fallen nature lacks God himself has to
awaken the faith and this has no relation with religious experi¬
ence at all, God's action in giving us his Word in Christ is the
sole basis of our knowledge of God; anything which is derived
from human efforts, human thought for example, cannot be God at
all; no human concepts can possibly "hold" the idea ofGod, for
iie can be fitted into nothing which man by himself devises.
One such devising is the doctrine of analogy in relation to
God. Barth rules out the whole method of analogy in the knowing »
of God; the extension of human models cannot reach God, There¬
for the title "Father" as applied to God is not a human model
which man has used out of his experience of human relationships
to understand the Divine - on the contrary, it is divine
1 * Yet, he also says in true dialectical fashion that Christianity
is a true religion!
307
personality which helps us to understand human personality.
The analogy comes in when we speak of our human progenitor as
father.1
Speaking of Kant's idea of religion within the limits of
reason alone as a human function,Barth claims that theology
should resign itself
"•••to stand on its own feet in relation to
philosophy, in theology recognizing its point
of departure in revelation, just as philosophy
sees its point of departure in reason, and in
theology conducting, therefore, a dialogue with
philosophy, and not, wrapping itself up in the
mantle of philosophy, a quasi-philosophical
method,
It is from such thoughts concerning revelation that we can
see the source of the ideas about the subject in Hendry and
Richardson, as well as in some of the Old Testament scholars
whom we have considered. But we can also see affinities with
other theologians; for example, the assertion that revelation
is not creation by man, is similar to Farmer's andlbdd's
distinction between revelation and discovery; also the fact
that psychological investigation of religious experience can
tell us nothing about God's nature, is similar to Dodd's content¬
ion that religious experience elucidates the knowledge of the
mechanism operating but not the content,
Barth's claims for revelation, however, are much more
forcibly put than by any other of the theologians we have
1. See John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God. p.llSf.
2. Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl~ p.190 (my italics)
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considered. It is natural that they have met with much criticism,
some of which we wi.ll consider.
1, The first criticism lies in Barth's "retreat into
revelation,""'' his making theology's point of departure in this
concept, which involves the dismissal of reason and philosophy
from the courts of theology. Some of Barth's critics go along
with Barth so far as to admit that God not only gives revelation
of himself, but also the capacity to receive it in a Buberian
"I-Thou" encounter! nevertheless, they claim that the moment we
begin to write about it, discuss it, question it and scrutinize
it, we are employing philosophical methods, so that
inevitably enters into theologizing. The encounter itself is
not theology} but once we begin to describe it and talk about
it, we are doing theology with the inevitable aid of philosophy,
Mc^-ntyre points out that Barthhiraself spoke of dogmatics in much
the same way, as "a laborious advance from one partial insight
2
to another," and this could mean that he allows a place for
creative imagination; but he is speaking here of dogmatics, and
not of revelation. Buri's comment is perhaps the most apt herei-
"Despite their continual emphasis on the humanity of
all our utterances, some theologians talk as if they
were lecturing to us from heaven on high -
It is claimed that it is not for us to question the Divine
Revelation, rather it questions us! Our duty is to accept it and
1. Basil Moss, The New Theologians.
2. Barth i/l, p.l4
3. Buri, Christian Faith in Our Time, p.59-60
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act on obedience.
Is it natural for man to accept everything without
questioning? John Macquarrie who himself uses the term "rev¬
elation" almost non-dogmatically in the sense that nothing can
be known unless in some way it reveals or manifests itself to
2
us, has asked the questions How do we know that "Thus saith
3
the Lord" may not be a veiled way of saying "I'm telling you!"?
Perhaps a psychotherapist might say that it was due to an over-
determined super-ego! The point is that we can only find out by
testing what is alleged to be revelation, using what techniques
the human mind has available, using the faculty of reason which
the Barthian tends to despise. It is natural for us to test rev¬
elation, and not regard it as its own validity or standing in
a unique way under the sole control of God, Dodd's test, that
if that which we think we have received from God in revelation,
acts creatively in human life, then we can conclude that we are
not deceived, is practical; if it enables men, says Dodd, to deal
with an ever larger area of reality, then it cannot be dismissed.
There is nothing unquestioning about this attitude; it involves
1. It is this side of Barth's teaching which has caused dismay to
more liberal-minded theologians, like H.D. Lewis, who in
Philosophy of Religion, p. 23^ discerns in it similar react¬
ionary trends of political dictatorship and authoritarianism
to those of the totalitarian states of Central Europe, There
is always a danger when God is made "utterely transcendent"
that arguments like Paul's "potter and clay" of Romans 9.21
come to the fore. But as C.H. Dodd has reminded us, we are
not pots, but persons. ('Romans , p. 159)
2. The Honest to God Debate, p.190
3. Twentieth CenturyReligious Thought, p.33^
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also all the human faculties. One therefore agrees with Hepburn,"*"
that it is an enormous and costly illusion that philosophy has
to be kept outwith the charmed circles of revealed religion,
where Biblical ideas and images, and the Biblical notion of
2
truth have, as is claimed, unchallengable authority. We would
wish to extend these criticisms, with which we are in full sym¬
pathy, from the realm of philosophy to psychology! for an
encounter surely involves not only the God. who is being encount¬
ered, but the person whom he is encountering, We have quoted
Dodd as saying that psychology only deals with the mechanism of
the experience, and not its content, and Baillie as relegating
all imperfections to what he calls "the receiving apparatus", by
which he means the one to whom the revelation is imparted. But
one cannot remain satisfied with either of these contentions.
We hope to show that psychodynamics can say more than is allowed
by any of these theologians, and that a psychological evaluation
of the experience itself, in a way, precedes the philosophical
theologizing.
1. Christianity and Paradox, p.6
2, Barth would argue that revelation is a particularly distinct¬
ive concept within the realm of faith, William Nicholls in
Revelation in Christ, follows in this line and claims that
by revelation we have true knowledge of God, (p,15f.)
Kraemer in The Christian Message to the Non-Christian World
holds that revelation is not a specifically Christian concept,
but is a universal religious concej^t, (p,69 - quoted by
Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation?, p.242,) Downing says
that Christians have no inside knowledge which distinguishes
them from the crowds. Downing, like Hepburn and Macquarrie,
argues from outside the "charmed circle"; Nicholls, follow¬
ing Barth, argues from within it.
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2, A second criticism levelled against Barth is along the
lines of his anthropology. Wingren"*" has claimed that Earth" s
anthropology determines his hermeneutics, and draws the logical
conclusion that man is the centre ofBarth's theology - not
the man of faith in the Bible, however, but modern atheistic
man of the twentieth century, whom Barth takes over quite
uncritically, as a being for whom God does not exist. Because
of this assumption, Barth, like Kierkegaard, can only see man
and God as distanced from each other. Here again we meet the
2
denigration of man. This extreme distancing of man and God,
owing to the view Barth takes of man, has been modified by
3
Barth in his The Humanity of God. in which he posits a manvard
side to God when he relates to man. This means that the extreme
4
wholly otherness of God is reduced. Barth's essential
1• Theology in Conflict.
2. "It is impossible... to remain content theologically and
philosophically with the divorce which obedience allows -
Tories in! - between the logical character of human theo¬
logical discourse and the "meaning" and "truth" which is
allegedly "breathed into' it miraculously and independent
of its nature,... The value of the human is minimized,
denied and deplored ostensibly to glory in the miraculous
inspiration of the divine; but such a policy can never
lead to a genuine theory of incarnation, only to violation
of the debased human by the divine which, instead o±"
"inspiring1 the human, assaults and replaces him," Frederick
Fcrre, Language, Loalc and God, p.89. For a truer theory
of inspiration, which does not denigrate man, see Wheeler
Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament,
which we will consider presently.
3. Fontana paperback.




The dynamics of revelation are claimed to work miraculously
and independently of man; yet how should we know anything about
thera if they did not happen to man; and as such, they should be
amenable to psychodynamic investigation; however, the known
workings of the mind reveal no such a "take-over" of man as
Barth's idea of the workings of revelation seem to suggest. The
strength of Barth's position lies in the satisfaction it offers
as an intellectual theory; but it can stand up to no empirical
tests of any kind; such tests if applied at all could only draw
an agnostic conclusion. A word of Jaspers in this connection
is relevant:-
"...whatever is said and done in the name of
revelation, is said and done in worldly form,
in worldly lan^age, in human acts and human
perceptions« "
3• What we have just said leads to another charge made
against Barth by Wingren, namely, that his whole idea of
revelation is over-intellectual. Man's trouble is that he lacks
knowledge of God; the answer is given through revelation.
1. Wingren adds other criticisms and comments, e.g., he states
that the Bible's anthropology is determined by the death
and resurrection of Christ, and that man's needs are
salvation, justification and forgiveness of sins, and a
righteousness which is not his own: but Barth regards evil
as nothingness, and so underestimates guilt and emnity; also
for Barth no account is taken of Law as a preparation for
the Gospel, which means that he had to allow a place for
law within the Gospel itself, and that rules and regulations
are derived from revelation, which is inappropriate. Psycho¬
logically speaking, Wingren in this criticism is desiring to
present Christian Faith as contained within the "depressive
position."
2. Kerygam and Myth, Vol.XI, p.l67
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Wingren also shows that Easter is displaced in the Christian
year by Christmas, the idea of the Incarnation takes over from
redemption and salvation. Gerald Downing also points out that
the intellect is unduly stressed above other faculties and
endowments. Downing states that revelation only became important
"when Christians began unduly to emphasise the role of the intel¬
lect in the service of God." He quotes Gustav Aulen,"The word
2
•revelation' is heavily burdened with intellectualism." Downing
appeals to Freud in support, that only the conscious part of
man's mind is affected by this argument from revelation, and
he regards it as having no apologetic value for the non-Christ¬
ian,"^
So paradoxically, Barth, who is disparaging about man's
intellect in his knowing of God, is accused of having the
intellect as the determinative factor in his theological schema!
Wingren writest
"As a gospel of incarnation or 'revelation' the
gospel is from the beginning to end conceived
intellectually.... Barth has the ability to a
very large degree of being able to employ the
language of scripture in a system that is totally
foreign to the Bible.
4. Fritz Buri^ sees a tie between atheism and revelational
theology. They are "united", claims Buri, "in that they cannot
1. Has Christiantiy a Revelation?, p.137-9
2. Revelation. p.275» quoted Downing p.249
3. ibid., p.249-253
4. Wingren, p.126
5. Christian Faith in Our Time, p.42
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apprehend the God-man, in that they offer no understanding of
God apart from a special form of supernatural revelation in
the Christ which atheism denies and revelational theology
cannot vindicate." He makes the point that the "all or nothing"
approach of Barth with revelation as a central concept refuses
to face the apologetic concern of preaching the Word of God to
unbelievers.
5. One other point must be made before we leave Barth;
this is his inversion of human models, so as to make their
place of origin in God and not in man, e.g., his idea that when
we speak of the Fatherhood of God we are not using a human model,
but that we understand hurnan fatherhood from the idea of the
Fatherhood of God. Now it is quite true that Clement Webb in his
1918 Gifford Lectures wrote as follows
"Thus what we call the philosophical use of person
in the modern European languages has been determined
by the use in the formulation of the doctrine of the
Trinity." 2
This may be true, but the concept "Father" has always been
known by humans from their having had earthly progenitors. One
must agree with Macquarrie that although divine fatherhood may
be ontologically primary and human analogies are derivative
from it, nevertheless, the human analogies are the first
1. ibid., p.58. Without using the phrase, Buri clearly regards
Barthianism as a "defence system", a dogmatism conspicuous
for its hostility to reason, which resists such examination
because of a number of hidden undisclosed first premisses.
2. God and Personality, p.46
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episternologically. The psychological aspects of this type of
inversion will be considered later in this enquiry.
That such a large part of this chapter should have been
devoted to the position of Karl Barth is inevitable, as his
thinking on this subject has dominated so much contemporary
theological writing.
ke would now turn to those who are critical of the concept
of Revelation, beginning with Downing, to whom we have already
made reference; vre do so, not because his work is earliest in
time, but because it is the fullest and most comprehensive
treatment of the subject. His book, Is there a Christian
Revelation?,is a shattering treatment of the subject. But it is
a most scholarly work.
After a very careful study of those Old Testament passages
which have been used by dogmatic scholars as the basis for their
concept of revelation, Downing concludes that he cannot find
2
anything to justify the contention that God has revealed himself.
He has little sympathy for the oft-made statements of dialectical
theologians that even when God does reveal himself or disclose
3
Himself, He remains a hidden God. This kind of statement is
1. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.32^» There
is also a discussion of models as used in the Old Testament
by Ramsey in Talking about Gods Models Ancient and Modern.p.76
of Myth and Symbol (ed. Dillestone). See also R.S. Lee,
Your Growing C lild and Religion, p.67
2. Is there a Christian Revelation?, p.47
3. E.g. Hendry in The Theological Word Book of the Bible; Barth,
Dogmatics. l/l,p,192; Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old
Testament. p.73
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regarded by Downing as pure nonsense. In the Old Testament
knowledge is related to obedience, as in Jer. 22.16, "He judged
the cause of the poor and the needy} then it was well. Is not
this to know me? says the Lord." (R.S.V.) One knows God when
one obeys his will and purpose, so there can be no question of
such knowledge being revealed.*- Downing finds the same notion
2
of knowledge being equated with obedience in St Paul. When
St Paul said that God had acted decisively to reconcile the world
to himself, he did not say that God had revealed himself to the
3 4
world. In the Synoptic Gospels Jesus reveals the demand of God,
and in St John seeing and revealing refer to the physical visi¬
bility of Jesus the man; but John also insists that there is no
5
relationship without obedience.
Downing concludes that revelation, as used today by theo¬
logians, as a major term for conveying the purport of the life,
death and resurrection of Jesus, does not occur in the New Testa¬
ment ,^ so he sets "a very heavy question mark" against contemp¬
orary theology which attempts to find "revelation of God" in the
7
Bible, or in the Bible and tradition. Then come the strong-
words s that if God had intended to reveal himself in Jesus Christ,








he failed. Moreover, a revelation of what cannot be seen is not
a revelation.The term revelation should be kept for the
fulfilment of some future eschatological hopes to regard it as
a present fact is "pernicious nonsense". The result of this
enquiry, Downing argues, is that the great dogmatic structures
based on the concept rest on shaky foundations. Other terms
should therefore be used in place of revelation, e.g., salvation
is a better term to understand the Biblical message; salvation
2
would lead to commitment in dependence and obedience to God.
Such a "root and branch" criticism of this popular concept
has not passed without comment. John A.T, Robinson gives Downing
3
a rather cool reception in his review of the book. He argues
that for the layman to be told that Christianity has "salvation"
rather than a "revelation" does not get him very much further
or leave him with many fewer unanswered questions. He claims that
Downing's view of the Gospels is not a balanced one. However, in
fairness, it should be pointed out that Downing was not writing
for the layman but for theologians.
However, other writers have taken the same line as Downing.
4
James Barr too says that the Biblical word is considerably less
comprehensive than its modern usage. He points out amongst other
matters that there is no reference to revelation in either Exodus
1. ibid,, p.238
2. ibid,, p.283,289
3. Prism. No, 92, p.64
4. 'Revelation' in Basting's Dictionary of the Bible. 1963.
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or the account of Mount Sinai. The word is not very frequently
employed in the Bible and its distribution is unequal.
"The now common theological use of 'revelation'
for divine self-communication in general needs
to be criticised wherever it has grown too far
away from Biblical usage."
and
"It is doubtful whether the common theological
use of 'revelation' for divine self-communication
is appropriate in the light of Biblical usage.
John Mclntyre can be counted as one in this tradition. He speaks
of the "Revelation Model", which implies that it is a construct
of the mind of man classing it as a second or third-order model,
and, no doubt, following on from Downing, he saysi
"It has always seemed to me to be a strange anomaly
that the concept of revelation which has become such
a popular term in modern theology should have so
little biblical basis for its employment."^
Now we turn to psychological objections to the concept of
revelation as outlined by Barth. The term of Philip Rieff, which
he applied to Freud's concept of the Unconscious-"God-term"-
naturally suggests itself. However, the use of such a term might
please some Revelational theologians, for this is what they are
claiming! "God-term" would be descriptive rather than critical!
What one wishes to say is that the way the concept "Revelation"
1. ibid.t p.8^9
2. The Shape of Christology. p,153« The criticisms of Jaspers
and Buri, have been referred to earlier. It is significant
that Bultmann still holds to the concept. He refers to the
term as meaning not communication of teachings, or philoso¬
phy or theological understandings, but God speaking directly
to me summoning me in my own humanity, which is null without
God. (Kerygina and Myth JTP. 192 . )
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has been used has provided men with an Absolute, an infalli¬
bility, which in turn permits an opportunity for the exercising
of and capitalizing on omnipotent thought, the undying omnipotent
wishes of man. To this we will return. ¥e may take up the earlier
criticism made, that the concept over-values the intellect
which it consciously despises, at the expense of the other
parts of the human psyche, as both Downing and Wingren point
out. The intellect is seated in the ego, therefore revelation
makes its appeal to the ego; but one would argue even more to
the super-ego! For the more authoritarian revelation becomes,
the more God and man are distanced, the more it appeals to the
super-ego-orientated character, based on the "depressive position";
the natural consequence is unquestioning obedience to the
authority behind the revelation, as the only hope for the person
who receives it, for he is assumed to be fallen and his mind
corrupted. In Barth particularly, the psychological side is
ruled out, as playing no part in the revelation. It is our con¬
tention, however, that the human side needs to be stressed quite
as much in theology as it now is in scientific studies; for it is
by personal participation that we can learn anything at all.
Without the personal, subjective side of man it is doubtful
whether revelation could ever take place. One is reminded of
words heard once at a conference:
"The denial of the subjective is the greatest
repression of all; repression against subjectivity
320
is as much a defence against reality as is
phantasy,
If \te are to continue to employ this concept in a fully signi¬
ficant way a place for the personal participation of man, his
subjective part must be found. Without it, there could be
nothing which could be called revelation, or, shall we say,
knowledge of God,
We would therefore turn to two scholars who have taken this
aspect into account. The first is Wheeler Robinson, and the
second, Paul Tillich,
In his book, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament.
Wheeler Robinson considers revelation always along with the
subjective aspects. Admitting that we cannot move directly from
the Biblical material and witness to the outlook of the modern
world, without some form of explication, adjustment or prior
criticism, he also sees difficulty involved in making this kind
of judgement,
"It is useless to enquire exactly what happened at
Carmel, and what might have been seen by a cold,
dispassionate spectator of scientific temper; there
were no such people there."2
The psychology of the Hebrews no more satisfies us today than
does their mythological account of creation as scientific
historical fact, or their moralistic way of writing history.
The Hebrews understood all activity as the activity of God; much,
1, Dr. Kenneth Soddy at the Congress of The Institute of Religion
and Medicine at Birmingham, 1966, quoting a Dutch psychiatrist.
2. Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, p.^5
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therefore, that is subsumed under direct divine activity would
be understood by us under other concepts such as natural law,
(and we may add psychodynainics! ). Many of their beliefs are
impossible to us,
"Just because the Hebrew was not aware of many
mental processes familiar to ourselves, he could
more easily ascribe their products to the direct
revelation of God, But there is no reason why we
should not think of God as working through such
activities, physical or psychical. They do not
necessarily offer an alternative explanation
of the event; they can equally well be a fuller
and more adequate account of it than the Hebrew was
able to give. Scientific knowledge can never invalid¬
ate religious faith, however much it may lead to the
re-statement of the ways and means of God,... A
change of emphasis in the manner of proof does not
discredit the validity of the message,"^
Wheeler Robinson claims that the unit of revelation is not the
event, but the interpreted event. It is in the interpretation
of the event that we find the revelation; but that interpretation
is naturally private and personal for it necessarily involves
an interpreter. For Wheeler Robinson the revelation is not
"nothing else than" interpretation, for he believes that it comes
from a transcendent source, but iti-
"can be studied only from the point at which it
makes contact with our experience. From that point
its activities do submit themselves to our analysis.
The theology of revelation has for its counterpart
or rather its necessary constituent, the psychology
of inspiration,"^




iconoclastic work on the concept of revelation, and Wheeler
Robinson uses the word therefore in its broad sense. One would
ask what this transcendent source is? Is it the supernatural, to
which some theologians would give the name of God?* For the
moment, however, I would leave this and consider the "necessary
counterpart", whilst expressing my whole-hearted agreement with
this emphasis on the psychology of inspiration.
It is interesting in this respect to see what Knight wrote
about Moses, and how far, in spite of his very different theo-
2
logical standpoint, he illustrated Wheeler Robinson1s point.
(The following illustrations are italicized by myself.)
"The all-important matter is that Moses was clearly
convinced that he had met, at the Burning Bush, with
nothing less than a revelation of the Word of God,,.."
"...Moses must have discovered that the physical
phenomenon before his material eye was the objective
sign of his own subjective experience of the Word of
God forming within his inner consciousness."
"...Moses had sufficient insight to regard each and
every incident in the Exodus nexus of events as
meaningful in the sight of God."^
Leaving aside Knight's acceptance of revelation in the story,
his acceptance too of the Moses saga as history, and the Barthian
language concerning the Word of God forming within Moses' inner
consciousness, we have in this description some very highly
personal, subjective terms — convinced... discovered... his own
subjective experience... his inner consciousness... sufficient
1, E.g., Porteous in New Peake, p.155
2. A Christian Theology of the Old Testament. p.4^f.
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insight... meaningful. He describes for us precisely what
Wheeler Robinson is claiming, for he makes revelation depend on
the necessary counterpart, or the subjectivity of Moses, on the
value-judgement which Moses makes of the Burning Bush incident,
and on his relating it to the future events. Unfortunately,
Knight does not carry through the inherent logic of what he says,
for he goes on to speak of God being known by His Name in His
Self-Revelation.
Wheeler Robinson sees the intuitional value-judgement
playing a great part in the actual process of revelation. He
has little sympathy with those who wish to find in the authority
of revelation some form of external guarantor, like the Bible or
the Church. To them he asks the further question} "Who guarantees
2
the guarantor?" The process of revelation inevitably brings us
back to some form of intuition^ the presence of a value-judgement
is inescapable.
"The intuition of a value-judgement, therefore, is
exactly what we ought to expect when personal Real¬
ity reveals itself to persons. Tradition and reason
will more or less co-operate, either to introduce or
to conform, but the ultimate basis of the conviction
will have come in this way, involving all the faculties
of the personality."3
"In the law and in the prophets, the revelation is
usually described as 'spoken' by God to man. This
externalization of the process was inevitable, with
the given psychological limitations, in order to





historic form of the event, the actual way in
which it came about, must have been much more
intimate than an external voice in order to secure
the necessary nucleus of conviction,
So, Wheeler Robinson asserts that the psychological analysis
of the experience cannot be dispensed with, and it always brings
us back to some point of an unconscious intuition, ",,.the auth¬
ority of revelation was secured by a personal conviction."
The second theologian who is willing to admit that there is
a subjective participation within revelation is Paul Tillich.
Not only does revelation have a subjective reference; God also
is subjectively involve^ as he is spoken of as that which
unconditionally and ultimately concerns us, as the Ground of our
Being,^
With Tillich we return to the terminology similar to that
which we met in our consideration of the Existentialist Analysts
in Part One (Chapter V). Like them, Tillich makes use of Husserl's
phenomenological method as competent to deal with logical mean¬
ings , but it is only partially competent to deal with matters in
the realm of the spirit, like religion. He therefore adopts what
he calls "critical phenomenology" which unites two separate
elements: (a) an intuitive-descriptive element, which provides
the technique by means of which the meaning which is manifest
in the example is portrayed; and (b) an existential-critical
element, which provides the criterion by which each example of
1, ibid,, p,27k
2* Systematic Theology, Vol,I, p.l4
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revelation is selected. This approach with these two qualifiers
involves much more than a pure pheaomenological, presupposition-
less approach. Pure phenomenology would run the danger of making
Hie
experience itself/sole source of systematic theology, and this
would open the door to all kinds of heresies,^ The existential¬
ist-critical element acts as a safeguard, together with Tillich's
positing revelation in Christ as final,
Tillich gives various definitions of revelation. It is the
manifestation of something hidden which cannot be approached
through the ordinary ways of gaining knowledge ; revelation,
2
however, does not dissolve the mystery into knowledge. It is
also the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately, for
mystery which is revealed is of ultimate concern to us, because
it is the ground of our being. Tillich would exclude everything,
however, that is not of ultimate concern to us and that which is
3
not of essential mystery. As well as being the manifestation of
the ground of being, it is also the depth of vision, pointing to
4
the mystery of existence, for the cognitive function of human
reason,
"Knowledge of revelation cannot be separated from
the situation of the revelation; knowledge of rev¬
elation is knowledge about the revelation of the
mystery of being to us, not information about the _
nature of beings and their relation to one another."
1. J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p.28





He adds later that knowledge of revelation is knowledge of God,
of what ultimately concerns us, grasps us and manifests itself
to us, and it is always bound up with the cognitive function of
reason,
Tillich admits, however, that every revelation is condition¬
ed by the medium in and through which it appears; it only has
revelatory power for those who participate in it ; it has in
the first place to be revelation for someone, who has received
it as his ultimate concern, When this takes place we have
"original revelation". If, however, others make it their own,
then it becomes "dependent revelation". Peter's confession at
Caesarea Philippl is an example of original revelation; our
confession of Jesus as Christ is a dependent one, Tillich claims
that there are no revealed doctrines, but only revelatory events
and situations which can be described in doctrinal terms. Eccles¬
iastic doctrines are meaningless if separated from the revelatory
situations out of which they have grown.^
Tillich also ties up revelation with what he calls "ecstasy",
a term which Baillie could not accept. He admits that the word
had difficulties, but "a word which expresses a genuine experi¬
ence can only be dropped if a substitute is at hand, and it does
2
not seern that a substitute has been found." He prefers "ecstasy"




The original meaning of the word means "standing outside one¬
self", and no negation or destruction of reason is implied by
it} it means that the reason goes beyond its normal uses in the
1
overcoming of the subject-object structure. Reason is raised to
a more creative level in which the breach between theoretical
detachment and affective union is overcome. The vehicle of
revelation is an experience which has become charged \^ith a sense
2
of the depth and mystery of existence. Therefore revelation
consists, as J, Heywood Thomas puts it, in a whole constellation
of sign events grasped by ecstatic reason, conveying a sense of
3
ultimate concern,
Tillich also speaks of the ground of revelation, and here
he links up what he has to say with Otto's Idea of the Holy, The
ground is the threat of non-being, of ontological shock, the
mysterium tremenduin, the annihilating power of the divine presence,
over against the mysterium fascinosuiii. its elevating power, But
in revelation the power of non-being is conquered.
Should the question be raised as to where psychological
investigation can enter into Tillich's system of revelation, one
receives an ambivalent answer. On the one hand, Tillich welcomes
all scientific investigation as it protects revelation by
detecting the false; science, psychology and history are all alike,
1. Dorothy Emrnet in The Theology of Paul Tillich . p. 211
(ed. Kegley and Bretall)
2. ibid., p.211
3. J.H, Thomas, Paul Tillicht An Appraisal. p,50-l
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allies of theology. But on the other hand, psychology is unable
to Interfere with the knowledge of revelation. There appears to
be some confusion here} psychology can detect "bad" revelation,
but must say nothing about "good" revelation.
Finally, Tillich posits the Christian Church's claim of
Jesus Christ as the final unsurpassable, decisive fulfilling
revelation as "the bones of all Christian theology", which is
universally valid as it contains the criterion of every revel¬
ation."'' The history of revelation and the history of salvation
are one and the same thing, for salvation can only occur with a
2
correlation of revelation.
Regarding Tillich's statement about revelation, w^e have
already noticed the use of the existentialist vocabulary, and
many of the criticisms made in considering the existential
analysts are applicable, particularly the criticism that this
whole language of being is a return of metaphysics. In this
connection, David Jenkins has found the same tie in Tillich's
work which is to be found in Hegel, that link between reason and
the pure spirit of the cosmos, now being re-baptised under the
name of Being, which likewise appeals to reason; in this aspect
3
he regards Tillich as philosophically old-fashioned.
There is also the criticism from the standpoint of linguistic
philosophy made by A.C. Garnett who regards Tillich's views on
1. Tillich, Systematic Theology. p.l48
2. ibid., p.160
3. Guide to the Debate about God, p.89
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"being" as sheer error, springing from an elementary failure
to understand the logical function of the verb "to be". The
verb has a logical function, and even when used existentially
refers to nothing particular. One can also discern in Tillich
a tautology of "Being's beingness", as much as in Barth of
"God's godness",
There are other characteristics of Being which convey
themselves to us. Tillich's world of being is an almost static
world which has lost motion, and not the dynamic world of action
as in the Bible. Although he employs the word "ecstasy", there
is a lack of the real emotional disturbance which one finds in
the paradigmatic Biblical stories concerned with "original
revelation". The whole vocabulary of being is loaded with
nebulous ubiquity. Being, Ultimate Concern, Revelation, Ground of
Being, God, Essential Mystery, Depth of Vision, Mystery of Exist-
2
ence make one glorious "liquidized mishmash", and they all
cohere into a glutinous symbiosis. In fact, we have suggested
already that to get behind the subject-object structure one must,
in terms of psychological growth, return to the mother-infant
cocoon, the symbiosis of the nursing dyad, where the feeling is
"oceanic", undifferentiated and almost womb-like. The metaphors
which Tillich employs all seem to point in this direction. Now
the argument from origins is not an argument against religious
1. J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp.367 & 275
2. The phrase is not originalj it comes from Eric Ileaton,
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experience by any means, as we hope to show in the next section,
but this aspect of the employment of maternal symbols must be
noted* One value of* Tillich's approach lies in his not making
revelation something apart from the participator in the actual
experience *
Conclusions
This long digression on revelation has been regarded as
necessary at this stage of the enquiry because we have seen that
the word has been used so much in modern theological writing,
that if some of the claims made for it were taken as absolute,
then there would be no place for a psychodynamic enquiry such
t
as this. This position occupied by Barth, for example, who posits
a transcendent God as not only outside the categories of our
thought, but also outside our experience, so that nothing sig¬
nificant can be said about Him unless it were communicated to
us by Revelation, would rule this work out of court. I have
already shown why I cannot accept this contention,
Tillich, on the other hand, \irould claim that there are no
revealed doctrines such as Barth asserts, but only "revelatory
events and situations" which can evidently be described in
doctrinal termst he stresses that doctrines are meaningless if
separated from the revelatory situations out of which they have
grown, I regard, however, the term "revelatory situations" as
one which is already loaded* X much prefer the position of
H,D, Lewis. He too rejects the contentions of the dogmatic
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theologians, describing their theology as "a set of doctrines
abstracted from the context which first gave them significance
and presented as if they were meaningful in this way and final
in themselves,Of these theologies he says, "There is little
attempt at imaginative reconstruction of the situations and
experiences which prompted the pronoucements on which the doct-
2 3
rines are based," Dogma , declares Lewis, is derivative. But,
derivative of what, we may ask?
The answer would no doubt be the experience within the
situation or context. But when we come to the word "experience"
we encounter the same difficulties we met in Part One, Chapter VII,
when we looked at the idea of metaphysical thought as in Prof¬
essor Emmet's writings. She regarded the world "experience" as
essential and inescapable, but considered also that it presented
difficulties, e.g., that we cannot have "raw" experience, devoid
of interpretative categories for which we have used the term
4
"metaphysics from below". If we start from this experience which
already includes its "metaphysics from below" we may find it
necessary to interpret its full meaning and impact of the exper¬
ience by inferring the idea of God, as a necessary explanatory
construct. But God cannot be regarded as a mere construct, a part
of our metaphysics from below; once he is posited, he becomes
1. Philosophy of Religion, p.234
2. ibid,, p.235
3. ibid,, p.236
4. After Colin Williams, Faith in a Secular Age, p.42 footnote
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a part of a "metaphysics from above", for to posit God means that
we are faced with someone, something qualitatively different from
us, transcendent, existing in its own right, whose autonomy and
absolute character we have to acknowledge. This is what "God"
traditionally means.
I would maintain that for this to happen, some interpreta¬
tion or inference is required, so as to transform "experience"
into a "revelatory situation". Inferences and models are still
needed, are in fact indispensible for translating the significance
of this transcendent being, its relation to us and its intrinsic
nature. We are here in a situation like that described by Ian T.
1
Ramsey as "disclosures" , and that revelation is given in terms
of the language which the man of faith himself feeds into the
encounter or experience. In this way religion is no different
from science; neither is objective, but both depend on intuitions
of the human mind. Value-judgement is as necessary in one as in
the other. The mystery confronting us is extrapolated by means
of the models applied in order to understand it. But even then,
the man of faith realizes that "the other side" is not static,
to be explored without response; this "other side" is responding
and responsive.
What we have been trying to do is to spell out what Wheeler
Robinson was inferring when he spoke of the theology of revelation
1. Religion and Science, p.2k
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having for its counterpart or rather its necessary constituent,
the psychology of inspiration. He presented this as like two
sides of a coin; we have telescoped it outwards and filled in
what we regard as its essential meaning.
But if we saw that revelation depends on an intuitive value-
judgement, are we not opening the door to every kind of heresy,
which would have happened if Tillich had stuck to the phenomen-
ological approach of the Existentialists, and not changed it to
a critical phenomenology, including not only the intuitive-
2
descriptive element, but also the existential critical one?
Some safeguard to ¥heeler Robinson's theory seems to be required;
For example, does it square with the consensus of opinion as
held? Can it be fitted into an already existing and meaningful
tradition? Or can it satisfy Dodd's test that the thing received
by revelation works creatively in human life? Or by what Ramsey
3
calls "empirical fit"? But even then, if the other side of
revelation is an intuitive evaluation by the recipient, would
this not reduce theology to the status of value-judgements,
which men have found meaningful in the past, thereby founding
a tradition which has eventually been given an objective status?
This was Ritschl's contention in the last century. Even if we
admit this, we again encounter the further question, as to where
1. Revelation and Inspiration in the Old Testament, p.173
2. J, Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillicht An Appraisal, p.28
3. Models and Mystery, p.17
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psychodynamic evaluations can enter into this matter. I believe
that the evaluations must enter in between the experience from
which the revelation has been inferred and the theologizing
which begins about it, as the psychodynamics themselves were
present in the experience, I do not believe that we can ever
move straight from experience to theology. "All religious situ¬
ations may be said to be a matter for psychology since they are
obviously owned by and experienced by religious men.As
indicated in the Introduction, this is the position to which we
wish to adhere throughout this whole enquiry.
The moment, however, we admit psychodyanmics as an ingredient
in revelation, we are up against the fact that part of the
mystery which confronts man may lie in himself, in the large
unconscious, unrecognized parts of himself with which the self-
he-knows (his ego) has to deal. Is what he has regarded as wholly-
other, God in his majesty transcending man? Or, is it only his
own super-ego, who, like Don Giovanni*s statue of The Commanda-
tore,is rising up against him? Should we, like Freud, regard
Kant•s moral law and the starry heavens as nothing else than his
over-large super-ego? Here we have two models dealing with
similar experiences, both of which are significant to some people.
In this whole discussion I have employed the term "revel¬
ation", lai^gely disregarding the strictures of Downing that it
is an inappropriate term. However, I would emphasise again a
1, Ramsey, Religious Language, p.2k
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fundamental psychological objection to the Aise of the concept,
in that in providing men with an Absolute, it grants an infall-
iability which can then afford the opportunity to exercise
omnipotent thought, through an alliance on this infallible
revelation, and an identification Avith it. No doubt this is the
result of that condition described by Buri that revelational
theology "manifests an all too human confidence in itself."*'
That revelation is its own criterion is an independent claim
which is unsupported by other arguments from outside theology,
but it certainly supports the many who wish to identify with it!
Those whose Acritings appeal throughout to infallibilities attract
certain personalities; but they also lay themselves open to the
criticisms of Freudianisrn. To speak of any closed system, and to
defend it by regarding criticism as invalid and inappropriate,
is again to the psychodynamically trained an indication of a
defence system, having very likely an origin in anxiety. Is not
Barthianism an ansAver to Kier^kegaardian "Angst" ? One may be
able to prove the position philosophically and justify it; but
to place oneself beyond normal criticism again demonstrates the
defensive and brittle nature of this concept.
One could accept that revelation as a concept could be
valid if it were based on an experience in which one evaluated
that God was present, and gave good reasons for it, Avhich were
acceptable to others, even if the experience itself Acere not
1, Christian Faith in Our Time,p.52
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communicable. But once the idea of infallibility enters in,
neurosis slides in with it; for it is as a candlelight to all
the insecure, who, like moths, fly to its alluring flame. I
believe that theology must return to the position stated by
John Oman, in which he claimed that we cannot argue any more
from an a priori of infallibility, for "there is no more any
infallible authority left on which to build, at least in openness
of mind and with a sense of reality.""*"
Modern man will choose to use from many models to interpret
his own experiences and to reinterpret the older experiences in
order that they may have fresh meaning for him in his present
day. Which is the appropriate model to use? This will depend
on no infallible outside authority, but on the "empirical fit"
and on the authority people are willing to give to it, always
bearing in mind that "truth can only rest securely on the witness
2
of the reality to itself." To abandon infallibilities is the
only honest position this enquiry can adopt, even though it may
offer for a time no resting place.
We conclude therefore that we are unable to regard Revelation
as autonomous; it is a derived concept, derived from situations
and experiences to which psychodynamic models could equally well
be applied. We must note that it is unfortunate therefore that
so many Old Testament scholars should employ this term, which we
1. Grace and Personality, p.8
2. ibid., p.vili
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regard as neither necessary nor justified.
Revelation, therefore, need not stand in the way of
our enquiry.
CHAPTER IV
PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTION AND ITS ORIGINS
In our consideration of Freudian criticisms of monotheism
in Chapter I of this section, we noted that most of the writers
were unacquainted with Biblical (in this case, with Old Testa¬
ment) studies, and we sought to remedy this deficiency by
presenting a summary of them ourselves. This is turn led us to
consider the concept of Revelation which appeared to play a
large part in these studies, and being an autonomous concept,
appeared also to stand in the way of further enquiry. In the
last chapter we sought to show why we could consider this
evaluation of Revelation as unfounded, and that the enquiry
could proceed.
However, there was a second factor to be noted in the writings
of the Freudian school in relation to religion, namely that
their arguments always contrived to lead to a reductionist
conclusion. In the Introduction to this whole enquiry, we stated
that reduction was not our prime purpose. However, we have now
arrived at the place where this assertion must be spelled out
in greater detail; we must therefore deal with the problem of
reduction in as radical a way as we dealt with the problem of
Revelation, J-t is impossible to proceed with the general line of
enquiry without making our position clear on this vital matter.
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1. THE RELEVANCE OF FEUERBACH
The type of argument which Freud used in his writings on
religion was by no means original} it had been previously deployed
with great skill by Ludwig Feuerbach who is regarded as the
principal "reductionist" of all time. His contributions and
particularly his book,The Essence of Christianity, are often
quoted by theological writers, but are usually dismissed in a
short paragraph or sentence; seldom are they dealt -with at any
great length. Interest in Feuerbach has increased of late by
the writings of Earth on this thinker,"*" and by a recent paper¬
back edition of The Essence of Christianity, to which Barth
writes an introduction.^
Feuerbach claimed that religion is the dream of the human
mind; the super-human and objective God is nothing else than a
product and reflex of the human mind, and is the expression of
the subjective nature of feeling made objective, purified and
freed from conditions and limitations of human nature•
"The yearning of man after something above himself
is nothing else than the longing after the perfect
type of his nature, the yearning to be free from
himself, i.e., from the limits and defects of his
individuality,
In the first part of his book, Feuerbach is concerned to
1. From Rousseau to Ritschl, p.255f*
2. The following quotations will be taken from this edition. Prior
to securing it, I referred to a copy printed in the last
century, from a well known theological library. I had to cut
the pages to read it!
3.ibid., p.281, Appendix.
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prove directly that theology is nothing less than anthropology.
Man can never get beyond his true nature, and can never get
loose from his species; the "positive final predicates" as
Feuerbach calls them, are always qualities drawn from his own
nature and projected. But in religion what we find is that
consciousness of the object and self-consciousness coincide.
He cites St Augustine to support his contention:-
"God is nearer, more related to us, and therefore
more easily known by us, than sensible, corporeal
things." (i)e Geriesi ad litteram. l.v.c. 16)1
Feuerbach himself writes:-
"Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and
soul; and conversely, God is the manifested inward
nature, the expressed self of a man."2
Religion therefore is man's earliest and also indirect form of
self knowledge; the attributes of the divine nature inform us of
the attributes of human nature. Feuerbach argues that when man
denies goodness in himself, it is not lost; it is projected on
to the deity. This process makes for disunity of man, because
the supposed "opposites" of himself are to be found in the deity,
abstracted from himself. Everything is placed in God "excepting
3
that alone which it despises." "What man praises and approves,
that is God to him; what he blames, condemns, is the non-divine."
It is interesting to note that this point has been taken up
in recent times by Erich Froiura, who writes: "The more perfect God





becomes, the more imperfect becomes man. He projects the best
he has on to God, and thus impoverishes himself,""'" Fromra argues,
as does Feuerbach, that by thus projecting his most valuable
powers on to God, man has become alienated from himself. Every¬
thing he has no\>r of value is in God and there is nothing of
value in him. Hence in \<rorshipping God, man is trying to get in
touch with a part of himself which he has lost through project¬
ion,
Feuerbach describes the building up of God's nature by man
as follows:-
"Man - this is the mystery of religion - projects
his being into objectivity, and then again makes
himself an object to this projected image of himself
thus converted into a subjecti he thinks of himself
as an object to himself, but as the object of an
object, of another being than himself."^
He compares this to the systole and diastole in the action of
the blood through the arteries and veins,
"In the religious systole man propels his own nature
from himself, he throws himself outward: in the
religious diastole he receives the rejected nature
into his heart again."3
Feuerbach returns again and again to the disuniting of man
from himself which is accomplished when he sets God in antithesis
to himself, God is infinite, man finite, God perfect and eternal,
man imperfect and temporal: God almighty and holy, man weak and
1. Psychoanalysis and Religion, p.50
2. ibid., p.29-30
3. ibid,, p.31» This process is very similar to projection and
introjection as described by Klein.
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sinful. All this differencing of man and God with which religion
begins is a differencing of man with his own nature,
"What man praises and approves, that is God to himj
what he blames and condemns is the non-divine."-'"
God as a metaphysical being is nothing else than these good
attributes made absolute. It is natural, therefore, that he
2
should resolve metaphysics into psychology.
The idea of God as an absolutely perfect moral being, whose
nature is made so difference from ours, is, of course, nothing
else than the moral nature of man posited as an absolute being,
but also because he is thereby distanced from us, the chasm
between ourselves and his being is disspiriting. Again, we can
see how Feuerbach foreshadows present-day teachings, in the Flugel
3
interpretation of ego-superego relations in terms of "distancing",
Feuerbach would reduce all theology to pathology, anthropo¬
logy and psychology. In certain aspects Feuerbach comes very near
to Freud on the idea of omnipotent thought, Feuerbach says that
in the personality of God, man concentrates the supernaturalness,
immortality, independence, unlimitedness of his own personality}
whereas Freud would have said/by postulating the idea of God,a
means was found whereby omnipotent thought could continue, which
makes x-eligion an illusion, Feuerbach defines omnipotence as
"subjectivity exempting itself from all objective conditions and
1, Feuerbach, ibid., p.97
2, ibid., p.4o footnote
3, See Flugel in the previous discussion. Man, Morals and Society,
pp. 6?-8, 220, 282. "
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limitations, and concentrating this exemption as their highest
power and reality."^" "Providence" is also likewise "reduced"
to the projection by man of the infinite value of his own
existence; belief in a providential God is nothing else than
the belief in human dignity.
He accuses religious dogma of inverting the natural order
of things, for man unconsciously and involuntarily creates God
in his own image, and after this God consciously and voluntarily
creates man in his own image. Prayer, Love, Heaven, The Trinity,
all are likewise subjected to this reductionist process of the
"nothing-else-than" argument. He concludes Part One of the book
with these words!-
"Our most essential task is now fulfilled. We have
now reduced the supermundane, supernatural and super¬
human nature of God to the elements of human nature
as its fundamental elements. Our process of analysis
has brought us again to the position with which we
set out. The beginning, middle and end of religion
is MAN."2
The second part of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity
which forms the indirect proof that theology is anthropology,
contains many repetitions of his former arguments. However, there
3
is a short chapter on Revelation which he describes as the
concept regarded by many as the culminating point of religious
objectivism. It is naturally deduced" to the self-determination
of man, "only that between himself the determined, and himself




the determiner, he interposes an object - God, a distinct being,
God is the medium by which man brings about the reconciliation
of himself with his own nature.""'' Therefore in revelation, "man
goes out of himself in order, by a circuitous path, to return to
2
himself." To Feuerbach, this is a striking confirmation of the
position that the secret of theology is nothing else than anth¬
ropology. When he says that man "must separate from himself that
which gives him moral laws, and place it in opposition to himself,
3
as a distinct personal being,"he comes very near to the Freudian
contention that God is nothing but a projected super-ego. Again,
when he says that the being of God is man's own being, and he
adds that "what presents itself before thy consciousness is
simply what lies behind it", he is coming very close to Freud's
unconscious imputation for belief in God.
We could continue quoting from Feuerbach's theory and dis¬
cussing it, but one final quotation must suffice:-
"The essence of religion, its latent nature, is the
identity of the divine being with the human; but the
form of religion, or its apparent conscious nature,
is the distinction between them."4
Karl Barth is one who recommends his students to know their
Feuerbach, but one gathers that it is only for the negative value
it provides, Feuerbach, Barth admits, is a great thinker, yet






and his theory a "platitude"! Earth claims that he practised
anti-theology, which does not touch faith, and pays too little
attention to man's wickedness - "we are all evil head to foot" -
and to the fact that we must die.^" Earth gives the warning that
Feuerbach demonstrates the logical outcome of any theology
which begins with man's subjective states, whatever form they may
take. However, we must assert that there is all the difference
between beginning with subjective states and Earth's procedure
of completely disregarding them, at least as far as his early
writing is concerned,^
2. "NOTHING ELSE THAN" ?
What then can we say of the Freud-Feuerbach ideas of God
being "nothing else than" aspects of man which are "projected"?
In the first place, we cannot retreat into that defensive
position in which each discipline has its own models standing
in their own right. In theology, it is argued that as the object
concerning the study is God, theological categories are approp¬
riate and psychological ones are inappropriate. Vice versa in
psychology, psychological models are appropriate and theological
ones are inappropriate. This attitude was ruled out in advance
by the very nature of this enquiry.
1. From Rousseau to Ritschl, p.360. Also Introductory Essay to
Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p.x-xxx,
2. Earth does, however, speak of "The-anthropology" in a later
writing, claiming that the abstract doctrine of God has no
place in the Christian realm, only a doctrine of commerce
and communion between God and man. See The Humanity of God.p.9
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We can, however, accept the guarded position of Jung, to
which in practice he does not always strictly adhere. It is that
psychology cannot make any statement about the absolute exist¬
ence or non-existence of God, nor about the reality of God's
being or about theological conceptions based on faith, as these
realities lie outside the realm of pscyhology; to say anything
about them would be overstepping the boundaries. However, we can
study and consider man's ideas and conceptions of God, as these
form the proper study of psychology,^"
This means that Feuerbach and Freud with their "nothing
else than" projectionist arguments claiming to give a complete
reduction of the God of faith without remainder, which amounts
to a virtual debunking of theological assertions, are claiming
for themselves that which is logically impossible. The trans¬
cendent God can exist independently of such arguments and is
not touched by any of theia.
If then we confine ourselves to man's ideas of God, we
would need to admit that theological models hold complete sway
in the Old Testament, as all the descriptions appear in terms
of them. Now many of the phenomena described under such models
could equally well be investigated by psychodynarnic models, which
we now possess, and can be understood in terms of them. To do
this would mean that we would have two sets of models relating
to the same phenomena, and that each would render some insights.
1, We shall discuss this fully in Part Three.
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1
Alston admits that between the two systems of religion and
psychology there are certain surface similarities, but that this
is not evidence of a causal connection, but at best "furnishes
a clue". We are not, however, seeking to establish causal
connections; we are claiming that two kinds of models can be
applied to the same phenomena, and that we will choose the one
which is the most significant to us. The very fact of choosing,
however, means that the autonomy of the theological model is
broken by the fact that whenever the use of a model other than
the theological one is preferred, certain concessions have to be
made from the area of theological description.
One can foresee objections to this procedure on the grounds
that the choice is subjective. Theologians, however, have become
accustomed to changes in outlook, because they have been subject¬
ively convinced of the validity of the operation of other models
in spheres traditionally regarded as the exclusive province of
theology. We are now adjusted to the impact of nineteenth
century scientific thought on Biblical views. The Bible knew
nothing of the concept of natural law, of cause and effect,
without which we find it impossible to understand much phenomena.
We do not think that God, by independent action,makes his sun to
2
rise and to set each day, as did the men of the Bible. Likewise,
the Church has had to adjust its thinking regarding the doctrine
1. Faith and the Phllosphers. p.72
2. X follow Wheeler Robinson in this.
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of creation, owing to the impact of the teaching of evolution
on Genesis, Faith in a Creator is still held, but understood no
longer in the old way. For some the doctrine is all the more
enriched and to be wondered at, because of the concessions made
on the one hand, and the incorporation of scientific thinking on
the other, A similar adjustment in our times comes through the
demythologizing work of Bultmann, Even if the total concept is
not accepted, no doubt his views on the cosmology of the Bible
are. And to anticipate a matter which will be detailed later in
this chapter, a further adjustment may be required in relation
to the projectionist attitude of the scripture writers and the
introjectionist attitude of our times.
Adjustments to traditional positions are always resisted
by those more orthodox and fundamentalist thinkers who tend to
be prohibitionist. Some theologians who strongly object to a
psychological enquiry being made into the sphere of religion,
and in particular that of Freud who equated the super-ego and
God, are nevertheless perfectly capable of going on to speak of
God employing super-ego terms, as if he were "nothing else than"
super-ego.^ It is our contention that these adjustments must
continue to be made, for it is in the nature of modern man to
view the Biblical material in terms of the models with which he
is acquainted, and which he habitually uses as significant for
1, Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics. Cf, pp.223 & 125.
Further examples will be given in Part Three.
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understanding other phenomena in life. Theology cannot ask that
this practice be abandoned. The conclusion is therefore that we
can no longer proceed straight from what the Bible says to
theologizing, without making some prior adjustments;any theo¬
logy which short-circuits these other enquiries does so at its
peril.
In writing of the theology of the Old Testament we have
already referred to Norman Porteous1 quotation: "the nature of
that supernatural power which theology identifies by using the
name of God. However, not only -was "the supernatural" identi¬
fied in this manner; many aspects of life were embraced within
this concept, both the known and the unknown, both those aspects
of life which were understood and those which appeared mysterious.
One such phenomenon would be that mental function or pattern to
which Freud gave the name of super-ego; even although it is part
of man's inind, it possesses that quality of standing over against
and outside of man, as objective to him. One can ask therefore
where else could the ancient Hebrews with their limited cate¬
gories of thought find a place for this function except within
the concept of God? This means that the Biblical conception of
God could contain the super-ego; hoxtfever, this is very different
from saying that the super-ego could take over the total concept
of God and explain it without remainder.
1. New Peake Commentary, p.151, col.ii
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3. ORIGINS AND EXPLAINING-AWAY
The argument from origins need not be an argument of
"explaining-away". For example, we have seen that when Tillich
and the Existentialists speak of being and ground-of-being, they
are using a maternal or aren a womb symbol. When Roraain Rolland
questioned Freud about the basic religious experience of "oceanic"
feeling, as genuine mystical experience, Freud was quite right
to answer that it was a survival of ego feeling from infancy,
when the mother-child symbiotic "cocoon" was the prime mode of
human awareness. It would be wrong to follow Freud and to assume
that knowledge of the origin of such an experience destroys its
validity. All that this tells us is that this earlier experience
is being utilized in the service of religious faith. Similarly
Schleiermacher*s "Feeling of Absolute Dependence" is an obvious
example of a relationship which had its origins in the dependent
state of childhood, H.H, Farmer's "Absolute Demand" and "Final
Succour" are models whose psychodynamic origins lie in the early
relations of the child to the parents - usually the father and
mother respectively; these models being extended by the qualifiers
"absolute" and "final", I think therefore that Farmer is wrong
2
when in his Gifford Lectures he makes the claim that there
are objective factors in religion which he names "substantival"
itfhich are distinctive in that they have to do with God's active
1, Civilization and its Discontents, p.7-9
2, Reason and Revelation,p.l66f.
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self-disclosure and are sui generis religious, over against
"adjectival" factors which deal with man's needs and can be
satisfied apart from the religious consciousness, but which,
nevertheless, can be taken up and used by religion, so that
fulfilment is provided by religion. Ve hope to have shown that
this distinction is false, and that all types of religious
experience have their origin in partly non-religious sources in
early childhood. Religion re-captures, retrieves as well as
utilizes and employs these earlier experiences, which originally
had different objects from those which the individual now encoun¬
ters. Man has religious experiences, but they are not exclusively
religious. Saying this may involve some necessary concession to
Freudian theory, e.g., acknowledging value in his idea of the
"return of the repressed", but this is not the same as making
the experiences invalid. To claim that these expressions concern¬
ing God and the experiences behind them have psychological origins
and are hot distinctively religious in origin, is not necessarily
an argument against religion, but can be one for it, in the sense
that religious faith deals with the very stuff of our human
nature. The earlier experiences are preparatory for the later
experiences which are associated with religion. If religion did
not use these fundamental experiences, it would cease to be the
force it is.
We have seen that Freud was quite wrong to assert that
knowledge of the origin of an experience, in fact explains it away.
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We agree with Alston, who said that even if theistic belief
can be shown to be causally determined, this does not furnish
1
any evidence against theistic belief. Causal origin is one
2 M
thing and episteraological status is another. We could be per¬
verse and quote Freudian theory which postulates that intellect¬
ual pursuits have their origin in the sexual inquisitiveness
and curiosity of children towards their parents, and we could
go on to draw the logical conclusion that these pursuits are
thereby invalidated because of their early emotional origin.
But Freud himself regarded the intellect as the means of man's
salvation. His concept of maturity was such that the intellect
would be in control and that one would then be able to appreci¬
ate reality without suffering from the disturbing distortions of
emotion; but this is in fact giving primacy to one fundamental
experience which had its origin in childhood activity, Freud
never applies his "nothing else than" argument against intell¬
ectual activity as he does against religion. Rieff regarded
these latter arguments as Freud•s own animus sanctified as
science, the reductive weapon of psychoanalysis being employed
3
with open hostility. Religion for some may be the satisfaction
of infantile wishes, but could not the same be said of some
intellectual pursuits?
1. Faith and the Philosphers, p.85
2. ibid., p.89
3. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of the Moralist, p.268, Cf, Victor White,
God and the Unconscious,p.64."An obsession of humanity or
not, religion was certainly an obsession with Freud."
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John Macmurray says something similar} having conceded the
point to Freud that religion could be a projection of a child's
experience of family life he addss-
"There is plenty of illusory religion; but that does
not prove that religion is illusory, but simply that^
he (Freud) believes in science but not in religion,"
The indiscriminate use of the "nothing-else-than" and
"nothing but" arguments if pursued to their conclusion would
land us in a situation in which even the arguments employed
would themselves become invalidated,
4. A NOTE ON PROJECTION
A further word is needed regarding the wide and indiscrim¬
inate use of the term "projection" in the writings of Feuerbach
and Freud.
Melanie Klein has taught us that projection along with
introjection are two basic mechanisms for the upbuilding of the
ego, and are the means whereby the child discovers the world, so
projection has a "respectable" use! The txtfo processes go hand in
hand. Our age is one in which man has recalled some of his former
projections; and there is an emphasis on introjection. For example,
xve do not speak of demon possession, but of mental illness. We
are introspective, inner-directed people; our inhibition on
metaphysics on a grand scale and the reluctant permitting of a
limited "metaphysics-from-be 1oiir" all testify to the general
Persons in Relation, p.155
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orientation. By contrast the Bible comes from a world where
projection was emphasised to the extent of its being an accepted
model of expression. Our empirical, scientific approach has
destroyed the "screen" on to which man formerly projected his
innermost thoughts. Keeping the same metaphor, we are forced to
examine the slides in the limited space of the disused, unlit,
projector. As indicated in the Introduction to this whole enquiry,
we must apply the various critiques and bear the risk of trans¬
forming the Biblical ways of speaking of God. However, we must
also assert that even although this happens to be necessary,
owing to our introspecting and introjecting all the time, the
fact of a transcendent God existing in his own right is, episte-
mologically, not imperilled by such arguments.
5. PSYCHODYNAMICS AND THE FINDINGS OF
OLD TESTAMENT SCHOLARSHIP
I wish now to take up the findings of present day Old Testa¬
ment scholarship as outlined in Chapter II of this section, and
to apply to them the criticisms which psychoanalysis suggests,
excluding, however, Freud's myth from Totem and Taboo.
We begin with a consideration of The Covenant Relationship
which Eichrodt regarded as the fundamental concept of the whole
Old Testament, In this relationship between unequals , the greater
partner imposes the conditions, and the lesser partner has to
obey them. Only the lesser partner can be in the wrong, and by
his disobedience he is guilty; the greater partner can never be
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in the wrong. The psychodynaraics underlying this relationship
xvrould be explained by those of the depressive position (as
described by Klein), The small child is set over against the
parent; when things frustrate the child, he, due to omnipotence
of thought, feels that he is responsible for the state of anxiety
with which he has to cope. He cannot regard the pai-ehts as "bad",
for they are his providers and he cannot do without them, as
he depends completely upon them for his welfare, Wrong must
reside within himself, and he must do something about the matter
to put it right. The child can accomplish the reduction of
anxiety by various means - acts of restitution or reparation,
confession of his own faults, or the bearing of the infliction
of some punishment. The ideal state for the child is that of
oneness with the parent, but in the depressive position, it is
not achieved by a symbiosis, but by the child, who does what he
regards as the will of the parent, so that he is not disobedient.
Some of these methods were ritualized in the Old Testament by
the sacrificial cultus which coped with the anxieties generated
in such situations; also explained by this position, is the
interpretation of the disasters of life as a form of divine
punishment j and the idea expressed in Jeremiah 22,16, that of
knowing God means carrying out His will. Whenever the parental
injunctions are internalized in super-ego form, obedience can
effect a union between ego and super-ego, which enables the
1. Flugel's Polycrates Complex.
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anxiety engendered by the super-ego to be mastered.
In this way The Covenant Relationship can be understood as
the retention by ritualization or codification of a fundamental
experience of childhood, which in later life permits the return
of repressed material now being projected outwards by the individ
ual on to "God", The parent, as seen by the child, has been intro
jected along with some of the child's aggression and then repress
ed, and so contributes to the formation of the super-ego} it is
later projected on to God as a return of the repressed. The
Covenant in the Old Testament therefore was a means of maintain¬
ing the depressive position as the fundamental one{ as the child'
link yith its parent lies in obedience to the parent's will
(which later comes to be at one with what the super-ego desires
of the ego) a sense of guilt comes about through disobedience.
The child thinks that as only parents can annul the relationship
between them - for the child is too weak and dependent to act
freely in this manner - similarly only God can annul the Covenant
"If you do not obey His will, God will withdraw His love and you
will have to face his judgement and punishment in the disasters
of life" would be regarded by psychoanalytical critique as
"nothing else than" the return in adulthood of the repressed
basic feelings of the depressive position in childhood, and the
maintenance of that position as basic and fundamental.
We also saw in the relationship between Israel and Yahweh
that both worshipper and Deity can partake of very different
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qualities; whether the Deity happened to be near or distanced -
pleasantly near, unpleasantly distanced. The notion of God in
the Old Testament is by no means consistent; it oscillates from
the closeness of the loving-kindness of God to the distanced
jealous God who visits his people with disasters and plagues.
At times it can be so close that man's relations with God can be
expressed best by a personal model, in circumstances where the
Covenant notion can be dropped; at other times, the relationship
can be with one who is a Legislator of the Law of Israel, but
who is a Wholly-Other, Utterly Transcendent Being. When Eichrodt
speaks of God as "The Guardian of Justice and the Keeper of Laws"^",
who shows his anger towards human sinfulness, we are in a less
intimate relationship. Psychoanalysis would describe these
oscillations as being due to a projection of the empirical
"distance" between the ego and the super-ego, and the quality of
relationship they enjoy with one another, as explained by Flugel's
distancing theory.
The concept of hesedh would likewise be explained as the
recreation and capitalization in experience of the closest
possible relation of mother and child after their separation
from the symbiosis at the beginning of life, as the benign
2
influence of the mother on super-ego formation,
1. Eichrodt, p.259
2. Freud spoke much of the influence of fathers, but made less ref¬
erence to that of mothers. Bowlby in Child Care and the Growth
of Love shifted the emphasis to the mother as the fundamental
influence on children's characters and personalities. A recent
study on the role of fathers is that of R.G, Andry who in,
Delinquency and Parental Pathology, demonstrated that paternal
deprivation was a fundamental one in the production of delin¬
quents, although the supremacy of the man's role was a quest¬
ionable one.
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On the other hand, the wrath of God would be explained not
merely as the internalized anger of parents, but as due to the
quality of the super-ego being affected by the innate aggression
of the child, projected outwards towards the parent and then re-
introjected. Holiness and separateness would be seen as the
child * s feelings towards his father, who both over-awes and
fascinates the child, whom the child, nevertheless, wishes to
emulate and be like, which would explain the ethical quality of
1
Israel's conception of holiness. The other attributes of God,
such as omnipotence, omniscience, providential care, etc,, would
be explained as an analogy of the small child's view of his
2
parents and of his feelings towards them. When Eichrodt attempts
to hold together the diverse and disparate views of God, this
would be regarded as "nothing but" the achievements of the
depressive position. In the quotation from Archbishop Sjbderblora
about the abyss of despair, we would have left the depressive
position in which most of the Old Testament is orientated for
the schizoid position, with its basic feelings of Angst, which
has been ably described by both Fairbairn and R.D, Laing in
psychology, and by Spren Kierkegaard in philosophy. Here the gulf
between man and God has become so great that personal relations
1. R.S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p,127f Your Growing Child
and Religion, p,58} Ernest Jones,'The God Complex' in
Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, p.211 suggests a repressed
death-wish as the origin, but this we do not accept,
2. A1s ton, p,72
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cease to operate at all, and the individual is isolated with
his fears and anxieties, so as to be in a state of "non-being".
We have not yet considered the achievements of the Covenant
Religion, The imposition of a common law,whenever this was done,
which led to national unity, is not a specifically religious
concept; it belongs properly to sociology or social psychology,
and parallels can be found in our own times of this taking place
without religion, (For example, in the countries which have had
Communism imposed upon them, and have developed a pattern of
life and form of civilization as a result of common allegiance
to a universal set of codes.) Universal codes and laws appeal
to the super-ego structure of man's mind, and as Freud pointed
out, they help him to make the necessary instinctual renunciations
2
for the sake of order and coherence. All man's achievements
are, however, double-edged, and if the super-ego is used to
excess, it can be as damaging to psychic health as the very forces
it was brought into being to control, A menacing super-ego is
as detrimental to man as instinctual domination; in a similar
way, a jealous, punishing, controlling God or a stern set of
1. We need existentialist language to describe this state;
Freudian language describes the depressive position
adequately; this is why we tend to rely more on Freud for
the elucidation of the psychodynamics behind the Old Testa¬
ment, There is a decided affinity between Freud the Jew
and the faith of his fathers. In some way, Freudianism
is almost a secular Judaism!
2. Moses and Monotheism. p.l66f.
360
Laws of God are as damaging to full religious faith as spiritual
anarchy. ^
The other great achievement is that which was used by von
Rad as his central concept, namely "Saving History". The Hebrews
certainly did have this "remarkable interior attitude to history."
Psychoanalysis would perhaps explain this phenomenon as due to
the passing-down of the super-ego from generation to generation;
or by the extension of it in time whereby a tradition came to
be established in which the projected internal super-ego was a
constant factor under the name of Yahweh, the Lord of history.
The above suggests how arguments used by psychoanalysis,
in its reduction of the Old Testament religion as being "nothing
else than" psychology, could be pursued. However, we are not
committed to this viewpoint; reductionism is not our aim, our
ends are not prescribed. Nevertheless, the above discussion
demonstrates how far the parent faith of Christianity deployed
the super-ego in its belief and practices, and how great was
the investment of the super-ego in that faith. This, however,
is not saying that faith in Yahweh could be reduced to "nothing
else than" super-ego. The Hebrew concept of deity was an omnibus
one, in the sense that it embraced all that was mysterious as
much that was not, and this would involve much more than super¬
ego. The super-ego, however, was one of its most vital components.
1. The Torah, however, was much more than merely controlling
laws; Deuteronomy excels in humanitarianisrn and concern
for the weak; yet the exercise of such high ethics involves
a renunciation of instincts, as mentioned by Freud.
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To demonstrate our own position, we would now turn to
examine certain key passages in the Old Testament for the
elucidation of the employment of super-ego characteristics.
CHAPTER V
PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORIES APPLIED TO THE OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES
PARADIGMATIC PASSAGES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
In the last chapter we have seen how the psychodynamic
critique can be applied to the Old Testament, and how the
super-ego emerges as playing a significant role in the religious
practices and the beliefs held. We have seen how many aspects
of Old Testament theology, far from being only comprehensible
in the terms of a theological model, can also be understood in
a non-theological manner, through the employment of a psycho-
dynamic model.
Our purpose, however, is neither to prove nor disprove
reductionist theories and so arrive eventually at a reduction¬
ist conclusion, or its opposite, but to ascertain what part
psychodynamics, and in particular the super-ego, have played in
the concept of monotheism. To demonstrate our own point of view,
we would now turn to certain paradigmatic passages or incidents
in the Old Testament.
Our approach to the Old Testament will be different from
that of most of the scholars we have considered. In his critic¬
isms of their approach, James Barr, we have seen, felt that the
Biblical dogmatic scholars cte-pended far too much on individual
words and their meaning, and did not look at the larger units
of scripture; also they neglected the subjective, psychological
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factors involved. H.D. Lewis also contended that there was
little attempt to reconstruct imaginatively the situations and
experiences. To the Old Testament scholars all that seemed to
matter was the theological content, with a corresponding tendency
which suggested that psychology is of no import in the Biblical
stories.
We wish to emphasise the subjective, psychological aspects
of the larger units and will risk the use of imagination and
intuition in the reconstruction of background to the stories
and passages. We regard the following selected incidents as
paradigmatic, in the sense that thy possess a large frame of
reference, and in the hope that they can be understood in the
light of psychodynamics as well as of theology.
1. ADAM AND EVE
We have already remarked that Christian theologians have
used this story in much the same way as Freud used his myth in
Totem and Taboo, as a causal explanation of man's condition, and
not as a mythical description of it. Another way to interpret
the story is in the light of Christ, where the lost perfection
of the first Adam is defined over against the perfection of the
second Adam.^" This involves some reading back into the story to
make it available for Christian use, so that the story does not
stand in its own right.
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol.11, p.82
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If, however, the story is looked at as a mythological
descriptive account of the present condition of man, it can then
be seen as the source of the richest of psychological truths.
Most psychodynamic writers regard the story as a description of
the normal process of the infant's growth to self-awareness;
the state of innocence refers either to the period of the womb,
with birth being represented by the driving out of the Garden}
or by extending the first period to include early infancy to the
syrabioses of the early idyllic condition of being free from
anxiety and guilt, having no ethical reponsibility at all, and
the driving from the Garden being the birth of self-consciousness
with its accompanying anxiety and guilt, "Work" in the story
X
represents the facing of reality,
R.S. Lee, however, draws attention to the inversion in the
story of the actual facts, for knowledge of good and evil is
the result of being born (others would say of maturing to self-
consciousness) and not the cause of it, Lee attributes this to
the fact that the many strands from the unconscious which lie
together in the myth have been worked over afterwards by conscious
minds to present logical coherence. Von Rad might support such a
contention, "The Fall", says Lee, "is not something subsequent
2
to the acquisition of a moral sense; it is a precondition of it,"
To Lee, as a Freudian, this acquisition of moral sense goes hand
1. Lee, Freud and Christianity, p.102f,jRollo May, Man's Search
for Himself, p.180-191
2. Lee, ibid., p.l6l
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in hand with the formation of the super-ego and resolution of
the Oedipus Complex,
Rollo May raises the same question as to why ethical
responsibility is depicted in the myth as happening against the
will and commandment of God, and gives as the reason that the
God in question is a jealous God, Similarly, Erich Fromm would
agree, God is jealous of man's becoming equal with him, for he is
concerned all the time with hi3 own superior role,^ Neither of
these writers accepts the Fall as a fall, Fromm, who divides
religion into authoritarian and humanistic types, cannot regard
unwillingness to submit to a higher power, thereby to know right
from wrong, as a sin; the true fall is man's "alienation from
himself, his submission to power, his turning against himself,
2
even although under the guise of his worship of God," May, on
the other hand, would agree with Hegel that it was a Fall upwards,
3
a necessary prerequisite for virtue and morality,
Xt is clear that this element of man's being blamed for
knowledge of right from wrong is an obstacle to the understanding
of the myth, I do not think that R.S, Lee's contention solves
the problem. One thinker who is able to work from the myth as it
is, is John Wren-Lewis as in his Gunning Lectures at New College
^ 4
Edinburgh in 1963* He looked on this aspect of the myth, not as
!• Psychoanalysis and Religion, p,42
2, ibid,, p,52
3, Rollo May, ibid,, p.180
4, See also Psychoanalysis Observed, p,103f
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an acquisition of the knowledge of good and evil, but as a
misapplication of that knowledge, which was a means of breaking
the integrity of the moral life. Due to the natural impulses
being cut off from love and becoming dominated by anxiety, the
two involved, Adam and Eve, put up defences of a moralistic kind
and began to recriminate one another in a "blame-game". This leads
to their expulsion from love and interrelatedness to a life of
unrestrained aggression, which Wren-Lewis finds symbolized in
the angel with the flaming s%*rord. "Moralizing is the one
absolutely certain way for human spontaneity and creativity to
destroy itself,
However, the change in man's subjective condition, i.e.,
of how Adam viewed Eve and vice-versa, leads to a change in
their perception of the divinity. God's nature changed simultan¬
eously by what they did, and in the way they regarded one another.
At the beginning of the story God is near, centred, according
to Wren-Lewis, in the ground of being, and walks in the Garden
as a friend; but when they are governed by anxiety and relying
on moral defences, God is no longer near, but like the angel of
the flaming sword is made in man's image and projected "out
there"5 he is more powerful and more moral than they themselves
have tried to be; he has become for them the awful father. God
2 r




lectures referred to, Wren-Lewis quoted Canon Edward Carpenters
"He who has truly met another and in the other found himself,
has found a third who is a Creator."
The conception of God as an implicate of human relation¬
ships, will not be readily accepted by dogmatic theologians,
although it follows much of the thinking of John Macmurray.
God as the awful father, is to Wren-Lewis the projected super¬
ego, concerned with moralizing and at the same time inhibiting
spontaneity over against which man is guilty and self-consciously
anxious.
This story thus becomes a perfect example of the "distancing",
and alteration of the nature of God, which we have already
discussed.~
2. ABRAHAM AND ISAAC
This is one of the most moving stories in the whole of the
Bible. It is told with an economy of words, and a minimum of
description, so that we are left to imagine for ourselves the
pathos of the situation, making thereby a more powerful impact.
This may be one of those stories which have been used for diff¬
erent meanings in various ages, such as an "example" story
1. The Structure of Religious Experience. p.53f» where Macmurray
speaks of the idea of God arising from transcendence involved
in reflection which starts from the actual facts of personal
relationships and is then carried beyond the limits of the
actual given and universalized. He would always keep religion
tied to the empirical facts of personal relationships.
2. Other aspects of Wren-Lewis* interpretation of the myth will
be dealt with later.
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against child-sacrifices. Calvin interpreted the story as God's
struggle with himself. He makes a promise, re-iterates it again
and again, and then acts as though he were going to destroy it,
says von Rad, for Isaac is the sole means of bringing the promise
to fulfilment."'" God must come before his promise; men must learn
to trust in him rather than in his gifts. Von Rad speaks of
faith's extremest experience, where God himself rises up as an
enemy of his own work, and hides himself so that Abraham the
recipient of the promise had to experience the sense of utter
forsakenness, such as Israel suffered in her history when God
seemed unbearably to contradict himself as a means of testing
Israel's faith,
Kierkegaard's brilliant panegyric on this story in Fear
and Trembling, also regards Ambraham's act as one of supreme
faith in God, whereby Abraham who loved himself and loved others,
loved God even greater than all. If someone else were to do
2
what he did, it would be sin, but this was not the case with
Abraham, \*ho believed in virtue of the absurd, "for all human
3
reckoning had long ceased to function." The paradox of faith
is able to transform a murder into an act well pleasing to God,
argues S^ren Kierkegaard, because faith begins precisely where
1. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I, p.17^
2. Fear and Trembling, p.39
3. H.D. Lewis, The Philosophy of Religion. p.235> speaks of
contradiction which could be dispelled by clear thinking
being given the more dignified name of paradox.
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thinking leaves off, and this sort of action involves a teleo-
logical suspension of ethics. The ethical is suspended in
opposition to the universal; Abraham is no tragic hero who
renounces himself in order to express the universal; the knight
of faith renounces the universal to become the individual. Hence
he is isolated, alone, misunderstood, which condition is required
of those who place absolute duty to God highest of all.
This hardly does justice to Kierkegaard's most powerful and
penetrating work, which has no doubt influenced von Had, It was
part of Kierkegaard's "dogmatic" to regard anxiety as inevitable
because of man's separation from God, and of his strivings for
free ethical action. May we not see, however, Kierkegaard's own
psychological state being read into the Abraham saga? Man and God
are distanced; God has disappeared; hence man is filled with a
sense of isolation, being misunderstood and going against the
universal, which statements reflect only too clearly Kierkegaard's
own psyche, with his schizoid character projected in an over-
determined psychological identification with Abraham. The pane¬
gyric concentrates almost exclusively on Abraham and scant
attention is paid to Isaac's feelings, Kierkegaard almost forgets
that Isaac is a son with equal rights to develop his own faith
in God as well as the father. So Kierkegaard regards Isaac as an
"It" and not a "Thou"; the only "Thou" that counts is the over¬
riding and demanding "Thou" of the deity, who demands that Isaac
be treated as an "It", so that Abraham could be in right status
with God. Kierkegaard does not question the demands of the deity,
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demands which are of an irrational primitive quality* But
God is looked upon as a matter wholly separate from duty to
1
one's neighbour. In fact, one is detached from the other.
It is natural for psychodynamic studies to link this story
with the Oedipus myth. This is what is done by E» Wellisch in
his Isaac and Oedipus. Each man stands at a focal point with
innumerable ancestry behind him, and a potential similar post¬
erity before him, and this tension around procreation, in the
relations between child and parent and parent to child is the
"central ganglion of all complexes." Although at first sign the
relationships in the Akedah (the name Wellisch gives to this
story) and the Oedipal myth are inverted, the latter telling of
the son rising against the father, yet in this story Laius first
all tries to do away with his son, exposing him with a stake
through his feet; he is subsequently discovered and reared and
given the name "Oedipus" (swollen feet). Psychoanalytical
thought has contributed much to our understanding of the
1. We can contrast Kierkegaard's identification with Abraham
and his forgetting Isaac with this war poem of Wilfred Owen.
Then Abrara bound the youth with belts and straps
And builbed parapets and trenches there,
And stretched forth the knife to slay his son.
When lo1 an angel called him out of heav'n,
^aying, Lay not they hand upon the lad,
Neither do anything to him. Behold,
A ram, caught in a thicket by its horns;
Offer the rarn of pride instead of him.
But the old man would not so, but slew his son —
And half the seed of Europe, one by one....
From the text of War Requiem, by Benjamin Britten.
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respective threats of sons to fathers and vice-versa, A son can
be a threat to a father, as well as the father to the son, Man's
failure to love and co-operate with the next generation leads to
strife between parents and children. Even if the story were an
inverted Oedipus myth it would not worry a psychoanalyst, as
the story in this form could well be child's phantasy, imputing
to the father what the child himself would like to do to the
father. As it stands the story has for its motive the feeling of
the father who believes himself threatened by the son's virility,
and this is rationalized and transformed from attempted murder
1
into holy sacrifice.
Wellisch ties up the soul's image of God with the super-ego;
but this not only is a parental image, but the call of a trans¬
cendental God; self-love mixed with the love of God would account
for the rationalization. For Wellisch, these emotional compli¬
cations do not invalidate the story as revelation. The revelation
is that the dark Gods of the past who demanded the sacrifice of
the sons, were purged from the father's soul, Isaac's perfect
obedience contributing to the new insight. The Akedah marks the
turning point; before it, the father's authority was based on fear;
the fear that the son might threaten the father. After Abraham,
it has been based on love, and his achievement was the uniting
of authority with love, and because of this singular synthesis
1. Groddeck regards Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac as castration.
The Book of the It, p,l63. See also Jacobson, The Self and
the Qb.iect World. p,120f.
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Abraham became the Creator of Israel."'"
The psychological feature which this story embodies is the
threat which fathers feel from their sons, and which, because
of strong super-ego feelings a reaction to it can be rationalised
as a will to be obeyed at all costs, regardless of considerations
towards the son himself. One finds it difficult to regard the
command of Abraham as a higher call of duty and of faith; one
feels that it is in fact the result of a primitive, unethical,
over-determined super-ego, which would assert "talion" desires
2
of the most primitive kind.
This kind of irrational, unethical super-ego is not, as
Kierkegaard asserted "higher than the universal" requiring a
teleological suspension of ethics (like Hamlet's "cruel to be
kind"); at best it resembles the morality of duty which permits
nothing to come between one's sense of duty and its fulfilment,
3
not even persons, so admirably described by T.E. Jessop and by
4
Harry Guntrip. One feels that Kierkegaard's arguments were
1. Philip Mairet,'The Love and the Wrath*, in Christian Sews Letter,
April 1955» p.64-68, reviewing Wellisch's book, would put the
deception of God's supposed misleading of Abraham to Abraham
himself. Mairet accepts Tillich's idea of revelation being
received through the medium of experience and regulated by the
"norm". He also accepts the notion of the father feeling the
threat of the sons,
2. The American, John Brown, is famous for the song about his body
and his soul which goes marching on, but it is not generally
known that he sacrificed his own sons "for the cause" he had
close at heart, even in situations where he could have spared
them, and against the entreaties of his wife. See Menninger,
Man against Himself, p.111-2
3. Law and Love. p.38-53
4. Psychology for Ministers and Social Workers, p.267-76
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contrivances to hold contradictory notions of God together, of
a God whom one must not question, and who cannot be discerned
when one is bent on doing a desperate act at the command of
primitive talion super-ego. There is soundness in Jeremiah's
precept - to obey (in that case, to care for the needy) is to
know God} knowledge of him is an implicate of good ethical
behaviour.
3. SAMUEL
This Biblical character is perhaps the most straightforward
of a super-ego orientated character in the whole of Scripture.
It is strange therefore that the text I, Sam. 15.22s "Hath the
Lord delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices as in obeying
the voice of the Lords behold to obey is better than sacrifice
and to hearken than the fact of rams." is often quoted as an
example of true religion, regardless of the context from which.
2
it came, W.A.L, Eliaslie regards Samuel's contributions to
Hebrew religious development as those of reason and conscience;
in savage circumstances Samuel asserts the paramount authority
of conscience. Elmslie admitted the inadequacy of conscience,
since blind obedience to it is the stuff whereof fanatics and
3
not saints are made.
1. Hepburn, Christianity & Paradox, p. 132, writes s?. ,. the divine
imperative is binding only if it corresponds with the moral
imperative. To exhort peoj^le on moral grounds to renounce
the moral in favour of the divine imperative is a logically
absurd request»"
2. How came our Faith, p.224-244
3. ibid., p.229-233
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However, the story of Samuel affords us with the most
illuminating account of how the super-ego is formed and how it
can be projected on to God. By itself, it almost bears out the
suggestion of Winnicott on the parallels between the two systems,^"
Samuel was born as a late child to Hannah, who was one of
the two wives of Elkanah, the other wife having children. Feeling
the reproach of her barrenness, and passionately wanting a male
child, she visited the shrine of Eli, who seeing her fervently
at prayer, assured her that herwish would be fulfilled. After
the birth and weaning of Samuel, Hannah returned to Eli's shrine
2
and left the child there, having "lent him to the Lord," Whether
Hannah was a very religious woman, or whether she entertained
mixed, ambivalent feelings towards the child depends on whether
one applies a theological or a psychodynamic critique I
The effects of being deprived of his mother's company and
care became apparent. The boy is isolated with no one to turn to,
and far from being the good wise old man Hannah had thought, Eli
turned out to be careless, foolish and judgemental in his attitude}
his own family had not turned out a success. During the day the
child Samuel, we are told, was "good", obedient and dutiful.
This precocious morality had another side to it; it was grounded
inaixiety. At night the child Samuel lay awake and had strange
dreams; he imagined that he heard voices which awakened him;
1. Chapter I of this section.
2, I Sam. 1.28.
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he dreamt of judgement descending on the house of Eli. And this
is precisely what we should expect to happen to a child exposed
to such a loveless and anxiety-provoking situation. His life by
day was so frustrating that he entertained all kinds of aggressive
and punitive phantasies against the one whom he regarded as the
cause of his trouble, namely Eli. The child was at the mercy of
his own anxieties, and when he went to Eli for help about the
voices that were keeping hirn awake at night, the old man, too
lazy to be bothered, told him that they came from "The Lord",
and Samuel believed him, then and for the rest of his life.
Having no adequate parent figures with whom he could identify,
no one to lessen his anxieties,' he had to build up his own
defences against anxiety in the erection of a punitive, scrup¬
ulous super-ego,formediargely of aggression turned against him¬
self. His God was one whom one fears, who "is always watching
to catch out the offenders and give dire punishment, a God who
takes the joy and pleasure out of living and exacts unswerving
obedience.""'" This paranoid conscience eventually came to be
called "God"; it was formed largely out of all the aggression
which Samuel had turned back against himself to cope with his
basic anxiety.
Now in later years, Samuel was able to capitalize on these
experiences, proving himself to be a great leader, a strong judge,
1. R.S. Lee, Your Growing Child and Religion.ul^B.cfFlugel' s
Polycrates Complex.
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one capable of bringing back order into the place of chaos.
The task to which he was dedicated was the obliteration of evil -
this was the will of God for him! His scrupulous conscience
comes to the fore in his struggles over the appointment of a
king. He selected Saul and feted him like a son, no doubt because
his own sons, like those of Eli, were not a success. But Samuel
and Saul were too similar to live together in agreement, for both
were highly suspicious and suffered in different degrees from
paranoid fears and anxieties* Samuel could almost be called the
destroyer of Saul, e.g., his treatment of Saul at Gilgal, where
Samuel came late for the sacrifice, having kept Saul waiting for
him. Saul was too good a general to alloxir military advantage to
slip through his fingers; he was also too religious to permit
his forces to go into battle without sacrifice, so he offers the
sacrifice without Samuel. When Samuel arrives late and without
any apology, he derides Saul for not keeping "the commandment of
the Lord which he commanded you.""*" In the incident in which Saul
Spares Agag, Samuel again derides hiin, this time using the well-
known text, and ending by hewing Agag in pieces. It is no wonder
that Saul could not take all the direction which Samuel had not
only offered but forced on him, and this must, in no small way,
have contributed to his mental disintegration.
Samuel therefore stands for one whose super-ego, primitive
and merciless, was God for him. Psychodynamics would endorse that
1, I Sam. 13.13. I owe this last suggestion to the Rev, Roy Hogg
of Dundee.
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this kind of character is perfectly capable of being produced
in a childhood situation like that of Samuel, where the child,
deprived of a mother's love and the care and affection of a
good home, had to face great odds unaided, feeling that everyone
and everything was against him. A scrupulous, punitive and
primitive conscience is the only defence against such persecutory
and self-destroying phantasies.
In this Biblical character we have the clearest example of
one whose idea of God was almost completely identified with his
super-ego. God was never close to Samuel, because in the formative
years, closeness and intimacy had been denied him, God was
distanced and menacing; it is difficult to see how "He" could
have been otherwise.
4. HOSEA - AND HESEDH
Hosea affords a clear example of one who used his own
personal experience as a model for understanding the relations
of God with Israel, and in his application of this model, we
have a clear example of projection at work. Moreover, it is with
this prophet that the distinctive word hesedh is associated,
as we have seen already,"'" its meaning being "steadfast, devoted
love"akin to the New Testament agape.
The story of Hosea is too well know to need recounting. His
call to marry a woman who was a harlot is very likely i^ritten up
1. Chapter II of this section.
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after the events, and need not be taken as an example of the
absurd, with a teleological suspension of ethics, such as
Kierkegaard contrived for explaining the story of Abraham and
Isaac. In oriental thought, consequences are confused with motives
and are read back into the original event as a motive.
, It has often been pointed out that Hosea's love for Gomer is
the most remarkable feature of the story, and that in his pro¬
jecting this into the relationship between Yahweh and Israel,
a breakthrough in religion was achieved, as he was the first to
teach that God loved his people. The difficulty, however, is to
ascertain how far the parallel actually works, and whether all
he says of Israel is true also of Gomer.
Israel is regarded as responsible and guilty for whoring
after other Gods; is Gomer likewise blameworthy because of
infidelity? If "Israel may not be restored without repentance,
and cannot repent without disillusion and chastisement", and a
"full recognition of the ethical requirements of the case" must
1 2
be made* does the same apply to "the Prodigal Wife"? To speak
in such terras, is in fact to reveal a very superficial moralizing
attitude towards the relationship between Gomer and Ilosea.
Anyone with a smattering of psychodynamic understanding would
know that no marriage breaks down as the result of one party
being "good" and the other "bad", but of incompatibility between




the two persons, whose unrecognized traits and immature needs
conflict and cause the rupture.^
One would ask whether this grave, thoughtful, constant, dull
man did not need a wife who was the opposite to him, one who was
gay, erratic, inconstant, and one would suggest that his love of
her was indeed based on the need of her being so different and
opposite to him. Did not she, in a strange way complete his
life, representing and articulating the unacknowledged and un¬
expressed aspects of his own character, and by her expression
of them, did not Hosea find some vicarious satisfaction? In this
attraction of opposites, Hosea's love of Gomer was based on his
need of her.
A second factor is that we understand the hysterical
personality better now than in past ages, and we know that people
like Gorner are not what they are by conscious choice. Our present
times have seen honest attempts by creative artists to understand
2
those whose characters lack super-ego in the normal sense.
Spending their lives in what appears to be wrecking other people's,
is not a conscious design, but a seeking-after a love which they
1. One Old Testament scholar, W.A.L. Elmslie, How came our Faith.
p.271, does understand the basic dynamics of the relationship,
and suggests "incompatibility of temperament", and that it
is no easy thing to be married to a genius, even a theological
genius, who confronted Gomer with extraordinary religion.
2, For example, Alban Berg's two operas, Wozzeck and Lulu;
Shostakovitsch*s Katerina Ismailova, and Britten's
Peter Grimes. to mention work in only one field.
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feel they have never yet found. They have not only been denied
the basic love of childhood, but also the environment to develop
a super-ego of the kind that is useful and valuable.
The contemporary understanding of relationships between
two partners, and of structure of Gomer's personality, should
remove the super-ego moralizations from the domestic tragedy,
and at the same time show us how Hosea's love of Gomer was based
on need, as is almost all love."'" We have seen that a component
of aggression is required for love to be fulfilled; we now see
the component of need. Can one sustain a personal relationship
in which there is no need? But can one project this on to God
and conclude that he needs his people to feel complete?
5. THE PUNISHING DEITY.
"You only have I known of all the families of the earth;
Therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities."
(Amos 3.2)
A Biblical theologian might interpret the above as a
definite proof that election does not entail favouritism, but
2
rather a high sense of moral responsibility, A psychoanalyst,—
on the other hand, would interpret the passage as an example of
moral sadism on the part of the deity or moral masochism on the
part of the worshipper, (i.e., a projection of the Polycrates
Complex.)
1. See Anna Freud's brilliant discussion of altruism in The Ego
and Mechanisms of Defence. Chapter X, p.l35ff*»
2. See C.H. Dodd, The Bible Today, p.40
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"He (Yahweh) was in fact a Jealous God, and inspired
guilt in his worshipper^
2
But this is very little different from the statement of Eichrodt
previously quoted, who speaks of "trembling prostration before
the jealous God, who will admit no degradation from his majesty",
and who will "turn his weapons of leprosy, serpent and plague...
even against his own people."
Christians often find such Old Testament thought thoroughly
revolting} however, let the words of Harry Williams banish any
self-righteous superioritys-
"Much of the dynamic behind the animosity felt by
many for the Old Testament Jehovah is, I suspect,
that He reminds them of their self-destroying
desire for punishment."3
There is a decided link between the psychodynamics involved in
a planishing God and that of Flugel's Polycrates Complex, which
speaks of the removal of guilt by submitting to punishment, which
in turn renders an experience of relief. Williams is concerned
with the denial of this in the form of reaction formation.
He is also quite correct in asserting that a desire for
punishment is self-destroying, and that these aspects of the Old
Testament must be regarded as the least satisfying from a creative
point of view. Whilst Amos and the prophets introduced a sense
of order into the historic situation in which Israel found herself,
this had mixed blessings. It imparted a philosophy of history,
1. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, p.331
2. ibid., p.k5
3. The God 1 want, p.l69
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but it also enthroned the depressive position as fundamental,
which in its most extreme form, encourages not creative living,
but moral masochism,
6. ISAIAH AND THE NUMINOUS
Of all the various "calls" in the Old Testament, this call
2
of Isaiah is the most majestic and perhaps the most authentic.
Rudolf Otto regards this as the supreme expression of the
3
numinous in the whole of the Old Testament. Theologians regard
this passage as fundamental for the knowledge of God, a wholly-
other God, whose holiness produces in man a sense of sin and
inadequacy, yet pardons and enables man to do his work, whilst
remaining distanced and separate (holy). Knight, for example,
speaks of God's being "utterly other", not merely in transcend¬
ence , but in the sense of being separated from his world by the
4
sin with which it is diffused. A wholly "Barthian" doctrine of
God could be produced from the theological implications of this
chapter, but not the doctrine of a x*rholly Barthian man, for
Isaiah, whilst remaining largely passive throughout, had after
all gone into the Temple, presumably to worship.
Although this chapter speaks of an objective God, subjective
1. See Chapter IV of Barker, Psychology's Impact on the Christian
Faith.
2. One could mention the call of Moses, which contains the same
characteristics; regarding a pattern in these "Call" exper¬
iences see H.D.A. Major, The Mission and Message of Jesus.
p.113-5, commenting on the Transfiguration.
3. The Idea of the Holy, p.63, 78
4. A Christian Theology of the Old Testament, p.87
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factors are present, and, as we have seen, a wholly objective
statement about God may neverthelessbeanindicator of a certain
subjective predisposition.
J ..
I would regard the statement - "In the year that King Uzsiiah
died" (is, 6.l) - not as the time or dating, but as the occasion
of the young Isaiah being in the Temple. The King who had been a
great ruler had died, and great changes were coming in the world
political scene, with two great empires on either side of little
Judah. The chapter suggests that worship is proceeding, the
choirs singing antiphonally, "Holy, Holy, Holy..." The altar fire
burns, with the great doors on either side with their carved
seraphim each having six wings. The praise is so tremendous that
the very door-posts shake with the vibration of the sound. All
this is of the stuff of reality. Isaiah himself, however, is
filled with grief, guilt and remorse, a natural response by a
young courtier to the death of a good king, perhaps revered as
a father-figure. Isaiah feels weak and ineffectual.
It seems that the prophet went into a trance, in which the
distinctions between the subjective and objective were blurred,
fact and fantasy merged. Above the altar fire God is enthroned;
the inanimate carvings on the doors seem to come alive, one of
them flying to Isaiah with a live coal and touching his lips as
a symbol of cleansing. Then he hears the voice of God calling for
fellow-workers; Isaiah answers the commission, and is told the
strange mission he has to perform of proclaiming God's word again
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and again, but it will not be understood. The period of strain
is at an end, for the vision has resolved the subjective tens¬
ions; he is no longer undecided, for he knows what he has to do.
Should one accept the interpretation which concentrates only
upon the theological content of this passage, or should one
accept completely the subjective psychological factors, which
can only be brought out by imaginative reconstruction, is a
matter of choice. One accepts the psychological components, yet
one would not wish to "reduce" such a noble passage into a few
maxims of Freudian psychology. If, however, a sense of the
Numinous is to be interpreted as a return of the feelings which
the male child has had of the father as wholly other, one is
able to see why they should be present in this experience. One
could almost go further and say that Oedipal anxiety was present,
reactivated by the death of a father-figure. Mourning and melan¬
cholia were already mixed before Isaiah entered the Temple, so
that he was already overwhelmed by the loss of a loved object;
moreover, is there any mourning which is free from guilt?
He himself felt that he fell short of the high ideals of Josiah
and this would be a further factor in his feelings of being un¬
worthy and of God being "distanced".
One does not mention these factors to explain away this
vision and its authenticity, but to show how subjective factors
must be included in such a situation in order to draw out a
fuller meaning. The life of Isaiah following the vision passes
385
any tests we wish to make regarding its validity,
7. JEREMIAH
Jeremiah, like Amos, Hosea and Isaiah before him, proclaimed
the righteousness and justice of God, interpreting impending
military disasters as the consequence of the nation's godlessness
and moral degeneracy, Yahweh was the Lord of history and controlled
the events of the nation's life in accordance with his will and
purpose. Injustice and infidelity would therefore result in the
nation's doom. By relating coming disasters to present apostasy,
the prophets gave meaning to people's lives and the nation's
destiny, even though few would listen to their stern message.
Isaiah's "Ah, Assyria, the rod of my anger, the staff of my fury"
(isa. 10.5) is matched by Jeremiah's "Behold, I am bringing upon
you a nation from afar, 0 house of Israel, says the Lord." (Jer. 5*15)
This line of interpretation found in most of the prophets
could be regarded by psychoanalysis as being related to the super¬
ego, with its sense of order and control, Freud's words about Kant's
dictum, already quoted, could well apply. One does not speak of
the super-ego in any derogatory fashion, but wishes to testify
to the sense of law and orderliness which is part of any realistic
super-ego.
That Jeremiah entered fully into this prophetic tradition
is likely judging by his support of the Deuteronomic Reforms
under Josiah. I accept Skinner's contention that although his name
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is not among the active promoters of the Reformation, neverthe¬
less, he supported it. However, he soon found out that "you
2
cannot make people good by Act of Parliament." An external
code was of little use; what was needed was an inward, personal
response. Good laws must not only be written in statute books,
but in the heart of man, for God is concerned with the whole of
man, not merely his external conduct. Yahweh is not merely one
who gives laws, but one who "triest the righteous, who seest the
heart and the mind." (Jer, 20.12, cf. 11.20)
It is clear that Jeremiah was a most sensitive person, who
found his prophetic role a very great burden. He witnessed men
trusting in infallibles like the Law (8.8) and the Temple (7»^).
It was Jeremiah who first called it a "den of robbers" (7»11#
see Mark 11.17)• In these outbursts, he met with great opposition
and found out that "the prophets prophecy falsely, and the priests
rule at their direction, and my people love it so." (5.31)
Knowledge of God lies in obedience, which means, as we have
already noted, caring for the needy. (22,16)
Jeremiah contrasts the migratory birds who know by instinct
when to return to their nests at the right season, \\?ith Israeli
the birds act as God had meant them to act, but Israel does not
know the ordinance of God (8,7) • This almost anticipates August¬
ine's well-know dictum (Confessions, I.l.i). The full flowering
1. Prophecy and Religion. p,96f.
2. Dodd, The Bible Today, p.46
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of Jeremiah's teaching, ho\>rever, only came after he had under¬
gone intense mental and spiritual anguish. He had to descend
into the abyss of doubt and disillusionment. He records for us
his experiences in the passages which Skinner has named 'The
Confessions of Jeremiah' . Almost every human mood is articu¬
lated in his personal colloquy with God; these sections afford
one of the clearest examples that religion is concerned with
and utilizes the most fundamental features of mental life.
The prophet struggles as he endeavours to hold on to his
faith in God's righteousness over against his personal misfort¬
unes. At times, his faith is strained to the limits; cries of
rectitude and self-pity emerge, but through his complete open¬
ness to the whole of his being, the prophet receives a "revel¬
ation" of God's nature. The outcome of this intense struggle is
to be seen in various ways;
(i) His concept of "The New Covenant" (31.31f») in which
the external, objective commands of the former Covenant would
be replaced by internal, subjective ones. The "Law in the inward
parts" could be regarded by psychoanalytical thought as a rein¬
forcing of the super-ego, or perhaps rather a rationalizing and
enlightening of it, so that the will of God could be done through
inner direction. But there is more implied in this concept than
mere super-ego reinforcing.
1. Prophecy and Religion, p.201-230
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(ii) One of the charges which the prophet brings against
the people is that they haVe committed two evils, "they have
forsaken me the fountain of living waters, and hewed out cisterns
for themselves, broken cisterns which can hold not water." (2.13)
The implication is that God acts as the spontaneous flow of a
spring. No doubt for Jeremiah, the broken cisterns are the
syncretistic religions and the moral debaucheries which the
people have pursued. But the implications of spontaneity, tempt
one to translate his words into direct psychological terms. A
Jungian may be tempted to transform the prophet's metaphor
completely into psychological statements. Was the prophet speak¬
ing about the self which we know and trust and. can manipulate,
as against the unconscious part of man with its greater resources
which we can neither manipulate nor control."*" One would not, and
indeed cannot, equate the broken cisterns with man's ego, but the
implications of Jeremiah's whole approach suggest that he was in
touch with inner forces which would now be considered under the
concept of the Unconscious, However, one must not make a too
hasty equation, as Jeremiah regarded the heart of man as "deceitful
above all things and desperately corrupt," (l7»10) One could
argue that Jeremiah was using projectionist language, seeing all
good residing outside himself and all evil residing in himself;
therefore God, not man, is the source of living waters. One must
1. Cf. Harry Williams in Soundings. p»83f»
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ask how the idea of God as a fountain of living waters could be
known by anyone unless he had experienced in himself creative
and spontaneous urges. I think that Skinner is right when he
says that the prophet came to achieve a sense of being able to
do the will of God "from a spontaneous impulse of a renewed
heart.""'" This would be a result after the conscience has been
illuminated — the law written in the heart - as in the concept
of the New Covenant, (31.33)
(iii) There is a further consequence of the experience of
Jeremiah as outlined in the Confessions. He worked through his
anxieties and melancholias, no doubt having endured the grief of
losing loved objects, the loss of his home, the loss of self-
esteem in himself and in his loss of the presence of Godj but
he comes through all this to the strengthening of his personal¬
ity, and finds that he does have defences to cope with all
opposition. "And I will make you to this people a fortified wall
of bronze; they iirill fight against you, but they shall not prevail
over you, for I am with you to save and deliver you, says the
Lord." (15.20) He naturally attributes this strengthening to
God. A man of faith today may do the same, but he would be will¬
ing to recognize certain psychological factors operating in the
experience. Emerging from his descent into the depths, as a
greatly strengthened character, chastened and liberated, the
1. Prophecy and Religion, p.329-330
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"grief-work" having resulted in an increase in ego strength,
the individual could also thank God for such an increase in his
powers,
In these three distinctive ways, we see Jeremiah as one
who was so open in every aspect of his personality, in the
illumination of conscience (super-ego), the strengthening of
his ego, and in the outflow of spontaneity (id), that we would
claim that in this prophet, rather than in the speculations of
dogmatic Biblican theologians regarding the pluralistic nature
of the deity that we find in the Old Testament the real kernel
of what was eventually to become Trinitarian faith, God for
Jeremiah was one who touched man at every point in his life.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
We now corae to draw the conclusions from this section of
our enquiry, which may seem like a number of disconnected
studies. We hope now to draw together the extended argument
and to show why we have travelled by a roundabout and devious
route.
Beginning with the suggestion of Winnicott that there were
parallels between the development of the super-ego in the child
and that of monotheism in Hebrew religion, we were led to examine
Freud's argument in Moses and Monotheism. We found that these
dep>ended in large measure upon the myth in Totem and Taboo which
Freud had constructed out of selections from prehistory and
anthropological speculations and which we could not accept. We
saw, however, that Freud was able to pursue his essential argu¬
ment without recourse to the myth, in his study, for example, of
Kant, and that a close parallel could be observed between the
super-ego and the Kantian conception of the deity which had
distinct similarities with that of the deity. This, however, was
different from observing similarities in development.
We then summarized the component parts of the super-ego
taken from Part One and to this we added the contribution of
Flugel, who had previously worked out the relationships between
the super-ego and the concept of God, also without recourse to
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the myth from Totem and Taboo. Two aspects of Flugel's teachings
were emphasisedi his Polycrates Complex which denoted moral
sadism, and a development which Flugel had made from an idea
of Freud relating to the respective distance between the ego
and super-ego in mania and depression, to which we gave the name
of "distancing".
Whilst it was now possible to admit a distinct parallel
between the two systems, we indicated certain weaknesses in the
arguments of the psychoanalytical writers,namelys (i) that they
were unacquainted with the results of Old Testament scholarships,
Freud himself having selected scholars whose ideas fitted into
his own theories, and (ii) that the arguments employed usually
resulted in a reductionist conclusion.
In order to deal with the first difficulty, there followed
a summary of contemporary Old Testament scholarship. First of
all we considered t\*ro studies on the idea of plurality in the Old
Testament deity which was claimed by the writers to be a fore¬
runner of Trinitarian thought; we did not accept their arguments.
Secondly, a general review of Old Testament theology followed,
from which two further factors emerged. The first of these was
that there \\ras a lack of certainty about the precise dating of
the material of the Old Testament, which again made it impossible
to demonstrate the parallel in the developments of the super-ego
and monotheism side by side. We could only proceed therefore by
examining the content of the Biblical material as it was presented,
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without taking historical development into account. The second
difficulty was more fundamental. With few exceptions, the emphasis
of the findings of the Old Testament scholars was presented in
the form of Revelation, after the manner of the Biblical dogmatic
theologians. This key concept is virtually regarded by these
scholars as autonomous, and should this be accepted we could
not proceed with our enquiry.
To get round this difficulty, an extended chapter which
considered the whole idea of Revelation in contemporary theology
followed, in which we gave reasons for dismissing the autonomous
claim; we accepted, however, the idea as interpreted by Wheeler
Robinson (and by Tillich) who permitted human participation within
the revelatory acts. Revelation itself, we concluded, was a
specific interpretation of phenomena, which could also be examined
and interrogated by means of psychodynamic models as well as
theological ones.
When we turned to the second difficulty arising from the
psychoanalytical writers, namely that of reduction, we examined
the history of the idea going back to Feuerbach's The Essence of
Christianity, with its "nothing-else-than" arguments and the
reliance placed on projection. By taking the findings of present
day Old Testament scholarship, which are usually understood
under the concept of Revelation, we demonstrated how they could
be understood and interpreted under psychodynamic terms. However,
this interpretation does not necessarily imply reduction, as it
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could also be considered to mean that religion employed the most
basic and most fundamental experiences in life, namely those which
had their origin in early childhood.
We can therefore argue that psychodynamics need not be
regarded as a mere reductionist technique which threatens Christ¬
ian theology, but that it can be an additional critical tool
which should take its place along with other critical tools used
by scholars, and that when it is used in that way, it can elucid¬
ate the Biblical material and so render insights and understandings
which would be unobtainable without its application.
The conclusions resulting from psychodynamic critiques need
to be taken into account before any theologizing and philosophizing
about Biblical material has begun. One also has to note that the
Biblical material is orientated in a projectionist manner, which
means that while a doctrine of a transcendent God could be prod¬
uced from a direct reading of the Biblical text, this wholly-
otherness could be produced by the projected nature in which the
material is presented, or by a selection of "distanced" material,
which has strong super-ego emphasis. Unless these factors are taken
into account, the end result cannot fail to lead to an "utterly
transcendent" deity.
We felt, therefore, that in view of all the difficulties
stated, a fresh start was required, therefore we took what we
considered to be certain paradigmatic Old Testament passages,
demonstrating how psychodynamic factors had played their part.
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In these studies we noted in particular certain Oedipal factors,
and "distancing" of the deity, corresponding to man's condition,
both of which led us to conclude that super-ego factors were
very much involved. In fact, the distinct super-ego features
pointed to a parallel between Hebrew monotheism and this psychic
institution.
By and large, the central faith of the Old Testament resided
in a God, who as Legislator, demands obedience and lays down a
set of commandments. The superimposition of an external authority,
however, demands also a form of instinctual renunciation from his
subjects, and this is achieved by the dominance of the super-ego,
called into service of the ego,to deal with the instinctual
demands of the id (to use Freudian language). In this sense Freud
was substantially correct; the super-ego had a saibstantial invest¬
ment in the idea of monotheism which Christianitjr inherited from
its parent faith. Within Hebrew monotheism lies the record of the
achievement of the super-ego. It hardly matters whether it was
Moses who led the tribes out of Egypt, giving the Hebrew clans
the inspiration necessary to over throw their servile bonds and
take to nomadic life, following which he induced them to accept
the rudiments of a legal code and religious system, or whether it
was accomplished much later and the achievements were read back
into the time of Moses, The achievement was related to the super¬
ego, and resulted in a unified society blessed with the benefits
1. C.H, Dodd, The Bible Today, p.55
396
of law and order, the Law being an expression of faith in Yahweh,
Legislator, Creator and Sustainer of Life.
Yet in spite of the super-ego orientation of much of the
material of the Old Testament we found it impossible to state
that Yahweh in the Old Testament is "nothing else than" super¬
ego. It would not be possible to explain the concept of God in
the Old Testament without remainder by this single term. Even if
we regarded the ideas of Yahweh as Lord of History, Lord of Nature,
and Lord of the Nations as speculative extensions of the prophets'
personal experiences, which we could perhaps claim were strongly
orientated on super-ego lines, much would still remain to be
explicated. The Old Testament conception of God contains all that
the ancient Hebrews did not understand, all that was mysterious
and much else besides. Their idea of God therefore included many
notions which we have now separated out through the application
of other disciplines, and the super-ego is one of these, but only
one. "God" in the Old Testament contained the super-egos but not
vice-versa.
A further feature which leads us to see a strong relation¬
ship between the two systems lies in the fact that the nature of
God's being in the Old Testament is by no means consistent; Yahweh
can be near or "distanced", and the quality of his character
changes according to his distance from man. We found that related
to the respective distances are the varying conditions and states
of man, and that the nature of God fluctuates and oscillates
according to man's relationship with himself and his personal
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relationships with others. Closeness and intimacy involving
obedience in doing God's will implies knowledge of God:
"distancing" from God involves sin, disobedience or lack of
knowledge, and, in extreme cases where the abyss is infinite,
schizoid non-being. The nature of God is intimately related to
man's subjective states and may, in some sense, be considered as
an implicate of them.
Writing of the continental theologians, John Macquarrie
says near the conclusion of his argument!-
"It seems to be all a question of hitting the right
balance, of recognizing the distance between man
and God without exaggerating it by degrading man too
far. For if this happens, God himself is degraded.
He ceases to be the Saviour of souls and becomes a
salvager of chattels .
How does one hit the right balance? It is clear that revelation
does not do it for us, as the "revealed" God is posited at
various distances from man. We would, therefore, suggest that
behind this phenomenon lies the "empirical distancing" implied
in psychoanalysis between the ego and super-ego and that this is
what regulates the distance whether it be far or near. Consciously
and intellectually we may posit God where we think he ought to
be| but experientially, "hitting the right balance" seems to
depend on unrecognized or unconscious psychodynamic factors of
which the super-ego is a decisive one.
1. Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p.338
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We think therefore that by our own devious paths we have
once again arrived at a conclusion which others have already
reached, namely the close connection between the God of the Old
Testament and the super-ego. However, we have not found it
necessary to reduce monotheism to psychology without remainder.
One further fact, however, has emerged from this section
of the enquiry. It is that in our study of the prophet Jeremiah,
we believe to have found the nearest approach to Trinitarian
experience out of which the doctrine of the Trinity could event¬
ually emerge. This prophet presented a concept of God who was
intimately related to all aspects of the psyche. We, therefore,
regard his teaching rather than the speculations of Old Testament
dogmatic theologians about the plurality of God, as the real Old
Testament ground of Trinitarian dogma.
